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Abstract		The	Arab	Spring	came	as	a	shock	to	most	onlookers.	It	forced	states	and	supranational	institutions	to	rapidly	reconsider	their	relationships	to	authoritarian	regimes	and	existing	regional	cooperation	frameworks.	The	events	also	threatened	to	collapse	many	assumptions	about	the	effectiveness	of	democracy	promotion	activities	that	had	effectively	stabilized	authoritarian	regimes.	The	immediate	response	from	the	EU	was	to	adopt	a	renewed	emphasis	on	supporting	regional	civil	society	in	the	face	of	a	momentous	expression	of	political	will.	One	of	the	first	actions	(in	September	2011)	was	to	declare	a	commitment	to	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation.	This	despite	the	fact	that	the	ALF	had	encountered	heavy	skepticism	for	its	lack	of	independence,	limited	funding	and	governmental	patronage.	In	this	environment,	what	role	can	culture	and	civil	society	actually	play	in	the	development	of	EuroMediterranean	relations?	This	research	takes	a	broadly	transnational	approach	to	discover	the	strategic	basis	behind	promoting	regional	cultural	networks,	the	political	limitations	on	networking,	and	the	subjective	experience	of	participants.	It	employs	qualitative	techniques	of	document	analysis,	semi-structured	interviews,	and	participant	observation	as	well	as	tools	from	social	network	analysis.	The	research	finds	that	the	condition	of	cultural	relations	in	the	region	continues	to	be	a	product	of	the	EU’s	internal	politics	and	increasingly	the	influence	and	advocacy	of	cultural	foundations	and	their	networks.	Within	a	new	strategic	approach	to	culture	the	ALF	is	a	key	partner	providing	a	regional	frame	in	complement	to	bilateral	policies.	However,	the	ALF’s	effectiveness	is	still	tied	to	regional	uncertainty.	Its	biases	and	limitations	are	borne	out	in	a	study	of	the	interactions	between	its	constituent	networks	which	reveals	a	predominance	of	European	networks	and	a	considerably	lower	level	of	interaction	between	non-European	networks.	It	also	suffers	from	poor	visibility	and	even	suspicion.	The	final	section	considers	the	Civil	Forum	as	an	encounter	between	participants.	It	demonstrates	the	need	for	the	ALF	and	EU	to	adapt	their	language	and	approach	to	account	for	new	perspectives	and	better	provide	practical	solutions	to	regional	civil	societies.	
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Chapter	1:	Introduction	
	In	The	Mediterranean	and	the	Mediterranean	World	in	the	Age	of	Phillip	II	Fernand	Braudel	set	out	a	comprehensive	and	enduring	depiction	of	the	social,	political,	economic	and	geographical	complexities	that	made	the	Mediterranean	an	important	area	of	study	outside	of	the	histories	and	conflicts	of	nation-states.	Braudel’s	approach	of	l’histoire	totale,	which	stressed	the	benefits	of	multidisciplinarity	to	engage	with	the	full	extent	of	interrelated	phenomena,	has	led	to	its	continued	influence	on	recent	works	that	attempt	to	understand	the	heterogeneous	practices	and	identities	of	the	region	(Chambers	2010).	In	this	remarkable	work,	he	also	attempts	to	address	a	delimitation	of	the	Mediterranean	space	(most	notably	identifying	the	‘true’	Mediterranean	between	the	olive	trees	of	the	North	to	the	great	palm	groves	in	the	South)	(Braudel	1995,	232).	However,	his	approach	also	drew	him	to	the	complex	and	multidimensional	relations	that	made	any	simple	delimitation	of	the	region	inherently	problematic.	Accordingly,	Braudel	identified	the	Sahara	as	another	Southern	border	and	‘second	face’	of	the	Mediterranean.	And	yet	even	here	the	extensive	trade	networks	along	this	‘border’	pulled	sub-Saharan	peoples	and	states	back	into	any	proper	understanding	of	regional	dynamics	or	explanation	of	a	Mediterranean	history.	In	response	to	this,	he	identifies	a	global	
Mediterranean	open	to	the	broader	dynamics	of	capitalist	exchange	and	intercultural	mobility.	This	vision	sweeping	from	“the	Azores	and	the	New	World,	the	Red	Sea	and	the	Persian	Gulf,	the	Baltic	and	the	loop	of	the	Niger”	(Ibid,	168)	reflects	Braudel’s	attentiveness	to	physical	and	natural	geography.	However	his	attention	is	also	emphatically	human	in	its	concern	for	the	environment	and	its	effects	on	settlement	and	exchange.	Braudel’s	geography	laid	the	basis	for	a	more	heterogeneous	and	relational	basis	from	which	to	understand	historical	developments	in	the	Mediterranean.	Capturing	these	historical	transnational	exchanges	has	been	tied	into	the	political	objective	of	integration	observed	in	the	promotion	of	heritage,	translation,	artistic,	and	educational	exchange	programs.	This	interlinking	of	the	social,	cultural	and	
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economic	spheres,	however,	runs	up	against	a	recurring	politicization	of	the	region,	instances	of	which	tend	to	downplay	complexities	in	favor	of	simplified	representations.	Such	representations	are,	of	course,	not	new	or	novel	features	of	the	political	landscape	of	the	Mediterranean.	For	example,	the	image/concept	of	Mare	Nostrum	(Our	Sea),	a	Roman	construct,	continues	to	have	political	life	and	has	in	fact	undergone	some	revitalization	in	the	platform	of	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean.	Transforming	‘Our	Sea’	into	a	common	Mediterranean	lies	at	the	heart	of	attempts	at	integration.	And	power	imbalance	aside,	pulling	societies	together	intuits	their	globality.	The	contradiction	of	a	political	delimitation	of	a	‘EuroMediterranean’	space	is	that	it	requires	the	nurture	of	transnational	networks	whose	existence	affects	a	process	of	reorientation	among	practitioners.			 With	the	intention	of	recapturing	some	of	the	essence	found	in	the	idea	of	a	‘global’	Mediterranean	while	also	accounting	for	more	recent	political,	economic	and	cultural	developments	this	chapter	introduces	some	of	the	key	ideas	that	form	a	conceptual	backdrop	for	the	subsequent	analytical	chapters	as	well	as	key	events	or	contexts	that	have	influenced	the	study.	It	establishes	a	basis	from	which	to	explore	the	key	research	questions	that	drive	the	study	–	namely	trying	to	understand	the	role	of	culture	and	civil	society	in	the	development	of	Euro-Mediterranean	relations.	In	trying	to	resolve	this	core	problem	the	research	also	responds	to	three	sub-questions	which	are	dealt	with	in	separate	chapters	including	the	transnationalization	of	political	action,	understanding	the	ways	in	which	regional	organizations	provide	discursive	frames	for	civil	society	participants,	and	the	ways	in	which	these	frames	are	engaged	and	contested.	As	a	point	of	departure	the	introduction	sets	forth	by	establishing	the	changing	environment.	The	implications	of	what	has	been	termed	the	‘Arab	Spring’	for	Euro-Mediterranean	relations	are	significant	but	in	many	ways	also	subtle.	So	the	geopolitical	changes	are	considered	in	the	relations	between	the	EU	and	regional	government	and	institutions.	But	there	is	also	a	notable	transformation	at	the	social	level,	which	signals	the	possibility	of	new	shared	understandings	and	could	have	an	impact	on	regional	dynamics.	Picking	up	on	these	themes,	the	next	section	briefly	considers	how	the	Mediterranean	itself	has	been	subject	to	conceptual	fluctuation	and	political	manipulation	as	a	way	of	promoting	integration	and	such	constructions	can	form	
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the	basis	of	subjective	attachments.	One	of	the	possible	outcomes	of	building	networks	of	cultural	operators	and	civil	society	actors	under	the	heading	of	a	Mediterranean	citizenship	is	to	generate	such	attachments.	The	remainder	of	the	introductory	discussion	focuses	on	looking	at	the	development	of	cultural	relations	–	specifically	in	relation	to	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	–	through	a	transnational	perspective	that	contains	three	aspects:	the	politico-strategic	motivations	linking	informal	politics	and	official	policy-making,	a	focus	on	networking,	and	the	experiential	value	of	transnational	practices.	The	final	section	engages	in	a	methodological	discussion.		Since	the	1970s,	the	European	Union	(EU)	has	become	increasingly	active	in	the	Mediterranean	region.	Through	official	and	institutionalized	discourses	the	EU	has	constructed	the	Euro-Mediterranean	for	policy	consideration	(Pace	2006).	Based	around	distinct	European	forms	of	political,	social	and	cultural	practice	the	Euro-Mediterranean	affirms	and	legitimizes	the	dominance	of	the	EU	over	non-member	Mediterranean	countries	and	peoples.	Moreover,	the	Euro-Mediterranean	is	built	upon	a	complex	spatial	arrangement,	which	lends	legitimacy	to	the	extension	of	EU	governance	practices	and	the	institutionalization	of	political	practices	across	the	Mediterranean	region	(Jones	2011,	42).	Institutionally	this	has	come	in	the	form	of	an	evolving	variable	geometry	that	favours	economic	and	then	political	forms	of	interaction.	Contrary	to	this,	Michelle	Pace	suggests	that	the	study	of	developments	involving	Mediterranean	countries	should	evoke	a	Mediterranean	area	rather	that	presupposing	a	physical	geography	of	the	Mediterranean	identity.	Importantly,	this	approach	allows	for	multiple	constructions	and	realities	(Pace	2006,	2)	and	attempts	to	avoid	a	representation	of	the	region	as	a	homogeneous	unit	offering	a	better	way	to	incorporate	the	diversity	of	cultural	contexts.	Whereas	for	Pace	this	involves	particular	constructions	of	the	region	on	the	part	of	EU	elites	and	policy-makers,	the	same	is	true	of	non-official	actors	that	take	part	in	interactions	across	the	Mediterranean.	What	is	revealing	about	this	analysis	is	the	way	in	which	the	EU’s	language	actively	breaks	down	the	Mediterranean	into	compartments	(Pace	2004,	100).	These	discursive	acts	parcel	the	region	into	forms	fitting	the	EU’s	external	capabilities.	This	is	parallel	to	the	EU’s	cultural	discourse	that	emphasises	the	multiplicity	of	the	Mediterranean’s	history.	What	
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is	missing	from	this	analysis	is	the	role	that	transnational	networks	play	in	developing	such	cultural	discourses	and	implementing	policy.	Institutional	developments	are	also	at	the	centre	of	this	issue.	Cooperation	between	regional	organizations	within	the	EuroMediterranean	framework	and	European	actors,	including	the	evolving	European	External	Action	Service	(EEAS),	highlight	new	avenues	for	cultural	relations	and,	potentially,	transformations	in	the	field	of	cultural	diplomacy.			
The	‘Arab	Spring’	and	political	identity	The	timing	of	this	project	could	not	have	been	more	significant	following	a	set	of	historic	uprisings	against	authoritarian	regimes	in	Tunisia,	Libya,	and	Egypt	and	spreading	to	other	countries	including	Morocco	and	Bahrain.	The	transformation	of	attitudes	towards	many	of	the	influences	discussed	in	subsequent	chapters	was	undoubtedly	affected	by	the	experience	of	large-scale	protest	and	revolution.	These	certainly	impacted	upon	the	research	process,	bolstered	both	by	enthusiastic	support	in	some	instances	and	shut	down	in	others	as	a	result	of	a	continually	changing	political	context	–	the	coup	d’etat	that	brought	General	al-Sisi	to	power	in	Egypt	led	to	immediate	self-censorship	by	many.	In	this	uncertain	atmosphere,	transnational	practices	and	affiliations	helped	to	dissect	the	political	and	cultural	experience	within	North	African	and	Middle	Eastern	societies.	Essid	and	Coleman	(2012,	4-5)	are	correct	to	suggest	that	one	effect	of	globalizing	processes	is	to	bring	into	conflict	the	basic	organizing	values	of	different	societies.	However,	they	are	wrong	to	assume	that	opposition	necessarily	takes	place	between	these	principles.	Led	by	a	top-down	understanding	of	globalizing	process,	Essid	and	Coleman	neglect	the	glocal	reality	of	cultural	practice,	which	eschews	any	given	directionality	but	navigates	a	multitude	of	pressures.	The	political	aspect	of	the	region	-	through	the	development	of	regional	governance	structures	and	institutions	-	continues	to	represent	serious	restrictions	on	movement	and	exchange	and	as	a	result	it	also	signifies	the	maintenance	of	national	forms	of	cultural	bordering	and	identification	despite	the	avowal	of	a	common	Euro-Mediterranean	space.	On	the	other	hand,	these	experience	has	affected	the	way	in	which	the	Mediterranean	
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region	is	thought	about	and	the	meanings	that	it	takes	on	for	transnational	actors	as	well	as	local	actors	with	the	desire	to	express	their	political	subjectivity	transnationally.		Civil	society	and	especially	organized	NGOs	are	considered	in	policy	circles	to	be	central	to	the	construction	(by	external	and	internal	powers)	of	active	subjects	trained	in	the	language	of	development,	empowerment	and	citizenship	(Challand	2011,	274).	Many	of	these	actors	may	in	fact	be	highly	critical	of	the	hierarchy	of	funding	circles	but	this	only	reinforces	the	role	of	this	relationship	in	the	process	of	subjectivation.	Challand	(2011,	275)	is	correct	to	point	out	that	what	was	unique	about	the	uprisings	was	that	the	implicit	norms	supported	by	these	funding	agencies	were	not	the	basis	for	resistance,	rather	it	was	often	against	this	notion	of	individualism	that	protests	were	expressed	employing	the	discourses	of	social	justice	and	unity	(Ibid,	276).	In	line	with	this,	Sari	Hanafi	(2012)	has	pointed	out	the	reflexivity	of	the	individualism	expressed	by	activists	based	on	the	“self-reference	of	an	agent	that	recognizes	forces	of	socialization	but	alters	their	place	in	the	social	structure	and	resists	their	disciplinary	power”	(Hanafi	2012,	203).	In	the	face	of	limited	representation	or	ability	to	influence	policy-making	the	alternative	was	a	form	of	solidarity	through	informal	networks	and	actions	(Solera	2015,	47).	Rather	than	relying	on	traditional	forms	of	protest	these	networks	leveraged	the	visual	and	performative	impact	of	creative	expression	for	opening	up	alternative	routes	(Makar	2011;	Tanzarella	2012;	Moldo	and	Soustier	2014).	The	creative	and	non-ideological	character	of	local	struggles	also	raised	the	potential	of	achieving	global	solidarity	between	distant	movements	helped	by	the	creation	of	‘hybrid	spaces’	through	the	use	of	ICT	(Antebi	and	Sanchez	2012)	and	bolstered	by	a	common	anger	at	growing	inequalities	and	feelings	of	economic	insecurity	(Glasius	and	Pleyers	2013).	As	a	result,	local	struggles	became	regionalized	in	the	form	of	the	Arab	Spring	and	globalized	through	discursive	and	imaginative	configurations.	Whereas	unity	may	have	been	temporary	the	politics	of	being	seen,	of	practicing	political	opposition	publicly	and	visually,	has	become	essential	to	the	political	field.	In	this	vein,	the	new	political	subjectivity	highlighted	by	academics	like	Hanafi	and	Challand	also	connects	to	a	longer	process	of	political	engagement	in	the	MENA	region,	a	concurrent	
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transformation	of	visual	culture,	and	the	counter-strategies	of	ruling	elites	that	has	transformed	culture	into	an	important	battleground.	However,	the	flipside	of	this	opening	up	has	been	the	founding	of	new	conflicts	(Khalid	2015;	Fortiger	2015)	and	the	rekindling	of	tensions	between	Islamism	and	secularism	in	Tunisia	and	Egypt,	where	the	tension	has	at	times	taken	on	a	militant	form	with	the	assassinations	of	secular	politicians	Chokri	Belaid	and	Mohamed	Brahimi	in	Tunisia	and	the	military	coup	against	ex-President	Morsi	in	Egypt.	In	both	countries	the	effect	was	to	drive	communities	apart	and	saw	an	increasing	use	extremist	rhetoric.1	In	Egypt,	following	the	coup	the	Muslim	Brotherhood	came	under	increasing	attack	from	secular	members	of	society	who	feared	an	increasing	Islamization	of	society.	Even	within	the	ranks	of	secular	groups	divisions	began	to	erupt	around	those	who	supported	dialogue	with	Islamists	and	those	who	did	not	(Roque	2015,	48).	In	the	case	of	Tunisia,	the	Ennahda	Party	has	shown	a	political	adeptness	and	flexibility	to	assuage	many	of	the	initial	fears	amongst	secular	opponents.	On	the	other	hand,	Egyptian	society	continues	to	deal	with	deep	rifts,	which	are	propagated	by	the	lack	of	adequate	social	mechanism	to	promote	cohesion	between	communities	(Ibid,	49).		 This	new	subjectivity	and	the	transformed	social	and	political	context	provides	the	basis	on	which	social	and	political	actors	engage	with	their	counterparts	across	the	Mediterranean	region.	It	also	likely	influences	their	interaction	with	institutions	and	foundations	that	support	the	development	of	programmes	and	projects	across	the	region.	Partially	this	can	be	linked	to	the	establishment	of	associations	following	the	uprisings	and	the	easing	of	restrictions	in	Tunisia.	But	new	opportunities	cannot	entirely	account	for	the	subjective	shift	in	Egypt	where	the	difficulties	of	gaining	ministry	recognition	have	remained	fraught	with	problems	of	ministry	acceptance,	long	time	delays	and	ambiguous	procedures.2	A	telling	feature	of	this	landscape	can	be	found	in	the	politicization	of	the	cultural	networks	supported	by	the	Anna	Lindh																																																									1	This	was	experienced	in	Tunisia	during	the	barricading	of	parliament	by	leftist	parties	following	the	assassination	of	Mohamed	Brahmi.	Several	protestors	expressed	the	opinion	that	all	Ennahda	members	and	supporters	were	terrorists	and	should	be	locked	up.	2	Interview	with	Egyptian	ALF	member	7th	August	2013	
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Foundation	in	Egypt	whose	communications	and	meetings,	according	to	some	members,	have	become	increasingly	contentious	between	those	who	maintain	different	political	affiliations	and	members	who	believe	that	the	ALF	network	should	be	apolitical.	Apparent	is	the	essential	political	basis	behind	such	networks	where	even	the	apolitical	stance	is	justified	according	to	a	logic	of	socio-cultural	development	based	on	liberalized	citizenship	and	education	practices.	The	picture	of	fragmentation	resulting	from	current	tensions	is	qualitatively	different	from	what	came	before.	The	process	of	transition	across	the	region	is	far	from	complete	but	along	with	the	various	political	actors	that	exist	within	each	society	those	working	within	CSOs	and	NGOs	have	also	been	altered	by	the	experience	of	a	rupture	with	the	recent	political	past.	Whether	this	experience	has	opened	up	new	routes	for	local	actors	to	engage	in	transnational	practices	is	less	clear.		
The	Mediterranean:	place,	construct,	practice	The	‘EuroMediterranean’	is	a	contradictory	construct.	As	Jean	Paul-Henry	has	pointed	out,	the	Mediterranean	is	made	both	a	‘peripheral	part	of	Europe	and	an	identity	and	cultural	border’	(Henry	2007,	208)	in	its	construction	within	the	EuroMediterranean	framework.	It	is	unsurprising	that	cultural	cooperation	-	intended	to	bring	regional	societies	together	-	has	been	problematic	given	the	entropy	of	securitisation,	nationalisms	and	the	politicisation	of	migrants.	Any	developments	towards	greater	cultural	cooperation	are	likely	to	be	sparse	and	face	several	political	and	economic	barriers.	However	this	complex	environment	also	offers	insight	into	the	development	of	cultural	cooperation	globally.	There	has	been	much	debate	around	the	notion	of	Mediterraneanism.	Taken	as	the	existence	of	either	a	cohesive	region,	either	geographically	or	culturally,	it	is	generally	recognized	as	a	tendentious,	if	not	irrelevant,	concept	(Calleya	1999;	Heller	2004).	As	a	transformative	imaginary	any	form	of	Mediterraneanism	is	limited;	the	“Euro-Mediterranean	dream	is	very	much	about	a	cosmopolitan	world,	which	allows	free	spirit	and	movement.	However,	while	the	dream	of	unity	in	the	Mediterranean	waters	is	a	dream	of	a	just	and	equitable	world,	it	is	also	orientalist	by	nature”	(Lapidot-Firilla	2012,	126).	The	orientalist	nature	of	
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this	dream	is	more	than	just	the	basic	altruism	and	essentialism	inherent	in	the	necessity	of	a	(EU)	project	for	the	development	of	neighbouring	countries	but	is	also	in	the	idea	that	the	Mediterranean	is	some	kind	of	ideal	end-point	derived	from	a	Eurocentric	history.		This	can	be	seen	in	continued	debate	around	the	roman	concept	of	Mare	Nostrum	which	has	been	rejuvenated	to	include	those	arab	populations	who	throughout	history	were	considered	as	others,	not	part	of	the	possessive	‘our’.	It	is	questionable	that	the	imperial	notion	of	Mare	Nostrum	provides	a	more	suitable	way	to	bridge	the	diversity	of	experiences	across	the	area.	More	fruitfully,	anthropologist	Michael	Herzfeld	(2005)	has	noted	practical	forms	of	Mediterraneanism	that	are	employed	instrumentally	by	social	and	political	actors	in	order	to	place	themselves	within	a	global	hierarchy	of	value	(Herzfeld	2004,	2005).	Such	an	idea	is	a	valuable	contribution	to	understanding	the	social	life	of	the	idea	of	the	Mediterranean.	Treated	as	the	product	of	‘performative	utterances’	(as	per	J.L.	Austin)	this	understanding	of	Mediterraneanism	highlights	the	role	of	discursive	agency	within	processes	of	subjectivation	(Herzfeld	2005,	50).	For	example,	Andre	Azoulay,	Former-President	of	the	ALF,	when	visiting	the	UK	network	suggested	a	broader	EuroMediterranean	history	in	Britain	by	telling	the	story	of	his	ancestors	in	Essaouira,	Morocco,	and	their	long	history	of	trading	through	northern	English	ports.3	Regardless	of	any	geographical	issues	there	is	a	powerful	performativity	to	this	story	that	induces	the	creation	of	a	regional	memory	and	alters	the	referential	markers	attributed	to	these	different	societies.	Politically,	this	movement	overlaps	with	a	Mediterraneanism	that	acts	to	unite	countries	behind	a	regional	hegemon	(Ibid.),	which	legitimizes	a	regional	delimiting	and	bordering	process.		This	political	use	of	Mediterraneanism	acts	as	a	source	of	justification	and	discursive	framing	for	the	political	construction	of	the	region	through	territorial,	symbolic	and	institutional	means	(Jones	2011).	On	top	of	this	it	necessitates	a	strong	cultural	element	to	integration,	which	was	recognized	as	an	important	though	problematic	area	since	the	foundation	of	the	Barcelona	Process	in	1995	(Selim	2003,	166).	Nonetheless,	cultural	partnership	has	always	been	of	secondary	importance	(or	tertiary	if	we	follow	the	EMP’s	categorization).																																																									3	Interview	with	UK	ALF	member	5th	July	2012	
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Following	a	project-based	structure	beginning	with	the	areas	of	cultural	heritage	and	cultural	events	it	has	expanded	to	the	establishment	of	projects	such	as	EuroMed	Audiovisual,	EuroMed	Heritage,	the	EuroMed	Youth	Programme,	TEMPUS	and	TRESMED.	The	establishment	in	2005	of	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	(ALF)	strengthened	the	cultural	basket	by	creating	a	separate	institution	(funded	partially	by	the	EU	Commission	and	partially	by	UfM	member	states)	to	support	interaction	between	different	cultures	and	societies.	Despite	great	expectations	following	the	2003	High	Level	Advisory	Group	meeting	(‘Group	des	Sages’),	optimism	towards	the	Foundation	remained	low	among	many	observers	given	the	difficulty	surrounding	budgetary	negotiations	and	remaining	political	constraints	(Pace	2006:	86).	However,	despite	immense	difficulty,	as	well	as	having	to	withstand	an	uncertain	institutional	context	and	political	wrangling	over	the	creation	of	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean,	the	ALF	has	evolved	in	its	early	years	into	an	intriguing	institution	and	a	potential	source	of	development	on	socio-cultural	issues	and	intercultural	dialogue	in	the	region.			
The	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	The	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	(ALF),	as	a	regional	institution	aimed	at	the	development	of	dialogue	between	cultures	and	networking	between	civil	society	actors,	is	an	interesting	case	for	considering	some	of	these	ideas.	The	ALF	offers	a	platform	to	groups	and	individuals	who	might	otherwise	be	excluded	from	regional	developments.	This	approach	complements	that	of	the	UfM	which	targets	private	actors	and	economic	interests	in	building	regional	projects.	While	EU	policy	towards	southern	Mediterranean	countries	broadly	consists	of	a	strategy	towards	region-building	it	is	also	infiltrated	by	a	multitude	of	interests	and	discourses	from	EU	member	states,	EU	officials	and	institutions	and	officials	from	non-member	states	who	are	variously	influenced	by	global	politics	and	discourses.	Strengthening	the	civil	sphere	through	official	discourses	and	actions	is	a	key	aspect	of	engaging	in	complex	international	networks	and	building	relations	across	states.	To	the	extent	that	private	actors	and	informal	networks	become	more	important	in	regional	policies	there	is	also	a	corresponding	
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globalization	of	the	region	as	transnational	actors	more	or	less	rooted	in	local	settings	take	on	greater	significance.		It	is	possible	to	differentiate	the	position	of	the	ALF	between	the	variable	geometry	of	the	region,	whereby	it	effectively	institutionalizes	an	intercultural	dialogue	in	accordance	with	the	political	objectives	of	the	EU	commission	and	national	governments,	and	as	the	central	hub	of	a	network	of	political,	cultural	and	social	actors	across	the	region.	The	ALF’s	‘intercultural	strategy’	goes	beyond	promoting	dialogue	between	diverse	cultures	by	imposing	a	set	of	normative	goals	and	values	building	upon	the	original	recommendations	of	the	High	Level	Advisory	group	in	2003	which	suggested	that	intercultural	dialogue;	“may	then	also	become	a	powerful	vehicle	of	democratization”	(Report	by	the	High	Level	Advisory	Group	2003,	11).	On	the	other	hand,	it	has	constructed	a	considerable	network	of	independent	organizations	working	across	all	member	states	of	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean	and	organizes	regional	projects,	engages	in	grant-making	and	lobbies	for	increased	mobility	on	behalf	of	its	members.	Through	these	actions	it	provides	a	unique	opportunity	space	at	the	regional	level	but	it	also	integrates	a	wide	variety	of	different	perspectives	and	identities.	While	the	ALF	works	within	the	political	context	of	the	Euro-Mediterranean	it	has	also	been	responsive	to	alternate	representations	espoused	by	member	organizations.	This	complexity	makes	the	ALF	an	intriguing	case	study	and	exploring	some	of	these	elements	further	will	lead	towards	a	better	understanding	of	how	transnationalism,	understood	as	a	social	and	political	phenomenon,	plays	a	significant	role	in	the	region.		
Building	a	transnational	perspective	on	cultural	relations	in	the	
EuroMediterranean	The	study	of	cultural	relations	in	the	EuroMediterranean	received	substantial	attention	following	the	establishment	of	the	Barcelona	Process	in	1995.	In	2003	the	edited	volume	A	New	Euro-Mediteranean	Cultural	Identity?	explored	a	novel	proposition	in	the	emergence	of	a	common	cultural	framework	uniting	all	shores	of	the	Mediterranean	Sea	and	demonstrated	the	tempered	optimism	captured	within	the	EuroMediterranean	Partnership.	Amid	growing	skepticism,	a	special	issue	of	Mediterranean	Politics	in	2005	demonstrated	a	diverse	but	critical	
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examination	of	the	role	and	potential	of	dialogue	(Pace	2005),	the	conceptual	underpinning	of	intercultural	dialogue	(del	Sarto	2005),	securitization	(Malmvig	2005),	socialization	(Schumacher	2005),	global	civil	society	and	human	rights	(Feliu	2005),	and	a	world-systems	approach	to	culture	and	dialogue	(Stetter	2005).	Think	Tanks	such	as	the	Fondazione	Mediterranean,	Maison	Méditerranée	des	Sciences	de	l’Homme	(MMSH),	and	Instituto	Europeo	del	Mediterráneo	(IEMed)	sustained	interest	following	the	deadlock	of	the	EuroMediterranean	Partnership	and	its	replacement	by	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean	in	2008.	Though	important	work	has	been	written	on	the	subject	since	this	period	(see	Fabre	and	Sant-Cassia	2007;	Schäfer	2007,	2014;	Cardwell	2011;	Kausch	and	Youngs	2009;	Pace	and	Schumacher	2013),	the	interest	in	cultural	relations	specifically	has	been	relegated	to	the	periphery	despite	some	important	developments.	Moreover,	connecting	the	developments	in	cultural	relations	across	the	internal/external	divide	has	been	limited.		In	order	to	put	cultural	relations	back	at	the	centre	of	attention	it	is	necessary	to	account	for	the	changes	in	political	and	institutional	context	as	well	as	the	emergence	of	new	actors	and	discourses.	The	contention	of	this	thesis	is	that	the	state	of	cultural	relations	in	the	EuroMediterranean	reveals	a	tension	(both	creative	and	conflicted)	between	the	rejuvenation	of	Europe’s	cultural	identity	(and	competency	for	culture	at	the	supranational	level)	and	the	promise	of	transnational	networking.	It	presents	a	novel	understanding	of	cultural	relations	in	the	EuroMediterranean	as	products	of	the	global	reach	of	networks	and	in	direct	relation	their	influence	in	driving	the	evolution	of	cultural	narratives	at	the	EU	level.		There	has	been	a	profound	correlation	between	transformations	in	political	practice	and	discourse	that	argue	for	a	novel	approach	to	understanding	the	significance	of	developments	in	cultural	relations	across	the	EuroMediterranean.	There	are	a	few	elements	that	act	as	a	foundation	to	this	approach:	1)	A	change	in	political	practice	associated	with	the	dominance	of	norms,	discourses	and	practices	generally	subsumed	under	the	moniker	of	civil	society,	2)	increased	activity	and	emergence	of	new	political	and	cultural	foundations,	3)	formation	of	networks	connecting	foundations	and	other	cultural	and	political	actors	across	boundaries.	These	changes	have	driven	developments	in	cultural	relations	and	influenced	new	directions	in	external	relations.	The	
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tensions	and	features	of	these	developments	are	exhibited	in	developments	in	the	EuroMediterranean	(and	under	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean):	a	focus	on	establishing	networks	for	the	inclusion	of	civil	society	and	a	core	foundation	to	support	their	development,	an	incorporation	of	political	objectives	in	cultural	dialogue,	a	widening	practice	of	cultural	diplomacy	(with	respect	to	the	European	Union),	and	the	desire	to	forge	(and	regulate)	a	role	for	civil	society	in	national	and	regional	politics.	Together,	these	factors	present	a	novel	understanding	of	developments,	which	suggest	quite	different	future	opportunities	from	those	suggested	in	institutional	accounts	of	the	EuroMediterranean	relationship.	Moreover,	it	places	those	developments	within	a	global	context,	which	moves	beyond	the	presumptive	dualism	inherent	in	approaches	to	regional	politics	based	on	fragmentation	vs.	unity.	For	example,	whereas	some	institutional	accounts	have	previously	written	off	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	citing	its	funding	limitations,	visibility	and	relationship	to	national	governments	the	emphasis	on	networks	has	the	advantage	of	exploring	the	actual	(and	essentially	hybrid)	interactions	and	exchanges	of	participants.	While	the	ALF	may	not	be	noteworthy	in	the	breadth	of	its	actions,	it	is	a	valuable	case	depiction	of	how	global	cultural	relations	are	enacted	through	the	changing	practices	of	cultural	diplomacy,	political	practice	and	micro-level	contributions	that	suggest	alternative	ways	of	understanding	the	cultural	encounter.	The	ALF	is	indeed	the	region’s	‘most	symbolic	instrument’	(Schäfer	2007,	343)	but	it	also	offers	insight	into	the	complexity	and	potential	of	networking.			
Political	practice	and	the	civil	society	complex	The	Euro-Mediterranean	has	been	constructed	in	EU	policy	discourses	as	a	region	for	EU	action.	This	is	manifest	in	the	extension	of	governance	and	bordering	practices	through	the	European	Neighborhood	Policy	(ENP)	as	well	as	the	functional	form	of	region-building	inherent	in	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean	(UfM).	At	the	same	time,	the	complexity	of	these	processes	opens	up	spaces	for	civil	society	actors	to	engage	in	cross-border	cooperation	and	transnational	networking.	Recent	studies	have	dealt	with	the	development	of	civil	society	in	the	Euro-Mediterranean	by	focusing	on	finding	a	contextually	
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adaptable	yet	complex	definition	of	civil	society	in	order	to	understand	networking	between	civil	society	actors	in	the	region	(Scott	and	Liikanen	2010;	O’Dowd	and	Dimitrovova	2011).	This	research	has	highlighted	the	extent	to	which	reactions	to	the	operations	of	particularly	Western	NGOs	are	influenced	by	opposing	opinions	and	understandings	of	civil	society	(Dimitrovova	2010).	But	what	is	often	missing	is	an	exploration	of	the	way	in	which	civil	society	as	a	category	and	as	a	practice	has	been	transformed	by	its	transnationalization	and	the	extension	of	governance	across	state	boundaries.	One	of	the	initial	goals	of	this	study	is	to	provide	a	theoretically	informed	and	more	extensive	understanding	of	civil	society	and	its	role	at	the	regional	scale.	Here	it	becomes	clear	that	notions	of	civil	society	go	hand	in	hand	with	democratization	and	democracy	promotion	strategies.		At	the	same	time	the	transnationalization	of	democracy	promotion	presents	a	new	context	in	which	civil	society	not	only	becomes	a	‘fetish-object’	(Petric	and	Blundo	2012)	for	transnational	actors	but	it	also	leads	to	a	transformation	of	the	nature	and	practice	of	civil	society	in	relation	to	governance.	The	concomitant	‘civil	societalization’	of	politics	makes	it	less	useful	to	discuss	civil	society	as	an	autonomous	sphere,	something	which	is	itself	reflected	at	times	in	official	policies	and	discourses.	And	yet,	it	is	important	to	recognize	this	as	a	process	that	has	been	as	much	influenced	by	the	work	of	transnational	non-state	actors	as	states	and	governance	structures.	Political	foundations	(PFs)	are	significant	in	this	regard	as	they	maintain	a	dual	identity	first	based	in	their	official	governmental	mandate	and	internal	structure	and	secondly	based	in	their	independent	actions	abroad	during	which	PFs	tend	to	represent	themselves	as	private	actors	(Dakowska	2010).	Thus	they	also	have	been	conceived	as	contributing	to	the	expansion	of	global	civil	society	around	the	world	(Scott	2003,	8).	It	is	a	contention	within	this	research	that	such	conclusions	fail	to	acknowledge	their	reflexive	impact	on	the	way	in	which	civil	society	(and	global	civil	society)	is	understood	which	also	entails	the	risk	of	failing	to	distinguish	alternative	and	meaningful	forms	of	interaction.	In	addition,	the	work	of	PFs	is	increasingly	aimed	at	supporting	the	development	of	civil	society	in	target	countries	(Scott	1999,	153).	These	actions	risk	contributing	to	the	narrowing	of	civil	society	seen	in	part	by	the	fact	that	efforts	at	promoting	
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pluralism	tend	to	devolve	into	limited	forms	of	‘organizational	pluralism’	as	a	result	of	an	in-built	bias	amongst	grant-makers	towards	established	NGOs	as	opposed	to	smaller	community	groups	(Carothers	and	Ottaway	2008,	location	3464).	So	the	civil	societalization	of	politics	also	points	to	the	way	in	which	governance	and	civil	society	are	mutually	constitutive.	The	transnationalization	of	civil	society	is	as	much	a	political	as	it	is	a	social	development.	This	becomes	especially	important	across	a	region	where	‘civil	society’	as	a	social	phenomenon	can	be	understood	in	dramatically	different	ways	as	a	result	of	cultural	context	and	where	it	is	ever	more	apparent	that	different	meanings	do	not	exist	outside	of	power	relations.	It	is	also	crucial	to	acknowledge	that	civil	societalization	is	not	simply	a	critique	of	the	practice	of	civil	society	in	relation	to	governance	but	also	an	important	characteristic	of	the	globalization	of	governance	and	political	strategy.	Mario	Pianta	(2003),	for	example,	identifies	the	growing	significance	of	parallel	summits	and	bottom-up	movements	that	link	decision-making	to	civil	society	actors.	Pianta’s	chapter	draws	attention	to	the	role	of	global	civil	society	in	balancing	and	providing	a	democratic	alternative	to	neo-liberal	globalization.	However,	it	is	also	necessary	to	understand	how	civil	society	has	become	a	part	of	top-down	strategies	of	governance.	
	
Cultural	‘EU’rope	and	external	relations	The	cultural	relations	between	Europe	and	its	Mediterranean	neighbors	have	been	characterized	by	a	lack	of	development	and	peripheral	position	in	the	EMP	framework.	This	perspective	is	dominated	by	an	approach,	which	views	developments	in	the	Mediterranean	through	a	regionalist	lens.	If	Europe	is	“a	subregion	of	the	world-system,	Europe	proposes	that	the	Mediterranean	countries	be,	in	their	turn,	a	sub-subregion”	(Nair	2003,	298	quoted	in	Essid	and	Coleman	2012,	10).	Europe	has	been	turned	into	a	world	space	by	EU	policies	that	have	increased	European	competency	into	areas	traditionally	reserved	for	nation-states	(Huggins	and	Axford	1999,	184).	The	EuroMediterranean	Partnership	rests	upon	this	imbalance	between	an	integrated	and	powerful	Europe	and	its	fragmented	neighborhood.	The	Union	for	the	Mediterranean,	for	its	part,	has	been	an	attempt	to	foster	greater	unity	amongst	Mediterranean	
	 25	
countries	and	establish,	at	least	symbolically,	a	more	equitable	balance.	However,	this	quote	raises	another	important	dimension	in	understanding	relations	between	the	two	shores	and	that	is	the	difference	between	Europe’s	agency	vis	à	vis	its	external	capacities	and	the	local	and	global	influences	that	shape	the	unfolding	of	institutional	developments	and	ideational	support	for	integration.	European	cultural	policy	and	the	push	for	a	European	cultural	diplomacy	are	acting	as	two	of	the	new	drivers	of	cultural	integration	in	the	EuroMediterranean.			 The	unique	development	of	culture	within	Europe	–	what	Monica	Sassatelli	(2009)	has	labeled	a	‘polyvocal	process’	due	to	the	participation	of	myriad	voices	of	civil	society	and	cultural	practitioners	from	the	bottom-up		–	has	bolstered	the	influence	of	cultural	networks	tying	them	to	the	policy-making	process	and	attributing	them	an	important	role	in	the	dissemination	of	policy	output.	Many	networks	involved	in	the	development	of	cultural	competency	at	the	European	level	have	also	long	been	active	in	promoting	cultural	relations	abroad	–	as	in	the	case	of	the	European	Cultural	Foundation	and	national	institutes	of	culture.	This	boundary-crossing	nature	of	networks	is	fundamental	to	the	novel	approach	being	developed	for	a	distinctly	European	cultural	diplomacy	distributed	across	a	set	of	non-state	actors	and	coordinated	by	European	institutions	of	which	the	European	External	Action	Service	intends	to	be	central	(Isar	2015,	504).	These	developments	coincide	with	the	development	in	the	EuroMediterranean	of	a	sole	multilateral	institution	–	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	–	designed	to	promote	convergence	between	societies.	It	is	no	wonder	that	following	the	initial	events	of	the	Arab	Spring,	one	of	the	first	announcements	made	by	Commissioner	Stefan	Füle,	Directorate-General	External	Relations	(RELEX),	declared	it	a	priority	to	establish	a	closer	working	relationship	between	the	European	Commission	and	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	secretariat	(Füle	2011).	This	relationship	places	the	Foundation	within	the	context	of	a	European	cultural	diplomacy	and,	as	will	be	discussed	in	Section	2	on	this	thesis,	leads	to	some	level	of	convergence	between	EU	interests	and	organizational	objectives.			
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Transnational	Region:	strategic	frames,	networks	and	encounters	Connecting	the	role	of	transnational	cultural	networks	to	developments	within	the	EU	and	within	the	EuroMed	region	this	thesis	will	forego	a	geographically	delimited	analysis	of	the	region	either	as	acting	or	being	acted	upon.	After	all,	it	is	through	transnational	networks	that	the	region	is	constructed.	In	order	to	do	this	the	thesis	will	trace	the	idea	of	transnationalism	and	networks,	transnational	networks	as	they	relate	to	the	development	of	cultural	policy,	and	existing	networks	within	the	region.	Indeed,	in	the	evolution	of	what	success	has	been	shared	transnational	networks	are	essential	-	either	in	practice	or	as	a	normative	conceit.	In	practice,	such	networks	have	influenced	the	development	of	policies	and	institutions.	Networks	are	also	established	as	functional	arbiters	of	the	cultural	realm	where	we	find	circumscribed	transnationalism	as	a	practical	solution	to	conflictual	political	dynamics	and	a	normative	ideal-type	as	counter	to	those	constraints	-	practice	and	discourse.		Networks	have	been	shown	to	be	central	to	decision-making	in	the	policy-space	of	the	ENP	(Lavenex	2008).	They	also	have	a	deeper	significance	and	more	pervasive	quality	through	a	process	of	‘horizontal	socialization’	(Scott	&	Liikanen	2010)	and	identity	construction	(Castells	1997).	Networks	provide	the	informal	‘institutions’	necessary	for	the	successful	diffusion	of	various	elements	of	identity	within	and	beyond	the	streams	of	official	discourse.	As	such,	civil	society	represents	the	most	important	channel	through	which	Europeanization	can	proceed.	On	the	other	hand,	the	various	EU	policies	represent	to	many	the	imposition	of	Western	norms	and	ideals	rather	than	an	offer	of	equal	partnership	on	socio-economic	issues.	The	opportunistic	agendas	led	by	Brussels	and	official	state	bodies	through	traditional	geopolitical	models	often	interfere	with	meaningful	participation	by	civil	society	elements	(Dimitrovova	2009,	Darbouche	2008,	Kostadinova	2009).	As	a	result,	many	organizations	choose	not	to	participate	in	EU-led	programmes	in	order	to	maintain	their	local	legitimacy	(Dimitrovova	2009).	There	has	however	been	improved	and	increased	mobilization	at	the	local	and	national	levels,	which	has	led	scholars	to	argue	for	a	greater	focus	on	smaller,	voluntary	organizations	(Scott	&	Liikanen	2010).	Many	of	these	organizations	maintain	ties	with	actors	in	neighboring	countries	and	could	play	a	much	more	critical	role	than	often	considered	in	developing	an	
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alternative	sense	of	regional	engagement	and	in	developmental	processes.	Though	democracy	promotion	has	tended	to	focus	on	initiatives	like	building	civil	society,	institutional	developments	like	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	potentially	benefit	smaller	actors	by	shifting	focus	from	larger,	resource-rich	NGOs	to	smaller	organizations.		 Using	transnational	networks	as	our	basis	straddles	a	Euro-Mediterranean	that	has	its	basis	in	official	policies,	institutions	and	discourses,	and	a	space	of	interactions	and	exchange	of	ideas,	material	and	people.	This	space,	which	necessarily	includes	regional	institutions	and	the	influence	of	national	and	international	agreements	can	be	represented	as	a	
EuroMediterranean	space;	that	is,	a	space	implicitly	and	extensively	affected	by	these	developments	but	not	wholly	defined	by	them.	It	rests	more	easily	upon	a	
long	durée	of	historical,	cultural,	social,	economic	and	political	exchange.	In	this	sense,	the	Mediterranean	is	indeed	a	global	region	in	which	countries	and	cultures	around	the	world	can	find	common	foundations	and	it	also	focuses	attention	on	the	question	of	mobility,	exchange	and	interaction	and	returns	a	humanistic	element	to	study	of	the	region.	But	the	form	of	transnationalism	at	work	is	also	peculiar.	Its	peculiarity	can	be	found	in	the	differentiation	between	a	‘transnationalism	from	above’	–	based	around	the	actions	of	states	and	corporations	–	and	the	‘transnationalism	from	below’	of	migrants	(Guarnizo	and	Smith	1998).	This	‘transnationalism	from	below’	might	also	include	transnational	social	movements	and	other	social	actors	engaging	in	regular	or	intermittent	transnational	practices.	This	research	draws	attention	to	the	ways	in	which	these	two	categories	overlap	and	coincide.	As	Steven	Vertovec	points	out:	“Transnational	social	patterns	variously	condition	people’s	everyday	expectations…moral	obligations…institutional	structures…and	relations	to	the	state	(Vertovec	2009,	74).	But	they	also	condition	the	existence	of	these	things	in	return.	The	focus	on	transnational	networks	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	there	is	an	erosion	of	the	importance	of	place	or	the	nation	(Featherstone,	Phillips	and	Waters	2008,	386).	As	Stephen	Calleya	(2005)	has	already	pointed	out,	regional	fragmentation	means	that	local	identities	and	national	spaces	remain	central	to	political	and	social	action	in	the	Mediterranean.	This	fragmentation,	however,	is	
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decisively	political	in	many	circumstances	and	does	not	account	for	underlying	dynamics	of	social	and	political	contestation	that	occur	across	national	constructs.	So	it	is	also	important	to	consider	the	role	of	common	politics	and	projects	in	the	construction	and	maintenance	of	transnational	networks.	A	greater	appreciation	of	the	role	of	networks	historically	for	transnational	political	action	can	bring	awareness	of	the	ability	to	evoke	or	construct	a	transnational	history	for	particular	actors	and/or	issues	(Featherstone		2007).	Similarly,	Guarnizo	and	Smith	point	out	that:	“Politically	organized	transnational	networks	and	movements	also	weld	together	transnational	connections	by	constituting	structures	of	meaning”	(Guarnizo	and	Smith	2009,	19).	Annette	Jünemann’s	(2003)	analysis	of	the	Civil	Forums	established	under	the	EMP	framework	leans	towards	this	idea	by	calling	attention	to	the	potential	initiation	of	a	political	identity	organized	around	common	political	issues.	Of	course,	selection	processes	that	are	built	into	these	regional	projects	can	put	a	limit	on	the	involvement	of	actors	and	organizations	from	southern	Mediterranean	countries	but,	as	Sari	Hanafi	(2005)	points	out,	the	selection	process	can	also	benefit	transnational	networks	by	engaging	with	actors	and	organizations	that	under	normal	conditions	may	be	subject	to	local	divisions	or	clique	gatherings.	Furthermore,	networking	at	the	regional	level	has	the	potential	of	increasing	southern	actors’	influence	through	agenda-setting	and	alliance	building	(Hanafi	2005).	Hanafi’s	anthropological	approach	to	North-South	civil	society	relations	helps	to	understand	the	significance	of	the	regional	scale	for	social	actors,	especially	with	regard	to	the	latter	possibility	of	alliance	building.	As	analysis	of	both	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	networks	and	attendance	at	the	2013	ALF	Civil	Forum	point	out,	influence	is	mediated	by	organizational	objectives	as	much	as	distance	between	policy-making.	And	yet,	participation	reveals	a	certain	creativity	and	reflexivity	that	eschews	the	objective	of	direct	influence	at	least	partially	for	more	politically	transcendent	purposes.		
Researching	cultural	networks	This	research	project	explores	the	role	of	civil	society	in	the	Mediterranean	through	the	practice	of	transnationalism.	Leaving	aside	conceptual	arguments,	
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this	broadly	engages	two	interrelated	forms	of	transnationalism	identified	by	Steven	Vertovec	(2000)–	as	a	site	of	political	engagement	and	as	a	(re)construction	of	place	and	culture.	In	addition	to	these	concerns	this	research	also	queries	the	role	of	the	meso-link	-	the	role	of	organizations	(or	in	this	case	Foundations)	in	promoting,	maintaining	or	establishing	transnational	relations.	One	of	the	key	problems	facing	my	research	is	that	there	have	been	only	a	few	works	completed	on	small	civil	society	organizations	participating	in	regional	institutions	and	programmes	in	the	Mediterranean	that	seeks	to	explore	their	relation	to	regional	cultures	or	analyze	their	adoption	of	transnational	practices.	As	a	result,	data	and	experiences	related	to	these	specific	areas	will	need	to	be	produced	before	it	can	be	analyzed	further.	Table	1	(from	Pries	2007)	establishes	the	distinction	between	transnational	research	and	traditional	comparative	research	based	on	states	and	bounded	communities	and	studies	of	the	World	System	largely	influenced	by	Marxist	and	neo-Marxist	approaches	to	political	economy.	This	table	is	useful	as	a	starting	point.			
	
(from	Pries	2007)	
	One	aspect	that	should	be	highlighted	as	it	is	important	for	the	study	at	hand	is	the	exclusion	of	‘practices’	from	the	units	of	measurement	within	‘Transnational	Studies’.	There	are	undoubtedly	unique	practices	that	correlate	to	transnational	ways	of	living	or	contesting	politics	and	this	has	been	made	clear	in	the	review	of	current	literature	that	tends	to	rely	rather	heavily	on	identifying	these	practices.	Pries	does	acknowledge	this	point	in	his	original	discussion	of	the	differences	
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separating	these	approaches.	Naturally,	this	table	is	not	exhaustive	nor	is	it	to	be	taken	as	the	finite	attributes	of	each	approach	but	rather	sets	out	some	basic	differences	and	highlights	the	essential	frame	of	reference	for	the	study	at	hand.	The	purpose	of	this	section	is	to	explain	how	I	will	seek	to	answer	the	central	questions	of	this	research	project:	What	is	the	role	of	culture	and	civil	society	
in	constructing	a	Euro-Mediterranean	space?	And	also	secondary	questions:	
How	has	transnationalizaton	of	politics	contributed	to	new	avenues	for	
strategic	action	and	cooperation?	How	do	regional	organizations	provide	
frames	for	civil	society	actors?	How	are	these	frames	employed	and	
contested	by	members	and	participants?	In	pursuance	of	these	questions	I	will	employ	the	case	study	approach,	which	will	entail	various	methods	at	different	points	of	the	project.	These	are	document	collection	and	analysis,	interviews	and	observation/ethnography.	My	research	is	intended	to	explore	the	actual	experiences	and	practices	of	civil	society	actors	participating	in	regional	activities,	a	purpose	for	which	survey	research	is	not	best	suited	(Byrne	2004:	Hoggart	et	al	2002).	As	I	am	primarily	interested	in	practices,	meanings	and	understandings	the	interpretive	approach	is	most	conducive	as	a	means	to	discovering	the	meaning	that	people	ascribe	to	their	environment(s).	As	such,	the	case	study	will	be	exploratory	and	oriented	towards	description.	Throughout	the	application	of	these	techniques	scrutiny	of	the	position	of	the	researcher	as	a	participant	and	component	in	the	process	will	be	central	(Dowling	2000).		The	application	of	the	case	study	approach	for	a	transnationally	oriented	study	is	potentially	a	controversial	one.	In	terms	of	generating	a	more	global	sociology	or	transnational	methodology	there	has	been	a	great	deal	of	interest	in	the	idea	of	multi-sited	ethnography	(Marcus	1995;	Falzon	2009;	Köngeter	and	Wolff	2010).	This	approach	stresses	the	actual	network	from	which	social	phenomena	are	constructed.	Instead	of	focusing	on	particular	sites	it	stresses	the	relations	between	multiple	sites	and	actors.	In	Marcus’	original	terms	it	is	an	approach	oriented	towards	following	whether	that	be	in	terms	of	things,	ideas,	concepts	or	persons.	There	is	much	to	be	said	about	this	approach	and	it	has	direct	impact	upon	the	consideration	of	observation	and	the	application	of	the	case	study	approach	especially	in	terms	of	tracing	the	meaning	of	particular	ideas	and	identifications	(like	the	‘Mediterranean’	itself).	But	the	intention	of	
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generating	a	multi-sited	ethnography	–	to	underscore	the	fluidity	and	unboundedness	of	certain	relations	–	can	also	be	ameliorated	with	the	case	study	approach.	As	Bill	Graham	argues,	the	case	is	not	in	itself	the	context	and	can	never	be	truly	bounded	(2000,	1).	If	we	take	Graham’s	understanding	of	the	case	it	is	possible	to	view	specific	units	of	analysis	as	elements	of	a	broader	context	and	set	of	relations	but	also	retain	internal	coherence	for	case	study.	This	chapter	will	discuss	the	three	specific	methods	being	employed	justifying	their	use	and	also	referring	to	questions	of	instrumentation.	It	will	then	go	on	to	discuss	sampling	and	data	collection	and	analysis	in	which	questions	of	reliability	and	validity	will	be	addressed	with	regard	to	the	qualitative	approach.		
	
Methods		
Document	collection	and	analysis	An	important	technique	used	throughout	the	research	will	be	that	of	document	analysis.	This	will	include	such	texts	as	official	documents,	reports,	statistics,	speeches	and	other	written	and	visual	materials.	This	will	include	archived	materials	and	on-going	reports	as	well	as	texts	from	conferences,	workshops	and	other	events	as	may	be	suitable.	The	collection	of	these	documents	will	be	beneficial	for	setting	up	the	parameters	of	particular	investigations,	exploring	the	relevance	of	modes	of	enquiry	and	for	contributing	insight	to	the	significance	of	specific	concepts,	ideas	and	practices.	As	such,	the	analysis	of	documents	is	the	central	aspect	of	the	on-going	study	and	will	play	an	important	role	in	each	stage	of	the	research.	Accessing	documents	from	the	European	Union	and	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	is	relatively	easy	and	there	are	few	problems	of	access.	But	these	are	largely	official,	finished	records	intended	for	public	record.	Access	to	meeting	minutes,	unofficial	speeches	and	internal	reports	can	offer	much	greater	insight	but	these	rely	on	either	participation	or	the	ability	to	make	useful	connections	to	participants	and	practitioners.	To	benefit	this	area	I	will	do	the	utmost	to	leverage	existing	contacts	that	I	have	from	my	time	working	at	the	European	Parliament	and	new	contacts	made	during	initial	meetings	with	members	of	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation.		
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The	information	contributed	by	these	documents	of	course	cannot	be	taken	for	granted.	Rather	than	viewed	as	expressing	facts	they	should	be	treated	in	interpretive	fashion	as	documents	-	like	data	–	are	based	on	or	express	representations	of	political	and	social	constructions	(May	1993,	51).	The	other	side	of	this	scenario	is	the	way	in	which	the	document	is	read	by	the	researcher.	This	relates	to	the	argumentation	applied	by	a	researcher	in	favor	of	a	particular	reading	whereby	the	researcher	attempts	to	persuade	the	reader	of	its	validity	(Gerring	1998,	298).	Formal	logic	is	important	as	is	framing	and	clarity.	But	as	Gerring	(1998,	298)	also	points	out,	this	approach	is	crucially	about	analyzing	the	language	that	is	being	used	and	interpreting	the	significance	of	language	as	representing	political	experience,	or	practices.	In	other	words,	qualitative	forms	of	document	analysis	are	utterly	interpretive	and	argumentative.	Critics	of	this	approach	suggest	that	the	findings	tend	to	be	vague	and	situational,	or	worse	that	they	are	“conjectural,	non-verifiable…arrived	at	by	sheer	intuition	and	individual	guesswork”	(Cohen	1974,	5).	But	this	harsh	criticism	can	only	be	valid	if	the	researcher	does	not	practice	reflexivity	when	making	an	argument	or	conducting	research.	Intuition	is	not	an	inherently	bad	thing,	nor	is	guesswork	if	it	can	subsequently	be	backed	up	by	evidence,	logical	argument,	and	openness	on	the	part	of	the	researcher	with	regard	to	initial	assumptions	and	orientation.	Thus,	what	the	researcher	aims	for	is	credibility	and	the	production	of	a	believable	account	(Richerson	and	Boyd	2004,	411).	Document	analysis	alone,	however,	cannot	provide	all	of	the	data	necessary	to	achieve	the	goals	of	this	research.	Documents	may	be	incomplete	or	only	offer	one	viewpoint	on	a	particular	issue.	For	this	reason	it	will	be	necessary	to	use	in-depth	interviews	and	observation	as	supplementary	methods.			
In-depth	Interviewing	I	would	like	you	to	think	about	experiences	you	have	had	of	participating	in	regional	activities	that	have	significantly	affected	your	interest,	understanding	or	practice	in	your	own	organization	or	orientation	to	regional	issues.	Please	describe,	in	as	much	detail	as	you	can	remember,	the	circumstances	surrounding	these	experiences.	(General	opening)		In	an	interview	the	answers	given	by	the	respondent	provide	the	essential	raw	data	to	be	analyzed	later	in	the	research	process	(Ackroyd	and	Hughes	1983,	66).	The	main	task	then	is	to	understand	the	meaning	of	interviewees’	responses	
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(Kvale	1996).	This	essential	basis	links	different	interviewing	styles	that	can	be	appropriate	for	different	methods.	I	will	focus	on	the	semi-structured	interviewing	style	as	it	offers	the	ideal	balance	between	general	and	comparative	questions	while	also	allowing	space	for	maximum	understanding	of	the	interviewees’	perspective(s).	This	style	is	more	favorable	to	the	structured	interview	as	it	offers	little	room	for	interviewees	to	introduce	new	ideas	or	considerations	in	the	context	of	the	interview.	As	a	result,	it	does	not	offer	an	adequate	basis	on	which	to	interpret	meanings	attributed	by	actors	to	specific	phenomena.	The	superior	comparability	offered	by	structured	interviews	is	willfully	sacrificed	for	greater	depth	of	understanding	and	less	generalizability.	On	the	other	end,	the	focused	interviewing	style	adds	a	great	deal	of	benefit	in	terms	of	focusing	on	the	individual	perspective.	In	addition	to	this	it	allows	the	interviewee	to	refer	more	readily	to	their	own	‘frames	of	reference’	when	responding	to	questions	(May	1993,	94).	The	flexibility	of	this	style	allows	maximum	understanding	but	suffers	from	a	limited	ability	to	compare	interviews	with	each	other	(Ibid).	This	limitation	makes	the	semi-structured	interview	the	most	ideal	as	it	balances	the	benefits	and	shortcomings	of	both	the	structured	and	focused	styles.	With	this	in	mind,	some	of	the	questions	for	the	interviews	will	be	prepared	beforehand	in	order	to	guarantee	a	basic	level	of	correspondence	and	comparison	between	interviews.	As	suggested,	one	of	the	advantages	of	pursuing	the	in-depth	semi-structured	form	is	that	it	allows	for	both	a	conversational	style	and	allows	for	some	variation	whereby	interviewees	can	expand	on	their	personal	experiences	(Valentine	1997,	111).	Questions	of	accessibility	and	cognition	are	central	to	any	process	of	interviewing.	Accessibility	generally	refers	to	the	ability	of	the	interviewee	to	answer	the	questions	being	asked,	or	to	access	the	information	being	sought	(May	1993,	97).	Cognition	refers	to	the	interviewee	understanding	what	is	being	asked	of	him	or	her	(ibid).	Accessibility	is,	of	course,	more	important	in	the	case	of	the	structured	interview	whereby	specific	facts	are	being	sought.	But	it	is	also	important	that	questions	are	designed	such	that	they	are	appropriate	and	clear	to	the	interviewee.	Köngeter	and	Wolff’s	(2012)	discussion	of	experience	(via	John	Dewey)	is	useful	in	considering	these	two	issues	together.	They	note	that	experience	is	dependent	upon	the	acting	individual	doing	something	with	their	
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experience	after-the-fact.	Highly	significant	events	can	remain	unrecognized	whereas	passing	experiences	can	be	taken	as	highly	important.	There	is	no	pre-given	formula	for	what	may	be	established	as	significant.	But	rather	it	is	entirely	contingent.	Processing	of	experience	often	takes	place	at	what	the	authors	describe	as	hybrid	in-between	sites	which	they	define	as	“sites	at	which	the	processor	is	neither	here	nor	there:	eating	with	colleagues,	during	a	common	leisure	activity	or	much	later,	back	at	home,	at	meetings	of	‘ex-volunteers’”	(Köngeter	and	Wolff	2012,	7).	These	hybrid	in-between	sites	exist	in	a	liminal	zone	where	local	identities	entangle	with	transnational	and	global	commitments	in	a	similar	way	to	participating	in	forums	and	conferences.	So	the	site	of	the	interview	is	critical	when	planning.	Another	important	problem	relates	to	the	relationship	between	the	interviewer	and	interviewee.	This	is	an	important	issue	as	different	cultures,	religions,	nationalities	and	personal	beliefs	will	be	represented.	Interviewees	may	respond	very	differently	based	on	their	own	identity	but	also	based	upon	how	they	view	their	relationship	with	the	interviewer.	As	a	result,	each	interview	will	need	to	be	considered	individually	to	ensure	that	the	interviewee	is	comfortable	with	the	interviewer	but	without	altering	the	essential	style	of	interview.	This	can	be	as	simple	as	style	of	dress	or	venue	but	may	also	include	speech-pattern	and	use	of	language.	Ultimately,	the	semi-structured	interview	offers	the	most	useful	way	to	deal	with	these	problems	as	it	allows	flexibility	at	the	same	time	as	a	minimum	level	of	standardization	and	strong	reliability.	In	order	to	benefit	this	aim	I	will	employ	a	set	of	standard	procedures	when	conducting	the	interview.	This	will	consist	of	a	basic	list	of	questions	based	on	the	funneling	approach.	This	approach	initiates	the	interview	with	a	general	introduction	and	icebreaker	question	followed	by	a	broad	question	related	to	the	topic	(an	example	of	which	begins	this	section)	to	get	the	interviewee	comfortable	and	to	allow	them	to	engage	slowly.	Each	question	will	then	be	followed	up	by	sub-questions,	though	there	will	be	room	to	advance	slower	or	quicker	depending	upon	the	experience	of	each	interviewee.	Finally,	to	ensure	a	high-level	of	fidelity	is	maintained	across	interviews	and	into	the	analysis	phase	I	will	record	interviews	with	a	voice-recording	device	and	transcribe	them	as	soon	as	possible	following	each	interview’s	completion.		
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Observation/Ethnography:	events	and	organizations	This	section	will	discuss	the	method	of	observation,	as	it	will	be	applied	for	this	research.	I	largely	draw	upon	a	limited	ethnographic	approach	to	applying	observation	within	the	context	of	specific	events	and	potentially	within	an	organizational	setting.	Ethnography	can	be	defined	as	“a	certain	style	of	research	distinguished	by	its	objectives	to	understand	the	social	meanings	and	activities	of	people	in	a	given	field	or	setting”	(Brewer	2000,	11).	Furthermore,	the	ethnographic	approach	also	generally	entails	a	mixture	of	specific	methods	such	as	direct	observation,	social	interaction,	interviewing,	data	collection,	documents	“and	open-endedness	in	the	direction	the	study	takes”	(Fielding	1995,	157).	As	such	it	colludes	nicely	with	the	other	methods	being	employed.	The	role	of	observation	in	this	research	is	inspired	by	discussions	of	ethnography	because	of	its	centrality	in	research	on	transnationalism	and	because	of	its	comprehensive	treatment	of	the	practice	and	use	of	observation	for	research.	Inspired	by	pioneers	of	this	approach	such	as	Boaz	and	Malinowski,	purists	would	define	ethnography	as	essentially	“living	with	and	living	like	those	who	are	studied’	(Van	Maanen	1988,	2).	However,	the	definition	offered	by	Brewer	(above)	suggests	a	more	flexible	relationship	to	the	specific	location	of	research.	This	is	crucial	for	transnational	research	in	which:	“The	local,	regional,	national,	and	global	are	not	automatic,	taken-for-granted	social	arenas,	but	rather	categories	that	must	be	investigated	as	constructed	and	contested	social	facts”	(Khagram	and	Levitt	2005,	26).		Bate	(1997)	decries	the	abundance	of	‘airplane	ethnography’	based	on	brief	trips	to-and-fro	by	the	academic	or	researcher.	This	is	a	worthy	criticism	and	one	that	is	fitting	to	the	task	at	hand.	But	the	intention	here	is	not	to	engage	in	a	thorough	ethnographic	technique	but	to	leverage	particular	aspects	of	the	ethnographic	approach	for	events.	The	ethnographic	‘being	there’	(Yanow	et	al	2012)	is	critical	for	the	analysis	of	particular	events	or	in	accounts	of	organizational	life.	For	events	in	particular,	the	time	frame	is	limited	and	requires	the	researcher	to	multi-task	in	relation	to	the	use	of	different	skills	and	goals.	Effective	interviewing	and	complementary	document	analysis	can	then	follow	up	‘being	there’	once	particular	questions	and	phenomena	have	been	identified	during	this	experiential	phase.	As	Yanow	et	al	(2012)	point	out	with	
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regard	to	organizational	ethnography	there	are	two	additional	benefits	that	this	approach	implies:	sensitivity	to	hidden	dimensions	and	to	actor-context	relations.	This	sensitivity	to	hidden	meanings	can	be	seen	in	the	discussion	of	hybrid	in-between	spaces	where	practitioners	fall	into	routine	or	taken-for-granted	understandings	until	confronted	by	the	researcher	or	placed	outside	of	their	zone	of	familiarity.	This	can	be	challenging	for	the	participant	as	it	can	be	seen	as	contrary	to	their	beliefs	or	interpretations.	As	a	result,	the	reflexivity	of	the	researcher	is	of	critical	importance	as	part	of	a	consideration	over	the	ethical	implications	(Yanow	et	al	2012,	338).		In	relation	to	this,	role	is	another	important	aspect	of	conducting	ethnographic	work	as	it	determines	the	relationship	between	the	researcher	and	the	subjects	of	study.	My	role	at	events	would	take	the	role	of	‘observer	as	participant’	whereby	I	spend	time	with	other	participants,	get	involved	in	the	tasks	and	workshops	but	still	maintain	my	identity	as	a	researcher,	thus	avoiding	full	immersion	(David	and	Sutton	2011,	158).	However,	this	is	also	a	relationship	that	is	in	constant	negotiation.	For	example,	workshop	scenarios	require	full	participation	in	order	to	maintain	the	integrity	of	the	environment,	which	could	be	affected	by	the	presence	of	a	complete	observer.	Full	participation	is	potentially	dangerous	if	the	perspective	of	the	research	is	not	maintained.	It	would	be	easy	in	this	situation	to	become	too	involved	or	to	compete	with	other	participants,	thereby	affecting	the	environment	or	outcomes,	and	potentially	also	internal	validity.	So	as	Hammersley	and	Atkinson	(1995,	109)	point	out,	this	relationship	needs	to	be	managed	in	order	to	avoid	marginality	but	also	to	ensure	that	the	researcher	does	not	lose	his/her	own	perspective	based	in	the	research.	Another	problem	is	that	of	access.	Gaining	access	can	be	difficult	in	the	first	place	but	there	is	also	the	risk	of	introducing	bias	to	the	study	(David	and	Sutton	2011,	156)	and	determining	the	ultimate	direction	of	the	research	(though	this	need	to	necessarily	be	a	negative	outcome).	These	are	problems	that	need	to	be	considered	in	terms	of	sampling	and	the	determination	of	best	practices	for	the	study	at	hand.			During	observation	extensive	notes	will	be	taken	according	to	three	criteria:	reflective	notes,	descriptive	notes	and	demographic	information.	Notes	will	be	taken	in	a	dedicated	notebook	and	will	be	typed	on	a	computer	as	quickly	
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as	possible	following	the	observation	phase.	Reflective	notes	will	include	specific	ideas,	thoughts,	feelings,	impressions	and	speculations	of	the	researcher	during	the	observation	(Boglan	and	Biklen	1992,	121	in	Creswell	2009,	182).	Descriptive	notes	will	focus	on	details	of	the	events	and	people	involved	including	visual	and	physical	criteria.	Finally,	demographic	information	is	the	date,	time,	place	information	(Creswell	2009,	182).	This	practice	will	be	maintained	throughout	and	will	help	to	ensure	validity	in	the	final	analysis	of	the	data/observation.			
Sampling		Sampling	will	be	necessary	as	it	will	not	be	possible	to	involve	the	entire	population	for	reasons	of	geographical	distance,	resources	and	time.	Selecting	a	limited	number	of	cases	will	benefit	this	research	as	it	will	allow	in-depth	exploration	of	each	case	rather	than	employ	a	thin	understanding	of	many	general	cases	(Moser	and	Kalton	1983,	57).	The	units	of	analysis	will	be	civil	society	organizations	and	social	and	political	actors	who	are	members	of	regional	institutions	and	activities.	It	will	also	include	people	working	in	regional	institutions,	like	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation,	and	officials	from	regional	bodies,	including	the	European	Union	and	Union	for	the	Mediterranean.	Ascertaining	the	actual	sample	will	require	a	few	different	techniques	applied	in	conjunction	and	at	different	stages	of	the	study	(Strauss	and	Corbin	1998).	These	techniques	will	primarily	consist	of	a	multi-stage	approach	of	purposive	and	snowball	sampling.	Problems	of	population	size	and	geographic	distance	as	well	as	financial	and	time	constraints	make	these	two	techniques	the	most	effective.	The	use	of	these	techniques	will	maximize	the	samples’	representativeness.	Generalizability	will	be	sacrificed	for	thorough	exploration	of	a	limited	sample.	As	the	research	is	focused	on	subjective	experiences	this	is	not	a	shortcoming.	The	purpose	is	not	to	construct	an	accurate	and	general	depiction	of	the	entirety	of	relations	but	to	offer	a	precise	and	thick	analysis	of	the	impact	of	regional	developments	on	specific	actors	through	their	own	roles	and	experiences.			 Purposive	sampling	will	be	employed	based	on	the	experience	of	attending	events	in	the	UK	and	France	during	which	potential	participants	were	
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identified,	approached	and	given	a	brief	introduction	to	the	topic.	Participating	in	the	events	allowed	the	researcher	to	observe	different	actors	and	gave	an	idea	of	how	they	fit	into	organizational	and	regional	politics.	This	then	also	made	it	possible	to	evaluate	each	actor’s	relevance	and	representativeness	for	the	sample.	The	purposive	technique	is	appropriate	alongside	snowballing	whereby	selected	participants	(or	cases)	introduce	the	researcher	to	other	possible	participants.	This	is	a	beneficial	approach	to	discovering	the	social	networks	of	participants	and	offers	an	informal	way	to	access	a	larger	sample	(Atkinson	and	Flint	2001).	This	approach	reflects	some	of	the	ideas	inherent	to	the	multi-sited	ethnography	approach	that	is	important	in	transnational	research	as	it	allows	for	a	gradual	discovery	of	the	networks	that	exist	between	actors	with	common	affinities	(or	ethnic	origins)	across	boundaries.	This	networking	aspect	could	be	an	important	aspect	of	the	study	as	it	can	reveal	the	geographical	extent	and	the	social	density	of	relations	among	regional	actors.	In	some	ways	then	the	positive	aspect	for	this	study	outweighs	the	negatives	inherent	in	the	snowballing	technique.	This	lies	in	the	possibility	of	introducing	bias	by	reflecting	like-minded	or	self-selected	individuals	over	a	random	or	more	representative	sample.	But	any	mode	of	sampling	for	this	research	will	have	to	contend	with	the	major	constraints	of	population	size,	time,	resources	and	geographical	distance.	Some	of	these	problems	can	and	will	be	overcome	through	the	use	of	Skype,	email	and	phone	calls.			
Analysis,	Reliability	and	Validity		The	final	issues	to	be	discussed	pertain	to	reliability	and	validity.	Qualitative	reliability	generally	refers	to	ensuring	the	consistency	of	methods	(Creswell	2009,	190).	Also,	as	Yin	(2003)	points	out	all	procedures	should	be	documented	including	specific	steps	that	are	part	of	individual	methods.	This	offers	the	possibility	of	replication	in	the	future	by	either	the	same	researcher	or	other	researchers	in	the	field.	In	order	to	ensure	reliability	a	database	of	steps	for	each	method	will	be	created	and	maintained	throughout	the	research	process.	Standard	procedures	for	the	interviews	in	terms	of	recording,	structure	and	style	will	be	used	as	much	as	possible	without	affecting	the	experience	of	the	
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interviewee.	Also,	a	standard	protocol	for	note	taking	during	observation	will	also	ensure	that	steps	can	be	replicated	as	far	as	the	individual	steps	go.	Validity	is	a	bit	more	complex	for	qualitative	research	and	can	be	divided	into	the	categories	of	internal	and	external	validity.			 Validity	broadly	refers	to	the	accuracy	of	the	findings.	Creswell	and	Miller	(2000)	identify	validity	as	being	linked	to	concepts	of	trustworthiness,	authenticity	and	credibility	and	they	argue	that	validity	is	actually	one	of	the	key	strengths	of	qualitative	research.	Internal	validity,	from	a	social	constructivist	approach,	is	based	on	the	trustworthiness	of	the	work	and	analysis	within	the	research	(Mishler	1990,	419).	This	requires	the	researcher	to	remain	dedicated	to	the	experience	of	the	participant	and/or	the	data.	Validity	in	this	regard	can	be	reviewed	by	going	back	to	recordings,	tapes	and	field	notes	to	ensure	that	the	spirit	of	the	case	remains	central	in	the	analysis.	In	some	cases	this	may	require	secondary	interviews	or	clarifications	on	points.	External	validity	tends	to	refer	to	generalizability,	which	is	somewhat	compromised	in	the	qualitative	approach.	However	it	is	important	to	clearly	record	descriptive	criteria,	locations,	contexts	that	would	allow	other	researchers	to	reliably	consider	transferring	the	approach	to	other	cases.	External	validity	also	requires	an	analysis	of	the	representativeness	of	the	sample	to	the	rest	of	the	population.	In	order	to	ensure	validity	it	will	be	important	to	exercise	a	number	of	strategies	through	each	phase	of	research.	Clarifying	bias	and	discussing	discrepant	information	will	be	central	to	the	task	(Creswell	2009,	191).	Bias	has	already	been	mentioned	as	a	problem	during	sampling	and	gathering	data	but	it	will	also	be	dealt	with	through	the	analysis	where	it	will	be	possible	to	reflect	on	the	impact	and	significance	of	instances	of	bias	that	may	be	(or	may	have	been)	introduced	to	the	study.	Similarly,	discrepant	information	will	be	discussed	during	the	analysis.	Both	of	these	discussions	can	help	to	build	a	realistic	and	valid	account	of	the	case	under	study.	The	data	will	also	be	approached	with	the	specific	strategies	in	mind	of	triangulation	and	thick	description	(Ibid,	192).	Triangulating	findings	across	multiple	sources	and	types	of	material	can	ensure	accuracy	of	interpretation	and	increase	the	persuasiveness	of	the	argument.	The	use	of	document	analysis,	interviews	and	observation	in	complement	will	allow	for	effective	triangulation.	Thick	description	ensures	that	the	write-up	and	
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analysis	is	thoroughly	based	in	the	reality,	beliefs	and	lives	of	the	participants	(David	and	Sutton	2011,	20).	Validity	and	reliability	will	be	built	into	each	method	and	stage	of	analysis	followed	by	a	discussion	of	any	issues	or	problems	that	arise.	The	methods	have	been	selected	according	to	their	appropriateness	for	the	study	but	also	for	their	strong	reliability	and	validity	with	the	use	of	a	clear	protocol	of	procedures	for	each	step.		
Conclusion	In	studying	the	Euro-Mediterranean	region	there	exists	the	opportunity	to	reflect	the	transnationalization	of	Europe	as	opposed	to	solely	the	Europeanization	of	its	‘neighborhood’.	As	is	commonly	noted,	the	EU’s	borders	do	not	fit	the	national	mould	of	distinct	sides	but	are,	to	the	contrary,	based	on	complexity	and	a	certain	‘fuzziness’	(O’Dowd	and	Dimitrovova	2010;	Christiansen	et	al	2000;	Zielonka	2006).	The	approach	taken	in	this	research	highlights	that	this	fuzziness	is	fundamental	to	the	European	project	and	in	its	relations	with	its	near-abroad.	There	is	a	long	and	complex	history	between	both	shores	of	the	Mediterranean,	however	it	is	only	fairly	recently	that	these	relations	have	begun	to	be	formalized	through	institutions.	Functionally,	the	EU	is	limited	in	terms	of	external	instruments,	and	opportunism	on	both	the	part	of	EU	policy-makers	and	state	leaders	has	often	reduced	the	scope	of	cooperation	in	the	region.	The	purpose	of	this	research	is	to	delve	beyond	the	bilateral	relations	favored	within	the	ENP	framework	and	investigate	the	opportunities	and	realities	of	networking	among	societal	organizations	and	social	actors	on	both	sides	of	the	Mediterranean;	and	from	this	to	respond	to	the	question,	what	role	do	transnational	networks	play	in	constructing	cultural	relations	between	Europe	and	the	Mediterranean	(specifically	as	part	of	the	Euro-Mediterranean	space)?		One	assumption	being	that	it	is	not	only	through	formal	and	official	channels	that	political,	and	social,	developments	evolve.	This	research	examines	the	role	of	cultural	networks	within	Europe	and	networking	organizations	in	the	EuroMediterranean	in	constructing	a	Euro-Mediterranean	space	and	giving	voice	to	alternative	representations.		
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There	are	two	broad	aspects	to	this	study;	the	first	section	begins	conceptually	by	considering	the	process	of	transnationalization	and	how	it	relates	to	the	relationship	between	culture	and	politics.	It	then	moves	to	consider	the	role	that	transnational	cultural	networks	have	played	in	the	evolution	of	an	external	cultural	policy	within	Europe	and	helped	to	establish	influential	discourses	of	transnationalism	within	such	policy	fields.	The	second	major	section	turns	to	understanding	the	realities	of	networking	through	a	key	regional	organization	–	The	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	–	established	in	this	context	of	these	transformations.	This	research	considers	the	Euro-Mediterranean	within	the	context	of	global	and	transnational	change	and	through	evolving	forms	of	political	contestation.	As	suggested	above,	the	symbolic	and	constructed	nature	of	the	Euro-Mediterranean	is	a	problem	to	be	considered	throughout	and	is	an	important	aspect	of	interrogating	the	region	from	multiple	perspectives.			
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Chapter	2:	Background	Literature:	Going	beyond	
fragmentation	vs.	unity		This	chapter	expands	on	some	of	the	ideas	and	themes	discussed	in	the	introduction	by	reviewing	the	academic	literature	that	has	explicitly	analyzed	the	development	of	Euro-Mediterranean	relations	as	well	as	literature	that	makes	a	contribution	to	the	understanding	of	cultures	and	boundaries,	civil	society	and	transnationalism.	These	latter	sections	also	begin	to	elaborate	key	themes	that	influence	the	approach	taken	in	this	research	which	aspires	to	a	wider	(transnational)	perspective	on	understanding	cultural	relations.	As	such	it	demonstrates	the	relevance	and	ongoing	significance	of	the	research	subject.	It	also	establishes	a	gap	in	the	discussion	of	Euro-Mediterranean	cultural	relations	in	terms	of	the	subject	of	study	–	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	and	its	related	networks	–	and	in	approach	by	understanding	the	evolution	of	such	networks	in	a	global	context.			 	The	review	begins	by	addressing	a	theme	common	to	much	of	the	literature	in	EuroMediterranean	relations	and	moves	on	to	consider	some	key	ideas	and	concepts	that	provide	an	intellectual	backdrop	to	the	issues	discussed	in	the	remaining	sections.	The	review	then	moves	on	to	consider	cultural	relations	in	the	EuroMediterranean.	This	section	is	divided	into	three	sub-sections	divided	temporally	and	thematically.	The	first	sub-section	considers	the	development	of	institutional	frameworks	and	their	inclusion	of	culture.	The	second	sub-section	reviews	the	EU’s	response	to	the	Arab	Spring	and	its	impact	on	existing	frameworks.	The	final	sub-section	begins	to	theorize	the	cultural	impact	of	the	Arab	Spring	on	regional	actors	and,	by	extension,	their	role	in	regional	politics.	The	third,	and	final,	section	of	this	chapter	reviews	contributions	to	the	study	of	transnationalism	in	order	to	set	out	elements	of	a	transnational	approach	drawing	on	networking,	experiential,	and	practical	accounts.	It	raises	the	possibility	of	incorporating	some	of	the	insights	from	this	literature	to	bear	on	the	development	of	EuroMediterranean	relations	and	suggests	the	ability	to	help	illuminate	the	politico-strategic	motivations	of	
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promoting	regional	networks,	as	well	as	way	in	which	participants	might	experience	and	engage	with	overarching	narrative	frames.	Perhaps	one	of	the	fundamental	difficulties	is	how	to	understand	the	regionality	of	the	Mediterranean.	It	is	an	issue	that	is	bound	to	produce	a	variety	of	interpretations	depending	on	the	favored	approach	or	subject.	The	theme	of	fragmentation	vs.	unity	dominates	the	literature	that	sets	out	to	understand	the	significance	and	origins	of	developments	in	the	region.	This	is	not	always	explicit	but	betrays	the	reliance	on	a	dualism	that	suggests	only	two	possible	avenues	for	understanding	the	nature	of	developments	–	good	integration	through	political	and	economic	cooperation	and	bad	fragmentation	as	a	result	of	cultural	difference	and	resorting	to	state	power.	The	result	leads	to	an	assumption	of	conflict	resulting	from	difference.	Approaches	such	as	regionalization	attempt	to	overcome	this	duality	through	the	inclusion	of	civil	society	as	a	tertiary	factor.	However,	this	approach	too	relies	heavily	on	economic	and	state-based	interactions	that	favor	an	understanding	of	integration	through	formal	and	political	means.	What	this	section	demonstrates	is	the	need	for	an	approach	that	recognizes	that	diversity	and	hybridity	is	not	a	problem	but	a	core	element	of	regional	cooperation.	Thus,	the	final	section	sets	out	an	approach	based	on	a	multifold	understanding	of	transnationalism	that	offers	a	way	to	bring	hybridity	and	complexity	back	in	to	the	study	of	cultural	relations	in	the	EuroMediterranean	and	a	nuanced	understanding	of	how	power	relations	are	produced	through	networked	relations.		As	Michelle	Pace	(2006)	has	pointed	out,	International	Relations	literature	often	treats	the	‘region’	is	in	a	holistic	manner;	that	is,	the	region	is	assumed	to	have	an	identity	separate	from	its	parts.	Instead,	the	author	proposes	the	study	of	a	Mediterranean	area,	which	supposes	multiple	constructions	and	realities	(Pace	2006,	2).	This	approach	would	avoid	a	representation	of	the	region	as	a	homogeneous	unit	and	offers	a	better	way	to	incorporate	a	variety	of	cultural	contexts.	Whereas	for	Pace	this	involved	particular	constructions	of	the	region	on	the	part	of	EU	elites	and	policy-makers,	it	would	also	be	beneficial	to	consider	the	way	in	which	civil	society	actors	respond	to	and	take	part	in	interactions	across	the	Mediterranean	and	with	these	political	constructions.	Avoiding	the	reification	of	a	Euro-Mediterranean	region	will	be	very	important	
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for	understanding	the	development	of	cultural	interactions	and	regional	identifications.	However,	it	should	also	be	possible	to	consider	the	Mediterranean	and	constructions	of	the	Euro-Mediterranean	without	breaking	it	down	to	the	sum	of	its	parts.	In	addition	to	these	two	approaches	we	can	add	cross-border	cooperation,	which	incorporates	many	of	the	insights	of	these	approaches	and	offers	an	understanding	of	the	region	in	terms	of	opportunity	structures	and	processes	of	socialization,	thus	going	beyond	a	general	conception	of	the	‘region’.	With	the	development	of	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean	(UfM)	it	is	worth	reconsidering	the	form	and	function	of	regional	developments.		 Another	important	observation	is	that	this	concern	for	creating	a	more	conciliatory	space	was	not	only	reflected	in	the	EU’s	external	relations.	As	Isabel	Schäfer	points	out,	the	Mediterranean	as	a	concept	was	somewhat	in	vogue	in	the	1990s	during	which	time	North	Atlantic	Treaty	Organization	(NATO),	the	Western	European	Union	(WEU),	the	Organization	for	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe	(OSCE),	Council	of	Europe	as	well	as	the	United	Nations	Education,	Scientific	and	Cultural	Organization	(UNESCO)	all	created	programmes	designed	to	increase	cooperation	across	the	sea	(Schäfer	2007:	337-338).	UNESCO’s	Mediterranean	program,	established	in	1994,	also	put	forth	the	idea	that	stability	in	the	Mediterranean	region	relied	upon	the	convergence	of	cultures	and	identities	(Ibid).	It	is	during	the	development	of	these	programs	that	the	central	theme	of	fragmentation	versus	unity	becomes	a	mainstay	reflecting	both	the	cultural	debate	over	the	clash	of	civilisations/dialogue	of	civilisations	and	the	political	and	economic	imperatives	of	region	building.		
	
Key	Concepts	and	Ideas	
Regionalism,	states	and	civil	society	The	EMP	can	be	understood	as	an	emerging	multidimensional	regime	establishing	links	between	issue	areas	rather	than	separating	out	areas	of	interest	and	dominance	(Xenakis	2000;	Panebianco	2003;	Attina	1996).	Approaching	the	regional	framework	from	the	perspective	of	regimes	implicates	a	form	of	regionalization	that	encompasses	a	wide	range	of	actors	–	state	and	
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non-state	–	and	includes	an	important	cultural	element	as	a	result	of	interdependence	(Chryssochou	and	Xenakis	2002).	Chryssochou	and	Xenakis	argue	that	we	should	favor	a	view	of	the	Mediterranean	as	constituted	‘between	complexity	and	reality’	and	through	the	‘enduring	influence	of	cultural	distinctiveness	and	civilizational	diversity	in	the	politics	of	regional	order-building’	(2002,	143).	The	authors	are	correct	in	asserting	that	we	must	recognize	that	the	Euro-Mediterranean	is	uniquely	constituted	between	the	multiple	external	and	internal	regional	policies	and	institutions	and	that	fragmentation	that	is	often	decisive	in	the	political	sphere.	Or,	as	Joffe	(2001)	mentions,	the	Euro-Mediterranean	“appears	to	be	part	of	a	dualism,	bringing	together	the	structured	integration	of	the	European	Union	itself	and	the	‘open	regionalism…which	is	said	to	characterise	the	Barcelona	Process”	(Joffe	2001,	207).	Since	this	observation	there	has	been	a	significant	increase	in	the	number	and	overall	development	of	institutions	in	the	region	and	there	is	perhaps	ever	more	complexity.	Joffe’s	(2001)	analysis	definitely	points	towards	the	importance	of	the	region	for	security	and	perhaps	also	directs	us	towards	the	idea	of	the	security	community	as	the	prime	regional	dynamic	(see	Adler	and	Crawford	2005).	On	the	other	hand,	the	problems	of	security	and	migration	in	the	Mediterranean	are	framed	in	terms	of	their	impact	on	European	countries,	not	in	terms	of	a	regional	solution	(Joffe	2001,	217).	This	approach	points	towards	a	realist	model	rather	than	any	regionalizing	dynamic.	And	while	it	certainly	has	the	ability	to	produce	accurate	criticism	of	EU	policy-making	in	the	Mediterranean	region	it	also	does	not	pick	up	on	some	of	the	ways	in	which	regional	actors	–	both	governmental	and	non-governmental	actors	–influence	the	direction	of	cooperation	initiatives.		Implicit	within	the	regionalization	approach	is	an	understanding	of	globalization.	Stephen	Calleya	(1997),	contrary	to	these	arguments,	doubts	the	regionalization	of	the	Mediterranean	due	to	the	politicized	nature	of	interactions	(Calleya	1997,	229).	While	there	has	been	some	progress	on	areas	of	political	interaction	it	is	still	largely	limited	to	areas	of	economic	concern	and	security,	despite	the	numerous	initiatives	since	the	Barcelona	Declaration.	Additionally,	the	difficulties	associated	with	the	EMP	have	been	linked	to	integration	fatigue	leaving	political	elites	skeptical	of	additional	proposals.	Taking	this	as	our	basis,	
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however,	would	ignore	the	important	areas	of	increased	interaction	and	engagement	at	not	only	the	political	level	but	even	in	the	social	and	cultural	fields	that	remain	underdeveloped	in	the	framework	of	EU	polices.	The	forms	of	political	interaction	are	at	their	very	heart	globally	produced	as	well	as	affected	by	the	geopolitics	of	proximity.	The	New	Regionalism	Approach	presumes	a	more	nuanced	link	to	global	processes	(Hettne	and	Soderbaum	2000;	Hettne	1999)	offering	an	understanding	of	regional	development	based	upon	a	multidimensional	process	–	economic,	social,	political	and	cultural	–	that	suggests	a	more	significant	role	for	non-state	actors	(Hettne	1999,	17).	However,	the	state-market-civil	society	triangle	limits	our	ability	to	engage	with	non-institutionalised	political	and	social	actors	through	the	implicit	primacy	given	to	state	actors	and	economic	interests	and	affords	relatively	little	attention	to	non-official	and	non-economic	civil	society	actors.	Thus,	while	it	can	introduce	many	important	factors	and	can	even	highlight	the	existence	of	various	actors	it	cannot	adequately	deal	with	their	roles,	experiences	and	influences	on	the	process	of	creating	a	Euro-Mediterranean	space.	The	institutional	approach	can	be	supplemented	by	a	keener	attention	to	social	factors.	Due	to	a	relatively	narrow	definition	of	globalization	in	terms	of	economic	expansion	and	state-driven	politics	it	does	not	adequately	deal	with	the	loci	of	particular	influences	or	the	significance	of	social	and	cultural	factors.	On	the	other	hand,	this	type	of	approach	suggests	that	the	various	policy	initiatives	and	institutions	are	best	seen	in	terms	of	an	overall	institutionalization	of	political	and	economic	interactions	across	the	region.	So	to	understand	a	‘Euro-Mediterranean’	we	cannot	separate	these	various	aspects	but	recognize	their	interconnectedness.	The	official	concept	of	variable	geometry	recognizes	this	interconnectedness	but	in	practice	maintains	a	strict	hierarchy	between	the	economic,	political	and	social	fields	generally	favoring	economic	development.		Some	have	already	questioned	whether	the	UfM	represents	a	turning	away	from	the	regional	approach	inherent	in	the	EMP	(Kausch	and	Youngs	2009;	Aliboni	2009).	Certainly	some	of	the	progress	made	in	terms	of	civil	society	engagement	under	the	EMP	through	the	Civil	Forums	and	the	development	of	initiatives	such	as	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	(a	late	development)	deserve	fresh	attention	in	terms	of	the	new	geopolitical	picture.	Geopolitical	factors	play	an	
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important	role	for	the	way	in	which	social	relations	are	structured	and	the	way	in	which	political	and	social	actors	relate.	As	noted	by	Bicchi	(2010)	in	her	analysis	of	EU-North	Africa	relations	in	the	context	of	the	European	Neighborhood	Policy,	neighboring	states	have	been	capable	of	separating	favorable	dimensions	from	unfavorable	ones,	such	as	economic	elements	from	political	(Bicchi	2010).	Civil	society	is	one	area	that	is	generally	under	significant	threat	from	this	possibility.	Furthermore,	the	ability	of	states	to	separate	these	elements	is	strengthened	by	the	strategy	of	differentiation	as	practiced	within	the	ENP.	This	has	further	negative	consequences	for	the	success	of	networks	and	societal	actors	by	increasing	the	ability	of	states	to	inhibit	density	and	intensity	of	relations	for	political	reasons.	The	UfM	also	appears	to	push	national	interests	to	the	fore	and	further	threaten	the	possibility	of	multilateralism	and	a	cohesive	regional	approach	to	socio-cultural	issues,	democracy	promotion,	or	human	rights	(Bicchi	2011).		The	UfM	marks	a	fundamental	change	in	direction	from	the	EMP	and	the	ENP	and	the	new	‘Partnership	for	Democracy	and	Shared	Prosperity’	(PfDSP)	appears	to	ferment	this	new	direction	in	EU	Mediterranean	policy	as	it	explicitly	refers	to	establishing	a	greater	role	for	the	UfM	-	alongside	“positive	elements	of	the	Barcelona	Process”	-	by	continuing	the	strategy	of	‘variable	geometry’	(COM(2011)	200,	11).	This	is	reflected	in	the	EU’s	joint	communication	on	the	European	Neighborhood	Policy	wherein	the	UfM	is	endorsed	as	a	complement	to	the	bilateral	approach	of	the	ENP,	which	in	turn	would	allow	Action	Plans	to	focus	on	fewer	priorities	(COM(2011)	303,	18).	The	development	of	new	and	existing	cultural	initiatives	is	notably	absent,	even	within	discussion	of	the	promotion	of	‘partnership	between	people.’	This	new	functional	–	project-oriented	-	direction	posits	a	uniquely	‘EU’ropean	brand	of	region-building	to	the	contrary	of	many	previous	arguments	focusing	on	the	role	of	normative	values.	However,	it	cannot	be	said	at	this	point	exactly	what	direction	these	developments	will	take.	As	Gillespie	(2008)	noted	from	the	outset,	the	UfM	looks	to	orient	regional	policy	towards	the	EU.	Moreover,	implicit	in	this	approach	is	a	conception	of	functionally	limited	cooperation,	which	establishes	a	potential	basis	for	economic	integration	(Calleya	2009).	Alun	Jones	(2011),	a	political	geographer,	effectively	links	region-building	and	regionalization	processes	in	his	
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analysis	of	the	region-building	imperatives	of	the	EU	within	the	Mediterranean.	Jones’	analysis	highlights	the	ways	in	which	the	Mediterranean	is	spatially	constructed	in	order	to	legitimize	EU	political	actions.	This	spatial	approach	focuses	upon	the	territorial,	symbolic	and	institutional	constructions	that	together	form	the	basis	behind	political	constructions	of	the	region.	Territorially,	EU	elites	construct	the	region	as	lacking	any	collective	identity	either	politically	or	ideationally.	In	response,	regionalization	practices	are	justified.	Symbolic	constructions	depict	the	Mediterranean	as	politically	and	economically	volatile	and	threatening	to	EU	democracies	and	economies.	These	constructions	lend	legitimacy	to	the	extension	of	EU	governance	practices	and	the	institutionalization	of	political	practices	across	the	Mediterranean	region	in	a	process	of	Europeanization	(Jones	2011,	42).	This	spatial	perspective	reveals	the	complex	imaginaries	that	are	employed	by	political	actors.	What	requires	further	consideration	is	how	the	existing	institutions	and	instruments	for	fostering	regional	interaction	with	civil	societies	are	incorporated	into	these	constructions.	Building	on	this	will	allow	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	civil	society	actors	and	regional	development.	The	Anna	Lindh	Foundation,	which	has	its	basis	in	the	EMP	and	has	developed	during	a	period	of	transition	to	the	UfM,	offers	a	unique	institutionalization	of	the	socio-cultural	element	of	Euro-Mediterranean	policies.	Particular	interests	are	reflected	in	the	development	of	the	Foundation,	however	it	also	produces	novel	opportunity	structures	and	patterns	of	interaction	among	civil	society	actors	that	were	previously	limited	to	the	Civil	Forums.	A	stronger	analysis	of	the	ALF	is	thus	required	to	understand	its	role	in	the	region	in	fostering	regional	networking	among	civil	society	actors	as	well	as	in	the	promotion	of	intercultural	dialogue.	Understanding	the	role	and	capacity	of	civil	society	actors	to	engage	with	the	developing	institutions	and	forms	of	regionalism	is	perhaps	better	served	by	a	more	focused	analysis	on	the	specific	opportunity	structures.		
Concepts	of	Culture	Returning	to	cultural	relations	in	the	EuroMediterranean	requires	a	sensitive	approach	to	culture	that	can	account	for	different	traditions,	practices,	and	discourses.	Pieterse	(2009),	for	example,	understands	culture	as	being	learned	(not	instinctual)	and	shared	(not	individual)	leaving	no	territorial	limits	to	
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culture	and	opening	it	up	to	experience.	Thus,	he	distinguishes	between	
territorial	culture	and	translocal	culture	(Pieterse	2009,	48).	Linked	to	the	broader	idea	of	hybridization,	it	is	a	distinction	that	is	crucial	in	terms	of	understanding	the	context	of	cultural	identities	and	practices	while	at	the	same	time	linking	us	directly	to	the	implications	of	boundary	crossing.	Ultimately,	we	cannot	pursue	an	effective	intercultural	or	transcultural	agenda	without	first	recognizing	the	true	value	and	extent	of	difference.	Thus,	between	an	overly	static	depiction	of	culture	(i.e.:	clash	of	civilizations)	or	an	overly	dynamic	understanding	this	approach	suggests	that	there	are	both	more	structural	elements	to	culture	and	more	fluid	elements	(Pieterse	1996,	1392-1393).	Communication	strategies	and	the	incorporation	of	technologies	are	an	example	of	the	more	fluid	aspect	of	culture	however	there	are	also	deep-seated	understandings	and	practices	which,	if	misunderstood,	may	limit	any	reconciliation	between	cultures.	As	a	result,	this	distinction	between	territorial	and	trans-local	culture	is	highly	beneficial	theoretically	but	for	the	consideration	of	cultural	interactions	and	power	asymmetries	we	need	to	begin	with	a	substantial	account	of	the	contents	of	cultural	interactions.		The	idea	of	Multiple	Modernities,	most	closely	associated	with	the	work	of	Schmuel	Eisenstadt,	offers	a	useful	way	to	reconsider	some	of	the	problems	associated	with	previous	accounts	of	culture	in	the	Euro-Mediterranean	area	and	one	that	also	accounts	for	the	central	role	of	social	actors	and	social	movements	in	helping	to	determine	the	course	of	modern	transformation	in	different	societies.	Eisenstadt	argues	that:	“the	various	programmes	of	modernity	that	developed	in	these	[western]	societies	have	been	continuously	crystallized	through	the	process	of	a	highly	selective	incorporation	and	transformation	in	these	civilizations	of	the	various	premises	of	Western	modernity”	(Eisenstadt	2000).	In	terms	of	the	Euro-Mediterranean	this	is	an	intriguing	point	of	departure	as	it	is	undoubtedly	an	EU	construction	institutionally	and	also	in	terms	of	a	regional	identity.	However,	it	also	incorporates	various	regional	actors	that	do	not	share	the	same	sense	of	state-society	relations.	As	pointed	out	by	Stefan	Stetter	(2008),	there	can	be	said	to	be	an	element	of	cultural	path-dependency	which	shape	distinct	forms	of	modernity	but	which	also	allow	us	to	
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recognize	both	processes	of	isomorphization	and	heteromorphization	(Stetter	2008,	23-4).		Isomorphization,	the	development	of	common	institutions	and	political	and	social	practices,	can	be	found	across	the	Mediterranean	and	is	a	result	of	the	intermingling	of	societies	and	governments	as	well	as	of	power	asymmetries	and	the	consequences	of	colonialism.	The	emergence	of	new	media	stations	–	Al-Jazeera	being	the	most	widely	recognized	–	along	with	satellite	technology	and	various	social	media	have	also	influenced	isomorphic	developments	in	both	institutional	and	cultural	terms	through	the	imposition	of	market	forces	and	new	technologies.		Heteromorphization,	however,	can	be	seen	as	the	unique	historical,	cultural	and	geographical	circumstances	leading	to	differentiated	developments	within	individual	states	and	societies.	A	useful	example	of	this,	which	also	helps	us	to	move	away	from	bounding	the	idea	solely	in	terms	of	nations,	is	the	way	in	which	Islamic	movements	have	re-appropriated	(not	rejected)	the	common	elements	of	modernity	through	a	process	of	publicity,	professionalization	and	diversifying	(Göle	2002).	Contrary	to	modernization	theory,	Nilufer	Göle’s	insight	reveals	that	it	is	not	a	question	of	compatibility	between	religious	movements	and	‘modernity’	but	rather	a	question	of	how	they	interact.	Linked	to	heteromorphization	is	the	totality	of	implicit	understandings	that	inform	the	beliefs	and	practices	in	society	–	the	social	imaginary	(Taylor	1992,	218-219).	Values	in	this	sense	are	continuously	transformed	by	the	interaction	with	and	across	modernities,	however	wholesale	change	is	unlikely.		As	Charles	Taylor	(1992)	argues	with	regard	to	the	development	of	the	public	spheres	in	the	West,	it	is	the	commonly	held	values,	beliefs	and	practices	that	make	the	development	of	any	public	sphere	possible.	This	is	an	idea	that	will	also	be	picked	up	on	in	the	subsequent	discussion	of	civil	society,	but	it	is	informative	here	as	it	draws	us	away	from	considering	Western	developments	solely	in	terms	of	rationalization	and	individualization,	though	these	were	also	features	in	the	case	of	the	West,	and	draws	us	back	to	some	of	the	historical	and	religious	beliefs	that	have	undergone	their	own	transformations	and	have	informed	developments	across	time.	The	social	imaginary	may	be	a	somewhat	vague	and	difficult	term	to	apply	but	it	is	interesting	as	it	allows	us	to	consider	
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the	communal	aspect	of	modernity	thus	positing	multiple	interpretations,	the	Western	experience	being	only	one.		In	this	sense,	the	multiple	modernities	approach	does	allow	us	to	consider	what	is	common	across	the	differentiations	of	the	modern	period	without	referring	to	a	particular	‘global	condition’	(Wittrock	2003,	55).	Volker	Schmidt	(2006)	criticizes	the	multiple	modernities	approach	for	being	overly	cultural	and	as	a	result	for	failing	to	acknowledge	the	profound	socio-economic	transformations	associated	with	modern	development.	He	suggests	that	this	approach	implies:	“that	there	must	be	greater	variance	across	civilizational	lines	than	across	time”	(Schmidt	2006,	81).	Though	Schmidt	is	correct	to	assert	that	we	must	be	more	specific	about	the	nature	of	differences	his	temporal	criticism	only	seems	to	make	sense	if	we	limit	our	discussion	to	economic	(specifically	capitalist)	development,	which	asserts	the	convergence	of	social	and	cultural	attitudes.	On	the	contrary,	as	has	been	discussed	in	terms	of	isomorphization	and	heteromorphization,	there	is	a	more	complex	relationship	between	the	cultural	and	socio-economic	elements.	As	a	result,	one	of	the	key	aspects	of	the	multiple	modernities	approach	is	to	avoid	the	presumption	that	there	is	one	particular	path	to	modernity	(as	per	modernization	theory)	and	instead	suggests	the	significance	of	on-going	interpretation	and	interaction.	This	is	not	to	deny	the	centrality	of	the	global	capitalist	market	or	even	the	existence	of	global	values	changes	across	different	cultures,	however	these	transformations	are	in	large	part	still	culturally	determined	rather	than	standardized	(Sachsenmeier	2001,	44).		 Dirlik	(2003)	suggests	that	the	theory	of	multiple	modernities	ultimately	rests	upon	a	reification	of	cultural	identities	based	upon	the	nation-state	and	as	a	result	reinforces	a	Western	cultural	bias	(Dirlik	2003).The	example	of	Islamic	movements	offers	a	counter-argument	but	this	is	still	an	important	point.	States	often	portray	themselves	in	cultural	terms,	though	it	is	usually	representative	of	only	a	relatively	small	portion	of	the	overall	population	and	only	one	among	many	cultural	communities.	As	a	result,	Islamist	movements	can	be	highly	threatening	to	the	state	not	only	in	terms	of	their	capacity	for	mobilization	but	also	as	an	opponent	of	the	particular	state	culture.	In	terms	of	the	territorial	–	trans-local	distinction	it	might	be	tempting	to	characterize	these	Islamist	groups	
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as	evoking	territorial	forms	of	culture	whereas	more	secular	elites	(such	as	Kemalist	elites	in	Turkey)	may	represent	a	trans-local	culture.	However,	this	runs	the	risk	of	equating	trans-local	forms	with	secular	or	westernized	values.	Instead,	social	movements	should	be	seen	a	crucial	actors	in	determining	the	direction	of	modern	developments	(Eisenstadt	2002).	This	also	requires	there	to	be	more	than	one	cultural	understanding	within	any	state.	As	such:	“modernity	is	not	one	but	many;	modernity	is	not	new,	but	old	and	familiar;	modernity	is	incomplete	and	necessarily	so”	(Gaonkar	1999,	18).	The	modern	world	should	be	seen	not	as	homogenization	but	as	a	continual	constitution	and	reconstitution	of	a	multiplicity	of	cultural	programs	and	the	Euro-Mediterranean	should	be	similarly	considered.	Additionally,	we	should	recognize	the	competitiveness	within	Arab	societies	of	different	cultural	and	political	worldviews	(Salem	2002).			 Post-colonial	approaches	have	specifically	taken	up	this	challenge	in	considering	the	Mediterranean	as	a	‘post-colonial	sea’,	which	stresses	the	unsettled	and	imaginary	constructions	that	have	served	to	historically	and	politically	define	the	region	(Chambers	2008).	However	to	understand	the	Euro-Mediterranean	we	should	also	be	careful	to	place	policy	and	institutional	developments	as	key	additional	factors	in	the	development	of	interactions.	To	do	this	is	not	to	take	on	the	problem	of	a	culturist-universalist	divide	as	has	been	asserted	between	the	discourse	of	human	rights	versus	political	interests	(Biad	2003)	but	to	recognize	the	cultural	content	across	different	representations	and	discourses.	In	this	context	intercultural	dialogue	represents	an	ideal	of	political	and	social	cooperation	that	goes	beyond	this	divide.	In	the	Euro-Mediterranean	intercultural	dialogue	is	both	a	key	aspect	of	EU	policy	and	a	stage	in	the	development	of	an	alternative	approach	to	the	Euro-Mediterranean.	As	a	result,	the	practice	of	intercultural	dialogue	can	neither	be	separated	from	the	cultural	context	nor	from	the	political	context,	which	makes	it	highly	problematic	(as	demonstrated	by	Del	Sarto	2005)	in	practice	but	also	very	significant	for	understanding	the	heterogeneity	of	the	Euro-Mediterranean.	It	also	calls	for	a	better	integration	of	social	elements	as	part	of	a	dialogue.	In	many	ways,	the	prominence	of	the	nation-state	for	political	struggle	limits	the	applicability	of	notions	such	as	intercultural	dialogue,	which	would	surely	require	the	development	of	identities	beyond	the	nation-state	in	order	to	be	more	inclusive	
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and	open.	Intercultural	dialogue,	however,	when	linked	to	the	nation-state	establishes	an	automatic	divide	between	cultural	and	political	units	and	reproduces	existing	power	structures	(Sachsenmeier	2001,	57).			 So	how	can	we	incorporate	the	complex	political	contexts	into	an	understanding	of	cultural	interaction?	The	concept	of	the	encounter	provides	the	crucial	basis	for	assisting	our	understanding.	Delanty	(2011)	establishes	a	typology	of	the	encounter	based	upon	a	relational	understanding	of	culture.	As	such,	the	encounter	focuses	on	the	substance	of	interaction	and	the	possible	consequences	of	different	types	of	interaction.	The	typology	presented	by	Delanty	portrays	a	spectrum	from	conflict	and	hostility	to	fusion	or	syncretism	(2011,	644-647).	The	different	types	of	encounter	act	as	mechanisms	that	produce	different	effects	(Ibid,	649).	This	typology	offers	some	useful	ways	of	categorizing	historical	interactions	between	cultures.	However,	a	relational	approach	would	seem	to	preclude	the	sharp	distinction	between	mechanisms	–Delanty	would	likely	agree.	As	a	basis	for	approaching	both	ordinary	and	coordinated	interactions	between	different	cultures	and	identities	Maria	Rovisco	(2013)	focuses	in	on	the	novelty	of	the	encounter,	which	stresses	its	essential	hybridity.	The	effect	is	to	focus	on	“‘real	life’	struggles	to	bridge	borders	between	self	and	other”	(Nowicka	and	Rovisco	2009,	7).		
Borders	and	a	Euro-Mediterranean	Space	Borders	are	increasing	in	abundance	and	changing	in	location	(Balibar	2006;	Rumford	2010)	and	this	is	often	taking	place	at	the	local	level.	But	in	the	Euro-Med	there	is	also	a	more	general	process	of	bordering	between	the	EU	(Europe)	and	its	‘neighbors’.	A	general	fencing	of	relations	whereby	the	Mediterranean	becomes	the	backyard	of	the	EU	and,	as	a	result,	an	area	in	need	of	protection	and	action	in	order	to	secure.	Culturally,	there	is	also	a	severe	delimiting	of	the	region	and	this	can	be	found	in	the	pragmatism	of	intercultural	dialogue	as	a	policy	instrument.	In	the	Euro-Mediterranean,	what	is	the	relationship	between	the	regional	context	–	institutional	and	relational	–	and	ever-present	national	boundaries?	Within	the	context	of	the	Mediterranean	a	global	process	of	border	multiplication	and	transformation	(Rumford	2011)	is	highly	significant	by	virtue	of	its	strategic	importance	globally	as	well	as	being	attached	to	the	development	
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of	a	European	space	through	region-building	practices	and	historical	ties.	In	the	Mediterranean	region	there	is	a	complex	overlapping	of	political	projects,	primarily	from	the	EU	and	the	US,	marking	the	(re)construction	of	legalized	state	borders	alongside	the	borders	of	cultural,	linguistic,	ethnic,	and	civilizational	identities.	So	are	borders,	as	Iain	Chambers	(2010)	argues,	merely	the	‘materialization	of	authority’?	And	how	are	they	constituted	in	relation	to	regional	governance	and	institution	building?		 This	various	functioning	of	borders	is	highly	relevant	in	the	Mediterranean	region	where	different	historical	trajectories	have	resulted	in	differentiated	understandings	of	the	concepts	of	territory,	sovereignty	and	borders.	Furthermore,	different	actors	can	have	very	different	understandings	of	borders,	which	can	in	practice	lead	to	different	relationships	with	the	border.	For	example,	state	actors	may	view	their	relationship	with	the	border	in	terms	of	maintenance	and	protection	where	transgressions	by	migrant	communities	are	seen	as	a	threat	to	the	political	community	that	the	borders	are	meant	to	protect.	Such	can	be	seen	in	the	logic	of	the	‘Gated	Community’	approach	to	the	EU’s	bordering	practices	through	the	ENP,	thus	permitting	mobility	but	only	for	
particular	interests.	Migrants,	despite	bringing	attention	to	the	permeability	of	borders	do	not	reduce	their	salience	but	instead	amplify	them	directly	by	bringing	attention	to	them	and	provoking	the	response	of	governmental	actors,	but	also	indirectly	through	the	production	of	border	imaginaries	in	which	borders	are	maintained	and	the	physical	border	is	supplemented	by	theoretical	and	imaginary	considerations	linking	cultural	and	political	constructions	(Brandell	2006,	19).	Beatrice	Hibou	(2004)	notes	that	borders	can	be	seen	as:	“privileged	spaces	of	observation	of	fluid	and	moving	forms	and	of	the	continuous	formation	of	social	and	political	practices,	as	well	as	state	practices”	(Hibou	2004,	353).	Moreover,	they	are	sites	of	transformation	and	construction.	It	is	no	coincidence	that	the	most	explicit	and	strict	border	regimes	often	occur	at	the	incidence	of	the	overlapping	of	nation	or	ethnic	boundaries	with	state	boundaries.	Examples	of	such	practices	may	include	Palestine/Israel	and	Cyprus.		Conversely,	the	way	in	which	people	define	the	border	has	a	significant	impact	on	their	relation	to	that	border	and	will	in	turn	affect	the	type	and	role	of	interactions	across	the	space.	Within	the	EU	there	is	the	most	advanced	form	of	
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bordering	(de-bordering	and	re-bordering)	taking	place	between	member	states	through	the	process	of	integration.	In	response	to	this	the	process	of	enlargement	has	also	produced	an	increased	concern	with	delimiting	the	European	project.	The	ENP,	in	this	regard,	has	been	discussed	in	terms	of	a	bordering	process	(Kramsch	2003;	Walters	2004).	Walters’	(2004)	discussion	of	EU	external	borders	-	networked	(non)	border,	march,	colonial	frontiers	and	limes	–	presents	a	typology	of	the	different	forms	that	borders	can	take	and	the	different	roles	they	play	in	managing	the	interactions	between	internal	and	external	actors.	In	contrast	to	the	relatively	static	depiction	of	state	borders	the	borders	of	the	EU	are	more	ambiguous,	containing	elements	pertaining	to	the	maintenance	of	strict	dichotomies	alongside	decentered,	‘neo-medieval’	formations	(Zielonka	2006).	From	within	the	EU,	using	the	concept	of	limes	in	regard	to	the	Mediterranean	evokes	the	significance	of	the	institutionalization	of	various	asymmetries	as	evidenced	in	the	bilateral	relations	of	the	ENP	and	the	region-building	exercise	of	the	UfM.	Limes,	as	such,	should	be	seen	as:	“a	means	to	protect	what	has	already	been	domesticated	inside,	while	banishing	violence,	turbulence	and	instability	outside”	(Kramsch	and	Hooper	2004,	xxxiii).	However	this	is	a	one-sided	understanding.	Even	though	it	establishes	a	solid	basis	from	which	to	understand	the	EU’s	relation	to	the	region	it	does	not	consider	the	historical	development	of	borders	specific	to	SMCs	but	offers	a	stark	vision	of	borders	established	through	EU	external	policy.	Rafaella	Del	Sarto	(2010)	argues	that	the	extension	of	the	EU’s	variable	border	geometry	to	Southern	Mediterranean	Countries	suggests	that	the	Mediterranean	is	best	characterized	as	a	borderland	encompassing	functional,	territorial	and	symbolic	borders.	The	notion	of	borderland	suggests	an	area	of	transition	between	core	areas	(Newman	2003:	18)	or	a	“zone	of	passage	from	one	geographical	area,	functional	regime,	and	even	territorialized	identity	construct	to	another	(Del	Sarto	2010,	152).	It	goes	beyond	the	standard	definition	of	borders	in	terms	of	inside/outside	and	posits	a	range	of	differentiated	processes	and	border	interactions.	The	EU’s	institutional	development	according	to	the	logic	of	variable	geometry	suggests	that	the	internal	bordering	practices	of	the	EU	follow	a	similar	path.	Externally,	this	process	is	replicated	through	the	practice	of	differentiation,	which	allows	the	EU	
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to	establish	different	levels	of	integration	and	openness	with	individual	countries	based	upon	common	priorities.	Borders	may	be	relatively	porous	with	respect	to	certain	persons	or	products	but	highly	securitized	with	regards	to	others	even	when	originating	from	the	same	country.	This	multidimensionality	is	a	common	feature	of	contemporary	border	regimes,	especially	within	the	EU.	The	ENP	extends	some	of	these	practices	to	neighboring	states	by	bringing	them	into	the	governance	and	legal	frameworks	of	the	EU	(Del	Sarto	2010,	165).	The	notion	of	borderland,	however,	would	suggest	not	only	multidimensionality	but	also	multidirectionality	in	processes	of	acculturation	and	even	political	practice.	This	is	something	that	remains	unquestioned	in	an	overtly	political	analysis	of	bordering	practices.	The	notion	of	borderland	suggests	the	proliferation	of	political	boundaries	within	it	as	well	as	the	uncertainty	of	cultural	boundaries.	If	we	refer	back	to	the	post-colonial	conception	of	the	Mediterranean,	in	purely	cultural	terms:	“Borders	in	the	Mediterranean	are,	by	definition,	mobile	and	uncertain,	closer	to	the	idea	of	a	‘horizon’	than	that	of	a	cartographic	projection;	indeed,	the	actual	experience	of	these	borders	reveals	all	the	limits	and	contradictions	inherent	in	any	topographic	approach”	(Giaccaria	and	Minca	2011,	353).	Understanding	the	Euro-Mediterranean	as	a	borderland	appears	to	offer	one	way	of	ameliorating	the	complexity	of	incorporating	such	different	perspectives.	On	the	other	hand,	it	potentially	prevents	us	from	considering	the	region	beyond	an	inevitable	and	ultimately	compromising	mélange	of	political	and	cultural	interactions	with	no	identity	but	only	a	sense	of	political	contingency.	As	a	result,	further	consideration	should	be	given	to	how	the	different	types	and	understandings	of	borders	limit	and	find	representation	in	the	work	of	civil	society	actors.	Linked	to	this	would	be	an	understanding	of	the	way	in	which	civil	society	actors	relate	to	political	and	cultural	borders.	Certainly,	different	actors	perceive	space	in	very	different	terms,	for	example	business	men	in	the	Middle	East	tend	to	view	space	as	networked	and	much	more	fluid	than	less	mobile	actors	(Brandell	2006,	202).	As	a	result,	when	understanding	how	people	relate	to	a	particular	space	it	should	be	kept	in	consideration	the	role	of	transnational	relations	in	(re)producing	borders	as	well	as	overcoming	them.		
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Studies	of	cross-border	cooperation	consider	the	development	of	institutions	and	interactions	across	border	regions.	With	the	ENP	there	was	a	notable	move	away	from	the	regional	focus	that	was	inherent	in	the	EMP,	which	combined	a	form	of	regionalism	with	bilateral	relations	(Del	Sarto	and	Schumacher	2005,	21).	Rather	than	presenting	an	overarching	approach	to	the	region,	cross-border	cooperation	takes	specific	cases	of	interaction	and	institution	building	across	border	regions	and	through	this	provides	an	interesting	starting	point	for	considering	the	role	of	civil	society	actors	in	the	Mediterranean	region.	James	W.	Scott	(2006)	argues	that	the	ENP	should	be	seen	as	an	attempt	on	the	part	of	the	EU	to	“rationalize	and	consolidate	policies	towards	northern,	eastern	and	southern	neighbors,	enhancing	both	the	effectiveness	and	regional	significance	of	the	EU	as	a	geopolitical	actor”	(Scott	2006,	18).	As	such,	the	policies	cannot	solely	be	seen	through	the	lens	of	integration	but	must	be	understood	as	an	attempt	to	pursue	a	global	presence	beyond	trade	agreements	and	economic	prowess,	though	these	remain	critical	areas	of	influence.	In	this	regard,	and	with	the	increasing	differentiation	between	policies	aimed	at	Eastern	partners	and	those	in	the	Mediterranean	it	is	this	latter	region	that	represents	a	truly	international	presence	for	the	European	Union.	At	stake	is	a	process	of	Europeanization,	which	traverses	the	internal-external	divide	necessitating	significant	dynamism	and	highlighting	the	intrinsic	fragility	of	‘EU’	Europe	and	by	extension	any	process	of	Europeanization	beyond	those	borders	(Jones	&	Clark	2008).	In	the	Mediterranean	this	largely	takes	the	form	of	bilateral	agreements	and	defending	against	the	negative	effects	of	market	expansion,	perhaps	to	the	detriment	of	civil	society	engagement	(Scott	2006,	30).		As	Scott	(2006)	points	out,	EU	policy	initiatives	have	an	important	role	in	constructing	the	institutional	conditions	for	regional	cooperation,	however,	this	attempt	at	Europeanization	of	external	regions	is	also	subject	to	previously	existing	and	changing	cultural	and	political	conditions,	which	has	led	in	the	Mediterranean	to	a	difficult	role	for	socio-cultural	and	socio-political	engagement.	This	is	enabled,	if	not	exacerbated,	by	the	bordering	practices	–	the	‘gated	community’	–	of	selectivity	based	upon	neoliberal	and	state-centric	political	logics	that	are	inherent	elements	of	the	Neighborhood	policies	(Van	Houtum	and	Pijpers	2006,	60).	This	no	doubt	captures	to	some	extent	the	
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reasons	behind	the	limited	success	of	the	Neighborhood	policy	to	promote	increased	political	integration	and	engagement	with	civil	societies.	On	the	other	hand,	as	noted	by	Kramsch	and	Hooper	(2004):	“border	regions	enjoy	a	partial	autonomy	from	the	‘local’	which	displaces	them	from	prior	capital	restructured	crystallizations	of	the	state-guided	regionalization/regionalism	dialectic”	(Kramsch	and	Hooper	2004:	xxiv).	Though	always	in	development	and	only	partial	this	is	nonetheless	highly	important	for	economic	actors	and	migrants	and	also	for	civil	society	actors	who	can	engage	in	transnational	networking.		The	EUDIMENSIONS	programme	(2006-2009)	is	a	noteworthy	examination	of	the	opportunity	structures	and	socialization	patterns	created	by	the	European	Neighborhood	Policy	in	terms	of	cross-border	cooperation	with	civil	society	actors.	The	authors	pursue	a	‘contextually	sensitive’	approach	that	can	understand	not	only	the	influence	of	EU	norms	and	values	but	also	the	ways	in	which	they	are	contested	locally	(Scott	and	Liikanen	2010,	3).	Furthermore,	utilizing	a	comparative	framework	and	looking	at	individual	cases	and	instruments	offers	a	great	deal	of	specificity	and	insight	to	the	ways	in	which	civil	society	actors	can	differ	greatly	in	their	responsiveness	to	EU	policies	not	only	on	a	country-by-country	basis	but	also	based	on	different	sectors	and	as	a	result	it	highlights	the	internal	variability	of	civil	societies	which	is	a	crucial	point	for	understanding	the	development	of	regional	interactions.	However,	we	do	not	get	full	value	from	the	contextual	approach	being	applied.	The	concept	would	seem	to	imply	also	a	greater	focus	on	society-to-society	interactions,	research	on	which	is	lacking	in	the	context	of	the	Mediterranean.	The	contextual	approach	employed	for	the	study	was	beneficial	in	producing	a	comparative	understanding	of	practices	and	roles	for	civil	society	actors.	Dimitrovova	(2010)	points	to	the	different	understandings	of	the	role	of	civil	society	between	Moroccan	CSOs	and	European	CSOs	resulting	in	problems	of	cooperation	and	engagement	between	the	two	sides.	The	study	offered	useful	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	civil	society	actors	and	EU	policy	instruments	especially	with	regard	to	criticisms	of	EU	policy	as	being	unilateral,	top-down	and	overly	focused	on	economic	and	functional	areas	of	cooperation	(Dimitrovova	2010,	113).	However,	the	contextual	approach	would	have	benefitted	from	a	more	complex	theorization	of	the	practices	and	relations	
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between	civil	society	with	the	particular	cultural	and	political	settings	in	mind.	This	was	likely	limited	due	to	the	broad	focus	of	the	study	across	Northern,	Eastern	and	Southern	neighboring	countries.	In	addition,	only	Morocco	and	Turkey	represented	Mediterranean	countries.	Another	step	would	be	to	question	the	impact	of	such	cross-border	activities	on	civil	society	actors,	their	purpose	for	engaging	in	such	activities	and	the	specific	practices	that	comprise	these	activities.		
Understanding	cultural	relations	in	the	EuroMediterranean	
Institutional	Developments	and	Dialogue	The	cultural	construction	of	the	Mediterranean	predates	even	the	Barcelona	Process	(BP).	The	end	of	the	Cold	War	marked	a	departure	from	geopolitical	frontiers	established	at	the	height	of	East/West	tensions.	This	new	era	produced	a	new	ideology	of	threat,	of	which	the	pivotal	‘Clash	of	Civilisations’	thesis	is	indicative.	It	was	in	this	environment	that	Europe’s	southern	boundaries	took	on	greater	significance	(Henry	1996).	In	this	context,	the	European	Union	and	other	international	actors	–	UNESCO,	Council	of	Europe	–	established	programmes	designed	to	protect	against	the	potential	of	a	clash.	These	programmes	renewed	concepts	of	the	Mediterranean,	or	Mediterraneanism,	in	order	to	propose	a	unity	of	values	and	identities	(de	Puymège	1996).	Indeed,	in	this	period	the	European	Union’s	policy	towards	its	Arab	neighbors	lacked	consistency	and	in	order	to	stem	the	growing	inequality	and	potential	threat	there	were	growing	call	for	a	policy	that	contained	greater	cohesion	and	united	political,	economic,	social	and	cultural	projects	(Kader	1994).	Out	of	this	atmosphere	rose	the	Euro-Mediterranean	Partnership,	which	established	the	first	comprehensive	but	also	fatally	flawed	framework	for	cooperation	between	Europe	and	its	Southern	neighbors.	However,	the	BP	was	already	dominated	by	security	and	economic	motives.	Even	the	third	basket,	dedicated	to	social,	cultural	and	human	partnership,	was	dominated	by	concerns	over	migration,	terrorism	and	trafficking	(Balta	1997).	In	other	words,	the	political	construction	of	the	Mediterranean	and	its	institutionalization	followed	a	clear	logic	that	prioritized	the	goals	of	stability,	economic	cooperation	and	political	dialogue.	In	addition	to	
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this,	despite	the	intention	of	building	a	cooperative	partnership	between	regional	governments,	the	EMP	remained	a	reflection	of	European	interests.	On	the	one	hand,	this	was	embodied	in	the	‘ideological	edifice’	of	the	Mediterranean	concept	that	had	little	basis	in	the	Arab	world	and	also	become	apparent	in	attempts	by	the	European	Commission	to	centralize	control	over	cultural	instruments	(Bistolfi	2000,	14-22).		Stefania	Panebianco	(2003)	argues	that	the	EMP	should	be	seen	as	being	multi-layered	and	influenced	both	internally	(from	regional	elites)	and	externally	(from	international	and	inter-regional	relations)	offering	full	picture	of	regional	development	that	allows	for	a	certain	amount	of	complementarity	between	political	interests	on	either	side	and	the	construction	of	norms.	This	political	and	institutional	approach	favors	an	understanding	of	the	region	based	upon	official	and	economic	trajectories.	While	it	is	understood	that	non-state	actors	–	often	limited	to	economic	actors	-	can	affect	the	norms	that	constitute	any	particular	regime	it	is	unclear	how	or	when	this	is	possible.	A	New	
EuroMediterranean	Cultural	Identity	(2003),	edited	by	Stefania	Panebianco,	goes	some	way	in	trying	to	understand	the	implications	of	institutional	development	on	civil	society	participation	and	belonging,	including	a	critical	attempt	to	understand	the	conceptual	underpinnings	of	civil	society	inclusion	(Mouawad	2003).	Annette	Jünemann’s	(2003)	chapter	on	the	Civil	Forums	developed	as	part	of	the	EMP	is	enlightening	in	revealing	the	complex	political	interests	that	both	successfully	and	unsuccessfully	influenced	the	agenda,	participants	and	even	organization	of	the	civil	society	gatherings.	It	also	reveals	the	complex	network	of	actors	and	the	role	of	different	discourses	in	presenting	an	alternative	side	to	the	regional	process,	one	which	is	on-going	through	various	actors	and	forums.	The	Civil	Forums	established	under	the	framework	of	the	EMP	provided	new	opportunities	for	regional	interaction.	At	the	same	time,	they	were	seen	by	some	governmental	actors	as	an	opportunity	to	control	the	forms	of	interaction	and	the	discourses	of	engagement.	The	institutional	perspective	is	valuable	insofar	as	it	highlights	normative	biases,	external	influences,	and	opportunities	for	participation.	Yet,	there	also	needs	to	be	the	possibility	of	engaging	with	the	experiential	value	of	opportunity	structures	surrounding	new	institutions.	As	Robert	Bistolfi	points	out,	the	Civil	Forums	established	under	the	
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BP	lacked	the	direct	influence	over	policy-making,	however	they	were	still	valuable	as	a	venue	for	the	exchange	of	aspirations	among	civil	society	participants	(2000,	21).	Whether	they	can,	under	the	guidance	of	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation,	continue	to	provide	an	open	forum	for	participation	will	determine	how	they	are	perceived	by	regional	civil	societies	but	the	implicit	patronage	of	governments	continues	to	be	a	reason	for	skepticism	(Roque	2005,	117).		Research	on	the	cultural	basket	of	the	EuroMediterranean	Partnership	received	due	attention	in	a	special	issue	of	Mediterranean	Politics	in	2005.	This	issue	displayed	an	array	of	different	approaches	to	understanding	the	significance	of	developments	in	this	area	of	regional	integration	as	well	as	a	general	skepticism	towards	the	potential	of	intercultural	dialogue	to	break	the	deadlock	being	experienced	in	other	areas	of	the	Partnership.	Later	released	with	some	minor	additions	in	edited	book	format,	this	volume	represents	one	of	the	most	comprehensive	attempts	to	understand	the	potential	of	cultural	cooperation	in	the	EuroMediterranean	but	also	(in	its	mixture	of	hope	and	skepticism)	bears	the	hallmarks	of	the	context	in	which	it	was	written.	Specifically,	a	few	of	the	authors	present	some	significant	observations	with	regard	to	the	definition	and	practice	of	dialogue	in	the	EMP	including	some	early	speculation	on	the	role	of	the	ALF.	Michelle	Pace’s	(2005)	dialogic	approach	raises	a	number	of	issues	that	continue	to	have	relevance	to	understanding	the	limitations	and	potential	of	dialogue	as	a	basis	for	cooperation.	Among	other	things,	this	emphasized	two	points:	the	need	for	dialogue	to	provide	a	real	source	of	self-criticism	and	the	need	for	partners	on	either	shore	to	recognize	the	concerns	of	the	Other.	Yet,	this	continues	to	be	confounded	by	the	limited	reach	of	the	dialogue	into	regional	societies	and	the	influence	of	regional	power	relations.	Rafaella	Del	Sarto	(2005)	added	to	this	critique	by	focusing	on	the	underlying	power	structures	in	the	conceptualization	of	intercultural	dialogue.	Del	Sarto’s	article	highlighted	the	problem	between	the	normative	appeal	and	practical	shortcomings	of	intercultural	dialogue	as	a	function	of	high-level	politics.	Similar	to	Pace’s	observations,	Del	Sarto	expresses	hope	at	the	inaugural	objectives	of	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation.	However,	the	institutional	structure	(primarily	influence	of	national	governments)	feeds	into	concerns	over	the	reach	and	representation	of	dialogue.	Malmvig	(2005),	on	the	other	hand,	highlights	
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the	impact	of	securitization	on	the	role	of	cultural	dialogue.	This	effectively	diminishes	the	potential	impact	of	dialogue	by	limiting	access	for	the	general	population.	Access	and	participation	continue	to	be	relevant	points	of	criticism	where	security	is	often	used	by	authoritarian	regimes	to	control	mobility.	This	issue	established	an	essential	foundation	for	evaluating	progress	in	the	objectives	of	dialogue	and	regional	networking.		In	The	Convergence	of	Civilizations	several	leading	scholars	of	the	Euro-Mediterranean	region	have	taken	up	the	challenge	of	conceptualizing	the	region	in	terms	of	an	emerging	regionalism	and	regional	culture.	Nicolaidis	and	Nicolaidis’	concluding	chapter	effectively	summarizes	the	several	issues	that	require	continued	consideration	-	including	a	better	differentiation	between	the	understanding	of	culture	and	civilization	and	a	less	statist	view	of	region-building	practices.	Furthermore,	what	is	necessary	is	the	ability	to	distinguish	among	the	various	norms	and	strategies	being	promoted	and	their	origin	and	purpose.	According	to	the	authors,	the	re-working	of	the	EMP	as	a	post-colonial	agenda	relies	on	the	ability	of	the	Euro-Med	Process	to	construct	a	non-territorialized	region	and	the	ability	to	transcend	the	sense	of	us/them	that	predominates,	however	both	the	UfM	and	the	ENP	return	prominence	to	the	state	and	regimes	of	strict	border	control	thus	inhibiting	the	ability	of	civil	societies	and	social	actors	from	engaging	across	the	region	both	within	and	outside	of	policy	frameworks	(Nicolaidis	and	Nicolaidis	2006).	This	does	not	provide	grounds	for	much	optimism	for	a	better	relationship	with	civil	society	organizations.	The	need	to	‘bring	the	Mediterranean	back	in’	is	at	least	as	pressing	now	and	should	have	as	its	basis	a	sense	of	empowerment	applied	to	governments	and	societies	alike	(Ibid,	20).	As	Richard	Gillespie	has	noted,	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean	means	that	institutional	autonomy	is	not	forthcoming	in	the	region,	but	rather	looks	to	firmly	balance	regional	initiatives	towards	the	EU	(Gillespie	2008).	Developing	institutions,	however,	deserve	greater	scrutiny	alongside	the	transformations	that	have	given	rise	to	more	effective	levels	of	social	and	political	engagement	across	the	region	by	actors	often	considered	ineffectual	alongside	the	rise	of	transnational	actors	across	the	region.		
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Isabel	Schäfer’s	(2007b)	Vom	Kulturkonflikt	zum	Kulturdialog?	Die	
kulturelle	Dimension	der	Euro-Mediterranen	Partnerschaft	charted	an	ambitious	course	for	understanding	the	construction	of	a	cultural	dimension	to	Euro-Mediterranean	relations.	As	one	of	the	earliest	comprehensive	treatments	of	the	cultural	dimension,	Schäfer’s	text	reviews	a	number	of	issues	worthy	of	reconsideration	given	the	changing	context	of	regional	relations.	As	discussed	–	other	contributions	considered	the	impact	of	international	actors	and	the	impact	of	European	politics,	especially	in	integrationist	dynamics	at	the	EU	level.	However,	what	is	so	valuable	about	Schäfer’s	work	is	that	it	endeavors	to	understand	the	cultural	dimension	of	the	EuroMediterranean	as	a	product	of	external	cultural	policy	creation	rather	than	solely	through	a	process	of	regionalization.	As	a	result,	it	simultaneously	considers	the	politics	and	development	of	cultural	policy	at	the	EU	level	and	the	strategic	(international)	interest	in	the	Mediterranean	region	through	the	1990s	and	immediately	following	the	attacks	of	September	11th,	2001	(Schäfer	2007a).	These	insights	provide	fertile	ground	for	reconsideration	and	while	the	author	explains	the	international	context	very	well	it	would	also	be	beneficial	to	consider	some	of	the	developments	of	cultural	policy	not	just	as	the	result	of	international	dynamics	but	also	through	the	assistance	of	non-state	actors.	Indeed,	Schäfer	hints	in	this	direction	in	suggesting	the	needs	to	examine	private	actors	and	transnational	networks	(2007b:	254-258).	This	is	a	challenge	worth	addressing	especially	given	the	profound	changes	at	the	EU-level	with	the	changes	introduced	in	the	Lisbon	Treaty,	potential	for	fragmentation	following	the	Euro-Crisis	and	in	its	response	to	the	Arab	Spring	and	further	conflict	over	the	EU	and	its	member	states’	response	to	the	ensuing	migration	crisis.	At	the	same	time,	this	reconsideration	should	address	the	influence	of	democratic	narratives	in	encouraging	greater	interest	in	developing	stronger	ties	with	the	region.		
 
The	Arab	Spring	and	the	EuroMediterranean	As	events	unfolded	across	the	Arab	world,	the	EU	was	still	trying	to	come	to	terms	with	the	new	capacities	and	institutions	bestowed	by	the	ratification	of	the	Lisbon	Treaty.	The	obvious	need	to	respond	resulted	in	a	mixed	array	of	attempts	to	remold	the	foreign	policy	credentials	of	the	union.	The	result	was	a	
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mixed	bag	and	at	times	contradictory	set	of	policies.	Despite	talk	of	improved	use	of	conditionality	(both	positive	and	negative)	in	its	relations	with	neighbors	the	EU	continued	to	increase	aid	to	transitioning	countries	like	Tunisia	as	well	as	repressive	governments	in	Egypt	and	Algeria	(Schumacher	2014:	569).	In	the	case	of	Egypt,	the	EU	demonstrated	incredible	patience	ignoring	Morsi’s	temporary	presidential	decree,	continuing	crackdowns	on	civil	society	and	NGOs,	and	even	following	the	coup	d’etat	that	brought	the	Egyptian	military	back	into	power.	On	the	other	hand,	the	EU	gradually	committed	itself	to	a	regime	of	sanctions	against	the	Libyan	and	Syrian	governments	(Ibid)	displaying	a	bolder	foreign	policy	identity.			 The	uprisings	caught	the	EU	in	a	moment	of	institutional	flux	and	certainly	caught	political	actors	unaware.	The	immediate	rhetoric	refocused	attention	on	the	roles	of	culture	and	civil	society	in	laying	the	basis	for	the	uprisings	across	the	region	and	in	providing	a	fertile	ground	on	which	to	develop	new	projects	and	cooperation.	At	the	same	time,	the	EU’s	reaction	to	the	uprisings	in	the	form	of	the	‘Partnership	for	Democracy	and	Shared	Prosperity	in	the	Southern	Mediterranean’	(PfDSP)	has	been	described	as	a	mea	culpa	for	past	double	standards	(Echagüe	et	al	2011:	330).	On	one	level	it	marks	a	gradual	shift	away	from	the	regional	concept	in	practice	and	towards	the	strengthening	of	bilateral	relationships	between	the	EU	and	other	countries	based	on	conditionality	and	differentiation.	Some	commentators	have	noted	the	recurring	limitations	of	EU	policy	that	can	be	found	in	the	PfDSP	including	a	relatively	uncritical	focus	on	the	‘transformative	potential’	of	civil	society.	In	this	critique,	the	PfDSP	highlights	a	continuing	legacy	of	liberalism	by	thematically	dividing	democracy	from	development	and	distinguishing	the	role	of	civil	society	as	developing	political	and	civil	rights	with	relatively	less	emphasis	on	social	and	economic	rights.	On	the	other	hand,	the	concept	of	development	is	less	activist	or	rights-oriented	focusing	more	on	aid	and	technical	reform	(Teti	2012).	Like	previous	iterations,	the	policy	also	fails	to	deliver	specificity	regarding	the	application	of	negative	and	positive	conditionality	(the	‘more	for	more’	approach).	Ultimately,	the	EU’s	response	demonstrated	minor	changes	to	existing	policies	–	more	a	change	of	emphasis	than	of	substance.	Rather	than	presenting	a	truly	coherent	strategic	direction	for	regional	relations	both	the	
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PfDSP	and	the	Neighbourhood	Review	followed	the	ad	hoc	routine	of	adding	further	initiatives	and	instruments	while	trying	to	maintain	existing	structures	(Othman	2014:	604).	Despite	this	nominal	growth	in	instruments	and	actors	there	has	actually	been	a	slight	reduction	in	the	availability	of	funding	for	the	new	policy	objectives,	which	suggests	not	‘more	for	more’	but	‘less	of	the	same’	(Bicchi	2014).		On	top	of	this,	the	EU’s	remodeled	policies	have	been	rapidly	overtaken	by	security	concerns	related	to	migration	which	endangered	a	unified	approach.			 There	remains	the	underlying	tension	between	the	EU’s	strategic	mission	and	the	commitment	of	individual	member	states	(Tömmel	2013;	Dennison	2013)	thus	straddling	the	old	question	of	whether	the	EU	is	a	normative	or	realist	power.	However,	the	Arab	uprisings	also	allowed	the	EU	to	turn	emphasis	back	to	civil	society	following	the	failings	of	the	Euro-Mediterranean	Partnership	while	also	confirming	the	intention	of	the	EU	Commission	to	continue	to	play	the	strategic	leader	in	the	ongoing	development	of	regional	frameworks	such	as	the	UfM	(Tömmel	2013).	The	question	then,	is	how	the	EU’s	renewed	interest	in	creating	a	partnership	between	societies	can	be	realized	(Cassarino	2012:	13).	In	a	dispersed	way	the	EU	has	continued	to	leverage	civil	society	organizations	in	the	pursuit	of	assistance	on	civil	and	political	reforms.	However,	it	is	also	clear	that	civil	society	has	acted	as	an	empty	signifier	in	policy	statements.	As	Teti	(2012)	points	out,	the	discussion	of	civil	society	in	the	PfDSP	takes	up	a	significant	portion	of	the	document	and	yet	offers	no	clear	definition	or	discussion	of	its	limitations	or	application	in	different	cultural	contexts.	In	this	way	democracy	promotion	is	replaced	with	a	more	nebulous	policy	of	civil	society	assistance.			 The	appointment	of	a	Special	Representative	for	the	Southern	Mediterranean	also	subtly	moved	the	EU	response	away	from	a	regional	framework	by	establishing	bilateral	task	forces	to	help	negotiate	and	implement	policy	under	the	reviewed	ENP	(Schumacher	2014:	562).	This	has	also	been	accompanied	by	a	greater	focus	on	relations	between	the	EU	and	other	Arab	bodies	–	for	example,	the	Arab	League	and	the	Gulf	Cooperation	Council	–	suggesting	some	commitment	to	the	idea	of	a	variable	geometry	that	is	not	dependent	on	the	development	of	Euro-Mediterranean	institutions	but	can	
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develop	through	the	relations	between	regional	blocs.	This	has	the	potential	of	allowing	the	EU	to	cultivate	a	new	relationship	with	its	near	abroad	that	makes	better	use	of	its	post-Lisbon	foreign	policy	capacities	and,	potentially,	pursue	a	normative	agenda	that	overcomes	some	of	the	regional	conflicts	and	inequalities	built	into	the	EMP	and	subsequent	UfM	(Johanssen-Nogues	2015).	This	new	orientation	is	significant.	It	raises	the	possibility	of	an	alternative	future	for	the	EU’s	relations	with	its	Southern	neighborhood	that	is	not	reliant	on	past	models	–	such	as	the	Euro-Mediterranean	Partnership.	The	question	is,	to	what	extent	can	the	EU’s	external	cultural	relations	and	its	related	instruments	in	the	region	overcome	this	legacy,	and	what	role	does	the	‘Mediterranean’	as	a	unifying	concept	play	in	this	new	atmosphere?	Though	it	is	too	early	to	fully	respond	to	these	questions	it	would	be	impossible	to	do	so	without	first	understanding	the	current	situation	and	influence	of	past	frameworks.		
 	
Theorizing	the	Cultural	Impact	of	the	Arab	Spring:	new	actors,	new	contexts,	new	
perspectives	For	some	the	uprisings	represented	little	more	than	business	as	usual.	Another	example	of	the	historical	and	(in	some	cases)	cyclical	demonstrations	and	occasional	uprisings	that	have	taken	place	across	middle-income	Arab	countries	as	a	result	of	socio-economic	circumstances	(Sika	2013).	However,	the	events	certainly	revived	myriad	debates	surrounding	democratization	and	transition	to	democracy	(Pace	and	Cavatorta	2012).	The	events	clearly	put	the	question	of	democracy	–	its	values	and	the	question	of	transition	–	back	on	the	map	(Robbins	2015;	Diamond	et	el	2014).	Perhaps	ironically	though,	the	way	in	which	democracy	has	remained	an	important	goal	for	many	citizens	is	through	its	almost	complete	absence	as	an	original	objective	(Robbins	2015,	88).	As	Arab	Barometer	surveys	have	pointed	out,	the	support	for	democracy	has	remained	high	across	Arab	populations	despite	stagnation	and	a	return	to	authoritarianism	in	a	number	of	countries.	One	explanation	is	that	the	current	hardships	are	simply	not	being	subjectively	linked	to	a	process	of	democratization	(Robbins	2015;	XXX	and	Robbins	2014).	Rekindled	debates	about	democratization	are	clearly	relevant.	From	the	standpoint	of	democracy	promotion,	the	instant	verdict	was	damning	–	rather	than	helping	these	
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countries	transition	to	democracy	the	external	environment	was	found	to	be	contributing	to	sustaining	authoritarianism	as	a	result	of	an	overriding	focus	on	liberalizing	reforms	(Youngs	2014,	41).	The	immediate	move	by	some	external	donors	was	to	refocus	on	‘nontraditional’	civil	society	actors	rather	than	established	NGOs	(Youngs	2015,	151)	demonstrating	an	implicit	shift	towards	a	broader	understanding	of	democracy.	Indeed,	the	dominant,	Euro-centric	understanding	of	civil	society	was	at	least	partially	responsible	for	the	state	of	shock	felt	by	external	donors	who	had	committed	to	supporting	professional	but	often	ineffective	NGOs	(Roque	2015,	19).	As	proponents	of	different	democratization	paradigms	attempted	to	play	catchup	with	events	it	was	also	clear	(and	demonstrated	in	the	Arab	Barometer	reports	discussed	by	Robbins)	that	democracy	was	only	part	of	the	conversation.			 To	truly	understand	the	significance	of	the	Arab	Spring	it	is	necessary	to	redefine	the	relationship	between	culture	and	democracy,	and	the	ways	in	which	culture	as	a	creative	force	promotes	democratic	interactions	(Moustier	and	Soldo	2013).	This	perspective	views	democracy	as	an	evolving	cultural	process	rather	than	a	particular	endpoint.	In	this	way,	Moustier	and	Soldo	suggest	that	we	should	instead	explore	creativity	and	innovation	as	emergent	markers	of	democratic	change	(2014).	Some	of	the	most	compelling	evidence	being	explored	did	not	refer	to	the	expression	of	a	distinctly	democratic	political	will.	Rather,	it	was	the	use	of	expression,	creativity	and	art	as	means	of	protest	and	dissent	in	order	to	subvert	authoritarianism	(Makar	2011).	Such	insights	point	back	to	the	providence	of	keen	observers	before	2011.	Given	fragile	political	structures	and	limited	possibilities	for	participation	through	defunct	party	systems	new	political	subjectivities	emerged	favoring	spontaneity	and	fun	in	stark	contrast	to	rigid	political	structures	(Bayat	2007,	457).	This	is	not	a	turn	away	from	democracy	but	a	change	of	orientation.	In	fact,	the	freedom	to	create	should	be	viewed	as	equally	important	to	other	freedoms	as	creative	expression	can	act	as	a	means	of	developing	the	capacities	of	active	citizenship	(Tanzarella	2012).	Research	into	the	variety	of	actors	who	played	a	role	in	the	events	highlights	a	need	to	focus	on	the	emerging	power	of	“newer	forces	born	of	a	rising	generation	with	different	ideas	about	how	citizens	and	governments	should	relate”	(Dunne	2015,	79).	Even	remaining	within	the	boundaries	of	a	typical	debate	that	pits	
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secularism	against	religion	risks	missing	the	reality	that	secularist	parties	in	the	region	are	just	as	exclusionary	and	authoritarian	as	Islamist	parties	(Boduszynski,	Fabbe	and	Lamont	2015).	On	the	other	hand,	Tunisia	demonstrates	the	possibility	of	Islamic	inclusion	and	moderation	that	trends	towards	a	distinct	form	of	conservative	politics	in	deference	to	democratic	institutions	(Netterstrom	2015).	In	other	words,	the	emergence	of	a	distinct	political	culture	and	identity	abounds.	These	studies	imply	the	need	to	reconsider	the	evidence	when	it	comes	to	judging	the	quality	of	particular	developments.			 The	events	signaled	an	emptiness	in	ideological	explanations.	The	rapid	success	of	protestors	in	Egypt	bound	them	into	a	position	for	which	they	were	unprepared	and,	for	some,	uninterested.	The	protest	networks	that	were	so	effective	did	not	have	the	organization	or	vision	to	influence	the	subsequent	shape	of	Egyptian	politics	(Abdelrahman	2013).	But	the	goal	was	clearly	never	state	capture	for	the	vast	majority	of	participants.	It	was	not	about	imposing	an	alternative	ideology	but	about	making	the	current	system	more	amenable	to	their	needs.	In	this	sense,	Asef	Bayat’s	phrase	is	apt	that	the	protestors	were	not	revolutionary	but	‘refo-lutionary’.	They	sought	to	compel	the	state	into	reform	(Bayat	2013,	599).		 Authors	such	as	Benoit	Challand	and	Sari	Hanafi	were	quick	to	suggest	the	importance	of	this	trend	for	understanding	the	sociological	significance	of	events.	Challand	(2011,	275),	for	example,	pointed	towards	the	relationship	between	external	democracy	funding	and	values	in	the	form	of	individualism	implicitly	supported	by	funding	agencies.	However,	this	was	not	the	basis	for	resistance,	rather	it	was	often	against	this	notion	of	individualism	that	protests	were	expressed	employing	the	discourses	of	social	justice	and	unity	(Ibid,	276).	In	line	with	this,	Sari	Hanafi	(2012)	pointed	out	the	reflexivity	of	the	individualism	expressed	by	activists	based	on	the	“self-reference	of	an	agent	that	recognizes	forces	of	socialization	but	alters	their	place	in	the	social	structure	and	resists	their	disciplinary	power”	(Hanafi	2012,	203).	In	this	way,	protests	and	the	forms	of	protest	were	performative.	By	virtue	of	the	expressions	being	public	expressions	they	were	given	a	new	significance	(Alexander	2011,	x).	The	politics	of	being	seen,	of	practicing	political	opposition	publicly	and	visually,	became	
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essential	to	the	political	field.	In	this	vein,	the	new	political	subjectivity	highlighted	by	academics	like	Hanafi	and	Challand	also	connects	to	a	longer	process	of	political	engagement	in	the	MENA	region,	a	concurrent	transformation	of	visual	culture,	and	the	counter-strategies	of	ruling	elites	that	has	transformed	culture	into	an	important	battleground.	Such	insights	have	also	been	supported	by	more	recent	studies	into	diverse	actors	and	the	role	of	culture	and	especially	media.			 The	experience	of	crisis	established	some	commonality	amongst	populations	on	either	side	of	the	Mediterranean	Sea.	The	general	sense	of	insecurity	(especially	economic)	and	persisting	inequalities	contributed	to	a	“global	and	precarious	generation”	(Glasius	and	Pleyers	2013,	552)	that	was	also	able	to	take	advantage	of	new	capacities	in	the	form	of	communication	technologies.	Protests	become	hybrid	in	the	sense	that	they	occupied	by	a	physical	and	virtual	space	(Antebi	and	Sanchez	2012).	It	also	allowed	protestors	to	link	their	struggle	to	others	generating	a	transitory	solidarity	witnessed	in	Tahrir	Square,	Barcelona	and	New	York,	amongst	others	(Allende	and	Hattinger	2014,	594).	What	these	studies	demonstrate	is	the	importance	of	looking	at	how	actors	interpret	their	position	and	employ	strategic	frames	or	linkages	in	order	to	move	beyond	their	local	environment.	This	was	accomplished	by	invoking	and/or	extending	existing	frames	and	negotiating	a	new	meaning.	Recent	additions	have	bolstered	this	idea	and	provided	an	element	of	diversity	to	understanding	the	Arab	uprisings	contributing	an	important	theoretical	advance.	One	of	the	effects	of	these	widespread	protests	was	that	opportunities	emerged	for	new	struggles	to	be	included	in	regional	civil	societies	at	the	same	time	generating	new	conflicts	based	around	gender	and	LGBT	issues	(Khalid	2015;	Fortiger	2015).	In	many	cases,	such	as	in	Egypt,	the	authoritarian	regimes	were	able	to	limit	hostilities	from	boiling	over	between	communities	such	as	between	the	minority	Copt	and	majority	Muslim	populations.	However,	the	events	left	a	temporary	vacuum	that	raised	the	stakes	for	political	representation.			 As	a	concept,	the	Arab	Spring	is	inherently	flawed.	But	it	also	serves	as	an	effective	means	of	generalizing	a	wide	range	of	phenomena.	The	focus	should	be	on	understanding	the	diverse	and	everyday	struggles	that	instigated	broader	protests	in	different	areas	(Huber	and	Kamel	2015).	This	attentiveness	to	the	
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strategic	linking	by	actors	of	their	struggle	to	dominant	discursive	frames	and	the	micro-level	origins	of	momentous	events	is	an	important	contribution.	It	indicates	the	potential	of	a	transnational	perspective	that	conceptually	links	local	action	to	global	concepts.	Maryam	Jamshidi	(2014)	makes	a	useful	contribution	for	considering	the	participation	of	educated	and	middle-class	youth	by	concentrating	on	innovation	as	a	crucial	byproduct	of	the	revolutionary	experience.	Instead	of	remaining	mired	in	traditional	categories	Jamshidi’s	account	encourages	us	to	listen	to	and	observe	the	unique	ways	in	which	citizens	have	sought	to	mobilize	and	give	voice	to	their	concerns.	This	led	to	a	growing	number	of	organizations	committed	to	civic	entrepreneurship	and	has	resulted	in	a	surprising	growth	in	technology	startups	oriented	towards	solving	everyday	problems	(Jamshidi	2014,	2).	Rather	than	seeking	the	total	transformation	inherent	to	ideas	of	revolution	–	and	anticipated	in	many	accounts	of	the	Arab	Spring,	especially	as	optimism	began	to	sour	–	such	actions	demonstrate	that	grassroots	and	local	activists	often	had	much	more	practical	objectives	in	mind.	Civic	entrepreneurism	is	one	instance	of	the	attempt	to	generate	a	post-revolutionary	subjectivity	(Ibid,	27-28),	a	new	mind-set,	that	confounds	many	assumptions	about	the	nature	of	revolution	but	also	basic	distinctions	between	civil,	political	and	economic	actors.	Understanding	the	significance	of	these	events	requires	more	than	just	a	rehashing	of	old	models	and	concepts	whether	that	be	in	relation	to	transitions	to	democracy	or	static	cultural	models.	Instead	it	requires	an	attentiveness	to	subtle	gradations	of	change	and	this	means	also	substituting	the	desire	to	bring	judgement	with	a	desire	to	understand	the	creative	potential	found	in	actors’	circumstances.					
Elements	of	a	transnational	approach	to	political	and	cultural	developments		Steven	Vertovec	(1999)	provides	a	useful	breakdown	of	the	themes	raised	by	the	study	of	transnationalism.	He	identifies	six	ways	of	discussing	transnationalism:	as	social	morphology,	type	of	consciousness,	mode	of	cultural	reproduction,	avenue	of	capital,	site	of	political	engagement	and	as	a	reconstruction	of	place	(Vertovec	1999,	2).	This	characterisation	raises	not	only	the	multitude	of	ways	in	which	transnationalism	has	been	approached	but	also	the	essentially	contested	nature	of	the	concept	(Guarnizo	and	Smith	1999;	Vertovec	1999;	Glick-Schiller	
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2004;	Waldinger	and	Fitzgerald	2004;	Levitt	and	Khagram	2007).	While	a	significant	portion	of	the	literature	has	been	oriented	towards	studying	the	mobility	of	migrants	and	diasporic	networks	there	have	also	been	attempts	to	generate	insight	and	utilize	the	concept	to	understand	political	projects	and	identities	(Roniger	2011;	Featherstone	2008),	regional	politics	(Rogers	2004;	DeBardeleben	and	Hurrelmann	2011),	advocacy	and	norms	(Keck	and	Sikkink	1998)	and	cultural	transformations	(Hannerz	1996;	Ong	1999).	The	purpose	of	this	section	is	not	to	provide	a	comprehensive	categorization	of	transnational	phenomena	or	related	approaches	within	the	field.	Instead	it	will	establish	a	new	starting	point	for	studying	the	evolution	of	cultural	relations	that	can	account	for	the	quality	of	cultural	relations.		This	approach	blends	together	disparate	approaches	to	transnationalism	from	political	and	geographical	to	sociological	and	anthropological	accounts.	This	position	is	intentional	and	is	based	on	the	understanding,	as	argued	by	DeBarbeleben	and	Hurrelmann	(2011),	that	these	different	approaches	can	be	mutually	beneficial.	Specifically	with	regard	to	this	research	it	is	suggested	that	there	needs	to	be	a	more	concerted	effort	on	the	part	of	political	studies	to	engage	with	the	insights	provided	in	a	more	profound	understanding	of	the	systemic,	structural	and	ideational	impacts	of	transnationalism	(DeBarbeleben	and	Hurrelmann	2011,	28-32)	all	of	which	contribute	to	a	nuanced	understanding	of	the	context	in	which	practices	are	produced.		An	appropriately	broad	definition	to	act	as	a	starting	point	is	provided	by	Victor	Roudometof	who	defines	transnational	“interactions	as	taking	place	among	people	and	institutions	in	two	or	more	separate	‘containers’	or	nation-states”	(Roudometof	2005,	119).	While	there	have	been	some	instructive	studies	of	transnationalism	across	the	Mediterranean	(Gandolfini	2010)	there	has	been	very	little	attention	paid	to	the	interplay	between	the	development	of	regional	institutions	and	social	and	cultural	programmes	and	civil	society	actors	engaging	in	transnational	practices.	Thinking	the	Mediterranean	region	historically,	transnationalism	provides	a	uniquely	appropriate	approach	as	it	is	within	this	region	that	many	of	the	early	forms	of	transnational	interaction	and	diasporic	activity	originated.	But	it	also	makes	up	an	important	part	of	regional	interactions	and	focusing	this	will	provide	an	element	of	social	‘thickness’	
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(Kurasawa	2007)	to	understanding	of	the	Mediterranean	region	and	can	inform	the	ongoing	development	of	approaches	to	further	integration	and	cooperation	across	the	region.			
Studying	Networks		The	attractiveness	of	network	approaches	lies	in	the	ability	to	discover	‘sparsely	knit	and	spatially	dispersed’	forms	of	community	(Wellman	1999)	as	well	as	draw	comparisons	and	learn	from	other	areas	of	inquiry	such	as	urbanism	in	the	MENA	region	which	suffers	from	similar	problems	of	low	levels	of	integration,	weak	ties	and	sustained	hierarchies	(Stanley	2005).	Following	Featherstone,	Phillips	and	Waters,	networks	are	best	understood	as:	“the	overlapping	and	contested	material,	cultural	and	political	flows	and	circuits	that	bind	different	places	together	through	differentiated	relations	of	power”	(Featherstone,	Phillips	and	Waters	2008,	386).	If	it	is	the	case	that	multiple	realities	exist	within	one	or	multiple	overlapping	spaces	this	will	readily	be	apparent	through	investigation	of	the	social	interactions	that	take	place	outside	of	official	programs	or	through	paths	of	migration.	This	network	approach	also	offers	insight	into	the	types	of	space	and	the	formation	of	or	resistance	to	identities	through	social	structure,	ideas	and	relations	(Castells	1996).	In	line	with	Castells’	thinking,	the	network	offers	an	effective	integration	of	technological	developments	within	our	understanding	of	social,	political,	economic	and	cultural	interactions.	The	network	is	also	a	useful	way	to	invoke	the	social	patterns	associated	with	the	movements	of	transnational	migrants	and	diaspora	and	the	maintenance	of	complex	communities	across	national	boundaries	through	the	exploitation	of	communication	technologies.	On	this	basis	the	discourse	and	practice	of	maintaining	transnational	networks:	“can	be	viewed	as	affecting	the	formation	of	character,	identity,	and	acting	subjects	at	the	same	time	that	identity	can	be	seen	as	fluctuating	and	contingent,	as	the	contexts	through	which	people	move	in	time-space	change	and	are	appropriated	and/or	resisted	by	acting	subjects”	(Guarnizo	and	Smith	2009,	21).	The	network	provides	a	useful	descriptive	category	for	tracing	this	transformation	of	social	structure.	For	example,	the	weak	ties	thesis	put	forth	by	Mark	Granovetter	
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“suggests	ways	in	which	a	person’s	indirect	social	connection	are	often	important	channels	through	which	ideas,	influences	or	information	are	reached”	(Vertovec	2009:	35).	The	Strength	of	Weak	Ties	(1973)	points	to	the	relations	beyond	primary	groups	and	the	diffusion	of	influence	and	information	between	groups.	Diffusion	in	this	case	travels	further	and	more	extensively	through	weak	ties	than	through	strong	ties,	which	are	more	limited.	As	a	result,	removing	weak	ties	limits	the	distance	traveled	greater	than	removal	of	the	average	strong	link	(Granovetter	1973,	1366).	This	is	an	important	analytical	insight	to	the	significance	of	the	network	for	identifying	meaning	construction	and	common	practices.	Another	useful	concept	appropriated	from	social	network	analysis	is	that	of	multiplexity	–	“the	degree	to	which	relations	between	participants	include	overlapping	institutional	spheres”	(Portes	1995,	9).	This	is	a	useful	way	of	identifying	patterns	in	relations.	Significantly	it	can	also	be	useful	for	establishing	border	effects.	The	multiplexity	of	cross	border	social	networks	can	bring	out	interesting	insights	into	the	type	and	extent	of	connectivities	(Woolhiser	2005).	Borrowing	these	analytical	tools	for	analyzing	transnational	relations	can	contribute	important	insights.			
Networks	in	situ	According	to	Marston,	Jones	and	Woodward	(2005),	the	focus	on	networks	challenges	vertical	accounts	of	scale	that	privilege	boundaries	between	scales	and	assume	greater	agency	of	official	channels	and	state	practices.	As	such,	we	also	move	away	from	the	depiction	of	globalization	that	focuses	on	the	pervasiveness	of	global	capitalism	and	the	global	economy	and	recognizes	the	political	construction	of	scale	according	to	dominant	interests.	That	being	said	this	approach	does	not	follow	the	claim	that	transnational	practices	necessarily	mean	that	there	is	an	erosion	of	the	importance	of	place	or	the	nation	(Featherstone,	Phillips	and	Waters	2008,	386).	As	Stephen	Calleya	has	already	pointed	out,	regional	fragmentation	means	that	local	identities	and	national	spaces	remain	central	to	political	and	social	action	in	the	Euro-Mediterranean.	This	fragmentation,	however,	is	decisively	political	in	most	circumstances	and	does	not	account	for	underlying	dynamics	of	social	and	political	contestation	that	
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occur	through	national	constructs.	David	Featherstone	argues	for	a	greater	appreciation	of	the	role	of	networks	historically	for	transnational	political	action.	Central	to	this	is	the	ability	to	evoke	a	transnational	history	for	particular	actors	and/or	issues	(Featherstone	2007).	This	understanding	points	towards	the	role	of	common	politics	and	projects	in	the	construction	and	maintenance	of	transnational	networks,	which	is	of	significance	for	the	development	of	regional	integration.		Jünemann’s	(2005)	analysis	of	the	Civil	Forums	established	under	the	EMP	framework	points	towards	the	potential	initiation	of	a	political	identity	based	on	particular	political	issues	for	those	actors	involved.	The	impact	of	selection	processes	can	put	a	limit	on	the	involvement	of	actors	and	organizations	from	southern	Mediterranean	countries	but	on	the	other	hand,	as	Sari	Hanafi	points	out,	the	selection	process	can	also	benefit	transnational	networks	by	engaging	with	alternative	actors	and	organizations	that	under	normal	conditions	may	be	subject	to	local	divisions	or	clique	gatherings.	Furthermore,	networking	at	the	regional	level	increases	southern	actors’	influence	through	agenda	setting	and	alliance	building	(Hanafi	2005).	Hanafi’s	anthropological	approach	to	North-South	civil	society	relations	helps	to	understand	the	significance	of	the	regional	scale	for	social	actors.	This	can	be	enhanced	by	considering	the	significance	of	different	scales	of	action	and	the	variability	of	networks	such	that	they	consist	not	only	of	material	flows	or	of	physical	migrations	but	also	of	common	affinities,	imaginations,	identifications,	politics	and	projects	(Featherstone,	Phillips	and	Waters	2008).	Furthermore,	it	may	offer	the	possibility	of	engaging	in	‘relational	thinking’	(Paasi,	in	Johnson	et	al	2011),	that	is,	to	contextualize	socialization	and	bordering	practices	through	emphasis	on	social	interactions.	By	conceiving	of	space	in	terms	of	social	relations	(and	social	relations	with	regard	to	space)	it	is	possible	to	reveal	an	inherent	dynamism	and	process	of	transformation	at	the	heart	of	these	interactions	(Massey	1992).	But	in	order	to	progress	this	type	of	thinking	it	is	necessary	to	go	beyond	the	metaphor	of	the	network,	whose	inherent	relationism	is	important	but	should	be	tempered	by	a	focus	on	the	contextual	lives	of	networked	actors	as	well	as	their	contingent	experiences	within	transnational	phenomena.	Moreover,	a	network	approach	puts	relationality	at	
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the	forefront	of	analysis	whereas	the	purpose	of	this	research	is	also	to	comprehend	the	agency	associated	with	the	adoption	of	transnationalism	by	actors	and	how	this	is	subsequently	integrated	into	different	contexts.		 Networks	are	also	crucial	for	understanding	the	development	of	cultural	policy	and	cultural	relations	more	broadly.	Though	largely	ignored	by	scholars	of	cultural	relations,	some	important	contributions	demonstrate	the	importance	of	networks	for	understanding	current	developments.	Gudrun	Pehn’s	Networking	
Culture	traced	the	‘discrete’	emergence	of	networking	among	cultural	professionals	from	indirect	influence	to	increasing	legitimacy	and	finally	the	creation	of	a	fundamentally	new,	multidimensional	approach	to	cultural	cooperation	(Pehn	1999,	7-8).	Her	empirical	account	suggests	two	important	points:	the	essential	reflexivity	of	networks	and	their	influence	on	cultural	narratives	and	practices	at	the	regional	and	international	levels	contributing	to	new	policy	in	both	cases.	Two	other	authors	have	made	less	explicit	but	nonetheless	influential	contributions.	Both	Cris	Shore	(2000)	and	Monica	Sassatelli	(2009)	have	highlighted	the	central	role	played	by	non-state	actors	in	the	emergence	of	cultural	identity	and	cultural	policy	at	the	European	level.	Sassatelli	(2009)	provides	a	useful	addition	acknowledging	the	unofficial,	bottom-up	processes	of	Europeanization	working	alongside	institutional	narratives.	One	of	the	important	aspects	of	the	network	approach	is	the	ability	to	capture	these	processes	and	be	able	to	represent	the	‘multiple	configurations’	of	Europe	(Axford	and	Huggins	1999,	186).	Moreover,	networks	are	playing	a	central	role	in	the	current	development	of	new	competencies	for	culture	at	the	European	level	(Isar	2015,	498).		
Experience	and	transnational	networking	Considering	transnationalism	as	an	experience	entails	the	integration	of	a	wide	array	of	considerations	on	the	types	of	consciousness,	cultural	impacts	and	types	of	engagement	pursued	by	different	transnational	actors.	Anthropologist	Ulf	Hannerz	expresses	the	impact	of	transnationalism	well:	“It	is	these	dispersed	institutions	and	communities,	groupings	of	people	regularly	coming	together	and	moving	apart,	short-term	relationships	or	patterns	of	fleeting	encounter,	which	
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offer	the	contexts	in	which	globalization	occurs	as	the	personal	experience	of	a	great	many	people	in	networks	where	extremely	varied	meanings	flow”	(Hannerz	1992,	47).	Similarly,	John	Tomlinson	points	to	the	effect	of	networks	on	social	life	as	the	fundamental	arbiters	of	globalization	(Tomlinson	1999).	What	I	want	to	focus	on	here	is	the	(re)production	of	culture	and	meaning	through	transnational	engagement.	Both	Luin	Goldring	(1998)	and	Robert	Smith	(1998)	in	Transnational	from	Below	point	out	how	transnationalism	is	not	just	local,	but	is	‘trans-local’	and	based	in	multiple	contexts	from	different	points	of	origin.	However,	the	primary	role	of	locality	in	many	areas	of	lived	experience	goes	against	the	more	forceful	suggestion	of	Arjun	Appadurai	that	transnationalism	and	the	global	cultural	economy	have	led	to	a	‘steady	erosion	of	the	relationship…between	spatial	and	virtual	neighbourhoods”	(Appadurai	1995,	213).	Yet	this	insight	should	not	be	dismissed	immediately.	There	is	a	distinctly	transformative	potential	in	the	movement	of	people	and	ideas	between	localities	that	necessitates	a	crucial	awareness	of	the	‘trans-local’	production	of	cultures	and	identities.	Based	on	this	fact	there	has	been	a	general	move	towards	considering	the	concept	of	‘transnational	social	space’	in	order	to	delimit	the	realm	of	inquiry	and	to	further	conceptualize	these	relationships	(Pries	2001;	Faist	and	Özveren	2004).	This	is	a	fruitful	exercise	for	studying	the	impact	of	migrant	transnationalism	as	they	form	relatively	autonomous,	reciprocal	and	fluid	networks	but	it	is	perhaps	less	relevant	for	the	study	at	hand	which	is	more	politically	and	practically	defined.		It	is	worth	considering	the	concept	of	the	‘meso-link’	as	it	has	been	introduced	in	transnationalism	research.	This	refers	to	migrant	organizations,	supranational	organizations,	welfare	foundations,	INGOs,	and	transnational	social	movements	(Köngeter	2010),	which	can	act	both	as	a	potential	site	for	political	engagement	and	of	collective	meaning	construction.	The	organizational	perspective	can	provide	an	important	link	between	understanding	the	individual	(micro)	level	experiences	and	the	governance	(macro)	level	that	structures	transnational	interactions	(Pries	2008,	18).	Smith	and	Guarnizo	(1998)	also	point	to	the	importance	of	identifying	the	meso-structural	level	in	which	“institutions	interact	with	structural	and	instrumental	processes	(Smith	and	Guarnizo	1998,	25).	Identifying	and	including	this	level	within	transnational	
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research	can	help	to	answer	important	questions	related	to	how	trust	and	solidarity	is	constructed	across	borders,	the	discourses	and	practices	that	this	entails	and	the	sociocultural	basis	on	which	these	ties	are	maintained	(Ibid,	26).	However,	there	is	a	more	essential	quality	to	transnational	networking	that	is	not	captured	in	these	approaches	that	tend	to	rely	upon	the	physical	mobility	of	people	through	networked	space.	This	necessitates	a	return	to	a	more	global	perspective.	For	example,	Axford’s	systemic	approach	leans	towards	the	potential	of	networks	to	produce	some	commonality	of	consciousness	(Axford	1995,	86).	What	the	‘transnational	studies’	approaches	offer	is	a	level	of	analytical	precision	with	regard	to	specific	uses	of	the	term	which	can	at	times	be	overly	constraining	(as	in	the	definition	of	experience),	but	can	also	offer	new	avenues	for	consideration	(as	with	the	idea	of	the	meso-link).	However,	they	fail	to	capture	the	transmission	effects	of	networks.			
Practicing	transnationalism	A	complementary	approach	to	transnationalism	focuses	upon	sets	of	practices.	Transnational	practices	are	manifold	and	engaged	in	by	various	actors,	which	has	led	to	increased	interest	in	the	practice	of	transnationalism.	Work	on	the	transnational	capitalist	class	and	global	capitalism	(Sklair	2003),	the	work	of	global	justice	(Kurasawa	2007)	and	the	role	of	civil	society	and	non-state	actors	(Koehn	and	Rosenau	2002;	Berry	and	Gabay	2009)	have	revealed	the	importance	of	understanding	transnationalism	through	practice.	Peggy	Levvitt’s	(2001)	book	Transnational	Villagers	made	a	step	forward	in	understanding	transnationalism	by	exploring	how	the	transnational	becomes	integrated	into	the	lives	of	migrants	such	that	the	experiential	is	built	upon	the	transformation	of	specific	transformations	of	ideas	and	ways	of	living	thus	producing	a	tangible	change	in	the	everyday	practices	of	these	communities.	This	type	of	ethnography	highlights	the	importance	of	paying	attention	to	the	consequences	to	processes	and	developments,	which	may	originate	inside	or	outside	the	specific	context.	The	approach	undertaken	can	always	be	modified	for	appropriateness.		Transnational	practices	also	offer	a	way	to	counter	the	difficulties	of	understanding	different	trajectories	of	transnationalism	and	to	bridge	the	gap	
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between	‘transnationalism	from	below’	and	‘transnationalism	from	above’	(Smith	and	Guarnizo	1998)	by	revealing	the	way	in	which	strategies	are	constituted	by	developments	at	both	the	level	of	institutional	politics	and	communities.	Furthermore,	we	can	resist	critiques	that	limit	transnationalism	to	being	a	social	and	political	phenomenon	that	is	outside	the	realm	of	statist	and	regional	politics.	On	the	contrary,	states	can	also	participate	in	transnational	practices	through	intermediary	channels	and	competencies,	of	course	suggesting	a	change	in	the	strategies	of	governance.	Maintaining	the	necessary	distinction	between	transnationalism	and	the	state	risks	uncritically	reaffirming	the	conflation	of	state	with	nation	whereas	one	of	the	major	benefits	of	transnational	research	is	in	overcoming	this	assumption.	In	fact,	states	have	historically	taken	part	in	not	only	international	but	also	transnational	relations	by	engaging	non-state	actors	such	as	social	movements	and	private	and	political	foundations.		The	conceptual	clarification	used	by	Steven	Vertovec	is	useful	in	this	regard.	He	similarly	identifies	transnational	relations	as	“referring	to	sustained	linkages	and	ongoing	exchanges	among	non-state	actors	based	across	national	borders”	but	also	suggests	that	transnationalism	includes	the	“processes	of	formation	and	maintenance,	and	their	wider	implications”	(Vertovec	2009,	3).	A	comprehensive	understanding	of	these	aspects	would	necessarily	include	the	actions	and	participation	of	state	actors	in	governance	and	the	promotion	and	engagement	with	such	networks.	This	is	evident	in	the	Mediterranean	region	where	the	EU	and	regional	governments	have	partnered	with	civil	society	actors	and	regional	institutions	to	foster	limited	forms	of	transnational	activity.	Naturally,	this	is	not	the	autonomous	transnationalism	referred	to	in	much	of	the	literature	concerned	with	social	movements	or	migration	but	it	is	a	significant	feature	of	the	regional	landscape	and	potential	source	of	further	development.	In	other	words,	states	are	not	transnational	actors	in	themselves	but	can	take	part	in	the	formation,	maintenance	or	extent	of	transnationalism.	Examples	of	this	are	also	noted	by	Vertovec	(2009)	such	as	the	El	Salvadorean	government’s	provision	of	free	legal	assistance	to	El	Salvadorean	refugees	to	remain	in	the	United	States,	contributing	significant	annual	remittances	(Mahler	1998).	There	is	a	complex	relationship	between	the	worlds	of	states	and	transnationalism	oftentimes	based	on	a	subtle	interaction	between	the	two.	Another	reason	to	
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focus	on	transnational	practices	for	this	research	is	to	avoid	conflating	the	actions	and	participation	of	civil	society	groups	across	the	region	with	more	mobile	and	essential	forms	of	transnationalism	such	as	migration	or	to	characterize	these	actors	as	automatically	representative	of	a	transnational	(or	global)	civil	society.	Practices,	on	the	other	hand,	are	highly	contextual	and	can	be	employed	strategically	but	they	also	have	a	reciprocal	effect.			
Conclusion	This	literature	review	has	introduced	some	of	the	key	works	on	different	concepts	and	aspects	that	will	play	an	important	role	in	this	research.	The	discussions	presented	here	provide	a	foreground	for	the	analytical	chapters	to	follow,	which	will	pick	up	on	either	individual	themes	or	multiple	complementary	themes.	It	should	be	clear	from	the	previous	sections	that	this	research	picks	up	from	some	complex	debates	that	have	taken	place	in	different	fields	of	political,	sociological,	anthropological	and	geographical	research.	Combining	the	insights	from	these	different	areas	is	a	tricky	task	but	one	that	is	highly	beneficial	to	properly	understanding	the	role	of	civil	society	actors	and	their	diverse	understandings	beyond	an	integration	inspired	approach	to	the	Mediterranean	region.	First,	by	exploring	the	role	of	civil	society	actors	in	relation	to	transnationalization	and	political	governance	suggests	a	novel	way	of	conceptualizing	the	relationship	between	these	two	phenomena	and	the	way	in	which	civil	society	is	constructed	and	practiced	according	to	political	and	cultural	criteria.	But	applying	a	transnational	approach	also	allows	us	to	focus	upon	the	multiple	ways	in	which	transnational	relations	alter	these	roles	and	offer	opportunities	to	social	and	political	actors	to	engage	in	a	variety	of	practices	and	meaning-making	activities.	Coupling	these	ideas	with	a	renewed	concern	for	the	existence	of	regional	institutions,	programmes	and	activities	will	provide	understanding	of	the	complex,	contested	and	multi-layered	existence	of	the	region	inside	and	outside	of	political	constructions.
	 80	
Chapter	3:	Beyond	the	object	of	civil	society:	transnational	
democracy	promotion	and	the	proliferation	of	Foundations		This	chapter	elaborates	on	transnationalization	as	a	process	contributing	to	a	change	in	political	practice	that	is	evident	in	the	evolution	of	democracy	promotion	through	the	1990s	and	following	the	millennium.	This	is	the	first	of	two	theoretical	chapters	which	place	the	subsequent	research	in	the	context	of	increasing	multilateralism	and	the	growth	of	cross-border	and	transnational	networks	to	achieve	closer	cooperation	and	pursue	state	interests.	Transnational	cooperation	is	characteristic	of	non-state	actors	and	has	at	times	been	treated	as	unique	to	social	movements	or	migrants.	Where	the	state	has	been	discussed	is	usually	in	the	form	of	policy	networks.	This	perspective	focuses	on	the	organizational	politics	in	governance	whereby	ministries,	committees,	trade	unions,	businesses,	civil	society	organizations	may	form	cross-border	alliances	in	the	pursuit	of	achieving	more	effective	policy	solutions	and	implementation.		The	purpose	of	the	chapter	is	to	provide	theoretical	grounding	for	the	subsequent	analysis.	It	suggests	that,	in	order	to	understand	the	ways	in	which	culture	and	civil	society	have	been	incorporated	into	Euro-Mediterranean	relations,	we	also	need	to	look	beyond	the	region.	This	is	done	by	exploring	the	process	through	which	global	normative	culture	has	penetrated	political	strategies	and	altered	the	methods	through	which	official	actors	pursue	and	contest	political	objectives.	It	first	off	establishes	the	significance	of	non-state	actors	such	as	political	and	cultural	foundations	in	helping	redefine	the	practice(s)	of	democracy	promotion.	It	also	demonstrates	that	the	networks	that	foundations	help	to	generate	are	not	necessarily	independent	or	immune	to	state	influence	but	often	act	in	complement	to	official	foreign	policy	instruments.	At	the	same	time,	they	support	an	increasingly	horizontal	structure	that	encourages	the	participation	of	other	non-state	actors	thus	often	prioritizing	informal	politics	and	proffering	the	instrumental	value	of	civil	society.	The	chapter	unfolds	by	examining	the	relationship	between	transnationalization	and	democracy.	It	examines	the	role	that	global	normative	culture	has	had	on	the	way	in	which	politics	is	contested	at	the	local	and	international	level.	The	
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symbolic	and	real	influence	of	transnational	civil	society	has,	thus,	influenced	a	change	in	political	practice	that	can	also	be	seen	in	the	typically	state	reserve	of	foreign	policy.	The	final	sections	of	the	chapter	explore	these	theoretical	insights	in	relation	to	the	EU’s	democracy	promotion	activities	and	connects	changes	in	the	field	of	democracy	promotion	to	the	influence	of	networking	amongst	states	and	Political	Foundations.	In	the	context	of	transnationalizing	processes,	the	focus	on	civil	society	in	political	strategy	can	be	linked	in	part	to	the	increased	role	of	political	and	cultural	foundations.	In	the	field	of	democracy	promotion	this	is	apparent	through	the	emergence	of	foundations,	nominally	connected	to	political	structures,	which	in	their	work	emphasize	the	importance	of	society-oriented	programming.	A	similar	approach	can	be	found	in	other	policies	that	aim	to	establish	connections	at	the	societal	level,	especially	in	the	realm	of	cultural	relations.	Ultimately,	the	ubiquity	of	the	‘civil	society’	orientation	seems	to	stem	at	least	in	part	from	the	post-Cold	War	practice	of	democracy	promotion	and	has	remained	central	to	other	areas	of	foreign	policy	–	public	and	cultural	diplomacy	–	as	well	as	in	what	can	be	referred	to	as	global	cultural	policy.	This	chapter	responds	to	a	problem	at	the	heart	of	understanding	the	incorporation	of	civil	society	in	regional	institutions	–	namely,	the	relationship	between	states,	transnationalism	and	civil	society.	But	is	also	provides	an	essential	basis	to	understand	the	political	value	of	a	Foundation	to	support	civil	society	networking	in	the	context	of	weak	regional	integration.		Wolff	and	Wurm	(2011)	have	pointed	towards	the	deficiency	of	theoretical	approaches	to	understanding	democracy	promotion.	This	is	an	important	deficiency	that	deserves	much	greater	attention.	Working	in	this	direction	necessitates	an	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	democracy	promotion	and	global	politics	as	well	as	the	problem	of	democratization	of	the	global	system.	Certainly,	states	have	a	central	role	in	democracy	promotion	policies	but	specific	strategies	and	their	implementation	are	linked	to	more	general	trends	of	political	transformation	and	practice,	and	political	discourses	and	cultures	that	exist	alongside.	There	are,	of	course,	clear	instrumental	logics	in	the	strategic	implementation	of	policies.	But	there	is	a	limited	designation	of	legitimate	courses	of	action	that	has	followed	the	backlash	against	democracy	
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promotion	activities	worldwide.	This	backlash	can	be	observed	in	the	legal	and	extra-legal	actions	of	authoritarian	governments	such	as	the	bill	passed	in	July	2012	in	Russia	requiring	NGOs	that	receive	foreign	funding	to	publicly	adopt	the	label	‘foreign	agent’	or	suffer	legal	action.	On	December	27th	2011	Egyptian	forces	stormed	the	offices	of	17	NGOs,	including	several	linked	to	the	National	Endowment	for	Democracy,	and	detained	numerous	employees	ostensibly	for	operating	without	the	proper	permits	and	for	not	declaring	foreign	sources	of	funding.	Some	methods	of	democracy	promotion	have	become	less	clear	and	less	desirable	in	this	context.	For	example,	the	use	of	conditionality	in	EU	external	assistance	to	Southern	Mediterranean	countries	lacks	a	clear	framework	for	justification	and	has	been	deemed	ineffectual	at	times.	December	2012	saw	additional	loans	to	Egypt	despite	a	period	of	seemingly	anti-democratic	political	manoeuvring	on	the	part	of	President	Morsi	and	the	Muslim	Brotherhood.	In	addition,	the	limited	effectiveness	of	EU	conditionality	in	the	Southern	and	Eastern	Mediterranean	as	a	result	of	the	missing	‘carrot’	of	membership	further	complicates	its	use	and	indicates	the	potential	significance	of	transnational	actors	and	approaches	for	EU	policy.		Understanding	the	various	conceptual	underpinnings	and	the	practical	implications	of	the	significance	attributed	to	civil	society	actors	in	official	policies	toward	democracy	promotion	should	be	of	greater	concern.	I	intend	to	pursue	this	aim	by	linking	this	concern	with	the	process	of	political	globalization,	which	occasions	the	environment	for	its	proliferation.	We	need	to	contextualize	the	development	of	democracy	promotion	within	a	global	politics	and	through	the	elaboration	of	a	global	normative	culture.	As	we	see	a	growing	focus	on	civil	society	as	both	target	and	mediator	of	democracy	promotion	policies	there	is	a	simultaneous	shift	in	the	type	of	policy	being	pursued.	This	is	not	to	say	that	these	developments	are	inherently	linked	but	rather	to	suggest	that	there	is	a	twofold	process	including	the	transnationalization	of	democracy	promotion	and	its	conceptual	narrowing.	The	key	concerns	of	this	paper	can	also	be	linked	to	the	current	concern	with	conceptualizing	various	approaches	towards	and	understandings	of	democracy	promotion	(Hobson	and	Kurki	2011).	There	is	a	clear	link	between	transnationalization	and	the	study	of	transnational	civil	society	actors,	a	link	that	might	appear	patently	obvious.	However	there	has	
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been	less	discussion	of	the	impact	of	these	processes	on	the	actual	strategy	and	goals	of	democracy	promotion	activities	especially	in	reference	to	an	increasing	focus	on	civil	society	assistance.	At	a	time	when	there	is	greater	skepticism	towards	the	compatibility	of	narrow	conceptions	of	civil	society,	why	does	the	role	of	civil	society	actors	continue	to	expand?	And,	who	is	included	in	the	dominant	conceptions	of	civil	society?	In	order	to	begin	to	answer	these	questions	we	need	to	consider	the	relationship	between	the	discourses	of	civil	society	and	the	way	that	it	becomes	practiced	in	different	contexts.	One	aspect	of	this	is	to	recover	the	relationship	between	‘civil	society’	and	the	practice	of	governance.		This	chapter	will	explore	the	transnationalization	of	practices	and	strategies	of	state	and	supranational	actors	specifically	with	regard	to	democracy	promotion.	By	looking	at	the	ways	in	which	transnationalism	has	impacted	upon	state-level	politics	it	is	possible	to	understand	more	effectively	the	relationship	between	transnationalism	and	international	politics.	Thus,	transnationalization	and	transnationalism	have	led	to	the	civil	societalization	of	politics.	While	the	capacity	to	act	independently	has	increased	for	many	actors	there	is	still	an	intimate	link	between	governments	and	independent	political	and	non-political	actors	in	pursuing	democracy	promotion	strategies.	With	regard	to	the	European	Union	it	is	important	to	recognize	that	many	changes	have	also	occurred	during	a	period	where	the	efficacy	of	democracy	promotion	has	come	under	heavy	scrutiny	and	during	which	the	number	and	type	of	actors	involved	in	democracy	promotion	has	substantially	increased.	Simultaneously	there	is	a	growing	shift	towards	a	more	flexible	form	of	democracy	promotion	that	focuses	on	the	actors	involved	as	contributing	to	the	input	and	output	legitimacy	policies	and	programmes.	The	focus	on	civil	society	is	a	key	feature	of	promoting	a	form	of	'low-intensity	democracy'	(Robinson	1996,	18)	or	a	kind	of	'democracy,	abridged'	and	is	thus	also	a	structural	feature	of	a	global	society	to	the	extent	that	it	is	linked	to	transnationalization	processes.	However,	it	is	also	linked	to	the	functioning	of	cultural	and	discursive	interactions	that	(re)produce	a	particular	version	of	civil	society	and	democratic	politics.	Historically,	it	is	not	a	coincidence	that	discourses	of	both	human	rights	and	democracy	began	to	feature	in	foreign	policy	around	roughly	the	same	time	and	that	this	occurred	
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during	a	period	of	increasingly	political	as	well	as	economic	forms	of	transnationalization	(See	Guilhot	2005).	This	paper	leans	towards	a	deeper	investigation	of	EU	democracy	promotion	in	the	EuroMediterranean	favoring	insights	into	the	complexity	and	multidimensionality	of	regional	developments	(Kurki	2011)	and	proposes	a	novel	approach	to	looking	at	the	role	of	civil	society	in	relation	to	governance	in	the	EuroMed	region	through	the	concept	of	‘civil	societalization’.	The	approach	favored	is	more	intimately	aware	of	and	tied	to	globalizing	processes	and	a	transformation	of	global	politics	associated	with	a	movement	in	the	locus	of	power	from	traditional,	institutional	forms	to	a	condition	of	flexibility	and	organizational	differentiation.	In	the	place	of	democracy	there	are	a	series	of	new	tactics	and	organizational	strategies	aimed	at	producing	short-term	effects	and	measurable	results	and	which	are	legitimized	through	a	global	normative	discourse.	Recent	developments	in	democracy	promotion	tend	to	focus	on	flexible,	technocratic	and	low-cost	means.	Transnational	actors	have	been	one	influence	in	this	direction	as	they	play	a	greater	role	in	defining	and	implementing	policies.	But	governments	and	states	are	also	promoting	these	developments.	As	such,	we	can	link	these	developments	in	democracy	promotion	to	a	general	‘civil	societalization	of	politics’	whereby	political	practice	and	strategy	have	been	transformed	through	discourses	of	civil	society.	However	there	is	a	simultaneous	change	in	the	way	that	‘civil	society’	is	understood	and	practiced	as	the	concept	becomes	transnationalized	as	well	as	(re)constructed	by	political	actors.	This	paper	will	focus	on	one	aspect	of	this	process	in	relation	to	democracy	promotion	(specifically	in	the	EU)	and	the	role	of	political	foundations	in	helping	to	redefine	its	practice	in	the	context	of	an	increasingly	global	politics.	In	so	doing	I	will	show	that	it	is	not	sufficient	to	measure	or	objectify	civil	society	but	that	we	also	need	to	question	the	ways	in	which	civil	society	becomes	constitutive	of	governance	practices.		
Transnationalization,	civil	society	and	politics	Transnationalization	is	a	phenomenon	that	requires	definition	and	discussion	as	it	has	diverse	meanings	and	interpretations.	What	I	want	to	focus	on	specifically	is	the	extension	of	political	governance	beyond	national	boundaries	and	the	rise	of	transnational	civil	society	actors.	With	regard	to	civil	society,	these	new	
	 85	
governance	structures	are	often	represented	as	constructing	new	opportunity	structures	for	civil	society	actors	and	organizations	ostensibly	to	participate	in	the	act	of	governing	and	policy-making.	However,	the	relationship	between	the	two	is	often	left	relatively	unexamined	despite	the	fact	that	this	is	a	crucial	relationship	which	rests	at	the	heart	of	political	strategies	aimed	at	promoting	the	growth	or	involvement	of	civil	society,	whether	in	terms	of	democratization	or	for	regionalization.	A	central	goal	for	this	section	will	be	to	establish	the	significance	of	transnationalization	as	a	perspective	that	reflects	on	the	links	between	political	transformations,	social	and	cultural	change,	and	the	emergence	of	new	strategies,	organizational	forms	and	discourses	of	action	that	legitimize	political	relationships.	These	latter	aspects	will	be	discussed	subsequently	in	greater	detail	as	they	describe	a	critical	relationship	between	the	practice	of	politics	and	its	normativity	in	the	context	of	globalizing	processes.		The	definition	of	transnationalism	offered	by	Risse	(1995)	is	a	useful	starting	point:	‘regular	interactions	across	national	boundaries	when	at	least	one	actor	is	a	non-state	agent	or	does	not	operate	on	behalf	of	a	national	government	or	an	intergovernmental	organization’	(Risse	1995,	3).	However,	there	needs	to	be	a	greater	distinction	or	explanation	of	the	identity	of	the	non-state	actor	and	the	relationship	with	emerging	forms	of	governance.	Furthermore,	it	does	not	clearly	enough	specify	the	transnational	as	a	fragmentary	and	enduring	process.	Both	of	these	aspects	are	of	critical	importance	to	understanding	the	significance	of	transnationalization.	Non-state	actors	have	been	attributed	an	increasingly	significant	role	in	the	global	system	since	the	1990s.	The	expansion	of	international	institutions	and	the	growth	of	regional	integration	and	supranational	governance	has	produced	a	dramatic	shift	in	the	way	that	states	interact	and	on	the	ability	of	new	actors	to	have	an	impact	on	global	politics.	Extensive	writings	on	global	civil	society	(GCS)	or	transnational	civil	society	(TCS)	(Keck	and	Sikkink	1998,	Higgott,	Underhill	and	Bieler	2000,	Clark	2001,	Khagram,	Riker	and	Sikkink	2002,	Keane	2003,	Kaldor	2003)	beginning	in	this	decade	have	sought	to	illuminate	the	complexity	and	range	of	actors	and	relations	that	are	critical	to	understanding	global	relations	since	the	collapse	of	communism.	Indeed,	analysis	of	the	‘global	associational	revolution’	(Salomon,	Sokolowski	and	List	2003)	has	been	largely	(though	certainly	not	solely)	
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differentiated	along	a	sort	of	spectrum	of	optimism.	This	spectrum	could	be	said	to	range	from	a	belief	in	the	innate	transformational	impact	of	transnational	civil	society	actors	(Kaldor	2003)	to	a	more	cautious	interrogation	of	the	role	of	these	actors	in	relation	to	capital	and	state	power	(Higgott,	Underhill	and	Bieler	2000).	Nonetheless,	most	suggest	that	transnational	civil	society	should	not	be	overlooked	when	trying	to	understand	global	politics	and	they	(at	least)	implicitly	suggest	a	fundamental	transformation	in	political	practice	that	has	given	these	actors	new	impetus	and	opportunities.	A	crucial	difficulty	that	arises	is	in	understanding	the	relationship	of	these	new	actors	to	new	forms	of	political	governance	and	in	providing	an	adequate	scaling	of	relations.	On	this	question	there	is	a	double-sided	problematic	that	highlights	the	importance	of	context	for	political	action	and	the	transformational	impact	of	transnationalization	of	political	identities	and	actions.	None	of	this	suggests	that	the	place	or	influence	of	the	state	is	under	attack	and	a	crucial	understanding	is	that	transnational	civil	society	actors	are	always	locally	situated	and	glocally	oriented.		Implicitly,	we	can	see	this	in	Keck	and	Sikkink’s	concept	of	the	‘boomerang	effect’	whereby	TCS	groups	target	international	partners	in	order	to	subsequently	put	pressure	on	their	local	governments	(Keck	and	Sikkink	1998).	Thus,	the	global	consists	of	a	strategic	element	for	these	advocacy	networks	in	order	to	pursue	local	goals.	But	the	existence	of	international	organizations	and	the	capability	of	networking	transnationally	also	gives	new	significance	to	the	global	realm	precisely	by	expanding	the	range	of	options	and	meanings	available	to	these	actors.	The	‘boomerang	effect’	is	important	because	it	highlights	the	impact	of	transnationalization	on	the	political	strategies	of	civil	society	actors.	But	it	also	points	to	the	‘domestication	of	international	conflict’	(Tarrow	2001)	and	that	global	activism	is	also	connected	to	an	attitude	of	glocalism	by	altering	actors’	perception	of	states	and	borders	as	“local	practices	and	policies	are	embedded	in	transnational	processes	and	ideologies”	(Guidry,	Kennedy	and	Zald	2000,	Preface).	And	as	Anthony	McGrew	has	pointed	out,	transnational	actors	also	portend	an	infrastructural	power	understood	as	the	way	in	which	globalization	amplifies	the	ability	of	TCS	actors	to	take	advantage	not	just	of	the	opportunity	structures	but	also	through	new	mechanisms	and	through	the	effects	of	norms	and	socialization.		
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The	problem	of	understanding	transnational	civil	society	as	a	phenomenon	unto	itself	requires	also	a	consideration	of	power	and	influence.	As	Florini	(2003)	argues,	instead	of	wielding	material	power	these	actors	have	proved	to	be	adept	at	promoting	ideas	and	international	norms	in	order	to	persuade	governments	and	to	influence	changes	in	policies	and	political	identities	(Florini	2003,	10-11).	Keck	and	Sikkink	(1998)	allude	to	this	when	they	argue	that	one	of	the	goals	of	transnational	advocacy	networks	is	to	promote	a	change	in	discursive	positions	and	to	change	actor	behavior.	In	so	doing,	they	reinforce	the	role	of	discourse	in	producing	new	political	identities	and	political	change	–	they	help	to	reconstruct	‘structures	of	power	and	meaning’	(Price	2003,	583).	So	behind	the	power	strategies	of	agenda	setting,	networking,	compliance	and	mobilization	rests	a	more	fluid	understanding	of	power	that	varies	depending	on	context	and	issue	area.	Socialization	becomes	the	primary	route	to	influence.	And	yet	as	Richard	Price	(1998)	shows,	success	in	the	area	of	norm	promotion	tends	to	be	closely	linked	to	pre-existing	norms	or	rules	such	that	new	norms	can	be	‘grafted’	onto	existing	campaigns	(Price	1998,	617).	As	a	result,	focusing	narrowly	on	the	production	of	norms	and	rules	can	be	misleading.	An	effective	strategy	invokes	existing	agreements,	discourses	or	narratives	in	order	to	provoke	new	understandings	or	to	extend	an	established	form	of	legitimacy	to	another	issue.		Having	looked	at	the	ways	in	which	political	governance	has	become	more	flexible	it	would	seem	apposite	to	also	look	into	ways	in	which	transnational	actors	have	been	able	to	take	advantage	of	these	new	infrastructures	and	technologies.	In	this	sense,	one	could	differentiate	between	transnational	actors	and	global	discourses	along	the	lines	that	action	takes	place	in	a	particular	setting	or	across	particular	circumstances	whereas	discourse	is	about	framing	and	legitimizing.	But	this	breakdown	neglects	the	global	implications	of	transnationalization	and	specifically	its	impact	upon	the	state-system.	Moreover,	taken	as	a	statement	of	theoretical	explication	it	ignores	the	essentially	constituted	nature	of	global	politics	and	this	makes	it	necessary	to	supplement	the	opportunity	structure	model	of	transnationalization	by	understanding,	as	Ulrich	Beck	argues,	how	transnationalized	politics	“is	not	the	end	of	politics	but	rather	its	migration	elsewhere…Global	politics	have	turned	
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into	global	domestic	politics,	which	rob	national	politics	of	their	boundaries	and	foundations”	(Beck	2006,	249).	While	the	latter	argument	might	seem	premature	Beck	touches	on	a	crucial	peculiarity	when	he	refers	to	a	‘global	domestic	politics’.	In	fact,	it	is	in	understanding	this	transformation	that	we	can	also	move	closer	to	understanding	the	civil	societalization	of	politics	and	the	constitutive	nature	of	global	politics.	What	is	clear	from	this	is	that	we	need	to	be	keenly	aware	of	the	emergence	of	an	altogether	different	relationship	between	state-society	resulting	in	multifarious	actors	(state	and	non-state	actors	alike)	instrumentalizing	the	idea	of	civil	society.	As	Petric	and	Blundo	(2012)	have	argued,	civil	society	has	become	a	fetish-object	in	the	minds	of	transnational	actors	and	this	is	propagated	by	the	practice	of	transnationalization	and	the	emergence	of	globalizing	identities	and	cultures	that	reference	the	categorical	traits	of	civil	society	actors.			
From	global	normative	culture	to	the	civil	societalization	of	politics	In	the	sense	it	has	been	used	thus	far,	transnationalization	refers	to	the	institutional	and	organizational	transformation	of	politics	across	state	boundaries	through	the	emergence	of	new	actors	and	institutions	and	the	proliferation	of	cross-border	flows	of	goods,	people	and	ideas.	One	part	of	this	transformation	is	the	role	of	non-state	actors	in	the	form	of	NGOs,	CSOs,	social	movements	and	political	foundations.	In	both	the	targets	of	advocacy	actions	and	the	issues	represented,	such	as	environmentalism,	there	is	an	inherently	globalizing	viewpoint	and	this	is	both	supported	and	based	around	the	existence	of	a	global	normative	culture,	which	could	be	associated	with	the	culture	of	human	rights	that	has	developed	within	international	institutions	and	through	international	law.	Alongside	the	institutionalization	of	certain	norms	and	values	the	work	of	social	movements,	NGOs	and	other	civil	society	oriented	groups	continues	to	progress	a	transnationalization	of	the	public	sphere,	a	space	of	collective	(communicative)	action,	which	acts	as	a	critical	resource	for	a	global	normative	culture.	Global	normative	culture	does	not	refer	to	the	development	of	normative	frameworks,	or	the	establishment	of	international	regimes,	such	as	those	referred	to	in	the	human	rights	literature.	This	culture	is	a	social	
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phenomenon	most	clearly	linked	to	the	impact	of	transnationalization	on	political	community	and	in	the	social	and	cultural	as	well	as	political	responses	to	the	transformation	of	opportunity	and	capacity	at	the	local	level.	The	final	part	of	this	discussion	will	introduce	the	civil	societalization	of	politics	and	discuss	its	effect	on	policy	through	the	analytic	of	antipolicy.			 Public	spheres	are	always	subject	to	conflict	and	contestation	and	the	communicative	capacity	provided	by	globalized	media	and	communications	technology	ensures	a	multiplicity	of	participants	and	outcomes.	But	this	situation	does	not	create	an	even	playing	field.	It	is	also	not	possible	to	point	towards	an	existing	transnational	public	sphere	but	only	a	process	of	transnationalizing	in	response	to	the	various	crises	of	political	representation	and	the	national	public	sphere	under	globalization	and	the	enduring	adaptation	of	sovereignties.	The	significance	of	the	transnationalizing	public	sphere	does	not	necessarily	lie	in	its	normative	foundations	–	that	is,	the	ability	to	produce	even	exchange	and	consensus	through	deliberation	–	but	through	the	elaboration	of	alternative	discourses	and	modes	of	interaction	which	become	powerful	tools	in	their	own	right	as	well	as	being	subject	to	domestication	by	various	micronarratives	and	re-made	(Appadurai	1996,	10).	States,	political	parties,	corporations	all	show	a	willingness	and	ability	to	appropriate	such	discourses	for	their	own	needs	as	is	evident	in	the	proliferation	of	democratic	parties	in	authoritarian	countries	or	environmentally	concerned	corporations.	But	the	transnationalizing	public	sphere	is	much	more	of	a	critical	resource:		This	transnational	public	sphere	offers	a	place	where	forms	of	organization	and	tactics	for	collective	action	can	be	transmitted	across	the	globe.	It	is	the	medium	through	which	various	forms	of	collective	action	and	social	movement	repertoires	become	“modular”	and	transferable	to	distant	locations	and	causes	(Tarrow	1994,	6).	It	also	provides	the	space	where	material	resources	can	be	developed	and	distributed	across	national	boundaries	in	ways	that	limit	the	nation-state’s	capacity	to	sanctify	and	demonize	practices	with	cries	of	patriotic	and	alien	influences.	(Guidry,	Kennedy	and	Zald	2000,	7)		This	points	to	the	influence	that	non-state	actors	play	in	producing	change	in	the	practice	and	legitimization	of	politics.	But	the	transnationalization	of	such	movements	complicates	the	relationship	between	institutional	and	non-institutional	actors.	What	makes	the	notion	of	the	public	sphere	a	useful	construct	is	in	its	ability	to	help	us	represent	the	complex	relationship	between	
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conflicting	interests,	“the	social	construction	of	cultural	meaning,	and	the	institutions	of	the	state”	(Castells	2008,	79).	Certainly,	these	relationships	become	more	ambiguous	with	its	transnationalization	as	evidenced	in	the	proliferation	of	political	foundations	that	often	maintain	a	tenuous	distinction	between	governmental	and	private	actorhood.	And	yet	as	a	result	of	their	transnational	activity	political	foundations	continually	contribute	to	the	globalization	of	particular	norms	and	ideas	(Scott	and	Walters	2000).	So	for	reasons	not	associated	with	their	point	of	origin	or	political	identity	the	activities	of	such	actors	construct	new	lines	of	communication	and	power	through	the	establishment	of	social	networks	across	state	boundaries.	As	Delanty	and	Rumford	point	out:	“Global	normative	culture	exists	alongside	these	movements…providing	them	with	a	communicative	frame	of	reference	with	which	global	politics	is	increasingly	having	to	define	itself”	(Delanty	and	Rumford	2007,	416).		Such	a	context	has	led	to	a	fundamental	transformation	of	how	particular	issues	and	policies	are	viewed	and	contested	from	the	state-level.	Such	can	be	seen	as	a	civil	societalization	of	politics	to	the	extent	that	official	politics	and	policies	are	operationalized	more	readily	and	extensively	through	the	affectations	of	civil	society.	Civil	societalization	can	be	defined	as	the	contestation	of	political	objectives	by	governments	and	official	representatives	outside	the	formal	political	realm.	It	has	impacted	upon	politics	by	opening	up	new	avenues	for	political	contestation	into	areas	of	societal	interaction	and	culture.	The	CS	of	politics	can	be	seen	as	an	element	of	political	transformation	associated	with	the	globalization	of	a	normative	discourse	based	around	human	rights,	the	increasing	significance	attributed	to	the	activities	of	transnational	actors	and	the	corresponding	scale	shifts	in	governance	practices	in	order	to	incorporate	them.	Gerard	Delanty	and	Chris	Rumford	(2007),	in	their	original	discussion	of	the	civil	societalization	of	politics,	point	to	the	increasing	impact	of	transnational	relations	and	social	actors	on	governance	but	also	in	the	construction	of	a	global	normative	culture.	The	concept	of	civil	societalization	highlights	the	extent	to	which	this	culture	is	subsequently	capable	of	impacting	upon	politics	at	various	scales	of	governance.	As	such;	“…the	‘civil	societalization’	of	politics	signifies	a	common
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global,	the	national	and	the	transnational,	and	mobilizes	a	range	of	actors	around	common	political	codes:	competitiveness,	sustainability,	personhood	rights	and	social	justice”	(Delanty	and	Rumford	2007,	421).	Significantly,	the	extension	of	CS	into	the	fields	of	international	relations	and	foreign	policy	shows	that	one	of	the	outcomes	of	the	various	debates	surrounding	civil	society	and	democratic	governance	is	the	focus	on	organizational	strategies.	As	a	result,	governments	may	mobilize	transnational	civil	society	actors,	or	actors	representative	of	a	global	civil	society	(Ibid).	The	inherent	legitimacy	attributed	to	these	actors	can	then	be	linked	directly	to	official	policies.	An	important	question	that	remains,	however,	is	following	this	change	in	organizational	and	mobilization	strategy,	to	what	extent	does	the	CS	of	politics	also	produce	or	support	the	construction	of	particular	imaginations	and	identities?		As	a	strategy,	CS	develops	around	external	forms	of	legitimacy	that	conform	to	universalized	values	and	international	agreements.	The	CS	of	politics	infers	a	process	of	transformation	in	the	understanding	of	state-society	relations	as	political	actors	are	faced	with	new	strategic	considerations	regarding	the	adoption	of	new	organizational	forms	and	particular	discourses	of	legitimacy.	The	CS	of	politics	leads	political	actors	to	organize	around	particular	discourses	or	issues	and	to	mobilize	networked	actors	in	response	to	conflict.	Transnational	actors	have	taken	on	more	authority	through	the	functioning	of	a	global	normative	culture	but	also	through	complex	relationships	with	states	and	governments	(as	well	as	other	international	donors	exercising	unique	forms	of	sovereignty).	An	important	effect	of	this	civil	societalization	of	politics	can	be	found	in	William	Walters’	(2008)	analysis	of	‘antipolicy’.	Treating	antipolicy	as	an	analytic	helps	to	interpret	the	strategies	and	discourses	that	are	common	to	democracy	promotion	policies	that	are	explicitly	oriented	towards	civil	society	actors.	This	discussion	focuses	on	antipolicy	as	‘an	analytic’	as	this	suggests	a	route	to	integrating	these	insights	within	a	more	sociological	understanding	(Walters	2008).	Antipolicy	considers	the	way	in	which	official	strategies	are	developed	to	counter	‘bad	things’.	These	can	be	societal	or	international	problems,	or	both.	The	study	of	antipolicy	represents	an	attempt	to	come	to	terms	with	the	ways	in	which	‘anti-‘	discourses	have	not	only	a	life	of	their	own	but	establish	their	own	content	and	meaning	that	does	not	solely	rest	on	a	
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negation	of	the	issue.	On	the	contrary,	these	policies	entail	positive	components	that	contribute	to	the	narrowing	of	alternative	political	agendas.	This	is	important	precisely	because	of	the	political	purpose	of	including	civil	society	groups	in	these	policies.	A	major	factor	is	that	of	legitimation	–	that	is,	that	making	civil	society	either	the	target	of	policies	or	incorporating	them	within	democracy	promotion	carries	with	it	a	certain	form	of	legitimacy	that	is	all	the	more	important	with	a	waning	of	explicitly	political	democracy	promotion	activities	and	sources	of	funding	for	such	activities.	However,	this	is	not	sufficient	in	itself.		What	antipolicy	captures	is	the	significance	of	(re)defining	the	issue.	Therefore,	it	is	not	the	goals	that	justify	the	means	but	the	output,	or	as	Manuel	Castells	indicates,	as	“people	have	come	to	distrust	the	logic	of	instrumental	politics,	the	method	of	direct	action	on	direct	outputs	finds	increasing	support”	(Castells	2008,	85).	This	scenario	is	intimately	linked	to	the	strategy	of	non-governmental	organizations	but	is	replicated	in	official	government	policies	or	by	other	transnational	actors.	The	suggestion	is	not	that	civil	society	assistance	or	democracy	promotion	are	antipolicies,	or	even	that	they	are	based	upon	the	prevention	of	authoritarianism	in	a	general	sense	of	‘anti’	but	the	positive	aspects	of	antipolicy	are	broadly	applicable	to	a	change	in	official	policy	strategy	and	coincide	with	new	ways	of	approaching	issues	that	are	problematic	or	have	ambiguous	goals	attached	to	them.	As	Walters	(2008)	argues:	“the	things	which	anti-policy	targets	do	not	have	a	natural	existence	outside	discourse…Anti-policy	always	deals	with	racism,	terrorism,	etc.,	understood	in	very	specific	ways,	and	is	objectified	by	particular	networks	of	practice”	(Walters	2008,	274-5).	Democracy	promotion	could	certainly	be	perceived	in	such	a	way	and	this	paper	has	sought	to	re-contextualize	the	EU	approach	in	terms	of	a	narrow	understanding	of	civil	society	and	its	legitimacy	as	well	as	its	link	to	a	narrow	conception	of	democracy	both	of	which	are	(re)produced	in	the	transnationalization	of	such	policies.		Finally,	while	depoliticization	is	not	a	necessary	element	of	anti-policy	there	are	important	links	between	the	two	through	two	factors:	1)	the	externalization	effect	and	2)	the	blackmail	of	security	(Walters	2008,	281).	The	externalization	effect	can	be	understood	as	a	“discursive	move	by	which	certain	threats	come	to	be	understood	within	the	political	arena	as	dangers	emanating	
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from	outside	the	state…[the]	involvement	of	western	states	in	fostering	the	conditions	in	which	the	drug	trade,	people	trade,	racism,	terrorism	and	other	forms	of	violence	might	flourish	is	made	to	recede	into	the	background”	(Ibid).	The	externalization	effect	abounds	in	sensitive	policy	areas	like	democracy	promotion.	The	Arab	Spring	has	brought	much	greater	attention	to	this	effect	in	the	EU’s	relations	with	North	African	regimes	in	Tunisia	and	Egypt,	both	of	which	received	substantial	financial	and	political	support	from	European	countries	despite	habitually	poor	human	rights	records.	Policy	responses	in	the	form	of	reconfiguring	the	ENP,	establishing	closer	links	with	non-political	foundations	(like	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation),	and	establishing	a	greater	role	for	local	actors	and	civil	society	groups	have	all	sought	to	limit	criticism	based	on	the	externalization	effect.	The	blackmail	of	security,	on	the	other	hand,	points	to	the	way	in	which	official	anti-policy	might	tend	to	play	on	divisions	and	evoke	particular	political	agendas.	This	might	mean	playing	on	fear	or	threat,	or	by	oversimplification.	It	could	be	argued	that	the	exclusion	of	Islamic	organizations	(whether	desired	or	not)	is	an	inevitable	side	effect	of	the	‘blackmail	of	security’,	which	inevitably	establishes	categories	of	threat	that	is	capable	of	incorporating	whole	communities.		
Transnationalization,	democracy	promotion	and	the	EU	The	goal	of	this	section	will	be	to	consider	the	relationship	of	civil	society	actors	to	regional	governance	frameworks	particularly	in	the	context	of	democracy	promotion	strategies	and	developmental	instruments.	EU	policies	and	multilateral	regional	frameworks	in	the	Mediterranean	provide	an	institutional	architecture	for	the	region	and	suggest	new	opportunity	structures	for	governmental	and	non-governmental	actors	and	democracy	promotion	activities	form	an	important	aspect	(at	least	rhetorically)	through	the	European	Neighborhood	Policy	and	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean	and	various	instruments	such	as	the	European	Instrument	for	Democracy	and	Human	Rights	that	extend	focus	to	the	role	of	civil	society	actors	in	promoting	democratic	development.	But	EU	democracy	promotion	strategies	are	also	much	more	diffuse	and	manifold.	They	operate	through	unilateral	and	technical	instruments	
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(EIDHR,	European	Endowment	for	Democracy	etc.)	as	well	as	bilateral	agreements	and	multilateral	forums	(European	Neighborhood	Policy,	Union	for	the	Mediterranean)	such	that	it	is	difficult	to	characterize	them	under	a	cohesive	heading.	These	developments	point	to	a	suggestion	that	claiming	the	‘end	of	democracy	promotion’	should	stress	the	ubiquity	of	strategies	rather	than	their	dissolution.	It	is	precisely	this	abundance	mixed	with	funding	shortages,	short-termism,	and	the	focus	on	measurable	results	that	has	produced	a	movement	away	from	the	promotion	of	democracy	in	procedural	and	institutional	terms	as	well	as	through	the	practice	of	conditionality.	The	international	dimension	of	democracy	promotion	has	received	a	great	deal	of	attention	since	the	early	1990s	(Whitehead	1996).	Many	studies	have	focused	on	the	concept	of	external	democratization	to	refer	to	the	international	factors	(that	is,	not	domestic	factors)	that	can	influence	a	transition	to	democratic	forms	of	governance	or	can	promote	domestic	actors	in	favor	of	reform	(Beichelt	2012).	Yet	rather	than	drawing	clear	distinctions	this	move	risks	muddying	the	waters	between	the	role	of	different	democracy	promoters	and	the	effects	of	international	politics	on	democracy	promotion.	Instead,	we	need	to	look	more	deeply	into	how	transnationalization	has	influenced	new	strategies	and	goals	by	looking	at	how	the	goals	of	democracy	promotion	have	changed	in	response	to	transnational	actors	and	political	strategies	and	by	considering	the	role	of	transnational	actors	such	as	political	foundations	in	democracy	promotion.	The	growing	significance	of	civil	society-oriented	democracy	promotion	strategies	in	the	EU	can	be	linked	directly	to	the	influence	of	transnational	actors	and	discourses,	and	the	development	of	political	foundations	to	pursue	the	objectives	of	democracy	promotion	should	be	seen	in	the	context	of	the	extension	of	political	governance	beyond	national	boundaries.	Subsequently,	this	requires	a	reconsideration	of	the	discourses	of	democratization	and	also	of	the	role	of	culture	and	cultural	institutes	in	official	policy.			 The	relation	of	democracy	promotion	policies	to	international	and	transnational	phenomena	gained	increased	attention	alongside	growing	concern	for	the	context	of	democratization.	One	of	the	initial	attempts	to	include	the	consideration	of	these	factors	was	by	Laurence	Whitehead	who	discerned	three	
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models	of	external	democratization:	contagion,	control	and	consent	(Whitehead	1996).	These	three	models	offered	a	way	to	separate	the	influence	of	powerful	external	democracy	promoters	(such	as	the	US	and	European	countries)	from	the	effects	of	proximity	and	position	in	the	international	system.	The	question	of	contagion	appeared	especially	relevant	in	the	case	of	Europe	with	both	Southern	Europe	and	Central	Europe	undergoing	their	own	transitions	following	decades	of	authoritarian	rule	in	both	cases.	The	significance	of	the	European	cases	was	reflected	in	Paul	Kubicek’s	updating	of	these	criteria	by	substituting	consent	for	convergence	and	adding	a	fourth	model,	conditionality	(Kubicek	2003).	Working	from	a	similar	concern	for	the	international	dimensions	of	democratization,	Kubicek’s	criteria	offered	more	nuance	to	the	picture	and	a	closer	link	between	democracy	promoter	strategies,	domestic	democratization	actors,	and	the	international	environment.	His	approach	also	better	acknowledged	the	variation	in	promoter	strategies	according	to	these	different	variables	especially	in	relation	to	the	goal	of	accession	to	the	European	Union.	It	is	unsurprising	that	these	criteria	maintained	an	important	role	in	explaining	the	democratizing	role	of	the	EU	on	the	continent	and	was	even	expanded	to	debate	the	global	significance	and	actorness	of	the	EU	(Börzel	and	Risse	2009).	The	categories	of	contagion	and	convergence	were	effectively	extended,	however,	through	a	greater	concern	with	explicating	these	models	by	linking	traditional	rationalist	concerns	over	incentives	with	that	of	social	learning	and	new	modes	of	governance	(Schimmelfennig	and	Sedelmeier	2005:	18).	In	so	doing,	Schimmelfennig	and	Sedelmeier	(2005)	introduced	a	novel	way	of	looking	at	EU	policies	towards	neighboring	countries	that	was	influenced	by	work	on	socialization	in	international	relations	and	the	transnationalization	of	governance.	As	a	result,	analysis	of	EU	democracy	promotion	is	often	centered	on	the	two	factors	of	conditionality	and	socialization	in	evermore-sophisticated	understandings.	Börzel	and	Risse	(2009)	have	progressed	this	analysis	further	by	focusing	on	criteria	as	expressing	different	social	mechanisms	of	democratization:	coercion,	conditionality,	persuasion,	and	socialization.	Instead	of	using	a	broadly	constructivist	label	towards	the	categories	of	socialization	and	persuasion	they	argue	that	they	should	be	differentiated	through	the	concepts	of	normative	rationality	and	communicative	rationality.	Thus,	they	argue	that	
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socialization	can	be	linked	to	the	question	of	norms	but	success	usually	depends	upon	a	‘logic	of	appropriateness’	whereby	the	effectiveness	of	particular	norms	is	dependent	upon	their	institutional	context	(as	according	to	March	and	Olsen	1989).	Alternatively,	persuasion	follows	the	logic	of	communicative	rationality	whereby	consensus	is	achieved	through	open	dialogue	and	discourse.	It	is	perhaps	indicative	of	the	dominance	of	integration	studies	for	understanding	EU	democracy	promotion	policies	that	the	question	of	accession	continues	to	weigh	heavily	on	the	direction	of	debate.	These	studies	have	answered	important	questions	regarding	the	ways	in	which	transformative	power	functions	and	they	have	implicitly	dealt	with	the	impact	of	transnationalization	on	these	policies,	however	we	need	to	move	beyond	the	frame	of	accession	in	order	to	account	for	a	change	in	strategy	and	content	of	democracy	promotion	policies	over	the	same	time	period.		Criteria	initially	discussed	by	Whitehead	(1996),	which	have	evolved	and	become	subject	of	greater	theoretical	clarity	through	the	work	of	Kubicek	(2003),	Schimmelfennig	and	Sedelmeier	(2005)	and	Börzel	and	Risse	(2009),	reveal	a	gradual	elaboration	of	the	concern	for	the	external	and	systemic	contexts	of	democratization.	What	they	have	in	common	is	the	recognition	that	the	outcome	of	democratization	processes	results	from	the	combination	of	regional	factors	(geography)	and	the	impact	of	both	external	and	internal	factors	and	which	in	turn	highlights	the	importance	of	transnational	actors	(Grugel	1999,	5).	Constructivist	approaches	have	played	an	important	role	in	clarifying	the	impact	of	factors	that	cannot	be	explained	through	rational	actor	models	such	as	norms	and	identities.	Over	the	same	period	constructivist	arguments	have	played	an	important	(if	not	central)	role	in	explaining	the	power	of	transnational	civil	society	actors	in	global	politics	as	well	as	reconsidering	the	basis	of	the	states-system	in	general	(Wendt	1992;	Finnemore	and	Sikkink	1998;	Ruggie	1998).	However	transnational	actors	have	also	had	an	infrastructural	impact	on	the	practice	of	international	relations.	Democracy	promotion	has	taken	on	a	global	shape	through	the	work	of	international	institutions	such	as	the	World	Bank	and	the	IMF	but	also	by	the	European	Union	and	the	US	through	the	setting	up	of	aid	agencies	and	political	foundations.	Furthermore,	democracy	itself	has	become	globalized	in	the	context	of	democratization	with	the	
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development	of	internal	and	external	standards	that	stress	reform,	political	pluralism	and	participation	but	“also	about	satisfying	powerful	international	observers…that	acceptable	political	systems	are	taking	shape”	(Grugel	1995	quoted	in	Grugel	1999,	19).	This	is	evident	in	the	negotiation	of	bilateral	and	multilateral	agreements	that	link	economic	aid	to	some	form	of	political	conditionality.	For	example,	action	plans	under	the	European	Neighborhood	Policy	explicitly	include	criteria	for	democratic	reform	under	a	section	titled	‘Democracy	and	the	Rule	of	Law’.	The	significance	of	these	criteria	does	not	solely	lay	in	their	democratizing	credentials	but	rather	in	their	appropriateness	in	terms	of	providing	stability	for	international	interests.	The	external	aspect	of	democratization	is	also	evident	in	public	statements	made	by	US	and	European	officials	towards	countries	undergoing	democratic	transitions.	A	recent	example	of	such	came	in	response	to	President	Mohammed	Morsi’s	controversial	decree	expanding	his	powers	over	the	judiciary	calling	on	the	US	State	Department	to	urge	a	transition	that	is	“consistent	with	Egypt’s	international	commitments”	(State	Department	Press	Statement	Nov.	23rd	2012).	While	analysis	of	democracy	promotion	has	become	increasingly	concerned	with	external	factors	and	contexts	in	producing	successful	transitions	the	goals	of	democracy	promotion	have	also	taken	on	a	global	purpose	and	the	shift	is	more	than	discursive.	The	impact	of	non-state,	transnational	political	and	civil	society	actors	has	been	significant	on	the	expansion	of	democratization	agendas	and	policies.	However,	they	have	also	tended	to	organize	around	particular	conceptions	and	practices	of	democracy	promotion.	This	needs	to	be	accounted	for	more	explicitly.			
Civil	societalization	in	democracy	promotion	strategy	Approaches	to	development	espousing	the	centrality	of	civil	society	for	political	transformation	became	dominant	in	the	period	immediately	preceding	and	following	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union	aided	by	the	influence	of	global	development	institutions	(Robinson	1995).	The	United	Nations	Human	Development	Programme’s	1993	Human	Development	Report	promoted	the	strengthening	of	domestic	civil	society	institutions	as	a	way	of	increasing	social	stability	in	developing	states,	a	call	that	was	repeated	in	the	World	Bank’s	World	
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Development	Report	(McIlwaine	1998).	With	the	evolution	of	neo-liberal	policies	known	commonly	as	the	Washington	Consensus,	civil	society	promotion	also	took	on	a	specific	form	in	official	policies	depicting	civil	society	as	a	third	sector,	inclusive	of	social	activity	and	market	relations,	standing	in	direct	opposition	to	state	control	and	promoting	economic	development	and	efficient	(i.e.:	limited)	government.	Through	this	‘New	Policy	Agenda’,	discussed	by	Hulme	and	Edwards	(1997),	NGOs	and	CSOs	became	central	to	the	development	of	civil	society	in	relation	to	democracy	promotion.	This	new	agenda	focused	on	the	role	of	the	market	and	private	actors	in	ensuring	‘good	governance’	(Hulme	and	Edwards	1997,	6).	The	focus	on	good	governance,	which	has	dominated	EU-led	initiatives,	views	civil	society	as	both	a	target	of	funding	and	as	a	mediator	of	programmes.	Thus,	it	takes	on	a	dual	role	and	one	of	increasing	significance	in	relation	to	official	policy	and	crucially	for	the	current	discussion	it	also	begins	along	the	path	towards	transnationalizing	the	concept	by	understanding	civil	society	through	a	focus	on	mediating	bilateral	and	multilateral	programmes	and	initiatives	and	establishing	its	legitimacy	outside	of	the	local	setting.	But	how	did	civil	society	come	to	play	such	a	central	role	in	the	allocation	and	goals	of	democracy	promotion?			Certainly,	governments	and	organizations	working	in	the	field	find	many	practical	advantages	in	civil	society.	For	example	as	Carothers	and	Ottaway	(2010)	point	out,	a	lack	of	desire	to	undertake	reforms	within	recipient	governments	and	declining	budgets	for	democracy	promotion	both	prompted	a	focus	on	smaller-scale	involvement	as	even	the	limited	amount	of	funding	available	appeared	significant	in	relation	to	the	size	of	CSOs	working	in	the	field	(Carothers	and	Ottaway	2010,	location	108).	Ultimately,	the	primacy	given	to	NGOs	in	particular	has	led	to	their	introduction	“as	a	pervasive	associational	form,	marking	a	departure	from	the	past”	and	resulting	in	an	organizational,	as	opposed	to	political,	form	of	pluralism	(Ibid,	location	3464).		But	their	proliferation	in	this	regard	should	not	be	separated	from	the	international	growth	of	NGOs	since	the	early	1990s.	The	geographical	unevenness	of	NGO	growth	(Smith	and	Wiest	2005)	only	increases	their	strategic	importance	as	Western	NGOs	become	central	players	in	promoting	democratization	policies	and	programmes	of	their	own.	The	transnationalization	
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of	politics	has	reinforced	the	centrality	of	civil	society	for	democratization	as	a	result	of	the	diminishing	self-sufficiency	of	states.	In	a	parallel	development	the	notion	of	civil	society	assistance	has	gained	prominence	and	the	role	of	civil	society	actors	and	particularly	NGOs	and	CSOs	has	multiplied	and	become	much	more	complex	as	civil	society	is	simultaneously	transformed	into	an	object	towards	which	democracy	promotion	strategies	are	pursued.	In	addition	to	democratization	processes	being	deeply	embedded	in	global	and	regional	politics	there	are	also	important	practical	advantages	to	the	focus	on	civil	society	for	democracy	promoters.	As	a	result,	there	is	a	close	link	between	the	process	of	transnationalization	(of	political	governance	and	non-state	actors)	and	the	strategies	of	democracy	promotion	that	focus	on	civil	society.	Civil	society	in	democracy	promotion	work	has	typically	been	criticized	for	limiting	‘civil	society’	as	a	category	to	established	NGOs	(Carothers	and	Ottaway	2010,	location	3418).	This	problem	of	civil	society	assistance	is	acknowledged	in	EU	policy	where	there	has	been	a	(at	least	discursive)	shift	towards	incorporating	smaller	actors,	community	groups,	artists,	academics,	minor	media	and	generally	smaller	organizations	including	cultural	and	ethnic	groups.	In	some	cases	there	is	a	turn	towards	actors	who	see	themselves,	or	are	represented	as	being,	outside	the	political	field.	This	can	be	with	regard	to	culture	and	art	or	in	terms	of	exercising	technical	expertise,	observation	or	monitoring	(Petric	and	Blundo	2012,	13).	Such	depoliticized	actors	are	looked	to	in	order	to	pursue	a	less	divisive	and	overtly	political	agenda.		In	response	to	the	popular	protest	movements	across	Europe	and	the	events	of	the	Arab	Spring,	the	Commission	released	a	communication	entitled	‘The	roots	of	democracy	and	sustainable	development:	Europe’s	engagement	with	Civil	Society	in	external	affairs’	detailing	the	importance	of	civil	society	for	programmes	going	forward.	This	communication	identifies	civil	society	as	the	basis	behind	successful	democratization	and	development	but	rather	than	seeing	civil	society	as	a	means	to	democratizing	political	society,	civil	society	is	understood	as	“an	asset	in	itself”	(COM(2012)	492,	3).	Of	course,	civil	society	is	important	for	promoting	effective	governance	by	pushing	for	transparency	and	accountability,	aiding	service	provision,	engaging	in	peace-building,	promoting	inclusiveness	and	pluralism,	and	ensuring	sustainable	growth	and	the	key	to	
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ensuring	this	multidimensional	role	for	CSOs	is	independence.	But	this	key	criterion	is	less	than	clear	when	the	varying	contexts	of	action	are	considered,	for	example	independence	will	likely	mean	something	different	during	partnerships	between	national	authorities	and	CSOs	for	service	provision	than	when	CSOs	take	on	more	of	an	advocacy	or	activist	role.	The	multitude	of	identities	that	civil	society	actors	assume	is	neglected.	Independence	also	seems	to	be	defined	primarily	by	the	relationship	between	CSOs	and	national	authorities	leaving	the	impact	of	the	donor	potentially	under	scrutinized.	Benoit	Challand’s	argument	that	donors	should	instead	focus	on	ensuring	the	autonomy	of	CSOs,	which	more	effectively	safeguards	their	position	between	international	and	national	context	is	instructive	in	this	regard.	Autonomy	is	a	contextual	imperative	and	crucial	to	the	local	success	of	CSOs	as	it	helps	to	ensure	the	appropriateness	of	actions	for	the	particular	context,	the	credibility	and	legitimacy	of	actions	locally	and	the	sustainability	of	programmes.	What	is	significant	about	the	approach	pursued	in	the	Commission’s	communication	is	that	it	reflects	a	transnationalized	understanding	of	civil	society	as	a	depoliticized	associational	realm	whose	context	is	defined	by	the	scale	at	which	it	acts	rather	than	its	relationship	to	the	political.	Thus,	local	CSOs	are	characteristically	the	same	but	contextually	different	from	transnational	actors.	This	is	acknowledged	in	the	broad	definition	of	‘CSO’	whereby:	“The	EU	considers	CSOs	to	include	all	non-state,	not-for-profit	structures,	non-partisan	and	non-violent,	through	which	people	organize	to	pursue	shared	objectives	and	ideals…Operating	from	the	local	to	the	national,	regional	and	international	levels,	they	comprise	urban	and	rural,	formal	and	informal	organizations”	(COM(2012)	492).	One	of	the	few	things	that	they	have	in	common	is	some	form	of	organizational	capacity.	Civil	society	assistance	increasingly	sees	civil	society	as	an	end	in	itself	by	reifying	the	organizational	capacity	and	democratic	value	of	CSOs	and	NGOs.	This	conceptualization	underscores	the	significance	of	NGOs	and	CSOs	in	subsequent	policy	developments	as	the	concern	is	no	longer	focused	strictly	on	‘civil	society’	as	it	was	initially	envisaged	–	as	being	fundamentally	entwined	with	and	co-defined	by	political	society	–	but	rather	as	being	a	phenomenon	in	itself	which	has	innate	‘democratic’	potential.		
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Focusing	on	CSOs	also	offers	the	ability	to	avoid	overtly	political	involvement	and	to	pursue	democracy	promotion	in	a	more	technical	and/or	indirect	fashion.	In	the	case	of	the	EU	policy	changes	have	been	heavily	linked	to	the	politics	and	negotiations	unique	to	the	system	of	governance	in	the	EU.	It	was	only	in	1999	that	Council	regulations	975	and	976	were	passed	giving	the	Commission	a	legal	basis	for	expenditures	in	support	of	human	rights	and	democracy	and	in	2001	the	Commission	released	a	substantive	communication	declaring	a	strategic	approach	to	democracy	promotion.	The	European	Commission	(EC)	views	increasing	participation	as	a	fundamental	aspect	of	their	approach	to	good	governance,	which	specifically	entails	the	local	ownership	of	aid	programmes	and	has	keenly	avoided	engagement	with	political	parties	or	actors	with	clear	political	agendas.	Through	the	European	Initiative	for	Democracy	and	Human	Rights	(EIDHR)	this	has	meant	a	central	focus	on	the	transfer	of	funds	to	CSOs	in	order	to	implement	policies	and	pursue	the	objective	of	reform.	Between	2000-2006	€5.3	billion	was	channeled	through	CSOs	(COM	EVINFO	1259).	This	number	includes	funding	allocated	through	EIDHR	but	also	includes	transferred	funds	from	additional	sources	given	that	the	entire	EIDHR	funding	allocation	for	projects	between	2000-2006	consisted	of	€731.4	million.	Some	of	these	activities	have	led	to	a	limited	backlash	from	groups	as	the	practice	(and	language)	of	‘channeling’,	while	capturing	the	importance	of	transferring	funds	and	the	reallocation	of	funding	between	projects	(seen	in	the	figures	above),	does	not	indicate	an	effective	partnership	between	CSOs	and	the	Commission	(Ibid).	With	these	practices	there	is	an	increasing	centrality	of	civil	society	actors	in	the	EIDHR	and	the	Commission’s	strategy	more	generally	but	also	a	reduction	in	their	ability	to	act	autonomously.		
Political	Foundations	and	(re)defining	democracy	promotion		Since	the	introduction	of	the	National	Endowment	for	Democracy	(NED)	in	1983	by	the	Reagan	administration	political	foundations	have	become	increasingly	regarded	as	important	actors	in	promoting	the	national	interest.	On	6th	June	1996	Carl	Gershman	(then	President	of	the	NED)	addressed	the	French	Senate	to	promote	the	establishment	of	political	foundations	in	France.	Paying	homage	to	
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the	long-established	German	Stiftungen	and	the	recently	created	Westminster	Foundation	(1992	in	the	United	Kingdom)	Gershman	stressed	the	need	for	democratic	countries	to	support	the	‘transition	to	modernity’	in	poor	and	conflict-ridden	states	(Gershman	1996).	His	speech,	which	was	primarily	aimed	at	discussing	the	legitimacy	of	political	foundations,	clearly	associated	these	actors	with	humanitarian	assistance	and	democratic	peace,	both	popular	subjects	at	the	time.	But	it	also	alluded	to	their	governance	role	in	global	politics	through	the	‘relationship	of	complementarity’	between	governments	and	political	foundations	(Ibid).	Political	foundations	have	come	to	play	an	important	role	in	promoting	democratization	both	within	EU	policy	and	in	that	of	European	countries.	Certainly,	there	are	exceptions	to	this	recent	historical	reading	especially	with	regard	to	the	German	Stiftungen	the	oldest	of	which,	the	Friedrich	Ebert	Stiftung,	was	founded	in	1925.	However,	discounting	these	long-standing	foundations	the	average	age	of	national	political	foundations	in	Europe	is	a	mere	14	years	(Wersch	and	Zeeuw	2005,	12).	Foundations	established	at	the	EU	level	are	unsurprisingly	even	more	recent	with	the	European	Partnership	for	Democracy	established	in	2008,	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	established	in	2005,	the	European	Network	of	Political	Foundations	in	2006	and	the	still	developing	European	Endowment	for	Democracy	(to	be	established	under	Belgian	Law).	Political	foundations	tend	to	be	independent	but	also	closely	connected	to	governments	or	governmental	institutions	either	through	their	governance	structure	or	mandates.	Such	is	the	case	in	EU	policy	towards	democracy	promotion	and	development	and	stems	in	part	from	the	unique	structure	of	the	EU	political	system.	However,	the	same	trend	exists	within	individual	states	both	in	Europe	and	in	North	America	where	political	foundations	play	a	significant	role	in	developing	policy	and	in	exercising	decisions.	The	National	Endowment	for	Democracy	in	America,	the	German	political	foundations,	the	newly	developed	European	Endowment	for	Democracy,	European	networks	such	as	the	ENoP	and	the	ALF	all	represent	different	types	of	political	foundation.	What	they	all	have	in	common	is	a	transnational	orientation	and	organizational	structure	and	have	some	form	of	control	exerted	over	them	by	governments,	ministries	or	intergovernmental	institutions.	In	addition	to	this	three	common	characteristics	
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make	them	significant	actors	in	changing	the	practice	of	democracy	promotion:	network	structure,	‘glocal’	attitude,	and	anti-political	orientation.	The	proliferation	of	political	foundations	historically	follows	a	distinct	economic	logic	as	a	corrective	for	the	failings	of	both	government	and	markets	and	against	the	institutionalization	of	state	intervention	(Anheier	2001,	21).	As	transnational	actors,	they	are	able	to	establish	partnerships	with	smaller	organizations	based	upon	common	values	and	trust	and	are	able	to	gain	access	to	‘functional	elites’	and	to	other	leading	figures	capable	of	exerting	influence	at	the	local	level	(Mohr	2010,	111).	These	networks	produce	alternative	sites	of	power	and	resources	for	local	actors	unable	to	access	policy	centers,	though	this	is	still	subject	to	the	biases	of	the	individual	foundation.	There	is	an	obvious	logic	to	the	proliferation	of	political	foundations	as	they	allow	foreign	governments	to	work	in	highly	politicized	contexts	without	having	to	choose	sides.	For	this	same	reason,	they	are	often	forbidden	from	directly	supporting	or	funding	political	parties,	as	is	the	case	with	the	German	political	foundations	(Mohr	2010,	94).	However,	they	are	still	able	to	support	parties	in	less	direct	ways	by	supporting	their	international	position	(Ibid).	In	other	words,	it	is	not	that	political	foundations	exercise	purely	technical	means	or	avoid	political	sensitive	issues	but	they	allow	governments	to	re-frame	political	issues	in	a	depoliticized	context.	Two	ways	in	which	this	is	used	in	practice	is	by	acting	as	intermediaries	between	donors	and	recipients	by	channeling	funding	or	by	monitoring	programmes:	“political	foundations	generally	see	their	impact	through	numbers:	number	of	participants	at	their	conferences,	number	of	seminars	held,	number	of	meetings	organized,	number	of	texts	published,	number	of	people	trained,	and	so	on”	(de	Montclos	2012,	236).			 James	Scott	argues	that	political	foundations	“and	the	networks	in	which	they	are	embedded,	have	helped	to	expand	the	influence	of	the	‘multi-centric	world’	and	further	erode	the	autonomy	of	the	state	and	the	‘state-centric	world’”	(Scott	1999,	147).	The	emergence	and	expansion	of	non-state	actors	in	the	field	of	democracy	promotion	has	contributed	to	an	abundance	of	programmes	for	democratization.	But	while	a	multiplicity	of	different	agendas	exists	there	is	also	a	convergence	around	particular	norms	and	organizational	forms	that	are	reinforced	through	the	actual	organizational	practices	of	actors	like	NGOs.	And	yet	such	a	simple	conclusion	as	suggested	by	the	previous	quote	does	not	
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capture	the	complex	existence	of	many	transnational	actors.	The	role	of	political	foundations	might	instead	be	viewed,	in	one	way,	as	an	outsourcing	of	certain	policies,	which	might	be	linked	to	the	historical	identity	of	these	actors.	On	the	other	hand,	they	do	effectively	link	states	to	what	Scott	identifies	as	the	‘multi-centric’	world	and	as	Scott	also	notes:	“While	they	are	created	to	serve	a	purpose	which	is	closely	tied	to	‘national	interests’,	they	are	provided	space	within	which	to	operate	more	independently.	From	the	perspective	of	states	establishing	them,	this	provides	greater	freedom	of	action…and	ability	to	respond	to	situations	quickly.	It	also	involves	fewer	or	reduced	legal	and	political	ramifications	concerning	intervention	and	interference”	(Scott	1999,	148).	This	observation	is	crucial	for	understanding	the	significance	of	not	only	political	foundations	but	also	civil	society	actors	more	generally	for	pursuing	foreign	policy	goals.	The	fact	that	the	German	political	foundations	tend	to	represent	themselves	as	private	actors	when	abroad	(Dakowska	2005,	2)	is	exemplary	of	the	way	in	which	the	politics	and	identity	of	civil	society	actors	has	transformed	the	practice	of	politics	and	subsequently	the	practice	and	understanding	of	what	constitutes	‘civil	society’.			
	
Conclusion	While	this	paper	has	pointed	towards	the	transformation	of	democracy	promotion	strategies	and	the	ubiquity	of	civil	society	significant	contrasts	must	be	recognized	as	well.	If	we	compare	the	actions	of	EIDHR	and	EuropeAID	(instruments	more	explicitly	aimed	towards	promoting	democracy)	and	regional	programmes	such	as	the	UfM	it	is	clear	that	the	former	place	a	much	greater	emphasis	on	civil	society	in	the	implementation	of	policies.	In	the	regional	frameworks	civil	society	actors	remain	marginal	and	outside	of	policy-making.	Even	programme	implementation	falls	more	often	on	other	avenues	whereas	in	democracy	promotion	the	role	of	civil	society	actors	has	proliferated.	As	a	result,	the	relationship	between	civil	society	and	governance	is	not	maintained	across	policy	instruments.	One	explanation	could	be	that	the	flexibility	of	these	actors	makes	them	practical	in	the	first	instance	and	symbolic	in	the	second.	In	the	
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regional	EMP	and	UfM	civil	society	actors	are	primarily	included	in	the	social,	cultural	and	human	partnership	and	apart	from	more	politically	sensitive	areas.		The	civil	societalization	of	politics	provides	a	useful	way	to	address	such	observations	by	focusing	on	the	way	in	which	discourses	of	civil	society	have	been	assumed	by	political	actors.	This	has	led	to	a	change	in	practice	both	in	terms	of	what	‘civil	society’	entails	and	in	the	practice	governing.	Civil	societalization	makes	us	aware	of	the	interconnection	between	governance	and	the	transnationalization	of	political	practice	and	discourses,	a	relationship	that	is	underdeveloped	in	many	approaches	to	studying	democracy	promotion	and	the	European	Union.	As	a	result,	what	this	chapter	has	attempted	to	reveal	is	the	implications	of	transnationalization	for	global	political	pursuits,	in	this	case	democratization	and	democracy	promotion,	which	are	increasingly	identified	as	global	public	goods	(Wolff	and	Wurm	2011,	80).	However,	it	also	reveals	how	civil	society	has	gone	from	a	target	of	policy	to	a	method	of	pursuing	legitimacy.	Initial	responses	and	policy	reformulations	point	towards	a	greater	focus	on	pluralism	and	human	rights	through	building	the	capacity	of	civil	society	organizations.	The	critical	stance	is	not	to	suggest	that	the	goals	of	pluralism	and	human	rights	are	misguided	or	should	not	be	valued	but	to	clarify	the	complex	relationship	between	foreign	policy,	transnationalism	and	civil	society.	Foundations	have	become	sought	after	participants	in	policy-making.	An	important	role	that	these	organizations	play	is	in	establishing	relationships	with	like-minded	organizations,	or	promoting	and	supporting	the	establishment	of	networks	across	civil	society	actors.	Following	such	networks	also	helps	to	understand	the	shift	since	the	1990s	to	create	a	more	concrete	role	for	culture	in	the	EU	and	as	part	of	its	external	relations.			
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Chapter	4:	Transnational	cultural	networks	and	the	
development	of	cultural	policy		This	chapter	builds	on	the	insights	of	Chapter	3	by	showing	how	the	work	of	cultural	foundations	is	comparable	to	these	trends	bolstering	a	renewed	significance	for	culture	and	cultural	policy	at	the	EU	level.	These	developments	illustrate	a	changing	landscape	in	cultural	relations	with	strong	cultural	actors	and	a	gradual	change	to	the	national	basis	of	their	actions.	Cultural	foundations	have	an	essential	role	in	promoting	this	new	cultural	landscape.	They	often	act	as	flexible	intermediaries	between	the	public	sector	and	small-scale	cultural	operators.	They	are	not	only	active	in	distributing	small	grants,	but	are	also	engaged	in	lobbying	activities	related	to	cultural	policy	reform	as	well	as	its	implementation.	One	of	the	objectives	of	an	EU	strategy	for	culture	is	to	ensure	that	the	cultural	sector	has	the	capacity	to	structure	itself	and	develop	a	continuous	dialogue	between	public	authorities	and	civil	society.	Though	culture	has	been	an	important	consideration	through	successive	periods	of	integration	the	development	of	a	distinct	cultural	policy	has	been	hampered	by	legal	competency,	treaty	considerations,	competition	and	conceptualization.	Exploring	these	developments	provides	an	important	perspective	on	developments	in	EU	policy.	It	draws	our	attention	to	alternative	actors	including	national	cultural	foundations/institutes	and	other	regional	bodies	–	such	as	the	Council	of	Europe	–	in	the	evolution	of	EU	competencies	and	prefigures	a	change	in	the	EU’s	external	relations.		This	chapter	progresses	through	the	emergence	of	cultural	policy	in	Europe	beyond	the	state.	It	indicates	that	the	process	of	integration	(especially	in	the	realm	of	culture)	has	been	driven	by	the	growth	and	advocacy	of	cultural	networks	formed	initially	of	nationally-based	organizations	designed	to	promote	and	protect	national	cultures.	Networking	amongst	these	actors	created	opportunities	for	new	shared	meanings	and	areas	of	cooperation	opening	the	possibility	of	a	strategic	role	for	culture	beyond	the	nation-state.	Two	notable	effects	are	associated	with	this	process:	the	emergence	of	a	narrative	on	transnational	networking	and	attempts	to	establish	a	European	perspective	on	
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cultural	diplomacy.	Following	on	from	Chapter	3,	this	discussion	demonstrates	how	foundations	and	their	offshoot	networks	reveal	a	global	politics	that	is	increasingly	heterogeneous	(Scott	1999,	147).	It	is	within	the	context	of	these	developments	that	the	EU	is	touting	a	renewed	focus	on	social	and	cultural	dialogue	in	its	relations	with	neighboring	countries.	Certainly,	the	pursuance	of	intercultural	dialogue	is	not	unique	to	the	Euro-Mediterranean	though	the	form	it	takes	is	undoubtedly	a	response	to	local	and	national	dynamics.	But	trends	suggest	that	rather	than	opting	for	an	overtly	institutional	model	of	regionalism	the	EU’s	new	focus	on	culture	may	rather	operate	more	effectively	through	global	cultural	relations	based	on	multilateral	cooperation	and	the	establishment	of	regional	networks	linking	cultural	organizations.	In	this	model,	the	division	between	EEAS,	Council	and	Commission	continue	to	present	the	possibility	of	conflict	and	contradiction.	As	Chapter	5	discusses,	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	illustrates	the	ambiguities	of	the	EU’s	post-Arab	Spring	actions	in	its	relationship	with	the	EU	Commission.		This	discussion	of	cultural	networks	explains	how	perspectives	on	transnationalism	and	culture	evolve	in	the	EU’s	relations	with	institutions	and	networks	in	its	external	relations.	As	the	previous	chapter	argues,	there	have	been	a	couple	of	changes	in	the	way	that	external	relations	are	commonly	practiced:	1)	there	has	been	a	growing	focus	on	targeting	and	incorporating	civil	society	in	achieving	foreign	policy	goals	and	2)	non-state	actors	such	as	political	and	cultural	foundations	have	become	important	actors	both	independently	and	in	cooperation	with	foreign	policy-making	when	designing	and	implementing	policies.	The	growth	of	such	foundations	has	opened	up	space	within	the	policy	sphere	for	contributing	experience,	expertise,	resources	and	logistical	support.	A	byproduct	of	this	situation	is	the	growth	of	transnational	networks	linking	various	foundations	and	smaller	organizations	across	national	and	regional	boundaries.	Such	networks	have	come	to	play	a	major	role	in	promoting	the	development	of	cultural	policy	within	European	institutions	and	their	influence	can	be	seen	in	the	transformation	of	cultural	relations	between	Europe	and	its	neighbors	since	the	early	attempts	to	incorporate	culture	into	EU	competency.		 Culture,	a	field	in	which	the	EU	has	long	had	very	limited	capacity	for	maneuver,	has	simultaneously	been	put	forth	consistently	as	an	area	where	the	
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EU	can	exhibit	expertise,	generate	influence	and	locate	questions	related	to	its	own	existence.	The	cultural	foundations	of	Europe	are	complex	and	despite	common	allusions	to	a	Judeo-Christian	heritage	anthropology	raises	far	more	ambiguous	boundaries	between	it	and	the	rest	of	the	world	(Wolf	1982).	Such	sociological	and	anthropological	complexity	presupposes	some	uniqueness	and	the	potential	for	conflict.	What	is	more,	diverging	global	and	local	influences,	globalist	and	nationalist	ideologies,	’fragmegration’	further	raise	the	significance	of	culture	as	a	field	that	needs	to	be	taken	seriously	by	policy-makers	and	practitioners	alike.	But	as	the	famous	quote	attributed	to	Jean	Monnet	realises	-	it	is	not	always	at	the	forefront	of	developments.			 Taking	inspiration	from	Monica	Sassatelli’s	(2009)	more	expansive	treatment	of	cultural	policy	in	Europe,	which	highlighted	the	role	played	by	the	Council	of	Europe	alongside	European	institutions,	this	chapter	aims	at	the	space	in-between	a	multitude	of	actors.	It	explores	the	development	of	cultural	policy	in	the	context	of	evolving	European	institutions	and	draws	together	the	long-term	development	of	cultural	policy	in	the	EU	with	parallel	developments	in	transnational	networks	inside	the	EU	and	stretching	beyond	EU	boundaries.	Thus,	transnational	networks	(foremost	between	cultural	institutions)	promote	the	diffusion	of	ideas	and	narratives	into	European	policy	frameworks.	In	other	words,	EU	cultural	policy	has	been	the	product	of	a	range	of	actors	within	EU	institutions	but	is	also	indebted	to	the	work	of	other	actors	such	as	the	Council	of	Europe,	the	European	Cultural	Foundation	and	national	institutes	of	culture	and	other	foundations	who	developed	practices	and	policies	from	which	the	EU	was	able	to	strategize	its	own	role.	And,	in	conjunction	with	the	development	of	the	EEAS	a	more	flexible	and	networked	approach	to	external	relations.			 In	terms	of	the	development	of	culture	within	EU	policy	it	is	clear	that	from	the	outset,	there	is	both	a	political	and	an	economic	understanding	of	culture	-	relevant	to	the	different	facets	of	EU	integration.	But	importantly,	culture	has	always	been	outward	facing	-	oriented	towards	the	development	of	relations	between	members	states	and	external	partners,	or	towards	the	process	of	enlargement.	As	such,	culture	has	always	been	strategic	and	yet	only	through	the	exertions	of	cultural	networks	has	that	strategy	been	made	possible.	The	interaction	involves	a	mess	of	scripts.	For	example,	the	promotion	of	
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transnationalism	entails	specific	prescriptions	that	reinforce,	or	at	least	do	not	contradict,	nation-centeredness.	This	is	the	institutional	discourse	of	cultural	relations.	On	the	other	hand,	the	drive	to	participate	and	network	is	often	highly	practical.	Both	sides	are	ideational	and	give	attribute	significance	to	transnationalism,	though	policy	discourse	is	becoming	more	explicit	in	its	application.		 Within	the	policy	sphere,	the	transnational	aspect	becomes	self-referential.	There	is	a	strong	normative	persuasion	connected	to	transnationalism	both	in	academic	work	and	in	policy-making.	Attempts	academically	to	restrict	the	notion	of	transnationalism	to	pure	forms	often	in	reference	to	migrants	risk	obfuscating	the	complex	relationships	that	exist	between	transnational	actors	and	their	political	and	institutional	context.	In	policy,	we	see	a	different,	but	similar	approach	whereby	transnationalism	is	discussed	as	a	remedy	to	global	threats.			 Transnationalism,	as	Rumford	states,	should	not	be	considered	a	‘niche	concept’	(Rumford	2011).	If	studies	of	transnationalism	are	limited	to	studying	the	movement	and	mobility	of	particular	actors	then	we	risk	abandoning	understanding	of	important	systemic,	structural	and	ideational	changes	linked	to	transnationalism	as	a	process	(Hurrelman	2011).	To	argue	that	links	to	governance	or	governments	should	disqualify	processes	as	transnational	is	to	willfully	create	blind	spots	in	our	understanding	of	how	these	things	relate	and	to	construct	a	neat	vocabulary	that	describes	only	the	most	obvious	of	cases.	This	paper	proceeds	from	the	expectation	that	exploring	general	dynamics	can	subsequently	lead	to	specificity	without	shutting	down	the	possibility	of	complexity.			
Culture	in	early	EUrope	The	purpose	of	this	section	is	to	demonstrate	the	piecemeal	history	in	the	development	of	cultural	projects	in	Europe	and	cultural	policies	at	the	EU	level,	which	can	inform	an	understanding	of	how	culture	has	been	included	in	EU	external	policies,	especially	with	regard	to	the	Euro-Mediterranean	Partnership	and	the	UfM.	To	some	extent	this	entails	a	reconsideration	of	the	criticism	
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initially	directed	towards	the	uneven	progress	between	the	different	baskets	of	the	Barcelona	Process.	Although	the	EU	was	and	remains	to	a	large	extent	functionally	limited	in	its	ability	to	promote	culture	over	economic	and	political	objectives,	what	was	missing	was	allusion	to	the	ongoing	development	of	cultural	policy	within	Europe	that	was	feeding	in	to	the	EU’s	policy-making	and	the	necessary	development	of	networking	and	learning	across	boundaries	-	encompassing	national	boundaries	within	Europe	and	beyond	the	‘gated	community’.	Understanding	these	origins	allow	us	to	draw	clearer	conclusions	and	criticisms	of	the	use	of	culture	in	external	relations	and	the	difficulty	and	ambiguity	of	cultural	discourses	when	applied	in	a	foreign	policy	setting.		 The	spread	of	transnational	cultural	projects	coincides	with	the	rise	of	international	institutions	and	with	the	work	of	NGOs,	and	political	and	cultural	foundations	working	within	and	across	national	boundaries.	In	this	context,	intercultural	dialogue	-	initially	oriented	solely	towards	the	field	of	education	-	quickly	became	a	topic	of	importance	for	European	integration	where	the	ability	to	communicate	across	languages	and	cultures	was	realised	as	a	central	component	of	a	closer	union,	and	subsequently	a	‘People’s	Union’.	Given	that	the	EU	lacked	a	proper	legal	basis	from	which	to	act	in	the	cultural	affairs	of	member	states	prior	to	1992	(Shore	2002,	12)	the	history	of	cultural	relations	in	Europe	draws	our	attention	to	the	dynamics	of	alternative	forms	of	integration	alongside	EU	institution	building.	What	is	more,	these	dynamics	then	come	to	play	an	important	role	in	supporting	and/or	delineating	EU	integration	in	the	field	of	cultural	relations	both	within	the	EU	and	beyond.	One	important	feature	for	this	is	the	development	of	networks,	especially	in	education	and	training,	through	the	work	of	actors,	for	example	the	German	Stiftungen	and	the	European	Cultural	Foundation,	who	interacted	intermittently	with	the	EU	institutions	conducting	research,	writing	reports	and	engaging	in	limited	advocacy	for	the	inclusion	of	culture.	In	order	to	do	this	it	would	be	useful	to	consider	the	longer-term	practices	of	key	cultural	actors	-	transnational	organizations	and	foundations	-	that	maintained	projects	and	practices	and	made	it	possible	to	place	culture	on	the	political	agenda	and,	following	its	recognition,	help	to	develop	sets	of	policies	in	the	various	fields	of	cultural	cooperation	within	Europe	and	abroad.	
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	 As	one	starting	point,	Hans	Erik	Nass	(2010)	implicates	the	organising	capacity	of	UNESCO	in	bringing	together	European	Ministers	of	Culture	in	1972.	The	establishment	of	such	conferences	held	at	the	international	and	European	levels	opened	space	for	the	production	of	new	discourses	on	the	role	of	culture	in	relation	to	political	and	economic	integrations.	As	Nass	points	out,	while	there	is	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	these	meetings	or	key	speeches	led	directly	to	the	development	of	European	cultural	policy	it	is	reasonable	to	suggest	that	they	had	some	effect	on	the	political	climate	(Nass	2010).	Given	the	overlap	of	actors	-	national	ministers,	international	bodies	and	secretariats,	cultural	producers	and	advocates	-	and	the	proliferation	of	such	meetings	and	conferences	this	argument	is	certainly	logical.	Cris	Shore’s	(2006)	suggestion	that	the	history	of	EU	cultural	policy	is	exemplary	of	the	way	in	which	EU	integration	functions	in	general	is	also	useful	in	this	regard,	though	not	for	the	reason	suggested	by	the	author.	Shore’s	history	focuses	primarily	on	processes	internal	to	EU	institutions	and	does	not	account	for	the	significant	input	provided	by	actors	already	working	in	the	field,	such	as	the	European	Cultural	Foundation.	What	is	valuable	about	his	position	is	the	observation	of	the	way	in	which	the	EU	borrows	from	existing	practices,	concepts,	ideas	and	redefines	them	in	order	to	justify	or	obviate	EU	action	(Shore	2006,	14).	The	concept	of	intercultural	dialogue	is	one	of	these	examples.	Intercultural	dialogue	became	a	concept	around	which	many	cultural	actors	organised	their	own	work	and	justified	new	practices	for	cultural	relations	starting	in	the	1990s.		
Many	Europes	–	the	cultural	field	This	‘third	Europe’	is	exemplary	of	the	complexity	of	networks	as	they	negotiate	hegemonic	practices	and	categorizations	and	the	cognitive	frames	of	political	and	social	actors,	including	those	actors	who	partake	in	and	enact	networking	activities.	More	specifically,	it	speaks	to	the	co-existence	of	different	configurations	of	‘Europe’	(Axford	and	Huggins	1999,	186).	The	field	of	culture	and	cultural	policy	is	intriguing	as	a	case	that	maintains	strictly	national	boundaries,	and	yet	is	global	in	its	aspirations	and	increasingly	in	its	practice.	Moreover,	it	highlights	quite	effectively	the	impossibility	of	understanding	
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through	solely	top-down	or	bottom-up	perspectives.	As	Papastergiadis	(2011)	has	suggested	for	the	development	of	cosmopolitan	sentiment,	the	requirement	is	for	both	and	they	are	very	much	contingent	upon	each	other.	The	cultural	field	implicates	a	variety	of	actors	of	different	political	power	and	position.	Furthermore,	it	is	fundamentally	an	aspirational	field	in	the	sense	that	it	incorporates	a	desire	for	dialogue	and	exchange	as	a	basis	of	relations	(though	defined	in	a	multitude	of	ways)	even	within	traditional	avenues	of	influence.	This	is	what	makes	it	an	attractive	and	potentially	innovative	force	for	foreign	relations.			 From	early	on,	culture	in	Europe	was	recognised	as	being	a	facet	of	the	EU’s	place	in	the	world	and	was	linked	with	the	development	of	EU	external	relations.	In	1973	The	Declaration	of	European	Identity	was	necessary	in	order	to	define	the	EU’s	relationship	with	outside	countries	(especially	significant	given	the	process	of	decolonisation	over	the	previous	two	decades)	“and	the	place	they	[the	nine	member	countries]	occupy	in	world	affairs”.	This	document	was	the	product	of	a	transformation	in	the	EEC	following	the	change	towards	a	more	pro-Europe	leadership	in	France	under	Georges	Pompidou	and	moving	towards	the	first	enlargement	of	the	Community.	In	1969,	the	Hague	Summit,	which	brought	together	the	heads	of	state	under	the	Dutch	presidency	of	the	Council,	committed	to	three	objectives:	completion	of	an	Economic	and	Monetary	Union,	deepening	of	integration	by	expanding	the	competencies	and	powers	of	the	Community	institutions,	and	enlargement	(initially	to	Great	Britain,	Denmark,	Norway	and	Ireland).	The	evocation	of	an	initial	role	for	culture	in	European	integration	was,	as	pointed	out	by	Littoz-Monnet	(2010),	intended	to	serve	the	process	of	Community	policy-making.	The	imperative	of	establishing	relations	between	the	Community	and	foreign	countries	and	blocs,	such	as	the	Euro-Arab	Dialogue	in	1973	and	the	expansion	of	the	Global	Mediterranean	Policy	between	1972-1977,	at	this	time	were	to	be	served	by	this	new	depiction	of	a	European	identity.	Initial	movements	towards	the	inclusion	of	culture	on	EU	policy-making	set	up	an	ongoing	tension	between	the	market-logic	of	community	integration	and	the	creation	of	a	broader	political	union	based	on	a	European	identity	and	values	-	between	culture	as	an	economic	sector	and	serving	political	objectives.	
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	 Leo	Tindemann’s	1975	report	to	the	European	Council	furthered	the	political	objective	in	making	an	early	call	for	the	establishment	of	a	citizen’s	Europe	designed	to	promote	“a	rapprochement	of	peoples”	encouraging	solidarity	through	mobility	and	exchange	(Tindemanns	1975,	26-27).	In	1974	and	1977,	respectively,	the	European	Parliament	and	the	European	Commission	established	resolutions	that	supported	the	establishment	of	a	European-wide	cultural	sector	-	essentially	to	promote	cultural	products	and	allow	equal	access	to	cultural	works	across	countries.	Alongside	the	drive	towards	the	Single	European	Act	in	the	1980s	and	the	enlargements	to	include	southern	European	Mediterrean	countries,	two	additional	reports	were	produced	in	1985	in	order	to	promote	the	idea	of	a	People’s	Europe.	The	Adonnino	Reports	(1985)	focused	back	on	the	political	task	of	culture	-	as	a	way	to	promote	further	integration	and	provide	a	necessary	political	basis	to	the	forthcoming	economic	union.	From	these	reports,	a	wider	role	for	culture	was	discerned	not	just	a	set	of	symbols	that	would	pull	diverse	societies	together	but	also	in	the	form	of	projects	allowing	for	exchanges	and	contacts	across	European	societies.	Initiatives	such	as	the	‘European	City	of	Culture’	came	directly	from	this,	at	the	same	time	there	is	the	development	of	important	projects	now	central	to	EU	cultural	policy	-	such	as	the	student	exchange	programme	Erasmus	initially	devised	and	run	outside	of	the	EU	institutions	by	the	autonomously	founded	European	Cultural	Foundation.	The	1986	resolution	on	the	establishment	of	transnational	cultural	itineraries	(86/C	44/02)	agreed	among	ministers	of	culture	at	the	Council	confirmed	the	objectives	of	the	Adonnino	Report	and	committed	to	building	on	the	work	of	the	Council	of	Europe	and	the	European	Foundation.	Of	course,	until	the	1992	Maastricht	Treaty,	the	EU	institutions	lacked	the	legal	basis	with	which	to	act	in	the	cultural	affairs	of	member	states.	As	a	result,	the	CoE	and	European	Foundation	remained	the	major	European	players	in	culture.			 The	European	Cultural	Foundation	was	established	in	1954	the	same	year	that	saw	the	signing	of	the	Council	of	Europe’s	European	Cultural	Convention.	The	ECF	was	intended	to	promote	youth	and	education,	cultural	heritage	and	the	environment	in	order	to	provide	an	important	cultural	basis	for	the	integration	of	European	societies.	In	order	to	pursue	these	objectives,	the	ECF	created	Europe-wide	programmes,	research,	development	and	publications,	and	it	
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engaged	in	advocacy.	The	intention	behind	many	of	these	programmes	was	not	simply	to	symbolize	European	interconnectedness	but	to	develop	spaces	in	which	to	create	and	sustain	interactions	and	exchanges	not	only	between	European	societies	but	also	between	Europe	and	its	neighbors.	Many	of	the	projects	and	concrete	practices	presented	in	early	EEC	documents	mirrored	the	work	of	actors	like	the	ECF	who	in	the	1970s	were	pursuing	the	major	issues	of	student	mobility	and	environmental	protection	-	two	of	the	critical	themes	established	under	their	major	report	from	1968	Plan	Europe	2000.	During	this	decade,	the	ECF	helped	to	establish	the	European	Institute	of	Education	and	
Social	Policy	and	the	Institute	for	European	Environmental	Policy	both	designed	to	generate	positions	and	research	for	advocacy	in	their	respective	fields.	In	1987	the	ECF	established	the	Erasmus	programme	promoting	exchange	among	university	students	and	managed	the	programme	until	1995	when	it	was	transferred	to	EU	control.	As	described	on	the	Foundation’s	website	–	“the	Foundation	operates	where	various	spheres	meet:	the	European	Union,	non-EU	Europe,	the	Southern	Mediterranean,	and	the	transatlantic.”			 Also	in	1987,	the	European	Commission	communicated	the	Fresh	Boost	
for	Culture	in	the	European	Community	that	focused	on	five	areas:	creation	of	a	European	cultural	area,	European	audiovisual	industry,	access	to	cultural	resources,	training,	and	dialogue	with	external	countries.	Given	the	problematic	status	of	culture	on	EU	competency	under	the	Treaty	of	Rome,	however,	the	communication	is	ambiguous	on	how	it	can	tackle	most	of	these	issues	leaning	rather	heavily	on	the	idea	of	culture	related	to	the	internal	market,	industry,	research	and	innovation	(COM(87)	603,	6-7).	Given	this	limitation,	the	communication	-	with	regard	to	generating	dialogue	with	the	rest	of	the	world	-	emphasized	the	role	of	national	cultural	actors	as	well	as	member	state	and	Commission	representations	abroad.	This	put	cultural	institutes	at	the	centre	but	also	required	continued	cooperation	and	networking.	Even	following	the	1992	Maastricht	Treaty,	which	in	article	128	gives	the	European	Union	a	legal	basis	to	pursue	cultural	policies	the	role	of	foundations	and	national	actors	remained	(and	remains)	central.	The	Treaty,	though	ostensibly	expanding	the	responsibility	of	the	Union	to	the	field	of	culture,	also	severely	delimits	this	role	by	specifying	a	‘supporting’	and	‘supplementary’	role	for	the	EU	in	this	area.	At	
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the	EU-level,	the	1987	Fresh	Boost	for	Culture	in	the	European	Community	and	the	1992	Treaty	of	Maastricht	raised	the	feature	of	cultural	diversity	as	integral	to	the	European	project.	They	both	do	so	in	the	framework	of	promoting	national	cultures	within	the	European	Union	and	promoting	a	European	culture	outside	the	Union.	The	Treaty	allowed	for	the	development	of	financial	frameworks	to	support	specific	projects	including	the	audiovisual	industry	(MEDIA	I),	the	educational	sectors	(Socrates	I)	and	in	the	second	half	of	the	decade	cultural	heritage	(Raphael),	creativity	(Kaleidoscope),	and	translation	(Ariane)	all	in	parallel	to	the	ongoing	development	of	the	Barcelona	Process.	These	projects	were	incremental	steps	towards	a	more	significant	role	for	culture,	however	they	suffered	from	elemental	setbacks	including	the	institutional	and	strategic	framework	and	financial	independence	to	ensure	long-term	sustainability.	From	the	mid-90’s,	however,	a	new	standard	for	the	development	of	cultural	relations	was	evolving	which	incorporated	lessons	from	the	transnational	experience	of	the	European	Cultural	Foundation,	new	European	competencies	in	culture	and	the	development	of	the	EU’s	external	relations.			
Renewing	cultural	relations	through	dialogue		In	the	1990s,	culture	became	a	bigger	issue	for	policy-makers	and	publics	alike.	Following	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	end	of	the	Cold	War’s	bipolar	system	identity	and	culture	were	immediately	raised	as	new	sources	of	instability	given	the	fragmentation	of	the	superpower	blocs	that	had	held	together	diverse	communities	and	nations	for	the	latter	half	of	the	century.	Without	this	great	ideological	divide,	factions	were	now	bound	to	conflict	on	the	fault	lines	where	cultures	made	up	of	inherently	irreconcilable	differences	(especially	religious)	met	(Huntington	1993).	While	Huntington’s	thesis	proved	contentious	it	was	also	influential	sparking	an	endless	array	of	appropriations,	defences	and	rebuttals.	Writing	in	2001,	Edward	Said,	the	author	of	Orientalism	and	Culture	and	Imperialism,	wrote	a	scathing	response	to	Huntington’s	thesis	in	
The	Nation,	which	had	been	expanded	to	a	book-length	version	in	1996.	In	his	article	Said	traced	the	origins	of	this	‘clash	thesis’	to	the	work	of	orientalist	Bernard	Lewis	who	asserted	an	endemic	feeling	of	insecurity	and	superiority	in	
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the	Muslim	faith	(Said	2001).	This	foundation	leads	Said	to	conclude	that:	“‘The	Clash	of	Civilizations’	thesis	is	a	gimmick	like	"The	War	of	the	Worlds,"	better	for	reinforcing	defensive	self-pride	than	for	critical	understanding	of	the	bewildering	interdependence	of	our	time”	(Ibid).	In	other	words,	the	‘clash	thesis’	was	operating	as	a	replacement	for	Cold	War	doctrine	generating	new	friends	and	enemies.	A	proper	evaluation	of	the	post-Cold	War	world	required	a	more	critical	understanding	of	how	these	diverse	communities	were	dependent	on	each	other	and	interconnected	through	history	as	well	as	through	the	development	of	new	economic,	political,	and	cultural	relations.	Intercultural	dialogue	was	not	a	new	concept	at	this	time.	It’s	origins	can	be	traced	back	to	education	and	language	training	several	decades	prior	and	the	work	of	actors	such	as	United	Nations	Educational,	Scientific	and	Cultural	Organisation	(UNESCO)	and	the	Society	for	Intercultural	Education	Training	and	Research	(SIETAR)	in	the	1970s.	However,	its	appropriation	by	governance	actors	as	a	way	to	address	the	issue	of	cultural	diversity	within	societies	and	mediate	relations	between	foreign	societies	was	novel.			 It	is	difficult	to	ascertain	precisely	the	first	use	of	cultural	dialogue	in	this	sense.	But	in	1995	the	Barcelona	Process	(BP),	established	to	create	a	new	framework	for	regional	cooperation	between	the	EU	and	its	southern	Mediterranean	neighbors,	liberally	employed	the	concept	of	dialogue	as	central	to	a	new	form	of	partnership	between	the	newly	enlarged	EU	and	its	neighbors.	The	Mediterranean	has	long	been	considered	as	a	fault	line	–	even	before	Huntington’s	pivotal	and	controversial	‘clash	of	civilizations’	thesis.	Influenced	in	some	part	by	this	new	discourse	of	cultures,	the	Barcelona	Process	was	envisaged	as	a	way	to	prevent	a	possible	clash	between	cultures	on	either	shore	(Henry	1996;	Schäfer	2007a).	The	inclusion	of	the	cultural	basket	alongside	the	political	and	economic	baskets	was	intended	to	institutionalize	some	form	of	harmony	between	Mediterranean	cultures	and	direct	the	relations	towards	the	impetus	of	economic	and	political	integration.	The	cultural	basket	of	the	EMP	was	built	on	this	foundation	of	loose	ties	and	sector-oriented	projects.	This	implied	culture	as	a	support	mechanism	for	regional	integration	but	in	practice	it	lacked	the	backing	of	a	clearly	defined	and	institutionally	embedded	strategy	for	culture	(Schäfer	2007a).	In	other	words,	this	left	no	central	body	responsible	for	
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its	development,	nor	did	it	contain	a	clear	strategy	or	separate	budget.	The	third	basket	of	the	BP	explicitly	referred	to	the	necessity	for	promoting	dialogue	and	exchange	between	the	two	shores	of	the	Mediterranean	(Silvestri	2007).	The	BP	was	unique	in	its	intention	to	place	culture	at	the	centre	of	a	regional	framework	alongside	politics	(and	security)	and	economics.	The	Barcelona	Declaration	(1995)	makes	numerous	mentions	of	dialogue	in	all	three	of	the	baskets	-	political	and	security	partnership,	economic	and	financial	partnership,	and	the	partnership	in	social,	cultural	and	human	affairs.	But	it	was	its	inclusion	in	the	third	basket	-	alluding	to	the	development	of	exchange,	understanding	and	perceptions	through	the	development	of	dialogues	among	stakeholders	-	that	generated	much	optimism.	And	yet	in	this	format,	dialogue	was	still	explicitly	described	in	terms	of	a	structured	dialogue	that	would	bring	together	elites,	policy-makers	and	experts	(Schäfer	2007a,	347).	So	while	being	celebrated	initially	for	its	allusion	to	the	inclusion	of	societies	the	third	basket	was	in	practice	a	complement	to	political	dialogue	in	multilateral	forums.			 In	1998,	President	Khatami	of	the	Islamic	Republic	of	Iran	proposed	a	‘Dialogue	of	Civilisations’	to	counter	the	impending	logic	of	the	‘clash’.	The	United	Nations	and	the	international	community	took	up	this	proposal	declaring	2001	the	‘Year	of	Dialogue	Among	Civilizations’	(GA/RES/53/22).	The	idea	of	dialogue	as	raised	by	the	UN	in	its	‘dialogue	of	civilizations’	harkened	back	to	a	similar	notion	of	intercultural	dialogue	found	in	the	Council	of	Europe’s	(CoE)	1995	Framework	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	National	Minorities.	This	document	articulated	an	idea	of	dialogue	intended	to	address	the	issue	of	cultural	diversity.	And	while	the	CoE’s	framework	explicitly	focuses	on	national	policy,	the	UN	and	UNESCO	raise	cultural	diversity	into	the	international	arena.	So	whereas	the	Barcelona	Declaration	(and	early	EU	application	of	dialogue)	focused	on	dialogue	between	political	entities	the	‘Dialogue	Among	Civilizations’	proposed	a	more	fundamental	diversity	across	national	boundaries.	In	the	evolution	of	cultural	policy	within	national	borders,	the	EU	and	external	relations,	the	phenomenon	of	cultural	diversity	becomes	a	common	referent	in	policy	discourse.	The	adoption	of	dialogue	as	a	tool	of	policy	becomes	focused	on	the	objectives	of	politics	and	security	versus	cultural	exchange	and	mobility,	the	initial	struggle	in	determining	the	scope	of	intercultural	dialogue.	Mobility	-	a	
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significant	concern	amongst	cultural	operators	-	also	saw	some	boost	mostly	outside	of	official	policy	routes.	For	example,	the	development	of	the	Roberto	Cimetta	Fund	in	1999,	with	support	from	the	European	Cultural	Foundation,	sought	to	improve	the	exchange	and	mobility	of	artists	across	Mediterranean	societies.			
Expansion	of	networking	-	towards	an	institutional	discourse	The	Culture	2000	programme	integrated	previous	initiatives	-	Raphael,	Kaleidoscope	and	Ariane	-	and	sought	to	develop	a	more	streamlined	approach	to	culture	within	EU	policy	through	the	creation	of	a	single	programming	and	financing	instrument.	The	programme	was	designed	to	further	the	development	of	a	common	cultural	area	through	the	promotion	of	transnational	cooperations	projects	between	individuals,	organizations	and	existing	cultural	foundations.	While	effectively	filling	a	gap	in	the	promotion	of	transnational	cooperation	and	supporting	over	1000	projects	between	the	years	2000-2004,	in	practice	it	had	limited	scope	and	visibility	(COM(2006)	666).	However,	this	move	towards	a	more	strategic	approach	to	culture	was	important	as	it	altered	the	policy	landscape	towards	culture	and	opened	new	avenues	for	existing	cultural	actors	and	organizations	to	network	and	interact	with	European	institutions.	Within	this	new	context	a	growing	impetus	for	networking	between	foundations	was	solidified	through	the	development	of	umbrella	groups	such	as	the	network	European	Union	National	Institutes	of	Culture	(EUNIC)	founded	in	2006	and	the	subsequent	development	of	85	clusters	abroad	connected	to	this	network.	The	expansion	of	institutional	networking	helped	to	solidify	a	new	framework	for	culture	with	advocacy	from	these	groups	and	from	individual	organizations	like	the	European	Cultural	Foundation	(ECF)	which	from	2002	onwards	turned	increasingly	to	lobbying	for	the	development	of	a	more	strategic	and	robust	cultural	policy	both	within	the	EU	and	in	its	external	relations.	The	latter	aspect	was	essential	as	noted	within	the	ECF’s	summary	as	the	development	of	a	common	cultural	area	raised	the	implicit	danger	of	solidifying	an	inward	looking	Union	“deaf	to	the	experiences	and	knowledge	of	people	surrounding	it”.	Seminars	and	projects	were	thus	generally	followed	up	with	a	series	of	
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recommendations	to	cultural	actors	and	to	decision-makers.	At	the	same	time,	in	2003	the	Prodi	Commission	established	a	group	of	experts	to	offer	advice	on	improving	Mediterranean	relations	-	especially	with	regard	to	the	cultural	field.	The	‘Groupe	des	Sages’	report	helped	to	establish	a	set	of	objectives	in	improving	the	increasingly	deadlocked	EuroMediterranean	Partnership.	The	development	of	a	EuroMediterranean	Foundation	for	Intercultural	Dialogue	–	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	-	was	symbolic	of	the	desire	to	increase	transnational	flows,	communication,	exchange	and	dialogue	between	societies.	What	is	more,	the	report	evoked	an	evolving	discourse	within	the	cultural	field	on	the	potential	of	transnationalism	as	a	pragmatic	counter	to	threats	emanating	from	cultural,	political	and	economic	relations.	In	this	atmosphere,	a	consensus	discourse	on	cultural	diversity	emerged	in	conjunction	with	intercultural	dialogue.	The	inauguration	of	international	policies	on	cultural	diversity	and	intercultural	dialogue	effectively	changed	the	‘kind	of	labour’	(Ahmed	2012)	involved	in	doing	cultural	work.	In	other	words,	a	specific	form	of	transnationalism	became	the	essential	policy	tool	through	which	to	pursue	improved	cultural	relations	and	combat	negative	forms	of	‘globalization’	(Griffin	and	Devereaux	2013).			 Culture	2007	followed	on	from	Culture	2000	in	its	general	approach	and	management	establishing	three	objectives	following	from	the	limited	success	of	the	initial	programme	-	transnational	mobility,	circulation	of	cultural	products,	and	the	promotion	of	intercultural	dialogue	-	simultaneously	increasing	the	budget	from	236.5	million	to	400	million.	With	the	Directorate	General	Education	and	Culture	(DG	EAC)	taking	control	of	the	Culture	2007	programme,	the	EC	commissioned	a	series	of	EuroBarometer	reports	around	the	theme	of	European	cultural	values.	The	purpose	of	these	reports	was	to	feed	back	into	the	Culture	framework	and	to	offer	reflection	on	how	Europeans	conceive	of	culture,	level	of	interest,	activities	and	issues	surrounding	exchange.	But	they	also	served	a	strategic	objective	in	terms	of	the	role	of	the	EU	in	the	cultural	field	and	the	capacities	that	could	be	levied	in	its	external	relations.	The	eurobarometer	reports	on	intercultural	dialogue	in	this	context	can	be	seen	as	performative,	not	just	reporting	on	the	state	of	culture	but	as	bringing	it	into	existence	in	a	particular	formation.	As	argued	by	Vidmar-Horvat	(2012)	in	her	analysis	of	report	217,	the	implication	of	the	report’s	findings	are	that	diversity	can	be	seen	
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as	a	‘fait	accompli’	in	Europe.	Problematic,	for	certain,	but	practically	realized.	Diversity	and	Intercultural	dialogue	are	envisaged	as	features	of	the	European	‘demos’	and	features	that	can	be	exported	as	part	of	a	distinctly	European	cultural	diplomacy	-	a	feature	that	can	support	the	development	of	such	a	capacity.	Just	as	diversity	becomes	a	form	of	public	relations	for	organizations,	the	EU	employs	diversity	as	a	form	of	branding	on	the	world	stage.	The	Eurobarometer	functions,	in	this	vein,	as	internal	‘perception	data’	that	can	subsequently	be	used	to	justify	or	legitimate	the	extension	of	particular	types	of	knowledge	and	expertise	beyond	the	borders	of	the	EU.	However,	the	arrival	at	this	point	is	not	solely	the	result	of	energy	emanating	from	EU	institutions	but	the	incorporated	efforts	of	networks	of	individuals	and	organizations	changing	the	cultural	policy	landscape.	Without	these	networks	the	arrival	of	EU	competency	and	capacity	would	remain	even	more	limited	and	the	most	recent	(and	most	vociferous)	attempt	to	develop	a	strategic	approach	to	culture	bears	this	out.	In	2011,	the	EC	commissioned	eight	cultural	organizations	-	led	by	the	Goethe	Institute	and	including	the	European	Cultural	Foundation,	among	others	-	to	conduct	research	and	discussions	towards	the	goal	of	proposing	a	strategic	approach	to	culture	in	the	EU’s	external	relations.	While	following	the	intentions	of	competing	internationally	established	in	the	‘Communication	on	a	European	agenda	for	culture	in	a	globalizing	world’,	the	final	report	also	clearly	attempts	to	establish	a	mandate	for	existing	networks	crossing	EU	boundaries	in	the	development	and	enactment	of	‘transversal’	actions.			
EEAS,	transnationalism	and	cultural	diplomacy	The	Preparatory	Action	and	its	conclusions	are	significant	because	it	sets	out	a	more	formally	networked	approach	to	culture	but	one	that	also	feeds	clearly	into	EU	policy-making.	Existing	cultural	organizations	help	to	focus	a	series	of	issues	connected	loosely	under	the	umbrella	of	cultural	diplomacy	and	provide	pre-established	networks	of	actors	to	enact	and	further	refine	initiatives	–	focus	on	a	series	of	significant	objectives	such	as	culture,	exchange,	civil	society,	development,	dialogue.	In	the	policy	realm,	this	is	beneficial	for	many	reasons,	not	least	of	which	is	the	cost	associated	with	establishing	such	networks	from	the	
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ground	up	and	the	cost	of	ongoing	maintenance	and	support,	restructuring	and	funding	as	intermittently	required.	Instead,	the	endeavour	becomes	a	cooperative	one	where	costs	can	be	shared	to	a	larger	extent.	It	also	helps	to	avoid	certain	legal	pitfalls	in	the	case	of	the	European	Commission	bound	by	the	Treaties	that	specify	the	national	competence	of	cultural	relations.	But	there	is	a	clear	diffusion	of	ideas	and	narratives	between	cultural	institutions	and	the	EC	including	how	transnationalism	functions	within	the	policy	context.			 The	development	of	the	European	External	Action	Service	(EEAS)	-	hoped	to	evolve	into	an	effective	diplomatic	wing	of	the	European	Commission	-	adds	impetus	to	the	environmental	context	of	culture	in	the	EU’s	external	affairs.	Organizational	cultures	tend	to	focus	and	contextualize	concepts	consolidating	specific	frames	that	clarify	relationships	between	the	various	pieces,	thereby	influencing	narratives.	But	the	EEAS	is	unique	in	some	regards	as	a	result	of	its	still	fledgling	status	and	mixture	of	organizational	cultures	resulting	from	it	being	made	up	of	previously	existing	departments	within	the	Commission.	While	this	variation	in	culture	may	to	some	extent	be	exaggerated	there	remains	some	lack	of	cohesion	in	terms	of	the	EEAS’	identity	and	function.4	In	traditionally	institutional	terms	this	can	of	course	be	regarded	as	problematic.	However,	there	exists	another	possibility.	Batora	highlights	the	unique	position	of	the	EEAS,	what	he	refers	to	as	its	interstitiality	-	existing	in	between	“organizational	fields	and	recombining	physical,	informational,	financial,	legal	and	legitimacy	resources	stemming	from	organizations	belonging	to	these	organizational	fields”	(Batora	2012).	The	result	potentially	“paving	the	way	for	a	new	breed	of	flexible	and	integrated	delivery	of	external	policy”	(Batora	2013,	22).	The	interstitial	nature	of	the	EEAS,	intended	to	be	the	foremost	‘European’	cultural	representative	abroad	and	the	EU’s	diplomatic	wing,	posits	a	far	more	complex	role	for	culture	than	in	traditional	forms	of	public	and	cultural	diplomacy.	Furthermore,	with	the	advocacy	of	the	ECF	and	umbrella	organizations	like	EUNIC	as	well	as	the	productive	role	of	the	European	Parliament	in	pushing	for	greater	complementary	between	the	Council	and	Commission	there	exists	an	institutional	environment	that	is	supportive	of	a	more	distributed	approach	(Isar	2015,	504).	If	the	EEAS	continues	to	develop	along	the	lines	explained	by																																																									4	Interview	with	EEAS	official	2nd	October	2014	
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Batoras,	it	feeds	into	the	narrative	being	established	under	current	guidelines	proposed	during	the	ongoing	consulting	process.		 A	similar	message	is	expounded	in	the	Discussion	Paper	leading	to	the	‘Culture	in	EU	External	Relations’	Conference,	one	step	in	the	process	to	establish	clear	directives	for	greater	EU	cultural	competency.	The	role	of	the	European	institutions	and	EEAS	are	summarized	in	an	important	way	–	as	contributing	to	culture	““in	ways	that	generate	trans-national	added	value	and	transmit	the	overarching	European	message…”	(2014,	5).	The	allusion	is	to	a	distinct	European	cultural	diplomacy	but	one	that	is	not	beholden	to	the	dominance	of	official	agents.	On	the	contrary,	European	institutions	and	national	governments	are	essential	but	not	necessarily	the	foremost	actors.	In	fact,	this	new	narrative	endorses	the	already	existing	‘polyvocal	process’	made	up	of	‘bottom-up,	unofficial	processes’	(Sassatelli	2009,	195).		A	criticism	of	previous	inability	to	develop	a	clear	mandate	for	culture	concerned	the	small,	project-financed	cultural	organizations,	which	lacked	the	inter-organizational	facility	and	capacity	to	communicate	lessons	to	the	European	Commission	(Gerth	2006,	13).	Officially	embracing	the	role	of	governing	institutions	as	offering	an	organizing	capacity	offers	a	fresh	perspective.	Foundations	can	also	more	effectively	transmit	the	messages	of	smaller	organizations	through	their	institutional	ties	to	governments,	EU	institutions	and	amongst	each	other.	The	focus	on	capacity-building	has	gone	hand-in-hand	with	networking	thus	focusing	on	building	relations	across	smaller	organizations	in	part	by	including	them	in	common	projects	and	calls	for	action.	Thus,	the	EEAS	–	in	its	projected	form	–	and	the	call	for	a	‘global	cultural	citizenship’	based	upon	prosperity,	empowerment	and	dialogue	not	only	coexist	but	may	be	complementary	as	a	uniquely	European	cultural	diplomacy.	Furthermore,	instead	of	the	migration	of	‘Europeanness’	outwards	there	is	the	potential	of	a	two-way	flow	of	cultural	narratives	resulting	from	partnership	with	existing	cultural	networks	and	organizations.		 What	all	of	this	suggests	is	that	it	is	wrong	to	subsume	the	development	of	cultural	competencies	and	institutions	under	the	rubric	of	‘cultural	diplomacy’	in	a	traditional	sense.	As	Ang,	Isar	and	Mar	(2015)	point	out,	such	categories	have	become	increasingly	blurry.	The	definition	of	cultural	diplomacy	has	been	broadened	to	refer	to	mutual	understanding	and	dialogue	obscuring	the	more	
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limited	objectives	of	national	self-promotion	and	exchange	(Ang,	Isar	and	Mar	2015,	367-8).	While	the	authors	lament	this	situation	as	an	analytical	change,	in	practice	they	recognize	that	it	has	become	part	of	a	broader	change	in	diplomacy	based	on	engaging	transnational	relations	and	including	civil	society	and	business	actors	(Ibid).	This	network	of	actors	could	more	effectively	be	conceived	as	part	of	global	cultural	relations	encompassing	the	networks	of	governmental	and	autonomous	actors	presuming	a	certain	blurriness	in	its	complexity.	Cultural	diplomacy,	cultural	policy	and	the	development	of	cultural	foundations	at	state	and	regional	levels	are	key	points	within	this	matrix	that	is	built	for	the	objective	of	building	trust	between	societies	and	based	upon	the	legitimacy	and	credibility	of	non-state	actors	rather	than	the	traditional	governmental	agents	of	cultural	diplomacy.	Though	transnational	actors	are	inevitably	and	variously	restricted	from	entry	into	these	networks	–	membership	requirements,	skill	shortages,	identity	conflicts,	and	resource	shortages	–these	are	areas	that	can	more	effectively	be	addressed	through	the	flexible	and	context-sensitive	approach	of	networks.	Whereas,	in	traditionally	designed	programmes,	inclusion	assumes	acceptance	of	the	agenda	and	can	be	characterized	as	reinforcing	dominant	frames,	participation	in	networks	and	events	should	not	be	seen	solely	in	this	subordinate	light.	Participation	may	also	occur	in	an	agonistic	manner	whereby	frames	are	not	completely	rejected	but	their	meaning	shifted.	By	appealing	to	the	same	core	elements	and	interests	participants	inject	themselves	into	a	narrative.	Section	2	(especially	Chapter	8)	will	pursue	this	idea	further	by	exploring	the	position	of	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	in	this	context	and	its	seminal	event	–	the	Civil	Forum.		
Conclusion	The	path	leading	towards	a	distinct	constellation	of	actors	intended	to	collaborate	into	being	a	sense	of	European	cohesion	is	invested	with	the	integrative	instincts	of	European	institutions.	The	Commission	has	been	prominent	in	advocating	for	a	clearer	mandate,	most	fervently	since	2007,	but	the	support	of	the	Parliament	and	acquiescence	of	the	Council	has	been	crucial.	Though	it	is	still	early	days	when	it	comes	to	understanding	either	the	future	
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form	of	the	EEAS	or	the	institutional	impact	of	the	proposals	established	through	the	Preparatory	Action	continuity	remains	in	the	form	of	networking	across	cultural	Foundations	and	those	actors	brought	within	their	scope	of	action.	By	establishing	such	a	diffuse	arrangement,	the	EU	may	actually	be	doing	what	it	does	best,	which	is	to	complement	and	support	the	expansion	of	already	existing	mechanisms	to	promote	cross-border	interaction.	Though	in	many	circumstances	built	in	the	traditional	guise	of	cultural	diplomacy,	Foundations	show	the	potential	of	becoming	more	diverse	and	fluid	actors.	One	major	reason	for	this	occurrence	is	likely	the	effect	of	continuous	networking	across	borders	with	like-minded	organizations.	The	case	of	the	Goethe	Institut	and	CulturesFrance	bears	this	out	as	their	abundant	common	projects	have	resulted	in	a	great	deal	of	convergence	in	values,	objectives	and	actions	(de	Vries	2008,	65).	In	so	doing,	the	actors	involved	also	become	more	focused	on	their	European	destination	rather	than	national	origin.	Once	again,	this	appears	to	be	the	case	with	some	institutes	of	culture	such	as	the	Goethe	Institut	and	CulturesFrance,	which	have	officially	taken	on	the	mantle	of	promoting	a	‘European’	rather	than	strictly	national	culture	(Ibid).	This	section	has	demonstrated	the	prominence	of	Foundations	in	diffusing	a	new	narrative	on	culture,	specifically	at	the	EU	level.	In	the	context	of	already	existing	platforms	for	cultural	relations	in	external	relations,	the	shift	is	also	pragmatic.	It	builds	off	the	current	success	of	actors	including	the	Asia-Europe	Foundation	and	European	Union	Institutes	of	National	Culture	(EUNIC)	umbrella	organization,	in	addition	to	(as	this	thesis	argues)	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	in	the	Euro-Mediterranean	context.		 The	Foundation	as	an	organizational	model	finds	itself	at	the	heart	of	cultural	relations	by	being	viewed	as	a	flexible	and	functional	actor	from	the	perspective	of	foreign	policy	and	also	offering	an	image	of	credibility	and	legitimacy	to	outsiders.	Their	impact,	then,	is	conceptual	as	well	as	practical	redefining	transnationalism	in	the	policy	context	as	well	as	implementing	new	practices	and	avenues	for	cooperation.	Within	the	figurative	boundaries	of	Europe	this	is	largely	unproblematic.	However,	employed	beyond	those	boundaries	to	incorporate	neighboring	societies	reintroduces	problems	of	governmental	permissiveness,	trust,	power	and	the	content	of	values.	For	these	
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reasons,	the	setting-up	of	multilateral	organizations	to	act	as	regional	Foundations	for	the	promotion	of	cultural	relations	is	both	intriguing	and	problematic,	even	given	the	context	discussed	in	these	two	chapters.	The	subsequent	section	will	explore	several	points	arising	from	this	discussion	in	more	detail	especially	concerning	the	extent	to	which	such	multilateral	Foundations	can	be	integrated	into	established	networks	and	participate	in	novel	forms	of	‘cultural	diplomacy’	–	that	is	assuming	we	call	these	relations	‘diplomatic’.	Or	should	we	instead	point	towards	an	emergent	form	of	global	
cultural	relations	based	upon	the	concept	of	networking	across	networks?	Through	an	evaluation	of	the	establishment	and	progression	of	a	multilateral	cultural	foundation	for	the	countries	of	the	EuroMediterranean	Partnership	–	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	–	this	thesis	will	address	the	autonomy	of	transnational	networks,	their	functional	identities,	structural	position	and	the	realities	versus	pursuit	of	transnational	networking.
	 126	
Chapter	5:	A	‘Civil’	Euro-Mediterranean:	the	Anna	Lindh	
Foundation,	civil	societalization	and	intercultural	dialogue		The	many	Europes	theme	suggested	in	Chapter	4	opens	up	investigation	to	the	multitude	of	ways	in	which	Europe	and	the	European	Union	are	represented.	Whether	that	be	through	official	policies	and	actors,	the	development	of	a	European	public	sphere	or	in	the	recognition	of	alternative	models	within	Europe	this	approach	is	valuable	in	its	rejection	of	monolithic	understandings.	The	multiplicity	of	Europe	and	the	European	Union	is	seen	starkly	in	its	relations	with	the	rest	of	the	world	and	the	Mediterranean	is	an	intriguing	case	as	it	bridges	internal	and	external	visions	of	the	European	Union	and	Europe	as	a	cultural	entity.	The	historical	trajectory	of	the	region	and	the	fluctuating	relationship	between	the	northern	and	southern	shores	of	the	sea	add	to	the	complexity.	In	terms	of	EU	relations	with	its	near	abroad,	often	discussed	in	the	context	of	enlargement,	the	Middle	East	and	North	African	sub-regions	are	also	genuinely	foreign	relations	in	that	they	(apart	from	perhaps	Turkey)	do	not	represent	real	aspirations	to	EU	membership	(the	Moroccan	aspiration	was	quickly	deterred).	On	the	other	hand,	colonial	histories	and	on-going	policy	developments	continue	to	link	EU	member	states	and	countries	across	the	region.		This	chapter	attempts	to	build	on	this	by	reconsidering	Europe’s	role	in	the	Mediterranean	and	the	development	of	a	‘Euro-Mediterranean’	space.	But	rather	than	starting	from	an	institutional	approach,	as	the	previous	section	has	attested,	this	section	will	approach	the	development	of	a	EuroMediterranean	space	from	the	perspective	of	cultural	relations	and	transnational	networking.	This	starting	point	allows	for	a	more	global	interpretation	of	developments	instead	of	implicitly	bounding	the	region	according	to	power	dynamics	between	the	different	shores.	The	previous	section	emphasized	the	significance	of	Foundations	and	cultural	networks	in	the	development	of	cultural	policy	and	cultural	competency	in	the	EU’s	affairs.	But	these	networks	rarely	end	abruptly	at	the	boundaries	of	regional	space.	In	fact,	numerous	Foundations	from	the	European	Cultural	Foundation	to	national	institutes	of	culture	have	long	been	
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active	in	developing	projects	abroad	and,	importantly,	in	creating	capacity	for	networking.	Such	attempts	at	creating	trust	and	cohesion	have	previously	been	viewed	through	the	lens	of	either	democracy	promotion	or	cultural	diplomacy,	depending	upon	the	target	and	project	objectives.	Yet,	as	Chapter	4	has	discussed,	the	situation	is	full	of	complexity.	While	there	is	growing	impetus	to	pursue	transnational	networking	as	a	policy	objective	the	value	for	individual	organizations	and	participants	is	not	always	clear.	In	order	to	gain	a	better	understanding	we	need	to	merge	the	top-down	and	bottom-up	perspectives	on	network	formation.	This	section	pulls	together	the	strategic,	institutional	and	participatory	to	understand	the	significance	of	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	as	a	regional	body.	As	will	be	shown,	diplomatic	and	foreign	policy	pressures	come	up	against	organizational	culture	and	objectives	in	this	context.	And	though	participants	and	members	may	be	perceived	as	being	passive	actors	when	viewed	from	top-down,	their	modes	of	inclusion	suggest	the	potential	for	critical	dialogue	and	the	ability	to	construct	new	opportunities	to	participate	beyond	the	local	context.		This	chapter	contributes	two	findings	and	acts	as	something	of	an	introduction	to	the	significance	of	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	by	placing	it	between	the	previous	EU	objective	of	region	building	and	a	shift	towards	intercultural	dialogue	as	a	new	basis	of	cooperation.	The	result	exhibits	a	period	of	shift	in	strategy	towards	cultural	relations	at	the	EU	level.	Secondly,	it	demonstrates	the	political	significance	of	the	Foundation	in	providing	a	symbolic	and	coarsely	censored	space	for	the	inclusion	of	civil	society	beyond	the	boundaries	of	the	nation-state.	Over	time,	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	has	become	as	a	central	promoter	of	a	united	Mediterranean	and	an	important	actor	for	promoting	intercultural	dialogue	and	networking	among	civil	society	actors.	It	brings	a	crucial	social	and	cultural	focus	to	a	region	dominated	by	political	and	economic	interests	and	carries	within	its	vision	a	particular	image	of	a	Euro-Mediterranean,	which	to	some	extent	continues	to	reflect	the	influence	of	earlier	EU	discourses	on	region-building	but	also	a	changing	orientation	towards	cultural	relations	requiring	the	ALF	to	adapt	to	the	shifting	objectives	of	its	largest	funder	–	the	European	Commission.		
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The	purpose	of	looking	at	–	and	rethinking	the	significance	of	–	the	ALF	is	to	reveal	the	emerging	globality	that	is	inherent	in	the	construction	of	a	Euro-Mediterranean	space.	This	chapter	will	provide	an	overview	of	the	ALF	in	terms	of	its	political	and	institutional	context	and	argue	that	the	ALF’s	political	role	should	be	recognized	as	an	important	transformation	of	politics	in	the	region.	Criticism	of	political	censorship	and	control	over	many	of	the	activities	should	not	be	overlooked	but	this	does	not	adequately	engage	with	the	political	significance	of	the	ALF	both	in	terms	of	regional	development	and	in	terms	of	civil	society	promotion.	The	‘civil	societalization	of	politics’	suggests	that	the	ALF	should	be	seen	not	only	in	terms	of	civil	society	development	but	also	in	terms	of	a	related	transformation	of	politics.	The	chapter	will	begin	with	an	introduction	of	the	ALF	and	then	proceed	through	an	exploration	of	civil	society	as	it	relates	to	developments	in	the	Euro-Mediterranean.	This	section	will	introduce	the	concept	of	‘civil	societalization’	which	will	lay	the	basis	for	an	attempt	to	situate	the	Euro-Mediterranean	within	a	global	normative	politics	and	subsequently	provide	a	discussion	of	the	political	content	of	‘intercultural	dialogue’.	As	such,	the	paper	will	chart	a	political	course	for	the	ALF	in	the	context	of	the	Euro-Mediterranean	and	reveal	the	inherent	limitations	in	its	approach	to	civil	society	development	and	intercultural	dialogue.	At	the	same	time,	the	analysis	will	suggest	that	the	ALF	has	the	potential	for	promoting	alternative	forms	of	regional	interaction.		
The	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	The	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	(ALF)	represents	a	significant	achievement	in	cooperation	and	partnership	arising	out	of	the	social	and	cultural	basket	of	the	Euro-Mediterranean	Process	(EMP).	Despite	great	expectations	following	the	2003	High	Level	Advisory	Group	meeting	(‘Group	des	Sages’),	optimism	towards	the	Foundation	remained	low	among	many	observers	given	the	difficulty	surrounding	budgetary	negotiations	and	remaining	political	constraints	(Pace	2006,	86).	However,	despite	immense	difficulty,	as	well	as	having	to	withstand	an	uncertain	institutional	context	and	political	wrangling	over	the	creation	of	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean,	the	ALF	has	evolved	in	its	early	years	into	an	intriguing	institution	and	a	potential	source	of	development	on	socio-cultural	
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issues	and	intercultural	dialogue	in	the	region.	Originating	out	of	the	considerations	and	prescriptions	of	the	Report	of	the	High	Level	Advisory	Group	(‘Groupe	des	Sages’)	in	2003,	the	structure	and	goals	of	the	ALF	contain	both	a	normative	and	functional	basis.	The	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	functions	as	a	central	node	in	a	network	of	national	networks	for	civil	society	organizations	that	exist	across	European	and	Mediterranean	members	of	the	UfM.	Its	primary	objective	is	to	promote	intercultural	dialogue,	which	in	practice	consists	of	supporting	four	fields	of	action	–	Education	and	Youth,	Culture	and	Arts,	Cities	and	Migration	and	Peace	and	Coexistence.	According	to	the	2003	report,	in	contrast	to	markets	and	capital	in	the	EU,	youth	represent	one	of	the	most	significant	assets	of	Southern	Mediterranean	countries.	Youth	also	represent	a	potential	threat	to	the	EU	in	terms	of	migration	flows	and	through	the	perpetuation	of	cultural	conflict.	Thus,	the	strategic	is	not	far	from	socio-cultural	considerations.	The	work	of	the	ALF	encompasses	a	range	of	events,	awards,	reports,	and	calls	for	proposals.	Events	often	include	roundtables	and	forums	where	civil	society	actors	and	officials	from	either	side	of	the	Mediterranean	can	meet	and	discuss	new	priorities	and	concerns.	Awards	vary	by	theme	depending	on	yearly	priorities	and	target	those	groups	that	promoted	these	priorities	most	effectively.	The	ALF	also	produces	an	Intercultural	Trends	Report,	which	takes	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	cultural	values	and	trends	on	either	side	of	the	Mediterranean	through	examining	opinion	polls,	undertaking	expert	analysis	and	media	analysis	and	then	engaging	with	proposals	for	action.	As	such,	the	ALF	does	a	significant	amount	of	work	in	promoting	youth	development	and	in	promoting	the	conditions	for	understanding	divisions	across	the	region.		While	the	ALF	contributes	to	and	offers	new	opportunities	to	civil	society	actors	across	the	region	a	look	at	the	2010	member	survey	reveals	a	desire	among	a	significant	portion	of	members	for	greater	cross-border	contacts	as	well	as	increased	and	easier	access	to	funding	(Results	of	the	Network	Survey	2010).	Furthermore,	the	survey	reveals	a	significant	level	of	dissatisfaction	with	National	networks	and	the	roles	and	selection	of	Heads	of	Network,	which	are	currently	approved	by	national	governments.	In	terms	of	funding,	the	survey	also	reveals	discontent	with	both	the	level	and	format	of	funding.	Though	the	Network	survey	only	represents	a	small	number	of	all	ALF	members	(with	533	
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respondents,	or	approximately	20%	overall)	the	breakdown	of	these	organizations	along	fields	of	action	reveals	the	influence	of	funding	priorities	towards	Education	and	Youth	with	290	respondents	working	in	this	field.	The	High	Level	Advisory	Group	meeting	in	2003	declared	the	necessary	independence	of	the	ALF	in	order	to	achieve	legitimacy	and	neutrality	in	a	highly	politicized	region.	However,	the	scope	of	independence	attainable	by	the	Foundation	would	likely	always	be	limited	by	its	reliance	upon	the	EU	commission	for	funding	(Feliu	2005)	as	well	as	the	institutional	context	of	the	ALF	with	the	UfM	framework.	Furthermore,	the	ALF	does	not	have	freedom	of	action	within	UfM	member	states.	It	acts	as	an	organizational	hub	for	national	networks	setting	strategies	for	development	and	implementation	as	well	as	deciding	upon	funding	priorities.	However	funding	is	often	still	funneled	through	official	channels	and	member	states	remain	responsible	for	selecting	Heads	of	Network.	Egypt	is	one	example	where	Heads	of	Network	are	initially	voted	for	by	members	of	the	national	network	and	subsequently	approved	by	the	Ministry.	This	maintenance	of	oversight	over	national	networks	potential	limits	network	penetration	as	well	as	membership	opportunities.			
Civil	society	promotion	and	Regional	Civil	Society		The	concept	of	civil	society	is	one	that	is	highly	contested	and	fraught	with	difficulties	and	yet	its	use	is	also	widespread	in	both	academic	and	policy	circles.	Approaches	to	development	espousing	the	centrality	of	civil	society	for	political	transformation	became	dominant	in	the	period	immediately	preceding	and	following	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union	aided	by	the	influence	of	global	development	institutions	(Robinson	1995).	For	example,	the	United	Nations	Human	Development	Programme’s	1993	Human	Development	Report	promoted	the	strengthening	of	civil	society	institutions	as	a	way	of	increasing	social	stability	in	developing	states,	a	call	that	was	repeated	in	the	World	Bank’s	World	Development	Report	(McIlwaine	1998).	In	accordance	with	the	spread	of	neo-liberal	policies	through	the	Washington	Consensus,	civil	society	promotion	also	took	on	a	specific	form	in	official	policies	depicting	civil	society	as	a	third	sector,	inclusive	of	social	activity	and	market	relations,	standing	in	direct	opposition	to	state	control	and	promoting	economic	development	and	efficient	(i.e.:	limited)	
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government.	Such	policies	highlight	the	existence	of	multiple	understandings	of	civil	society.	Foley	and	Edwards	(1996)	have	distinguished	two	groups:	Civil	Society	I	(associated	with	liberalism)	and	Civil	Society	II	(associated	with	resistance	movements	such	as	Solidarity	in	Poland	and	scholars	such	as	Adam	Michnik).	The	first	version	of	civil	society	largely	reflects	a	concern	for	the	governance	impact	of	civil	society	organizations	(CSOs)	by	focusing	on	organized	citizen	groups	that	help	to	smooth	out	local	political	antagonisms.	The	second	notion	of	civil	society	is	usually	attributed	to	radical	agendas	and	limited	to	resistance	within	authoritarian	regimes;	however	the	importance	of	such	a	conception	for	democratic	politics	should	not	be	overlooked.	These	two	‘models’	of	civil	society	reflect	the	normative	and	contested	nature	of	the	concept	as	it	has	come	to	be	used	in	both	liberal	and	leftist	discourses	to	promote	alternative	routes	to	political	transformation.	This	fact	in	conjunction	with	the	increasing	salience	of	transnational	relations	as	a	result	of	deepening	neoliberal	reforms,	speedier	mobility	and	greater	access	to	global	communications	has	given	rise	to	the	idea	of	global	civil	society,	another	highly	elusive	and	widespread	term.			 The	use	of	global	civil	society	in	academic	and	policy	circles	similarly	reflects	this	division	between	different	conceptions	and	understanding	of	roles.	Mary	Kaldor	has	advocated	global	civil	society,	through	the	rise	of	new	social	movements,	as	a	bulwark	against	the	centralization	of	power	and	as	a	‘global	process’	of	negotiation	with	global	governance	institutions	(Kaldor	2003).	As	such,	global	civil	society	is	central	to	the	construction	of	global	norms	and	is	offered	an	innate	legitimacy	on	behalf	of	new	social	movements	and	non-governmental	actors.	More	skeptical	voices	point	toward	the	difficulties	associated	with	the	promotion	of	global	civil	society	within	frameworks	of	governance	and	decision-making.	John	Keane	offers	several	different	types	of	relationship	between	non-governmental	and	governmental	groups	such	as	hostility,	catalyst,	contractors,	partnership,	co-optation	and	various	groupings	thereof.	Such	a	spectrum	highlights	the	necessary	interconnectedness	of	political	institutions	and	civil	society	(Keane	2003,	108-109).	By	extension,	it	also	means	that	the	role	and	significance	of	civil	society	depends	largely	upon	political	context.	Such	considerations	have	led	those	more	skeptical	of	the	inherent	legitimacy	of	global	civil	society	to	query	the	deceiving	nature	of	partnership	
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where:	‘lack	of	representational	accountability	leaves	control	in	the	hands	of	the	powerful,	while	offering	the	appearance	of	‘openness’,	‘transparency’	and	‘accountability’	(Chandler	2004,	44).	Such	concerns	are	highly	relevant	in	the	politicized	context	of	the	Euro-Mediterranean	and	potentially	within	the	work	of	organizations	like	the	ALF.		The	idea	of	global	civil	society	is	one	that	is	difficult	to	reconcile	with	the	reality	of	the	Euro-Mediterranean.	As	Laura	Feliu	points	out,	the	networks	that	do	exist	are	of	low	density	and	can	hardly	be	referred	to	as	‘global’	in	scale	(Feliu	2005,	380).	Perhaps	unsurprisingly,	southern	Mediterranean	civil	societies	are	noticeably	under-represented	in	global	institutions.	For	example,	within	the	United	Nations	Economic	and	Social	Council	out	of	3194	registered	NGOs	only	162	(or	6%)	are	from	the	MENA	region	placing	it	second	worst	in	this	category.	UNESCO,	which	formally	ascribes	a	greater	role	to	national	authorities	also	maintains	official	relations	with	non-governmental	organizations,	however	out	of	the	369	listed	on	their	searchable	database	only	10	are	listed	within	the	MENA	countries	of	Egypt,	Israel,	Jordan,	Lebanon,	Morocco,	Tunisia	and	Turkey.	Out	of	65	countries	listed	7	are	within	the	MENA	region	and	average	just	over	one	organization	per	country.	Such	observations	have	previously	given	play	to	notions	of	‘Arab	exceptionalism’,	referring	to	the	perceived	democratic	deficit	among	states	with	majority	Arab	populations.	Such	simplistic	accounts	have	effectively	been	countered	through	various	discussions,	including	allusion	to	the	significant	Arab	populations	living	within	democracies	outside	the	MENA	region.	Rather,	it	would	seem	that	this	region	is	subject	to	a	unique	geopolitical	environment.	Furthermore,	lack	of	democratic	development	and	the	resilience	of	autocratic	regimes	are	very	much	linked	to	the	“narrow	conception	of	civil	society	that	some	international	donors	make	concrete	through	their	activities…and	that	funding	mechanisms	potentially	increase”	(Challand	2006,	20).	In	this	context,	the	highly	normative	basis	of	global	civil	society	is	significant.	Creative	expressions	of	civil	and	political	participation	across	the	region	since	2011	put	further	strain	on	the	concept	if	it	is	considered	in	an	organizational	sense.	But	as	Robert	Falk	(2003)	argues,	the	global	discourse	owes	less	to	reality	and	rather	is	looked	upon	in	the	creation	of	new	dynamics	and	new	realities.	The	lesson	that	should	be	learned	by	donors	is	that	civil	
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society	does	not	come	prepackaged.	And	in	response,	there	has	been	some	conceptual	broadening	of	the	concept	in	existing	instruments	(Youngs	2015,	151).	The	compelling	role	played	by	new	cultural	actors	in	the	Arab	world	argues	also	for	their	incorporation	into	understanding	the	dynamics	of	global	attachment	(Glasius	and	Pleyers	2013;	Allende	and	Hattinger	2014)	and	the	embracing	of	distant	frames	within	everyday,	local	efforts	(Huber	and	Kamel	2015).		The	ALF	employs	a	broad	conception	of	civil	society	in	its	activities	engaging	with	universities,	NGOs,	associations,	public	institutions,	non-profit	organizations,	private	companies	and	local	authorities.	The	promotion	of	civil	society	is	a	central	tenet	of	intercultural	dialogue	in	the	work	of	the	ALF	and	the	new	Strategy	and	Programme	Guidelines	reinforces	this	position	by	contextualizing	the	promotion	of	civil	society	within	a	broader	‘intercultural	strategy’	that	relates	dialogue,	diversity	and	democracy	within	the	Euro-Mediterranean	(ALF	Strategy	2011,	11-12).	Building	upon	the	idea	of	intercultural	dialogue	as	a	promoter	of	‘good	neighborliness’	this	strategy	suggests	a	more	ideological	framework	for	the	continuation	of	ALF	operations.	Furthermore,	according	to	this	new	strategy	the	ALF	commits	itself	to	playing	a	much	more	significant	role	in	developing	the	Euro-Mediterranean	region	in	concert	with	EU	policy	(ALF	Strategy	2011,	12).	The	regional	dimension	of	the	Foundation	offers	a	unique	opportunity	to	overcome	some	of	the	problems	faced	by	CSOs	in	the	Euro-Mediterranean.	Currently,	the	transnational	links	that	have	been	fostered	in	the	region	exist	primarily	through	vertical	relations	(that	is	between	North-South)	rather	than	horizontally	(between	southern	Mediterranean	states)	(Feliu	2005).	These	issues	raise	concern	over	the	conception	of	civil	society	that	is	being	favored	as	a	Western	and	secular	model	(Schumacher	2005).	As	such,	links	between	CSOs	may	be	promoted	according	to	the	interests	and	comforts	of	European	groups	and	at	the	expense	of	local	actors.	In	this	light,	one	of	the	most	important	contributions	of	the	ALF	is	in	the	development	of	independent	spaces	of	interaction	and	dialogue	through	regional	activities,	forums	and	meetings.	These	spaces	evoke	a	regional	‘public	sphere’	by	providing	the	institutional	setting	for	civil	society	actors	to	engage	in	dialogue	on	a	more	equal	footing,	though	this	too	is	subject	to	political	interference	not	least	
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by	potentially	controlling	the	mobility	and	communication	of	actors	across	borders.		Politicization	of	civil	society	actors	can	be	witnessed	in	the	wake	of	the	Arab	uprisings	across	the	region	whereby	states	have	actively	reintroduced	social	divisions	against	budding	transverse	relations	(Harling	2012).	On	the	EU	side,	the	purpose	of	the	ALF	clearly	also	includes	a	functional	element	in	promoting	the	development	of	a	core	group	within	the	southern	non-member	states	–	the	youth	–	which	has	been	identified	as	a	source	of	potential	labor	power	and	migration	to	the	EU	and	both	an	economic	and	security	issue	for	regional	governments	and	EU	member	states.	However,	it	also	represents	the	key	demographic	that	contributed	to	the	outbreak	of	discontent	across	the	region.	Whether	the	new	strategy	encourages	a	greater	centralization	of	control	within	the	Foundation	itself	or	extends	a	level	of	autonomy	for	national	networks	might	also	be	significant	for	the	development	of	regional	initiatives.	In	terms	of	political	handling,	centralization	may	reduce	the	significance	of	officially	controlled	Heads	of	Network	and	increase	access	to	funding	for	some	actors.	On	the	other	hand,	the	opposite	may	also	be	true	depending	upon	the	priorities	for	action	determined	by	the	Board	of	Governors	and	the	level	of	access	for	civil	society	actors.	Political	and	governmental	actors	will	continue	to	play	an	important	role	in	the	ALF	and	this	is	something	which	is	inherently	tied	to	the	debates	over	civil	society	and	the	political	nature	of	regional	developments.	This	should	neither	be	overlooked	nor	dismissed	but	instead	should	itself	be	understood	as	a	process	of	development.			
The	Civil	Societalization	of	EuroMed	Politics	Critiques	of	the	ALF	may	easily	arise	from	normative	prescriptions	but	they	would	risk	missing	the	inherent	(and	important)	political	basis	of	the	ALF.	A	reconsideration	of	the	ALF	first	requires	an	approach	that	can	maintain	the	fundamental	link	between	culture	and	politics	rather	than	dividing	them	into	separate	categories.	This	section	will	take	a	step	towards	this	goal	by	contextualizing	the	ALF	and	the	Euro-Mediterranean	within	a	global	politics	which	opens	new	roles	for	local,	regional,	national	and	transnational	actors.	Before	discussing	the	‘civil	societalization	of	politics’	it	would	be	beneficial	to	
	 135	
very	briefly	consider	the	concept	of	‘civil	societalization’	(CS)	as	a	social	phenomenon.	CS	appears	as	a	social	process	through	which	the	development	of	a	distinct	public	sphere	can	occur.	David	McCrone	(2007),	for	example,	argues	that	CS	is	a	process	of	social	change	that	occurs	in	a	particular	time	and	space	and	produces	effects	of	national	identity	construction	through	the	restructuring	of	social	relations.	As	a	result,	the	process	of	constituting	a	‘civil	society’	leads	to	a	parallel	process	of	identity	construction,	in	this	case	nationalism	and	national	citizenship.	For	this	reason	organizational	and	liberal	approaches	towards	analyzing	civil	society	do	not	wholly	capture	its	significance.	As	McCrone	argues:	“civil	society	is	more	than	market	relations;	it	is,	if	anything,	the	'cause'	of	national	feeling,	not	its	outcome”	(McCrone	2007).	This	sociological	understanding	evokes	a	constructive	role	for	civil	society	in	generating	common	values	and	feelings	similar	to	Cohen	and	Arato’s	(1992)	‘politics	of	identity’	whereby	civil	society	effectively	acts	upon	itself.	However	rather	than	focusing	on	issues	of	autonomy	(from	political	society)	or	internal	democratization,	national	identification	is	central	and	may	be	more	of	a	by-product	of	existing	social	relations.		Civil	societalization	has	impacted	upon	politics	by	opening	up	new	avenues	for	political	contestation.	The	CS	of	politics	can	be	seen	as	an	element	of	political	transformation	associated	with	the	globalization	of	a	normative	discourse	based	around	human	rights,	the	increasing	significance	attributed	to	the	activities	of	transnational	actors	and	the	corresponding	scale	shifts	in	governance	practices	in	order	to	incorporate	them.	Gerard	Delanty	and	Chris	Rumford	(2007),	in	their	original	discussion	of	civil	societalization,	point	to	the	increasing	impact	of	transnational	relations	and	social	actors	on	governance	but	also	in	the	construction	of	a	global	(normative)	culture.	The	concept	of	civil	societalization	highlights	the	extent	to	which	this	culture	is	subsequently	capable	of	impacting	upon	politics	at	various	scales	of	governance.	As	such;	“…the	‘civil	societalization’	of	politics	signifies	a	commonality	of	political	forms	which	link	the	local	and	the	global,	the	national	and	the	transnational,	and	mobilizes	a	range	of	actors	around	common	political	codes:	competitiveness,	sustainability,	personhood	rights	and	social	justice”	(Delanty	and	Rumford	2007,	421).	Significantly,	the	extension	of	CS	into	the	fields	of	international	relations	and	
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foreign	policy	shows	that	one	of	the	outcomes	of	the	various	debates	surrounding	civil	society	and	democratic	governance	is	the	focus	on	organizational	strategies.	As	a	result,	governments	may	mobilize	transnational	civil	society	actors,	or	actors	representative	of	a	global	civil	society	(Ibid).	The	inherent	legitimacy	attributed	to	these	actors	can	then	be	linked	directly	to	official	policies.	An	important	question	that	remains,	however,	is	following	this	change	in	organizational	and	mobilization	strategy,	to	what	extent	does	the	CS	of	politics	also	produce	or	support	the	construction	of	particular	imaginations	and	identities?	As	a	strategy,	CS	develops	around	external	forms	of	legitimacy	that	conform	to	universalized	values	and	international	agreements	–	a	normative	global	culture.	The	CS	of	politics	infers	a	process	of	transformation	in	state-society	relations	in	response	to	which	political	actors	are	faced	with	new	strategic	considerations	regarding	the	adoption	of	new	organizational	forms	and	particular	discourses	of	legitimacy.	However	this	is	not	the	same	as	instrumental	use.	Instrumental	uses	of	human	rights	and/or	democratization	in	the	pursuit	of	economic	gain	(as	one	example)	evoke	the	legitimacy	of	these	discourses	without	applying	the	criteria.	On	the	other	hand,	the	CS	of	politics	leads	political	actors	to	organize	around	particular	discourses	or	issues	and	to	mobilize	networked	actors.	The	extension	of	governance	programmes	across	the	Euro-Mediterranean	plays	an	important	role	in	changing	how	regional	governments	relate	not	only	to	other	actors	in	the	region	and	the	EU	but	also	potentially	to	their	own	constituents	and	societies.	But	even	governance	programmes	work	on	the	back	of	a	transnational	and	globalizing	organization	of	power.	The	growing	significance	of	transnational	actors,	including	migrants	and	civil	society	actors,	necessitates	a	transformation	in	the	way	that	governments	relate	to	civil	societies	and	social	actors.	Promoting	opportunities	and	opening	new	spaces	for	cooperation	across	the	region	is	an	underdeveloped	but	key	aspect	of	EU	programmes.	At	an	extreme	end	the	extension	of	the	‘civil’	beyond	the	nation-state	and	across	borders	could	produce	a	sense	of	citizenship	in	a	broader	but	still	exclusive	sense.	As	the	previous	section	attested,	transnational	civil	society	actors	are	relatively	scarce	in	the	Euro-Mediterranean,	however	as	Pertti	Joenniemi	has	argued	in	relation	to	the	Nordic	region,	increasing	plurality	and	
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the	promotion	of	non-state	actors	indirectly,	or	implicitly,	favors	the	‘civil’	(Joenniemi	2003,	236).	With	this	in	mind	it	would	be	useful	to	consider	developments	in	the	‘Euro-Mediterranean’	through	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	and	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean.			
The	ALF	and	the	‘Euro’-Mediterranean	“Now	we	want	to	have	much	closer	relationships	with	civil	society	organizations,	shifting	the	focus	from	relationships	with	the	authorities	to	relationships	with	civil	society.	The	time	has	come	to	be	more	ambitious	in	offering	a	more	solid	basis	for	our	relationship.”	(Fule	2011)		The	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	has	evolved	through	a	changing	regional	and	institutional	context	within	the	Mediterranean	from	the	Euro-Mediterranean	Process	(EMP)	to	the	European	Neighborhood	Policy	(ENP)	and	now	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean	(UfM).	EU	policy	towards	the	Mediterranean	region	took	on	a	novel	form	with	the	Barcelona	declaration	in	1995.	At	that	point	the	European	Union	began	to	negotiate	a	path	influenced	by	a	concern	for	development	and	democratization.	The	various	shortcomings	of	the	Barcelona	Process	and	Euro-Mediterranean	Process	have	been	well	discussed	and	documented.	However	the	multilateralism	of	the	EMP	and	its	comprehensive	approach	towards	regional	integration	as	a	response	to	the	constraints	of	economic	globalization	and	neoliberalism	had	the	benefit	of	emphasizing	long-term	transformation	based	on	social	and	political	cohesion.	In	the	context	of	on-going	frustration	with	the	EMP,	the	ALF	was	recognized	as	being	able	to	contribute	“decisively	to	a	sense	of	joint	ownership”	in	virtue	of	its	being	truly	multilateral	and	yet	independent	of	the	EMP	partners	(Pardo	and	Zemer	2005,	67).	But	on	this	basis	it	could	also	not	maintain	independence	from	political	influences.	The	criticism	leveled	at	the	ALF	by	Helle	Malmvig	(2005),	and	echoed	by	Richard	Youngs	(2006),	points	towards	the	influence	that	governmental	actors	have	in	selecting	who	participates	in	national	networks,	potentially	either	co-opting	Heads	of	Network	or	handing	the	work	to	ministries	and	thus	placing	political	actors	at	the	center	of	the	cultural	forum	(Youngs	2006;	Malmvig	2005,	360).	This	scenario	places	limits	on	the	ability	of	the	ALF	to	engage	independently	with	civil	society	actors	and	promote	greater	horizontal	linkages	across	the	region.	In	addition,	the	movement	towards	the	Union	for	the	
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Mediterranean	means	a	new	context	in	the	form	of	a	more	functional	and	project-oriented	framework.		The	transition	from	the	EMP	to	the	UfM	was	an	important	one	in	that	they	mark	two	different	modes	of	cooperation.	The	EMP	is	based	upon	a	more	comprehensive	and	‘communitarian’	approach,	whereas	the	UfM	is	primarily	intergovernmental	and	project-based.	In	the	context	of	the	UfM	the	perceived	shortcomings	of	the	ALF	may	become	more	explicit	but	in	this	framework	it	also	becomes	the	main	representative	of	culture	(Balta	2009,	298).	Roberto	Aliboni	(2009,	5)	reveals	the	substantial	impact	of	this	transition	on	the	ALF	as	it	reflects	a	broader	compromise	between	the	development	of	socio-cultural	issues	and	European	interests:		
	What	is	currently	happening	to	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	–	the	network	for	intercultural	relations	–	is	an	example	of	such	compromise.	The	Foundation’s	Board	of	Governors,	which	is	composed	of	Member	States,	has	invited	the	executive	boards	to	cut	a	number	of	initiatives	which	are	considered	too	"political".	Before	publication	of	an	inquiry	conducted	in	2009	on	perceptions	of	“the	other"	in	the	Euro-Mediterranean	area,	a	series	of	substantial	changes	were	requested	–	to	put	it	bluntly,	a	degree	of	censorship	was	used.		What	is	currently	happening	to	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	–	the	network	for	intercultural	relations	–	is	an	example	of	such	compromise.	The	Foundation’s	Board	of	Governors,	which	is	composed	of	Member	States,	has	invited	the	executive	boards	to	cut	a	number	of	initiatives	which	are	considered	too	"political".	Before	publication	of	an	inquiry	conducted	in	2009	on	perceptions	of	“the	other"	in	the	Euro-Mediterranean	area,	a	series	of	substantial	changes	were	requested	–	to	put	it	bluntly,	a	degree	of	censorship	was	used	(Aliboni	2009,	5).	Censorship	entails	a	broad	consideration	of	the	framing	and	context	of	issues	in	order	to	then	reduce	the	potential	impact	of	any	statement	and	bring	it	back	in	line	with	what	has	been	deemed	acceptable.	What	this	also	entails	is	a	considered	eye	for	what	is	recognized	as	legitimate	and	a	highly	selective	appropriation	of	normative	language,	such	as	‘good	governance,’	‘participation’	etc.	(Scholte	2001,	21).	In	terms	of	regional	development	Aliboni’s	analysis	reveals	a	change	of	focus	from	the	overtly	normative	concerns	of	the	EMP.	This	is	reflected	in	the	EU’s	joint	communication	on	the	European	Neighborhood	Policy	wherein	the	UfM	is	endorsed	as	a	complement	to	the	bilateral	approach	of	the	
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ENP	by	allowing	Action	Plans	to	focus	on	fewer	priorities	(COM(2011)	303,	18).	The	development	of	new	and	existing	cultural	initiatives	is	notably	absent,	even	within	discussion	of	the	promotion	of	‘partnership	between	people.’	What	is	more,	the	UfM,	while	offering	substantial	room	for	intergovernmental	cooperation,	places	the	relationship	between	EU	member	states	and	southern	Mediterranean	states	on	a	path	which	reinforces	an	inherent	power	imbalance	by	re-establishing	the	EU	as	a	regional	power	broker.	Following	from	Aliboni’s	insight,	then,	it	is	possible	that	the	ALF	could	take	on	the	role	of	a	legitimating	actor	giving	credence	to	member	states	and	the	UfM	by	illustrating	a	material	role	for	civil	society.	However,	while	normative	criteria	may	have	been	‘watered	down’	a	liberal	model	of	economic	and	political	development	remains	implicit	in	the	functional	framework	of	integration.	In	some	ways,	there	was	an	instant	fallback	to	pre-Arab	Spring	multilateralism	(Behr	2013,	80).	This	functional	–	project-oriented	-	direction	posits	a	uniquely	‘EU’ropean	brand	of	region-building	in	the	Mediterranean	which	removes	the	question	of	reform	from	cooperation	-	“realistically	or	cynically”	(Aliboni	2008,	12).	However,	given	the	relative	fragility	of	regional	governments,	continued	economic	struggle	and	lack	of	political	will	it	appears	unlikely	that	the	EU	will	continue	to	rely	on	multilateral	solutions	in	its	relations	with	the	EuroMediterranean	(Behr	2013,	80-81).	Instead,	the	inclusion	of	civil	society	will	–	in	the	short	term	–	teeter	between	the	continued	existence	of	these	regional	frameworks	and	the	revitalization	of	old	policies		with	the	addition	of	new	instruments	and	strategic	direction.		 The	ALF	reflects	the	political	salience	of	social	and	cultural	issues	and	the	transnationalization	of	civil	society	actors	(whether	through	mobility	or	communication	technology)	creates	new	problems	and	opportunities	for	governments.	There	is	no	doubt	that	national	governments	play	an	important	role	in	the	ALF	from	participating	in	the	Board	of	Governors	to	working	with	national	networks.	In	both	of	these	locations	they	can	exert	influence	and	mobilize	support	for	their	own	interests.	During	negotiations	over	the	most	recent	Programme	and	Guidelines,	the	Egyptian	government	rejected	the	first	draft	on	the	basis	that	it	was	too	political,	purportedly	pointing	towards	the	language	of	reform	and	democratization	(a	topic	of	some	controversy	given	the	
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events	unfolding	within	the	country).	Politicization	is	a	tricky	issue.	When	it	comes	to	political	issues,	the	ALF	headquarters	(ALF	HQ)	is	careful	to	tread	on	neutral	ground	in	order	to	avoid	controversy	or	antagonism	amongst	networks	or	member	states.	This	was	evident	during	the	events	of	the	'Arab	Spring'	during	which	the	ALF	HQ	expressly	avoided	taking	part	in	events	or	taking	sides	in	the	media,	despite	the	urging	to	do	so	by	some	member	organizations.	In	contrast,	however,	overtly	political	programmes	do	exist	and	are	an	important	part	of	the	work	that	the	ALF	undertakes.	So	whereas	the	Egyptian	government	found	the	language	of	the	negotiations	too	political	it	fervently	supports	inherently	political	programmes	such	as	Arab	Voices.	A	programme	initiated	through	the	UK	national	network,	Arab	Voices	has	quickly	become	a	success	in	bringing	together	young	people	from	across	the	region	to	debate	political,	cultural	and	social	issues.	Interestingly,	with	regard	to	this	same	programme,	we	can	also	highlight	the	other	area	of	government	involvement.	Arab	Voices	was	initiated	as	a	project	under	the	UK	national	network.	However,	growing	interest	from	the	UK	government	led	to	the	British	Council	taking	over	coordination	of	the	programme	and	taking	control	of	funding.5	These	observations	help	to	reveal	the	extent	to	which	governmental	actors	have	taken	on	social	and	cultural	issues	based	-	at	least	in	part	-	on	their	transnational	impact.	But	it	also	raises	the	question	of	the	direction	of	development	for	national	networks	and	the	extent	of	involvement	of	established	cultural	institutions	with	close	links	to	national	governments.		The	ALF’s	‘realignment	strategy’	supposes	a	more	crucial	role	for	the	ALF	within	the	region	and	–	taken	next	to	the	EU’s	PfDSP	–	the	future	shape	of	the	Euro-Mediterranean	region.	Despite	the	relatively	meager	budget	of	the	organization	the	confluence	of	opinion	within	the	EU	commission	and	the	ALF	would	suggest	recognition	of	the	significance	of	the	ALF	for	preserving	and	continuing	to	build	a	‘Euro-Mediterranean’	space.	It	is	especially	significant	in	consideration	of	the	content	of	the	UfM,	which	prioritizes	economic	development	and	political	cooperation	at	the	expense	of	social	issues	(Dimitrovova	2010).	Similarly,	alongside	the	revamped	European	Neighborhood	Partnership	Instrument	(ENPI)	the	ALF	complements	the	bilateral	negotiations	on	technical,																																																									5	Interview	with	UK	Head	of	Network	12th	September	2012	
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political	and	economic	issues.	When	it	was	first	proposed	the	autonomy	of	the	ALF	offered	it	a	unique	standing,	and	led	to	suggestions	that	a	new	–	post-colonial	-	agenda	might	be	possible	within	the	Mediterranean	(Nicolaidis	and	Nicolaidis	2004,	13).	This	would	place	cultural	alongside	political	and	economic	interests	when	determining	regional	strategies.	However	the	ALF’s	new	Strategy	and	Programme	Guidelines	2012-2014	explicitly	reflects	recent	EU	joint	communications	in	furthering	variable	geometry	as	the	functional	logic	behind	regional	development.	The	ALF	document	declares	as	one	of	its	priorities:	“Applying	a	strategy	of	‘variable	geometry’	to	act	complementarily	at	the	regional,	sub-regional,	or	national	level,	according	[sic]	the	variety	of	scenarios	coming	into	view,	and	the	priorities	of	the	ALF	donors,	which	cannot	be	handled	with	a	one	fits	all	policy”	(ALF	Strategy	2011,	11).	In	this	sense,	the	ALF	can	increasingly	be	seen	within	an	extension	of	EU	patterns	of	governance	over	the	region	allowing	for	a	highly	differentiated	set	of	relations	to	develop.	Moreover,	the	strategic	realignment	of	the	ALF	requires	a	reconsideration	of	the	autonomy	of	the	Foundation	in	relation	to	the	EU	commission	given	not	only	the	replication	of	language	but	also	the	explicit	statement	of	intent	to	prioritize	the	interests	of	donors,	the	EU	commission	being	the	largest	thereof.	This	means	also	reconsidering	the	regional	character	of	the	Foundation	in	light	of	a	changing	institutional	environment	and	how	the	legacy	of	past	regional	frameworks	continues	to	influence	the	ALF’s	identity.	The	ALF	supports	the	development	of	a	dialogue	on	Euro-Mediterranean	issues	and	identities	that	includes	civil	society	groups	across	the	region.	Through	various	regional	programmes	the	ALF	offers	a	platform	to	groups	and	individuals	who	might	otherwise	be	excluded	from	regional	developments.	This	approach	complements	that	of	the	UfM	which	targets	private	actors	and	economic	interests	in	building	regional	projects.	While	EU	policy	towards	southern	Mediterranean	countries	previously	consisted	of	a	strategy	towards	region-building	it	is	also	infiltrated	by	a	multitude	of	interests	and	discourses	from	EU	member	states,	EU	officials	and	institutions	and	officials	from	non-member	states	who	are	variously	influenced	by	global	politics	and	discourses.	Strengthening	the	civil	sphere	through	official	discourses	and	actions	is	a	key	aspect	of	engaging	in	complex	international	networks	and	building	relations	
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across	states.	To	the	extent	that	private	actors	and	informal	networks	become	more	important	in	regional	policies	there	is	also	a	corresponding	globalization	of	the	region	as	transnational	actors	more	or	less	rooted	in	local	settings	take	on	greater	significance.	As	a	consequence;	“the	‘civil’	appears	to	unfold	in	space	being	opened	with	states	that	enable	such	a	trend,	either	explicitly	supporting	it	or	simply	allowing	it	to	happen	by	taking	an	increasingly	international	approach	in	order	to	cope	with	the	various	challenges	of	globalization	(Joenniemi	2003,	236).	Civil	society	development	in	the	Euro-Mediterranean	has	occurred	under	the	supervision	or	ambivalence	of	state	actors	where	the	role	of	the	government	is	to	approve	and	facilitate	the	development	of	such	cooperation.	The	ALF	maintains	a	core	element	of	region-building	by	linking	identity	and	culture	to	a	process	of	political	transformation.	As	such,	it	also	represents	an	attempt	to	question	the	identities	and	relations	within	the	region	through	intercultural	dialogue.	However,	whether	this	regional	character	remains	important	rests	on	the	evolving	strategic	relationship	between	the	ALF	and	the	European	Commission.	Though	practical	changes	to	EU	policy	have	been	minimal	(Bicchi	2015)	the	institutional	environment	has	been	transformed.	Where	this	is	likely	to	affect	relations	is	in	the	EU’s	desire	to	constitute	a	more	formidable	global	presence	with	a	clear	and	strategic	cultural	identity	and	policy.	This	means	an	evaluation	of	how	different	institutions	and	frameworks	can	contribute	to	this	goal.	The	next	section	reconsiders	the	changing	meaning	and	role	of	intercultural	dialogue	in	this	context.		
Promoting	intercultural	dialogue	The	civil	societalization	of	politics	infers	a	limited	form	of	intercultural	dialogue	as	a	result	of	politicisation	and	strategic	interaction.	It	raises	the	possibility	that	dialogue	will	be	restricted	on	a	conceptual	level	in	its	definition	and	objectives	and	in	its	potential	for	exclusion.	Intercultural	dialogue	is	also	potentially	threatened	by	the	nature	of	cultural	itself.	Culture	can	be	equally	misunderstood	and	can	be	used	to	promote	the	establishment	of	boundaries	between	interlocutors.	In	this	sense	intercultural	dialogue	should	not	rest	on	culture	but	on	civility	(Hélé	Béji	2008).	However,	the	ALF’s	intercultural	strategy	rests	on	ideological	baggage.	
	 143	
The	concept	has	become	an	important	concept	for	debate	within	many	international	organizations	–	such	as	UNESCO,	the	Council	of	Europe,	the	EU	–	and	a	novel	approach	in	place	of	multiculturalism.	In	many	ways	it	has	become	a	concept	around	which	the	politics	of	cultural	diversity	is	being	organized.	At	the	same	time	it	is	in	no	way	immune	from	political	influence.	The	basis	of	intercultural	dialogue	in	the	Euro-Mediterranean	is	summed	up	briefly	by	the	EU	Commission	as	a	process	through	which	peaceful	coexistence	is	made	possible,	as	opposed	to	the	transformation	of	either	category	of	Self	or	Other	(European	Commission	2003,	Annex	1).	This	‘cosy	antagonism’	(Bauman	1991,	53)	fails	to	account	for	the	power	inequalities	between	the	different	regions	and	cultures	in	question.	The	primary	location	for	cultural	representation	among	southern	Mediterranean	states	remains	located	within	the	state	apparatus	and	not	amongst	the	populations	(Del	Sarto	2005).	This	practice,	thus,	territorializes	the	notion	of	culture	within	a	frame	to	which	it	is	not	naturally	limited	(Hannerz	1991,	113).	Relations	between	southern	Mediterranean	states	continue	to	focus	on	boundary-setting	and	competition.	Political	anxiety	over	border	controls	is	something	with	which	civil	societies	across	the	region	continue	to	battle	as	evidenced	by	the	inability	of	Palestinian	bloggers	to	obtain	visas	to	attend	the	Arab	Bloggers	conference	held	in	Tunisia	in	August	2011	(Abrougui	2011).	In	opposition	to	the	position	expressed	by	the	EU	Commission,	a	formative	cultural	dialogue	would	have	to	be	based	upon	the	re-drawing	of	boundaries	and	rigid	cultural	categories	(Del	Sarto	2005,	321).	However,	one	of	the	fundamental	problems	linked	to	the	intercultural	strategy	of	the	ALF	in	practice	is	conferring	upon	government	officials	the	ability	to	speak	in	the	name	of	specific	cultures:	“Thus,	while	serving	as	just	another	tool	to	strengthen	state	authority	and	to	promote	government	policies,	the	inter-cultural	dialogue	becomes	politicized,	thus	failing	to	address	the	objectives	it	was	meant	to	address	in	the	first	place”	(Ibid).	This	limiting	influence	can	be	seen	in	the	ability	of	national	ministries	to	effectively	regulate	national	networks	from	the	determination	of	membership	to	the	naming	of	Heads	of	Network.		The	ALF’s	‘intercultural	strategy’	goes	beyond	promoting	dialogue	by	imposing	a	set	of	normative	goals	and	values.	Rather	than	engaging	with	the	‘other’	the	practice	of	intercultural	dialogue	manages	the	relationship	between	
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‘self’	and	‘other’	preserving	the	dominance	and	unilateralism	of	EU	policy	(Dimitrovova	2010).	In	this	regard,	the	ALF’s	mission	has	been	viewed	as	hiding	strategic	interests	within	a	process	of	socialization	towards	common	values	(Bouris	2011,	98).	But	it	also	builds	upon	the	original	recommendations	of	the	High	Level	Advisory	group	in	2003	which	suggests	that	intercultural	dialogue;	“must	be	within	a	context	of	respect	for	fundamental	rights,	and	may	then	also	become	a	powerful	vehicle	of	democratization”	(Report	by	the	High	Level	Advisory	Group	2003,	11).	This	approach	would	posit	the	institutionalization	of	intercultural	dialogue	as	an	instrument	for	democratization.	This	is	potentially	problematic	in	the	work	of	the	ALF.	As	an	intergovernmental	and	multilateral	institution	the	ALF	involves	actors	both	within	–	UfM	member	states	and	regional	organizations	such	as	the	Arab	League	-	and	beyond	the	region	–	UNESCO,	Council	of	Europe,	UN	Alliance	of	Civilizations	-	through	partnerships	and	engagement	in	projects.	The	agreement	from	the	Tunis	Exchange	Forum	on	the	triadic	relationship	between	intercultural	dialogue,	citizenship	and	human	rights	reflects	a	conception	of	the	region	more	amenable	to	the	realization	of	a	multi-leveled	dialogue	that	would	engage	social	and	political	actors	at	various	scales.	In	this	formation,	the	concept	of	citizenship	functions	as	the	crucial	connection	that	implies	an	increased	responsibility	on	the	part	of	both	governments	and	civil	societies.	However,	in	contrast,	the	pursuance	of	an	agenda	in	accordance	with	democratization	strategies	introduces	greater	politicisation,	which	alongside	continual	budget	concerns	may	mean	a	greater	role	for	the	ALF	in	regional	development	but	reduced	independent	capacity	to	support	civil	society	actors.	In	this	sense,	intercultural	dialogue	comes	with	its	own	set	of	political	baggage	–	it	is	focused	on	the	promotion	and	contestation	of	particular	political	values	rather	than	the	development	of	a	true	dialogue,	which	would	require	a	more	natural	space	for	different	cultures	to	encounter	each	other.		However,	the	ALF’s	intercultural	strategy,	taken	in	the	context	of	the	EU’s	actions	following	the	Arab	Spring,	also	implies	a	subtle	transformation	of	the	Foundation’s	objectives	in	the	post-Arab	Spring	context.	As	Perthes	(2011)	notes,	these	events	were	a	considerable	challenge	to	the	EU’s	foreign	policy	capacities.	It	is	in	response	to	these	and	subsequent	events	that	the	European	
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institutions	have	embarked	on	clarifying	a	Global	Strategy	for	Foreign	Affairs	and	a	Strategy	for	Culture	in	the	EU’s	external	relations.	The	latter	Joint	Communication	foresees	the	use	of	existing	instruments	to	promote	cultural	objectives	cross-cutting	economic,	political	and	social	spheres	–	dialogue,	economic	growth	and	heritage	(JOIN(2016)	29).	This	implies	the	potential	of	a	centralization	of	cultural	instruments	based	on	region	separated	into	Enlargment	Policy,	European	Neighbourhood	Policy	and	Development	Cooperation.	It	also	specifically	identifies	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	as	a	source	of	promoting	cooperation,	dialogue	and	mobility	for	“new	cultural	players	and	audiences”	(Ibid,	11).	The	commitment	to	operating	as	part	of	a	‘variable	geometry’	has	already	meant	adapting	to	the	European	Neighborhood	Partnership	Instrument	and	moving	away	gradually	from	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean.	Negotiations	over	a	strategic	approach	to	culture	in	the	EU’s	external	relations	may	encourage	the	ALF	to	pursue	an	agenda	that	complements	the	economic	and	political	interests	negotiated	bilaterally	between	the	EU	and	partner	countries.	In	this	way	it	is	feasible	that	the	ALF	becomes	a	‘strategic	partner’	(Ibid,	14)	to	a	European	cultural	diplomacy	–	which	reconfirms	the	inherent	limitations	of	intercultural	dialogue	as	a	genuine	ambition.		
Conclusion	As	a	regional	actor	the	ALF	highlights	the	interplay	of	different	approaches	to	the	region	supported	by	EU	policy	makers	and	regional	governments.	Through	an	increased	role	for	(and	significance	of)	transnational	actors	in	the	region	there	is	a	corresponding	‘civil	societalization	of	politics’	through	which	common	political	codes	such	as	human	rights	and	intercultural	dialogue	have	become	grounds	for	contesting	political	issues.	This	marks	a	process	of	political	transformation	but	also	a	strategic	shift	in	policy-making	towards	the	mobilization	and	support	of	civil	society	actors	who	beget	legitimacy	not	normally	bestowed	upon	governmental	actors.	In	the	context	of	variable	geometry	it	can	be	said	that	the	ALF	is	undergoing	a	role	enhancement	as	it	establishes	closer	links	to	EU	policies.	However	it	also	reflects	ambivalence	within	the	EU	towards	the	role	of	culture	and	between	the	logic	of	functionality	versus	norm	promotion.	It	is	possible	to	differentiate	the	position	of	the	ALF	between	the	variable	geometry	of	the	region,	whereby	it	effectively	institutionalizes	an	intercultural	dialogue	in	
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accordance	with	the	political	objectives	of	the	EU	commission	and	national	governments,	and	as	the	central	hub	of	a	network	of	political,	cultural	and	civil	society	actors	across	the	region.	This	alternative	understanding	of	the	ALF	points	toward	the	importance	of	political	strategy	in	relation	to	the	underlying	influence	of	normative	models.	It	also	posits	a	more	complex	identity	for	the	ALF.	The	approach	taken	in	this	paper	opens	the	door	to	a	subtler	understanding	of	influence	and	questions	the	political	significance	of	transnational	links	and	interactions	among	elements	of	regional	civil	societies	when	subject	to	strategic	positioning.		
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Chapter	6:	ALF	Networks	–	political	boundaries,	circumscribed	
transnationalism	and	belonging		The	development	of	space	for	civil	society	and	networking	within	the	European	Union	has	been	based	upon	the	working	logic	of	the	EU,	which	is	respect	for	the	national	identities	of	member	states.	In	practice,	what	this	implies	is	that	European	space	is	divided	along	national	lines	rather	than	sub-national	and	regional	diversities	(Kastoryano	2003,	80).	The	same	logic	applies	for	the	construction	of	a	EuroMediterranean	space	where	states	are	even	more	protective	of	their	status	as	primary	actors	and	may	be	inclined	to	exert	control	over	participation	in	regional	networks.	The	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	has	a	difficult	job	in	this	context	–	promoting	identity	politics	without	the	reference	points	of	already	existing	integrative	measures	and	solidarities	as	in	the	national	context.	Participation	in	ALF	networks	produces	a	multitude	of	transnational	interactions	between	different	cultures	and	identities	that	exist	within	the	EuroMediterranean	space.	The	arrangement	of	these	networks	affirms	the	primacy	of	national	space	as	the	context	for	political	and	social	action.	However,	it	does	two	additional	things:	it	suggests	the	possibility	of	a	space	for	cultural	integration	and	appeals	to	the	representation	of	sub-national	groupings.	These	different	possibilities	make	it	important	to	examine	the	reality	of	networking	as	a	member	of	the	organization.	The	‘circumscribed’	transnationalism	promoted	in	cultural	policy	discourse	may	work	to	organize	the	scope	of	cultural	networking	and	legitimize	particular	participants	over	others	but	it	also	resituates	the	participants	internationally.		The	Euro-Mediterranean	is	a	political	construction	according	to	territorial,	symbolic	and	institutional	approaches	(Jones	2011).	Civil	society	actors	are	integrated	into	the	construction	of	the	region	through	the	work	of	regional	bodies	and	institutions.	In	so	doing	the	Euro-Mediterranean	space	is	also	ambiguously	put	forth	as	the	basis	of	a	new	(or	the	recovery	of	an	ancient)	transnational	imaginary	(Wilson	and	Dissanayake	1996).	This	experience	is	constructed	through	the	practice	of	exchange	and	interaction	between	political,	social,	cultural	and	economic	actors.	Ideas	of	the	what	the	Euro-Mediterranean	
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space	means	among	participants	of	regional	activities	waver	between	an	historical	and	physical	understanding	of	the	Mediterranean,	dominated	by	Europe,	and	the	experience	of	moving,	communicating	and	exchanging	experiences	across	the	region.	This	chapter	explores	the	role	that	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	(ALF)	plays	in	developing	a	limited	form	of	transnational	engagement	within	the	Euro-Mediterranean	space	and	the	way	in	which	it	frames	the	work	of	its	members.	It	will	also	briefly	consider	how	these	members	exercise	this	imaginary	and	how	it	reflects	the	various	constraints	imposed	across	regional	activities.	The	actorness	of	the	ALF	is	important	but	it	is	also	influenced	by	the	identities,	goals	and	values	that	member	organizations	bring	to	it.	Moreover,	the	evaluation	of	networks	raises	interesting	insights	into	programming	and	its	effect	on	network	centrality	and	density	prior	to	the	Arab	Spring	and	the	shifting	objectives	following	the	momentous	events.	As	such,	the	analysis	highlights	the	need	for	change	to	the	ALF’s	working	practices	and	its	need	to	bolster	and	prioritize	networking	across	Southern	networks	by	developing	programmes	that	address	the	needs	of	these	countries,	more	targeted	funding	and	by	adapting	requirements	on	the	inclusion	of	Northern	networks	in	projects.	This	chapter	makes	three	essential	contributions	to	the	thesis:	it	demonstrates	the	role	that	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	plays	in	shaping	transnational	practices.	Organizations	are,	in	fact,	important	arbiters	in	the	establishment	of	transnational	networks.	The	Foundation	has	been	successful	in	producing	significant	levels	of	cooperation	across	national	networks.	Though	there	has	been	some	overrepresentation	of	Europe-based	networks	due	to	imbalances	to	resources,	this	is	being	countered	through	new	regional	initiatives	and	a	pivot	towards	promoting	networking	between	non-European	networks	in	order	to	balance	the	capacity	of	networks	on	either	shore.	However,	this	role	also	includes	balancing	the	interests	of	governments	with	the	objective	of	increased	mobility	and	access.	The	second	contribution	is	in	demonstrating	how	the	concerns	of	both	the	EU	and	national	governments	influence	either	the	shaping	of	objectives	(in	the	case	of	the	EU)	or	the	outcome	of	decisions	(through	veto	or	limiting	mobility	across	national	boundaries).	At	the	same	time,	given	that	the	ALF	is	permitted	considerable	leeway	in	a	country	like	Egypt	where	
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freedom	of	association	continues	to	be	problematic	suggests	that	the	Foundation	has	political	significance	for	governments	as	well	as	participants.	The	final	section	contributes	a	view	from	participants	–	a	feature	that	will	follow	into	chapter	7	by	exploring	the	2013	Civil	Forum.	Thus,	the	overview	of	ALF	networks	in	this	chapter	reveals	how	cultural	networks	are	the	product(s)	of	organizational	environment,	the	ability	of	states	to	exert	control	over	physical	space	and	the	meanings	and	objectives	attributed	to	networking	by	participants.		The	cultivation	of	transnational	practices	is	essential	to	the	realization	of	such	a	space	and	it	has	been	put	forth	as	an	important	part	of	the	ongoing	development	of	regional	integration	under	each	of	the	political,	economic	and	cultural	baskets	originally	delineating	the	framework	of	the	EuroMediterranean	Partnership.	Within	the	cultural	basket,	however,	the	developments	have	been	scarce	and	have	certainly	not	lived	up	to	the	grand	expectations	of	the	Barcelona	Process.	As	the	most	significant	achievement	in	this	area,	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	provides	a	unique	example	of	how	the	imperatives	of	multilateralism	as	well	as	political	objectives	such	as	security	have	come	to	shape	a	particular	set	of	transnational	practices	even	within	the	scope	of	cultural	cooperation.	At	the	same	time,	the	analysis	raises	several	questions	regarding	the	concept	of	transnationalism	itself	and	it	will	be	argued	that	the	normative	content	of	much	transnational	theorizing	can	be	tempered	through	a	closer	examination	of	specific	examples,	such	as	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation,	that	demonstrate	clearly	the	role	that	states	and	regional	governance	plays	in	promoting	and	determining	how	transnational	practices	develop.	So	while	this	may	appear	to	be	an	inherently	limiting	case	the	purpose	is	to	demonstrate	the	contingency	of	transnational	dynamics	and	their	dependence	on	different	political	actors	and	opportunity	structures	in	a	regional	context.		
Organizations	as	a	meso-link	The	role	of	organizations	in	the	processes	and	practices	of	transnationalism	is	an	interesting	field	as	it	raises	several	questions	central	to	the	core	debates	in	transnational	research	regarding	the	relationship	between	transnational	actors	and	other	political	actors	and	institutions,	including	states	and	regional	governance.	According	to	Pries	“transnational	organizations	are	characterized	by	
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their	decentralised	resources	and,	at	the	same	time	and	opposite	to	multinational	organizations,	intense	coordination”	(2008,	16).	Such	organizations	engage	in	border-crossing	practices	while	stipulating	strict	membership	rules,	structures	and	display	‘more	or	less	explicit	goals	and	intentions’	(Ibid).	In	so	doing	they	unify	actors	into	broader	networks	of	common	affinities,	political	orientations	or	interests	providing	connections	that	individual	actors	may	be	unable	to	attain	by	themselves.	In	this	way,	organizations	can	be	essential	to	the	process	of	developing	transnational	practices	or	sustaining	practices	through	the	exchange	of	resources.	In	practice	there	are	potential	issues	with	this	definition	of	the	transnational	organization.	The	distinction	of	being	both	decentralised	and	highly	coordinated	does	have	the	benefit	of	providing	an	unbiased,	non-normative	understanding	of	the	most	basic	characteristics	of	a	transnational	organization.	On	the	other	hand,	it	limits	us	to	a	distinctly	institutional	definition	of	the	transnational.	This	has	its	benefits	for	establishing	a	distinct	field	of	research,	however	it	risks	obfuscating	from	the	relationships	that	determine	particular	institutional	structures.	When	evaluating	specific	examples,	it	also	limits	the	definition	to	separate	boxes	ticked	off	accordingly.	In	reality,	organizations	display	a	mixture	of	both	centralization	and	decentralization	depending	largely	on	the	sources	and	means	of	funding.	Secondly,	organizations	that	may	not	strictly	match	the	institutional	definition	of	the	transnational	organization	can	play	a	significant	role	in	the	process	of	developing	transnational	practices	among	participants.		How	do	we	differentiate	between	organizations	that	promote	these	practices	and	organizations	that	embody	the	transnational	institutional	structure?	Organizations	are	politically	situated	and	this	context	can	be	a	prime	determinant	of	key	institutional	and	foundational	characteristics,	which	in	some	cases	may	lead	to	a	discrepancy	between	the	structure	and	goals	or	purpose	of	an	organization.	So	in	order	to	contemplate	the	role	of	organizations	as	a	‘meso-link’	it	would	be	necessary	identify	not	only	the	character	of	individual	organizations	but	also	the	work	they	contribute	to	developing	and	sustaining	transnational	practices	–	making	personal	contacts,	support	for	projects,	communication	and	travel,	providing	common	ground	etc.	So,	an	important	
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addition	is	how	they	actually	reduce	many	of	the	costs	and	risks	associated	with	cross-border	activities	(Faist	2000,	100).	In	these	ways	organizations	can	play	an	important	role	in	fostering	different	types	of	transnational	experience	to	the	extent	that	they	can	frame	such	practices	according	to	their	political	orientation.	Contributing	to	the	establishment	of	transnational	networks	they	also	exercise	a	selection	capacity	(Hanafi	2005)	and	similarly	promote	the	development	of	particular	types	of	practice	over	others.	As	a	result,	politics	should	be	at	the	forefront	when	considering	the	role	of	such	organizations.	These	factors	are	of	central	importance	when	the	role	of	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	is	considered.	The	relative	centralization	of	ALF	activities	raises	possible	questions	as	there	continues	to	be	some	debate	over	the	organizational	structure	of	the	foundation	and	there	have	been	moves	towards	both	decentralization	and	greater	centralization	including	recent	discussion	over	the	decentralization	of	funding	activities	to	national	organizations.6	
	
The	Anna	Lindh	Foundation:	hope	for	fostering	transnationalism?	The	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	(ALF)	represents	an	important	and	symbolic	achievement	in	cooperation	and	partnership	arising	out	of	the	social	and	cultural	basket	of	the	Euro-Mediterranean	Process	(EMP).	Despite	great	expectations	following	the	2003	High	Level	Advisory	Group	meeting	(‘Groupe	des	Sages’),	optimism	towards	the	Foundation	remained	low	among	many	observers	given	the	difficulty	surrounding	budgetary	negotiations	and	remaining	political	constraints	(Pace	2006,	86).	There	is	also	some	question	as	to	whether	the	ALF	has	lived	up	to	its	original	purpose	as	recommended	by	the	‘Groupe	des	Sages’.	The	meeting	of	the	‘Groupe	des	Sages’	–	a	group	of	Mediterranean	and	intercultural	experts	–	put	forth	a	strong	argument	for	the	further	development	of	the	cultural	dimension	of	Euro-Mediterranean	integration	at	a	time	when	the	European	Neighbourhood	Policy	was	just	being	established.	In	order	to	promote	a	new	intercultural	dialogue	and	strengthen	the	human	dimension	of	integration	the	Groupe	argued	for	the	establishment	of	“transnational	institutions	and	cooperation	flows”	that	were	capable	of	“transcending	and	defying	those	states”,																																																									6	Interview	with	ALF	UK	Head	of	Network	12th	September	2012	
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“new	relationships	between	cultural	identity	and	citizenship”,	and	the	“emergence	of	open	and	pluralistic	public	spaces	in	the	countries	on	the	south	side	of	the	Mediterranean”	(Report	of	the	High	Level	Advisory	Group	2003,	8).	The	report	argued	that	this	was	necessary	against	the	background	of	three	transformations	–	international	laws	and	the	spread	of	democratic	ideas,	the	transformation	of	the	state	and	the	role	of	international	organizations	and	non-governmental	organizations	(Ibid,	17).	These	connected	transformations	argued	for	the	promotion	and	development	of	transnational	practices	especially	through	the	cultural	programmes	within	the	EuroMed	framework.	However,	the	proliferation	of	cultural	projects	under	the	various	EuroMed	instruments	merely	reflected	the	insignificance	of	the	basket	compared	to	the	political	and	economic	baskets.	In	order	to	drive	the	coordination	of	a	more	cohesive	and	transnationally	oriented	basket	the	report	put	forth	the	creation	of	a	EuroMediterranean	Foundation	for	intercultural	dialogue,	which	would	serve	as	a	central	hub	promoting	the	values	and	guiding	principles	of	intercultural	dialogue,	“promote,	launch	and	coordinate	actions	and	initiatives”,	and	“assess	the	compatibility	of	initiatives	with	these	principles”	(Ibid,	35).	The	report	also	argues	that	the	Foundation	should	also	have	financial	and	administrative	independence	which	in	practice	means	that	authorities	should	not	have	influence	over	how	the	Foundation	decides	to	spend	its	money	or	who	becomes	a	member.	In	order	to	secure	this	independence	the	Foundation	should	also	be	allowed	to	draw	of	private	funding	and	sponsorship.	On	top	of	this	the	foundation	was	not	intended	to	a	funding	organization	but	would	manage	activities	and	networking	by	providing	skills	and	organizing	capacity	and	should	play	a	lobbying	role	towards	regional	governments	(Ibid,	36).		
The	ALF:	structure,	goals,	and	partnerships	These	recommendations	immediately	came	up	against	the	realities	of	the	geopolitical	context	of	the	region	where	governments	largely	in	support	of	the	creation	of	a	regional	institutions	also	wanted	to	maintain	some	control	over	the	direction	of	developments	by	turning	the	Foundation’s	Board	of	Governors	into	a	multilateral	forum	where	states	would	be	able	to	approve	or	reject	the	budget	and	programme	guidelines.	As	such,	the	Board	of	Governors	is	made	up	of	
	 153	
representatives	of	the	forty-three	countries	of	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean	(UfM).	The	Board	is	advised	by	an	advisory	council	chaired	by	the	Former-President	Andre	Azoulay	and	staffed	by	eighteen	experts	in	the	field	of	intercultural	dialogue	and	regional	cooperation.	The	creation	of	the	Foundation	has	struggled	to	live	up	to	one	of	the	recommendations	that	it	be	highly	visible.	However	the	selection	of	Alexandria,	Egypt	as	the	base	of	its	headquarters	was	highly	symbolic	of	the	presence	that	countries	to	the	south	of	the	Mediterranean	would	have	in	ongoing	integration.	Similarly,	the	change	of	name	from	the	Euro-Mediterranean	Foundation	to	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	symbolized	the	mutual	respect	between	both	shores	of	the	sea	with	the	Egyptian	government	honoring	the	Swedish	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	who	was	killed	in	September	2003.	Despite	immense	difficulty,	as	well	as	having	to	withstand	an	uncertain	institutional	context	and	political	wrangling	over	the	creation	of	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean,	the	ALF	has	evolved	in	its	early	years	into	an	intriguing	institution	and	a	potential	source	of	development	on	socio-cultural	issues	and	intercultural	dialogue	in	the	region.	Originating	out	of	the	considerations	and	prescriptions	of	the	Report	of	the	High	Level	Advisory	Group	(‘Groupe	des	Sages’)	in	2003,	the	structure	and	goals	of	the	ALF	contain	both	a	normative	and	functional	basis.	The	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	functions	as	a	central	node	in	a	network	of	national	networks	for	civil	society	organizations	that	exist	across	European	and	Mediterranean	members	of	the	UfM.	Its	primary	objective	is	to	promote	intercultural	dialogue,	which	in	practice	consists	of	supporting	four	fields	of	action	–	Education	and	Youth,	Culture	and	Arts,	Cities	and	Migration	and	Peace	and	Coexistence.	According	to	the	2003	report,	in	contrast	to	markets	and	capital	in	the	EU,	youth	represent	one	of	the	most	significant	assets	of	Southern	Mediterranean	countries.	Youth	also	represent	a	potential	threat	to	the	EU	in	terms	of	migration	flows	and	through	the	perpetuation	of	cultural	conflict.	Thus,	the	strategic	is	not	far	from	socio-cultural	considerations.	The	work	of	the	ALF	encompasses	a	range	of	events,	awards,	reports,	and	calls	for	proposals.	Events	often	include	roundtables	and	forums	where	civil	society	actors	and	officials	from	either	side	of	the	Mediterranean	can	meet	and	discuss	new	priorities	and	concerns.	Awards	vary	by	theme	depending	on	yearly	priorities	and	target	those	groups	that	promoted	these	priorities	most	effectively.	The	ALF	also	produces	an	
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Intercultural	Trends	Report,	which	takes	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	cultural	values	and	trends	on	either	side	of	the	Mediterranean	through	examining	opinion	polls,	undertaking	expert	analysis	and	media	analysis	and	then	engaging	with	proposals	for	action.	As	such,	the	ALF	does	a	significant	amount	of	work	in	promoting	youth	development	and	in	promoting	the	conditions	for	understanding	divisions	across	the	region.	The	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	also	promotes	more	explicitly	transnational	practices	through	different	mechanisms	designed	to	support	networking	across	the	forty-three	countries	of	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean	(UfM).	The	main	formats	of	work	for	the	Foundation	under	the	Programmes	Guidelines	2012-2014	include	Calls	for	Proposals,	support	for	national	network	development,	the	Mediterranean	Forum,	‘Believe	in	Dialogue/Act	for	Citizenship’	Facility,	Euro-Med	Observatory	of	social	trends	and	cultural	diversity,	regional	campaigns,	and	resources	and	communications.	In	addition	to	this	the	ALF	has	committed	to	establishing	a	Mobility	Fund	for	Youth,	which	would	offer	support	for	young	people	for	mobility	across	the	region	outside	of	the	existing	education-based	mobility	programmes	already	established	by	the	European	Union	and	partner	countries.	The	new	Programme	Guidelines	also	redirects	the	attention	somewhat	by	focusing	on	promoting	networking	across	southern	Mediterranean	members.	It	will	also	devote	more	funding	to	national	networks	that	have	been	most	effective	in	developing	cross-border	projects.	In	order	to	understand	the	significance	of	this	it	will	be	useful	to	explore	an	interaction	matrix	(figure	1)	and	table	(table	2)	which	map	out	the	relations	between	different	national	networks	of	the	ALF.	These	are	employed	here	largely	for	illustrative	purposes	in	the	interest	of	highlighting	the	real	and	potential	development	of	transnational	network.	A	separate	and	supplementary	analysis	will	be	needed	to	explore	the	complexities	that	come	to	light	through	a	more	engaged	analysis	of	the	data.							
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Figure	1.	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	National	Network	Interaction	Matrix	
2005-2011	
		 Figure	1	provides	a	basic	breakdown	of	the	interactions	between	national	networks.	The	data	has	been	mined	from	national	network	information	provided	via	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	website	and	the	2005-2011	Anna	Lindh	Review	and	is	based	on	partnerships	reported	by	the	national	networks.	The	data	represents	partnerships	established	between	members	of	one	national	network	and	another	national	network.	These	may	be	the	result	of	projects,	participation	in	regional	programmes	initiated	each	year	by	the	ALF,	and/or	participation	in	the	first	ALF	Civil	Forum.	As	a	result,	it	measures	connections	beyond	the	1,015	projects	funded	by	the	ALF	between	2005-2011.	In	addition,	it	not	only	measures	actual	interactions	(those	that	have	taken	place	within	the	strictures	of	a	particular	project	or	regular	communications	on	common	issues)	but	also	potential	interactions	(where	members	of	different	national	networks	have	had	the	opportunity	to	develop	material	exchanges	by	determining	common	actions).	What	makes	this	beneficial	is	that	it	also	demonstrates	the	extent	to	which	the	
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ALF	operates	as	a	meso-link	by	creating	opportunities	for	networking	and	from	that	engaging	in	transnational	practices.	Given	the	political	context,	which	will	be	considered	in	the	following	section,	this	is	useful	for	highlighting	the	constraining	factors	in	generating	cross-border	interactions.	The	vertical	axis	marks	countries	whose	members	are	the	source	or	co-source	(co-partners	in	establishing	a	new	project)	of	projects	–developed	and	sought	partners	–	and	the	horizontal	axis	marks	countries	whose	members	were	either	targeted	for	inclusion	or	requested	to	become	involved	in	projects	established	by	members	in	another	country.	The	matrix	is	coded	along	the	horizontal	and	vertical	axis	with	colors	in	order	to	highlight	those	countries	with	more	members	involved	in	or	developing	projects	as	well	as	the	countries	between	whom	there	are	a	greater	(or	lesser)	numbers	of	connections.	The	interaction	matrix	offers	a	valuable	visualization	of	the	connections	that	have	been	established	and	it	also	highlights	some	potential	issues	or	problems	for	the	current	strategy.	Given	that	the	time	period	under	investigation	also	saw	the	Foundation	in	its	developmental	stage	on	paper	there	has	been	some	impressive	progress	in	promoting	networking	between	national	networks	with	2,914	partnerships	established	across	3,875	members	and	thirty-nine	out	of	forty-three	countries	reporting	at	least	one	partnership	established	(membership	numbers	based	on	own	analysis).	There	are	of	course	several	limitations	with	this	approach.	The	matrix	cannot	provide	detailed	information	on	the	level	of	activity	of	each	member	or	the	type	of	activities	taking	place	as	part	of	each	project.	Similarly,	by	lumping	the	projects	under	country	headings	the	matrix	does	not	account	for	the	relative	activity	of	individual	members.	So	a	country	that	has	a	limited	number	of	very	active	members	cannot	entirely	be	differentiated	from	a	country	that	includes	a	wider	range	of	active	members.	A	supplementary	analysis	is	necessary	to	account	for	these	important	dynamics.	But	this	generalized	picture	offers	a	good	place	to	start	in	terms	of	understanding	the	effectiveness	of	the	organization	in	promoting	transnational	practices	by	measuring	the	quantity	and	directionality	of	interactions	taking	place	and	by	demonstrating	the	centrality	and	significance	of	different	national	networks.	In	addition,	rather	than	focusing	on	the	number	of	projects	funded	or	supported	by	the	ALF	this	matrix	demonstrates	the	connections	(or	networks)	generated	via	these	projects.	
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Table	2.	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	members,	partnerships	and	projects	2005-
2011	
  	 Something	that	stands	out	immediately	is	the	relative	dominance	of	Egypt,	Italy	and	Jordan	as	sources	of	partnerships	all	with	over	200	(with	Palestine	following	closely	behind	with	199).	This	is	also	significant	given	that	only	Italy	is	in	the	top	5	in	terms	of	membership	(Italy,	Palestine,	France,	Morocco,	Turkey,	respectively).	Italy,	Egypt,	France	and	Morocco	also	stand	out	in	terms	of	partnerships	established	between	each	other.	These	four	countries	
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are	all	among	the	highest	numbers	of	partnerships	established	in	general,	which	is	likely	linked	to	their	high	number	of	members.	On	the	other	side,	Lebanon,	Jordan	and	Egypt	stand	out	as	countries	that	register	significantly	higher	numbers	of	partnerships	than	members	(see	Table	2)	demonstrating	a	higher	degree	of	networking	by	individual	members.	What	is	clear	from	table	1.1	is	that	national	networks	with	higher	numbers	of	partnerships	also	are	involved	in	higher	numbers	of	projects.	Exceptions	to	this	are	the	UK,	Tunisia,	Belgium	and	Algeria	all	of	whom	have	relatively	high	representation	in	projects	compared	to	partnerships	established	(based	on	less	than	100	partnerships).	This	reveals	the	practical	significance	of	generating	partnerships	as	they	offer	the	opportunity	of	building	future	projects	and	producing	sustained	networking.	Of	significance	is	also	with	whom	national	networks	are	primarily	connected	–	southern	or	northern	partners.	In	all	cases,	southern	national	networks	have	more	partnerships	with	northern	countries	than	with	southern	countries.	On	the	other	hand,	14	northern	Mediterranean	networks	have	a	greater	number	of	partnerships	with	other	northern	networks.	The	predominance	of	networking	among	European-based	networks	and	the	relatively	smaller	number	of	partnerships	between	southern-based	networks	is	highly	significant	and	raises	a	number	of	issues	that	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	section.	The	new	Programme	Guidelines	established	by	the	ALF	for	the	period	2012-2014	sets	out	to	remedy	the	relative	lack	of	sub-regional	networking	(across	southern	networks)	and	also	maintains	focus	on	some	key	areas	of	mobility	and	exchange.	Citizens	for	Dialogue	(DAWRAK),	initiated	in	2011,	focuses	on	the	support	of	CSOs	in	Southern	Mediterranean	countries	and	works	towards	an	exchange	of	practices	and	the	development	of	citizenship	education.	According	to	the	ALF	approximately	forty	percent	of	ALF	national	networks	in	these	countries	will	participate	in	various	projects,	forums	and	meetings	associated	with	DAWRAK.	In	addition,	DAWRAK	supports	the	training	of	educators	in	the	practice	of	citizenship	and	cultural	identity.	The	programme	is	made	up	of	two	different	fields:	(1)	capacity	building,	agenda	setting	and	advocacy	and	(2)	networking,	exchange	and	civic	engagement.	The	first	field	consists	of	incorporating	youth	in	local	dialogue,	education	for	intercultural	citizenship,	and	exploring	the	role	of	arts	in	political	change.	The	second	field	
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includes	a	variety	of	actions	including	empowering	national	networks,	increasing	twinning	and	exchange	programmes,	participating	in	the	ALF	Civil	Forum,	citizen’s	routes	that	decentralize	activities,	and	regional	conventions.	A	mobility	fund	will	focus	on	developing	exchanges	with	a	current	focus	on	journalists.	The	project	is	largely	inspired	by	a	focus	on	training	different	national	groups	in	the	exercise	of	liberalized	forms	of	citizenship	as	opposed	to	lobbying	for	the	inclusion	and	translation	of	different	forms	of	citizenship	and	engagement.	Citizenship	education	in	schools	is	favored	instead	of	opening	up	discourses	of	citizenship	to	different	forms	of	cultural	belonging.	This	is	supplemented	by	the	performativity	inherent	in	the	promotion	of	the	Euro-Mediterranean	partnership	and	displayed	in	the	2013	ALF	Civil	Forum	Citizens	of	the	Mediterranean	where	a	hybrid	cultural	unity	is	suggested	as	the	basis	for	developing	citizenship.		
Geopolitics,	transnationalism	and	governance	Looking	at	the	ALF	as	a	transnational	organization	raises	several	points:	the	relationship	between	states,	regional	governance	and	transnational	practices	(subsuming	the	imperatives	of	multilateralism	and	integration,	and	security	objectives),	the	use	of	transnationalism	to	construct	political	space,	and	organizations	and	social	fields.	Considering	the	ALF	in	this	way	offers	a	useful	way	to	explore	the	link	between	the	social	aspect	and	the	political	role	of	organizations	as	they	intervene	in	transnational	activity.	So	the	ALF	can	be	considered	as	a	meso-link	connecting	actors	on	all	shores	of	the	Mediterranean	but	this	understanding	should	also	be	qualified	by	critiquing	the	biases	and	restrictions	of	the	Foundation	as	well	as	the	way	in	which	members	appropriate	and	reconstruct	political	discourses	and	identities.	In	this	function	the	ALF	frames	its	activities	in	terms	of	a	shared	Euro-Mediterranean	space.	This	conception	of	the	region	is	part	of	a	broader	EU-led	political	design	to	develop	regional	integration	on	the	basis	of	a	distinct	‘variable	geometry’	(COM(2011)	200).	The	significance	of	the	ALF	in	this	context	was	revealed	in	the	aftermath	of	the	2011	arab	uprisings	during	which	one	of	the	first	actions	of	the	EU	commission	was	to	publicly	seek	to	foster	a	closer	relationship	with	the	ALF	(ENPI	Infocentre	08/09/2011).	Even	during	the	events	taking	place	some	members	of	the	Commission	tried	to	encourage	the	Foundation	to	take	more	of	a	
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public	stance	on	the	events	taking	place	especially	in	Egypt.⁠7	Nonetheless,	the	advisory	council	opted	to	take	a	strictly	neutral	line	during	the	events	(perhaps	in	deference	to	members	of	the	Board	of	Governors).		The	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	is	valuable	to	the	EU	as	one	of	the	sole	truly	regional	and	multilateral	institutions	established	as	part	of	the	EuroMed	Partnership.	It	is	highly	symbolic	given	the	limited	progress	in	this	area	and	it	offers	non-European	partners	a	clear	role.	The	Foundation’s	ability	to	promote	the	role	of	civil	society	organizations	and	non-governmental	organizations	is	also	a	key	priority	for	the	EU	under	the	new	ENPI	and	the	PfDSP.	As	a	result,	regular	meetings	between	members	of	the	ALF	advisory	council,	DG	external	relations	(RELEX),	DG	development	and	cooperation	(DEVCO),	European	external	action	service	(EEAS),	and	DG	education	and	culture	(EAC)	have	been	established	to	coordinate	actions	across	a	variety	of	instruments.	The	ALF	Programme	Guidelines	2012-2014	also	firmly	places	the	ALF	as	a	key	part	of	the	‘variable	geometry’	of	the	Euro-Mediterranean	area.	So	given	that	the	EU	Commission	remains	the	largest	overall	investor	of	the	Foundation	(approx.	EUR7	million)	it	does	exercise	some	influence	over	the	content	of	programmes.	Within	the	Commission	there	is	a	desire	to	allow	the	advisory	council	and	administration	of	the	Foundation	to	set	objectives	and	design	new	programme	outlines	independently	but	within	a	clear	(and	limiting)	framework	agreed	upon	across	the	different	DGs	and	with	the	ALF	advisory	council.	Similarly,	in	practice	the	Board	of	Governors	(where	states	can	influence	budget	priorities)	has	not	been	very	active	in	constraining	the	Foundation	during	negotiations	on	new	programme	guidelines.	An	exception	to	this	would	be	a	largely	symbolic	rejection	on	the	part	of	the	Egyptian	government	during	the	negotiating	phase	of	the	most	recent	budget	on	the	basis	that	the	document	was	too	explicitly	normative	in	its	language	and	possessed	too	much	political	content.⁠8	Despite	this	initial	protest,	the	new	Programme	Guidelines	went	ahead	largely	unchanged.	While	the	Groupe	des	Sages	in	2003	declared	the	necessary	independence	of	the	ALF	in	order	to	achieve	legitimacy	and	neutrality	in	a	highly	politicized	region,	the	scope	of	independence	attainable	by	the	Foundation	will	always	be	limited																																																									7	Interviews	with	DG	RELEX	15th	October	2013	and	EEAS	10th	February	2014	8	Interview	with	DG	RELEX	15th	October	2013	
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by	its	reliance	upon	the	EU	commission	for	funding	(Feliu	2005)	as	well	as	the	institutional	context	of	the	ALF	within	the	UfM	framework.	Furthermore,	the	ALF	does	not	have	freedom	of	action	within	UfM	member	states.	It	acts	as	an	organizational	hub	for	national	networks	setting	strategies	for	development	and	implementation	as	well	as	deciding	upon	funding	priorities.	Funding	is	in	some	cases	still	funneled	through	ministries	(though	this	tendency	has	become	quite	uncommon	since	the	member	survey	in	2010)	and	member	states	often	remain	responsible	for	approving	Heads	of	Network	and	maintaining	oversight	over	national	networks,	potentially	limiting	network	penetration	and	membership	opportunities	through	explicit	or	self-censorship.	When	we	consider	the	content	and	types	of	actions	pursued	by	the	Foundation	the	influence	of	both	states	and	the	EU,	as	a	regional	hegemon,	becomes	clearer.	Through	its	activities	the	ALF	supports	and	legitimizes	a	specific	form	of	transnational	interaction,	which	can	be	manifest	in	selection	procedures	and	in	the	content	of	supported	projects.	It	also	contributes	to	the	development	of	a	precise	political	imaginary	exemplified	during	the	2013	ALF	Civil	Forum	-	Citizens	of	the	Mediterranean.	This	necessitates	a	move	away	from	the	implicit	normativity	of	many	claims	made	about	transnationalism	as	anti-hegemonic	and/or	anti-exclusionary.	It	also	raises	questions	about	the	democratic	potential	of	transnationalism	as	it	is	assumed	to	provide	a	counterweight	to	exclusive	policy-making	structures.	Quite	on	the	contrary,	transnationalism	is	a	largely	uneven	process	through	which	states	and	supranational	institutions	“discriminate	quite	deliberately”	(Hurrelmann	and	DeBarbeleben	2011,	7).	And	the	transnational	organization	can	act	as	an	intermediary	through	which	these	actors	can	exert	control	over	these	processes.	The	ALF	in	its	institutional	structure	is	certainly	an	example	of	how	states	can	assert	control	over	the	potential	of	transnationalization.	At	the	same	time,	and	conversely,	the	ALF	operates	within	a	space	determined	by	some	EU	discourses	as	a	developing	social	field	as	well	as	institutional	framework.	These	two	features	result	in	a	complex	process	whereby	some	borders	are	re-enforced	and	re-inscribed	and	others	become	less	restrictive	and	more	selective.	This	is	clear	when	considering	the	directionality	of	a	majority	of	the	partnerships	that	have	been	established	between	the	period	2005-2011.	
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Limitations	of	mobility	are	an	immediate	problem	for	all	members	and	on	this	issue	the	ALF	and	especially	its	Former-President	Andre	Azoulay	have	been	increasingly	outspoken	calling	for	the	development	of	better	regimes	for	educational	and	youth	exchange	and	easier	mobility	among	UfM	countries.	The	foundation	has	also	shown	some	flexibility	in	its	willingness	to	support	organizations	that	were	unable	to	obtain	the	relevant	association	or	NGO	status	under	the	strictures	of	authoritarianism.⁠9	So	the	ALF	is	both	political	actor	and	opportunity	structure.		The	relative	lack	of	south-south	partnerships	established	between	2005-2011	reflects	to	a	large	extent	the	priorities	of	generating	network	across	the	northern	and	southern	shores	of	the	Mediterranean.	But	the	incidence	of	networking	across	European	members	versus	between	southern	members	also	reflects	a	geopolitical	reality	in	which	borders	between	countries	on	the	southern	shore	of	the	Mediterranean	remain	much	less	porous	as	a	result	of	sustained	political	imperatives.	It	also	raises	the	question	of	resources	and	capacity.	Whereas	there	are	fourteen	European-based	networks	that	have	a	majority	of	connections	with	other	European-based	networks,	this	is	not	the	case	with	any	of	the	southern-based	networks.	Many	grants	proposed	by	the	ALF	include	the	requirement	that	there	be	at	least	one	European	and	one	non-European	organization	involved	in	the	project	in	order	to	receive	funding.	However,	for	some	European	networks	this	could	be	seen	more	as	a	formality	than	a	necessity	raising	the	possibility	that	some	partnerships	were	established	on	the	basis	of	reliance	rather	than	equality.	As	a	result	of	these	limitations,	for	many	members	being	a	part	of	the	national	network	is	just	as	important	as	developing	transnational	networks	and	many	participants	see	membership	in	the	ALF	as	a	way	to	strengthen	domestic	initiatives.	For	some	this	is	because	the	funding	themes	and	goals	of	the	ALF	do	not	provide	many	opportunities.	It	is	clear	from	the	2010	members	survey	that	there	is	general	dissatisfaction	with	the	ability	to	find	partners	in	other	countries	but	many	at	the	Civil	Forum	2013	also	mentioned	the	scope	and	goals	of	funding	which	was	being	influenced	by	political	objectives	and	agendas	established	through	the	interference	of	the	EU	Commission.	This	could	be	seen	as	lending	to	a	sense	of	division	between	
																																																								9	Interview	with	Tunisian	ALF	member	17th	June	2013	
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Southern	organizations	struggling	for	funding,	partnership	and	recognition	and	Northern	organizations	with	more	alternative	sources	of	funding.	As	a	‘network	of	national	networks’	the	ALF	insinuates	the	creation	of	a	transnational	social	field	on	the	basis	of	the	idealized	Euro-Mediterranean	space.	Transnational	social	fields	“link	individuals	directly	or	indirectly	to	institutions	located	in	more	than	one	nation-state	as	part	of	the	power	dynamics	through	which	institutionalized	social	relations	delineate	social	spaces”	(Glick	Schiller	2009,	5).	But	there	are	immediate	problems	for	considering	the	networks	of	the	ALF	as	contributing	to	the	construction	of	this	social	field.	Of	course,	all	social	fields	are	highly	constructed	phenomena	subject	to	the	interplay	of	particular	power	dynamics	and	the	intervention	and	influence	of	institutions	on	transnational	actors.	However,	the	transnational	social	field	is	perhaps	still	less	formal	and	organized	by	the	limits	of	membership	than	are	the	networks	of	the	ALF.	On	top	of	this,	national	networks	as	supported	by	the	ALF	often	remain	just	that	–	nationally	organized	–	though	transnationally	connected.	The	regional	dimension	is	also	growing	increasingly	vague.	Its	symbolic	and	rhetorical	value	is	valuable	as	will	be	discussed	in	relation	to	the	2013	Civil	Forum,	however	the	lack	of	common	experiences	and	institutions	will	ensure	its	subordination	to	political	motives	rather	than	becoming	a	truly	shared	identity.		
Membership,	belonging	and	the	Euro-Mediterranean	Space	Engaging	in	transnational	networks	does	not	produce	an	erosion	of	the	importance	of	place	or	the	nation	(Featherstone,	Phillips	and	Waters	2008,	386).	As	Stephen	Calleya	(2005)	has	pointed	out,	regional	fragmentation	means	that	local	identities	and	national	spaces	remain	central	to	political	and	social	action	in	the	Euro-Mediterranean.	This	fragmentation	is	decisively	political	in	most	circumstances	and	does	not	account	for	underlying	dynamics	of	social	and	political	contestation	that	occur	across	national	constructs.	For	example,	networks	have	historically	played	a	central	role	in	the	consolidation	of	political	action	and	the	ability	to	evoke	a	transnational	history	for	particular	actors	and/or	issues	only	strengthens	such	networks	and	lays	the	basis	for	identity	construction	(Featherstone	2007).	This	understanding	points	towards	the	role	of	common	politics	and	projects	in	the	construction	and	maintenance	of	
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transnational	networks,	which	is	of	significance	for	the	development	of	regional	integration	and	common	affinities.	Annette	Jünemann’s	(2005)	analysis	of	the	Civil	Forums	established	under	the	EMP	framework	points	toward	the	potential	initiation	of	a	political	identity	based	on	particular	political	issues	for	those	actors	involved.	The	impact	of	selection	processes	can	put	a	limit	on	the	involvement	of	actors	and	organizations	from	southern	Mediterranean	countries	but	on	the	other	hand,	as	Sari	Hanafi	(2005)	points	out,	the	selection	process	can	also	benefit	transnational	networks	by	engaging	with	alternative	actors	and	organizations	that	under	normal	conditions	may	be	subject	to	local	divisions	or	clique	gatherings.	Networking	at	the	regional	level	has	the	potential	of	increasing	the	influence	of	southern	actors	through	agenda	setting	and	alliance	building	(Hanafi	2005).	Hanafi’s	anthropological	approach	to	North-South	civil	society	relations	helps	to	understand	the	significance	of	the	regional	scale	for	social	actors	and	some	motivations	for	participating	in	regional	actions,	supplementing	Jünemann’s	analysis	of	the	Civil	Forums.	However	both	focus	solely	on	the	significance	of	the	regional	level	and	as	a	result	miss	the	interplay	of	global/local	processes	of	political	expression	and	value	formation	produce	different	responses	to	regional	images.	Membership	in	the	Euro-Mediterranean	space	is	a	tightly	controlled	phenomenon	but	it	need	not	be	constraining	in	its	importance.	The	Mediterranean	Forum	held	in	Marseilles,	France	6th-9th	April	2013	marked	only	the	second	regional	forum	held	by	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation,	despite	the	intention	to	develop	an	annual	forum.	Problems	of	resources	followed	by	instability	within	national	networks	caused	a	series	of	delays.	The	agenda	of	the	Forum	was	determined	through	a	series	of	consultations	involving	different	national	networks	on	key	themes:	youth,	women,	migration,	institutional	cooperation,	and	media.	During	the	forum	there	were	repeated	calls	for	the	ALF	to	take	the	lead	in	restoring	a	human	dimension	to	the	Euro-Mediterranean	Partnership	(echoing	the	sentiment	in	the	‘Groupe	des	Sages’	report	from	2003).	Some	of	the	official	conclusions	proposed	a	more	structured	dialogue	between	civil	societies	and	governance,	education	for	inclusive	citizenship,	building	a	common	memory	(uniting	both	shores	of	the	Mediterranean),	and	a	greater	role	for	mobility	especially	among	students,	teachers,	journalists	and	artists.	Optimism	towards	the	ability	of	the	Euro-
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Mediterranean	to	help	Europe	overcome	its	Manichean	identity⁠10	contrasted	with	political	identities	seeking	to	place	themselves	in	the	context	of	the	Euro-Mediterranean,	or	trying	to	locate	the	Euro-Mediterranean	between	local	and	international.	During	the	Civil	Forum	2013	a	more	trivial	form	of	unity	represented	by	a	kind	of	neo-tribalism	in	which	many	participants	shared	an	instrumental	identity	for	the	duration	of	proceedings	was	also	present.	Finding	common	ground	on	the	basis	of	regional	characteristics,	personalities	and	gestures	made	for	a	pleasing	way	to	partake	in	networking	but	also	played	an	important	role	in	finding	regional	organizations	with	like	goals	and	commitments.	So	while	making	for	a	genial	atmosphere	there	is	also	a	practical	reason	for	employing	such	a	strategy	through	the	course	of	the	forum.	But	among	members	of	ALF	networks	the	Euro-Mediterranean	is	likely	to	be	given	a	diffuse	range	of	meanings	based	on	subjective,	practical	and	political	dimensions	depending	on	the	participants.	In	the	subjective	form	the	Euro-Mediterranean	is	a	cultural	and	intellectual	product	that	evokes	a	long	history	of	hybrid	relations	within	the	region	(Matvejevic	1999).	It	is	less	concerned	with	structure	and	more	with	the	experience	of	mobility	and	interaction	as	well	as	participating	in	regional	forums.	This	personal	experience	–	influenced	by	the	political	context	–	is	generated	as	a	representation	of	the	region.	And	for	some	the	experience	of	the	political	uprisings	in	the	region	could	be	linked	to	a	general	transformation	of	the	political	subjectivities	of	citizens	within	countries	on	the	southern	shore	of	the	Mediterranean:		 Thanks	to	the	revolution	we	are	nearer	to	the	other	people,	do	you	understand?	From	that	day	we	come	nearer	to	other	people.	We	think	that	we	have	the	same	identity,	the	same	mentality	–	almost	the	same	mentality.	And	I	think	the	Mediterranean	is	a	point	of	meeting. ⁠11		But	this	subjective	interpretation	also	opened	the	door	to	the	actual	socio-economic	experiences	of	people	living	on	either	shore	of	the	Mediterranean,	thus	
																																																								10	Rachida	Darwiche	referred	to	the	ability	of	the	Euro-Mediterranean	idea	to	help	Europe	realize	its	Islamic	history	that	is	an	essential	(but	disregarded)	feature	in	the	development	of	many	European	societies.	Thus,	she	called	for	recognition	of	the	Judeo-Christian-Islamic	identity	of	Europe.	11	Interview	with	ALF	member	3rd	July	2013	
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potentially	generating	a	closer	connection	with	citizens	of	other	less	developed	countries	rather	than	European	partners.⁠12	A	practical	interpretation	can	be	seen	in	the	self-ascription	that	takes	the	form	of	particular	characteristics,	specific	historical	encounters	or	common	features	in	order	to	maintain	some	semblance	of	regional	unity	in	the	pursuit	of	some	instrumental	goal.	Michael	Herzfeld	gives	a	useful	introduction	to	this	idea	when	he	argues	that	Mediterranean	culture	should	be	treated	‘as	performative	utterances	that	can,	under	the	right	“felicity	conditions,	actually	create	the	realities	that	people	perceive’	(Herzfeld	2005,	50).	Such	performances	can	be	wide	ranging	and	there	is	no	ideal	type.	But	what	is	also	evident	in	this	example	is	the	influence	that	events	have	on	political	subjectivity.	This	is	significant.	It	recommends	the	power	of	performance	for	producing	a	feeling	of	commonality.	This	was	also	expressed	in	a	more	explicitly	political	sense.	Politically,	the	Euro-Mediterranean	idea	is	intriguing	and	raises	the	question	as	to	whether	participants	of	the	ALF	networks	unite	based	on	common	political	orientations,	or	subject	the	imaginary	to	their	own	political	interests.	For	some,	instead	of	seeing	an	idealized	(Euro)Mediterranean	identity	as	an	end	itself	it	becomes	a	form	of	empowerment.	This	also	puts	focus	on	specific	practices	that	extend	across	and	beyond	the	region	and	entail	some	form	of	globality	in	the	sense	of	embracing	the	condition	of	alterity.	What	is	more,	this	understanding	tends	to	resist	(either	actively	or	passively)	dominant	constructions	of	the	region	without	rejecting	common	histories.	Instead	it	grasps	the	symbolism	of	a	collective	memory	and	uses	it	to	establish	a	voice	beyond	their	particular	circumstances. ⁠13	As	a	result	the	Euro-Mediterranean	also	becomes	a	site	of	political	engagement	transformed	by	the	development	of	local	subjectivities,	and	political	subjectivities	following	the	Arab	uprisings	(Challand	2011),	and	the	continued	pursuit	of	social	justice,	dignity,	and	freedom.	An	activist	who	participated	in	the	Tunisian	revolution	and	currently	working	for	an	artistic	association	explains:	
																																																								12	One	interviewee	noted	a	much	closer	feeling	of	attachment	to	people	from	Brazil,	India	or	Uganda	than	a	‘Frenchman’	or	‘Spaniard’		13	Interview	with	Tunisian	member	of	ALF	4th	July	2013	
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	There	is	huge	difference	between	creation	in	the	Arab	Mediterranean	and	creation	in	the	European	parts.	In	the	EuroMediterranean	region	you	are	all	licensed,	you	can	talk	about	whatever	you	want.	In	the	Arab	parts	you	still	talk	about	whatever	you	want	but	you	don’t	have	that	right.	You	need	to	earn	it,	strive	for	it.	It	[the	Mediterranean]	is	a	bridge	that	we	have	started	to	cross	in	order	to	open	up	to	the	international	scene. ⁠14			
 The	separation	but	convergence	of	the	two	shores	of	the	Mediterranean	was	a	major	theme	throughout	the	Forum	but	whereas	many	of	the	official	panels	focused	on	the	development	of	common	values	and	norms	(and	especially	their	development	within	southern	societies)	the	previous	comment	expresses	the	struggle	against	disempowerment	that	does	not	end	with	becoming	a	citizen	of	the	(Euro)Mediterranean	but	offers	a	platform	to	pursue	a	real	sense	of	equality.	These	expressions	only	begin	to	exemplify	the	ways	in	which	regional	participants	employ	the	imagery	supplied	to	negotiate	their	own	transnational	practices	and	orientations.	The	subjective	position	reflects	a	dichotomy	between	the	fragmented	nature	of	cultural	and	political	identities	in	the	Mediterranean	area	as	it	places	the	Mediterranean	in	relation	to	global	power	structures.	Thus	it	creates	the	possibility	of	a	global	solidarity	between	socio-economically	and/or	culturally	similar	nations	and	from	a	normative	perspective	it	can	act	as	a	forceful	critique	of	Western	dominance.	On	the	other	hand,	it	also	offers	the	possibility	of	a	rapprochement	between	different	societies	as	a	result	of	internal	transformation	where	the	mentality	and	subjectivity	of	actors	is	of	central	importance	as	it	reflects	changes	within	society.	And	yet	at	its	base	the	coming-together	is	necessarily	linked	to	a	mutual	commitment	to	similar	goals	and	values.	So	even	though	the	Mediterranean	becomes	a	point	of	meeting	it	remains	a	meeting	between	not	yet	equals	or	equals	in	becoming.	The	subjective	position	exemplifies	the	political	and	cultural	complexity	of	the	region	as	it	is	caught	up	in	a	reconfiguration	of	the	discourses	of	nationalism,	development,	cosmopolitanism	and	orientalism.	The	practical	position	is	similar	but	it	entail	a	more	implicit	process	of	situating	oneself	in	a	static	phase	of	development	either	in	cultural	terms,	or	may	be	used	by	some	actors	within	society	in	order	to	legitimize	the	recourse	to	political	help	from	external	actors.																																																									14	Interview	with	Tunisian	member	of	ALF	18th	June	2013	
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	 The	experience	of	mobility	–	limited	though	it	may	be	–	is	undoubtedly	a	significant	one.	All	of	those	quoted	do	engage	in	forms	of	transnational	practice	such	as	communication	(largely	via	email	and	social	media)	and	participation	within	issue-networks.	As	pointed	out	by	Szerszynski	and	Urry	(2002,	470)	corporeal	mobility	as	well	as	virtual	and	imaginative	mobility	contribute	to	the	development	of	cosmopolitanism	in	a	variety	of	contexts.	Mobility	here	does	not	represent	a	cosmopolitan	ethical	standpoint	against	the	parochial	local	culture	from	which	actors	emerge.	The	experience	of	mobility	is	important	but	does	not	alone	determine	a	cosmopolitan	attitude,	which	relies	upon	the	political	subjectivity	and	the	reflexivity	of	the	actor.	Mobility	and	other	transnational	practices	may	in	turn	help	to	induce	the	realization	of	such	desires	but	do	not	necessarily	determine	them.	Similarly,	contrary	to	the	notion	of	everyday	cosmopolitanism	or	the	latent	existence	of	cosmopolitanism	(Delanty	2011)	the	implication	here	is	expressly	political	as	it	functions	in	opposition	to	the	delimiting	of	legitimate	grounds	for	political	expression	within	the	state.	So	the	regional	becomes	grounds	for	pursuing	political	engagement	beyond	the	national	context	but	also	for	pursuing	a	global	identity	defined	by	local	experience,	which	is	expressly	political	but	not	one	that	rests	on	a	pedagogical	nature	like	that	suggested	above.	Instead	it	might	be	seen	as	an	emancipatory	version	that	is	the	complementary	flip-side	to	humility	(see	Malcomson	1998,	236).	So	the	region	in	this	instance	is	a	useful	way	to	link	the	local	to	the	global	without	succumbing	to	a	specific	ethics	or	dropping	the	essentially	political	problem	of	existing	beyond	the	nation-state.		
Conclusion	The	construction	of	a	Euro-Mediterranean	space	in	the	work	of	EU	instruments	and	European-led	regional	institutions	and	foundations	has	led	to	a	fundamental	delimiting	of	the	region	according	to	specific	institutional	goals	and	political	and	economic	practices.	Civil	society	actors	are	also	important	actors	in	the	development	of	a	common	space	and	have	been	incorporated	into	regimes	of	regional	governance	for	this	purpose	(Scott	and	Liikanen	2011).	The	ALF,	as	a	regional	foundation,	was	created	to	support	a	dialogue	between	cultures	and	to	increase	exchange	and	interaction	between	actors	across	the	Mediterranean.	To	
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this	end	the	ALF	has	increasingly	supported	the	development	of	a	common	unity	based	on	a	sense	of	Mediterranean	citizenship	and	culture.	However,	this	is	also	influenced	by	the	important	role	of	the	European	commission	in	supporting	the	Foundation	politically	and	economically.	But	rather	than	being	a	route	to	a	specific	type	of	transnational	activity	and	identity	we	should	perhaps	focus	on	how	the	transnational	desires	and	characters	of	its	members	is	what	really	gives	the	ALF	significance.	For	this	same	reason	it	is	important	to	bodies	like	the	EU	Commission	because	it	can	harness	some	of	the	influence	and	sentiments	of	these	groups	and	funnel	them	into	regional	activities	and	programmes	that	work	towards	the	goals	of	intercultural	dialogue,	democratic	consolidation	or	regional	integration.	While	these	are	also	important	for	transnationally	active	members,	the	role	of	transnational	practices	in	the	Euro-Mediterranean	may	be	viewed	as	a	stepping-stone	or	route	towards	becoming	more	globally	active	and	visible.	A	thorough	analysis	of	such	actors	would	have	to	explore	this	global/local	question	and	the	regional	as	an	opportunity	structure	in	the	context	of	global	politics.		Conceptually,	the	resonance	of	transnational	terminology	reveals	as	much	as	anything	the	vagueness	of	a	distinct	approach	of	transnational	studies.	For	example,	Pries	(2008,	3)	is	wrong	to	assert	that	the	transnational	perspective	can	be	distinguished	from	a	global-local	point	of	view	by	differentiating	between	micro-,	meso-	and	macro-	units	as	this	assumes	a	level-based	understanding	of	functions.	However,	the	idea	of	the	meso-link	is	useful	as	a	way	to	consider	the	foundations	and	organizations	that	intervene	in	or	promote	processes	of	transnationalism	and	to	explore	the	ways	in	which	these	organizations	may	incorporate	the	interests	of	states	or	supranational	institutions.	The	scope	of	transnationalism	given	the	influence	of	cultural	discourses	and	state	interests	is	limited	and	participants	continue	to	seek	appropriate	representation	at	the	national	level	rather	than	regional	(Kastoryano	2003,	81).	But	the	inclusion	in	such	networks	can	generate	alternative	perspectives	on	identity	and	politics	by	approaching	the	national	question	both	from	above	and	below	simultaneously.	Looking	at	these	networks	from	a	birds-eye-view	reveals	the	impact	of	certain	strategies	and	discourses	on	their	organization.	As	the	final	section	attests,	however,	the	view	from	the	perspective	of	network	members	can	be	quite	different.	The	following	chapter	pursues	this	more	within	the	context	of	the	2013	
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ALF	Civil	Forum	–	the	foremost	event	bringing	together	members	of	all	of	the	national	networks.			
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Chapter	7:	Constructing	Spaces	of	Dialogue:	the	organized	
cultural	encounter		Referred	to	by	one	member	of	the	European	External	Action	Service	(EEAS)	as	a	‘huge	waste	of	time’,	this	chapter	explores	the	significance	of	the	2013	ALF	Civil	Forum.	The	quote,	which	would	appear	to	be	a	bizarre	beginning	for	any	chapter,	points	usefully	in	two	directions.	As	the	EEAS	has	officially	recognized	cultural	diplomacy	as	part	of	its	remit15	events	like	the	ALF	Civil	Forum	offer	an	outreach	function	for	promoting	a	European	cultural	agenda.	Indeed,	the	EEAS	alongside	DG	RELEX,	DEVCO	and	EAC	have	had	regular	meetings	with	the	ALF	secretariat	in	order	to	effectively	coordinate	any	new	actions	and	programs.16	As	such,	the	quote	raises	questions	concerning	the	presentation	of	a	European	cultural	diplomacy.	On	the	other	hand,	it	also	suggests	a	general	cynicism	towards	the	effectiveness	of	such	events.	These	two	sides	form	the	core	of	questioning	in	this	chapter.	The	2013	Civil	Forum	is	significant	for	the	very	reason	that	it	offers	further	insight	into	the	relationships	that	have	been	introduced	in	previous	chapters.	In	order	to	combine	these	concerns	this	chapter	presents	a	unique	approach.		Cultural	encounters	are	place-bound	experiences	between	different	cultures,	identities,	religions,	ethnicities	etc.	and	can	range	from	conflictual	to	mundane.	Historically,	encounters	have	led	to	the	formation	of	modern	cultures	and	introduced	complexity	into	traditional	nation-state	narratives.	Different	types	of	encounter	can	also	be	related	in	different	ways	to	functional	and	intentional	types	of	transnational	practice.	The	notion	of	cultural	encounter	is	useful	insofar	as	it	can	account	for	a	range	of	political	contexts.	It	highlights	the	fact	that	cultural	exchange	is	not	a	unidirectional	process	as	has	been	suggested	by	theories	of	homogenization	and	cultural	imperialism.	As	demonstrated	by	authors	such	as	Delanty	(2011)	and	Dallmayr	(1996),	cultural	encounters	have	a	variety	of	different	outcomes	and	consequences,	but	they	also	take	many	forms	and	relate	in	different	ways	to	political	contexts.	The	real	benefit	of	the																																																									15	Interview	with	DG	EAC	27th	November	2013	16	Interview	with	DG	DEVCO	18th	November	2013	and	EEAS	10th	February	2014	
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encounter	is	that	it	is	not	wedded	to	the	assumption	of	either	cooperation	or	conflict,	good	encounter	vs.	bad	encounter.	It	allows	us	to	focus	on	the	actual,	characteristically	heterogeneous	experiences	of	cultural	interaction	(Rovisco	2013).	But	how	do	cultural	encounters	work	in	relation	to	organized	events,	especially	those	forums	oriented	towards	civil	society,	academics,	policy-makers	and	artists?	Is	the	implied	skepticism	of	the	opening	quote	warranted	in	suggesting	that	organized	events	cannot	be	considered	as	authentic	forms	of	encounter?		The	‘organized	cultural	encounter’	has	to	be	seen	among	the	set	of	practices	that	make	up	global	cultural	policy.	It	is	an	artificially	constructed	environment	given	purpose	through	institutional	objectives	and	meaning	through	the	set	of	interactions	and	contributions	of	participants.	Civil	societalization	has	made	the	organized	cultural	encounter	possible	by	demonstrating	the	productive	veneer	provided	by	outreach	events.	The	common	good	of	intercultural	dialogue	is	itself	an	institutional	desire,	which,	like	anti-policy,	is	significant	in	its	practical	limitations	and	particular	constellation	of	networks.	Looking	at	the	ALF	Civil	Forum	brings	some	of	these	contradictions	to	light.	The	political	embeddedness	of	the	event	stands	in	contrast	to	the	depoliticized	framing	of	identity	and	culture	in	the	goal	of	pursuing	intercultural	dialogue.	Allusions	to	citizenship,	participation	and	belonging	require	a	rethinking	of	political	and	cultural	bordering,	mobility	and	access,	and	organization.	Does	an	event	like	the	ALF	Civil	Forum	contain	the	potential	to	pursue	such	diverse	aims?	It	would	be	abrupt	to	occlude	any	possibility	of	genuine	debate	or	exchange.			
The	Civil	Forum	and	Intercultural	Strategy	Institutionalization	results	in	a	transformation	of	the	encounter	from	unpredictability,	openness	and	uncertainty	towards	the	logic	of	‘promoting	diversity’	within	a	set	of	hegemonic	practices.	Civil	forums	provide	space	for	structured	dialogue	engendering	trust	and	empathy	as	well	as	novel	forms	of	political	and	cultural	exchange.	Using	the	ALF	Forum	as	a	specific	example	of	an	‘organized	intercultural	encounter’	will	demonstrate	how	encounters	can	be	
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institutionalized	under	the	imperatives	of	political	and	economic	cooperation.	Such	functional	imperatives,	however,	subsequently	give	rise	to	alternative	frames	and	experiences	making	the	encounter	a	productive	site	where	dominant	dynamics	are	reproduced	as	well	as	challenged,	and	cultural	dominance	is	(re)interpreted	by	participants.	The	forum	as	an	organized	encounter	has	to	be	seen	as	part	of	a	strategic	vision	for	cultural	relations.	It	is	an	idealized	understanding	of	the	encounter	that	has	been	built	around	the	common	discourse	of	intercultural	dialogue	in	global	cultural	policy.		To	understand	the	role	of	the	ALF	Forum	though	we	need	to	understand	first	the	proliferation	of	intercultural	dialogue	and	then	its	incorporation	into	the	developing	EuroMediterranean	Partnership	as	the	discourse	of	intercultural	dialogue	has	come	to	provide	one	basis	for	the	establishment	of	the	organized	encounter	in	transnational	and	international	politics.	The	organized	intercultural	encounter	essentially	stems	from	the	desire	to	remove	the	suddenness	and	unpredictability	from	the	encounter	captured	well	by	Ulf	Hannerz	when	he	states:	“In	large	part,	change	is	made	up	of	other	people’s	continuities,	quite	suddenly	coming	up	close	to	us	as	well,	without	necessarily	being	understood,	or	fully	accepted.	‘Culture	shock,’	wherever	it	occurs,	is	mostly	about	this…”	(Hannerz	1996,	25).	The	organized	encounter	thereby	reduces	the	possibility	of	conflict	and	shock.	Instead	the	encounter	is	preceded	by	the	assumption	of	openness	and	acceptance	–	at	least	to	the	encounter	itself	if	not	the	cultural	‘other’.	These	organized	encounters	could	possibly	be	seen	as	part	of	what	Hannerz	labels	the	‘culture	shock	prevention	industry’	that	sprang	up	in	the	latter	decades	of	the	twentieth	century:	“Cross-cultural	training	programs	have	been	developed	to	inculcate	sensitivity,	basic	savoir-faire,	and	perhaps	an	appreciation	of	those	other	cultures	which	are	of	special	strategic	importance	to	one’s	goals”	(Ibid,	108).	Placing	the	organized	encounter	in	the	field	of	cultural	diplomacy,	the	term	‘special	strategic	importance’	is	central.	In	this	context,	intercultural	dialogue	has	become	the	primary	conception	of	an	idealized	cultural	encounter	and	as	a	set	of	practices	demonstrates	the	transnationalization	of	cultural	relations	and	official	policy	responses.	As	put	forth	in	the	Council	of	Europe’s	White	Paper	on	Intercultural	Dialogue	–	and	which	has	migrated	to	the	EU’s	own	policies	towards	promoting	culture	in	the	
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Mediterranean	and	its	very	recent	Preparatory	Action	on	Culture	in	EU	External	Relations	-	an	important	aspect	of	intercultural	dialogue	is	in	the	creation	of	‘spaces’	conducive	to	dialogue.	One	form	that	these	spaces	can	take	is	that	of	the	organized	encounter.	For	the	idea	of	the	organized	intercultural	encounter	to	be	useful	when	looking	in	areas	of	transnational	relations	we	need	to	contextualize	the	practice	in	terms	of	existing	networks	of	governance.	There	is	something	cynical	about	the	idea,	of	ticking	boxes	and	creating	an	exclusive	and	limited	understanding	of	what	the	cultural	encounter	should	look	like,	or	how	it	should	occur.	This	is	certainly	one	of	the	problems	that	can	be	associated	with	official	versions	and	practices	of	intercultural	dialogue	which	are	seen	an	extensions	of	a	successful	European	experience	of	diversity.	But	on	the	contrary,	it	is	desperately	needed	within	European	societies	–	not	just	in	conjunction	with	external	development.	On	the	other	hand,	what	also	comes	to	light	in	such	an	analysis	is	the	fact	that	no	cultural	encounter	can	be	entirely	scripted.	Peformances	are	not	inherently	limited	by	the	dominant	visions	organizing	the	encounter.	As	Papastergiadis	(2012)	suggests,	both	of	these	sides	are	very	much	intertwined,	and	perhaps	even	necessary.	The	real	limits	of	such	an	encounter	then	is	the	problem	of	translation,	exclusivity	and	reach.	But	given	the	extended	contacts	that	are	being	formed	there	are	growing	networks	(across	countries,	borders)	and	clusters	(within	geographical	spaces)	of	like-minded	individuals	and	organizations	who	variously	pursue	the	goals	of	intercultural	dialogue	and	understanding.			
Encountering	the	EuroMed:	Programming	intercultural	dialogue	The	Mediterranean	has	long	been	considered	as	a	faultline	–	even	before	Huntington’s	pivotal	and	controversial	‘clash	of	civilisations’	thesis.	Influenced	in	some	part	by	this	new	discourse	of	cultures,	the	Barcelona	Process	was	envisaged	as	a	way	to	prevent	the	inevitable	clash	between	cultures	on	either	shore.	The	inclusion	of	the	cultural	basket	alongside	the	political	and	economic	baskets	was	intended	to	institutionalize	some	form	of	harmony	between	Mediterranean	cultures	and	direct	the	relations	towards	the	impetus	of	economic	and	political	integration.	Following	the	terrorist	attacks	on	New	York	in	2001	the	cultural	dimension	took	on	renewed	significance	and	the	European	
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Commission	brought	together	a	group	of	experts	to	determine	some	priorities	going	forward.	Out	of	this	remarkable	meeting	of	some	prominent	thinkers	there	were	several	important	and	tricky	objectives	outlined	which	made	intercultural	dialogue	central	to	the	process	of	reconciliation	and	sustained	collaboration.	The	‘Groupe	des	Sages’	Report	established	a	particular	framing	of	transnationalism	in	order	to	combat	a	series	of	issues	facing	Mediterranean	societies.	The	Groupe	argued	for	the	establishment	of	“transnational	institutions	and	cooperation	flows”	that	were	capable	of	“transcending	and	defying	those	states”,	“new	relationships	between	cultural	identity	and	citizenship”,	and	the	“emergence	of	open	and	pluralistic	public	spaces	in	the	countries	on	the	south	side	of	the	Mediterranean”	(Report	of	the	High	Level	Advisory	Group	2003,	8).	And	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	can	act	as	a	central	institution	to	pursue	these	objectives	and	drive	the	process	of	building	transnational	cooperation.	However,	when	put	into	action	in	the	geopolitical	context	and	given	the	organizational	structure	of	the	Foundation	transnationalism	was	transformed	into	something	more	circumscribed	(as	discussed	in	Chapter	6).	This	interpretation	of	transnationalism	may	also	have	its	roots	in	the	2003	report.	As	argued	by	Martin	Griffin	and	Constance	DeVereux	(2013),	cultural	policy	discourses	reflect	a	dichotomy	between	globalization	and	transnationalism.	Where	globalization	is	often	defined	in	policy	discourses	as	a	negative	process	of	economic	struggle	and	a	threat	to	local	processes,	transnationalism	“may	be	seen	as	one	effort	to	correct	the	consequences	of	those	threats	and	to	circumvent	their	challenges”	(Griffin	and	DeVereux	2013,	chapter	1).	This	dichotomy	of	problem-solution	is	evident	in	the	report.	For	example,	globalization	is	defined	as	a	process	“exacerbating	feelings	of	relegation	and	marginalization”	through	the	exacerbation	of	existing	societal	instabilities,	the	intensification	of	financial	interdependency,	and	as	a	result	to	the	potential	conflict	between	standardization	and	fragmentation	(Report	of	the	High	Level	Advisory	Group	2003,	15).	On	the	other	hand,	transnationalism	–	ie:	the	expansion	of	cultural	cooperation	through	networking,	exchange	and	common	projects	–	is	provided	as	a	corrective	to	these	problems.	Of	course,	it	is	not	expressed	as	some	kind	of	‘deus	ex	machina’	for	all	of	the	problems	facing	Mediterranean	societies,	however	it	is	an	essential	ingredient	to	finding	solutions.	This	framing	has	consequences	for	the	evolution	of	policy	
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especially	concerning	the	relationship	between	transnational	actors	and	states.	For	example,	within	the	ALF’s	intercultural	strategy	the	national	dimension	to	networking	is	prominent.	The	transnational	dimension	may	be	put	at	risk	of	being	effectively	limited	to	the	involvement	of	the	national	network	in	regional	programmes	that	require	minimal	mobility	and	exchange.	Control	of	the	frame	is	thus	very	significant	in	influencing	future	developments.	The	organized	intercultural	encounter	provides	a	potential	setting	for	this	struggle	where	the	interests	and	identities	of	institutional	and	transnational	actors	come	together	under	the	aegis	of	a	dominant	framing	with	which	participants	are	expected	to	interact.	This	framing	affects	the	way	in	which	key	themes	and	issues	are	understood	such	as	gender,	mobility,	networking,	development,	diversity	etc.		The	Forum	puts	into	practice	and	works	to	clarify	some	of	the	ways	in	which	intercultural	dialogue	functions	as	a	discourse	of	institutionalization	for	civil	society	relations	and	developing	shared	ownership	among	societies	across	the	Mediterranean	sea	in	parallel	with	already	established	political	and	economic	agreements.	The	time	and	place	of	the	ALF	Forum,	which	coincided	with	the	first	meeting	of	Union	for	the	Mediterranean	Heads	of	Parliament	on	the	6-7	April	in	Marseille,	was	symbolic	of	the	central	role	and	close	institutional	relationships	that	the	ALF	is	hoped	to	assume,	certainly	among	many	in	the	ALF	and	the	European	Union.	In	a	promotional	article,	co-written	by	Martin	Schulz	(President	of	the	European	Parliament)	and	Andre	Azoulay	(Former-President	of	the	ALF),	they	highlight	the	necessity	of	building	a	“union	for	the	peoples	of	the	Mediterranean”,	implying	that	the	ALF	can	act	as	a	primary	advocate	for	its	development	within	the	current	political	frameworks,	a	privileged	partner	for	promoting	the	development	of	bottom-up	initiatives.	This	is	not	a	radical	vision	but	a	highly	pragmatic	call	for	inclusion	of	civil	society	representatives	and	a	focus	on	important	areas	of	culture,	education,	unemployment	and	other	major	social	and	cultural	issues.	The	importance	of	social	and	cultural	issues	is	linked	not	solely	to	an	allusion	to	abstract	common	values	but	to	factors	such	as	the	impact	of	economic	deprivation:		The	debt	crisis	in	Europe	has	shaken	people,	politics	and	institutions	and	resulted	in	rampant	unemployment	that	is	particularly	affecting	the	continent’s	youth.	The	political	costs	include	an	increasing	sense	of	powerlessness,	an	increasing	distrust	towards	politics,	and	a	worrying	increase	in	intolerance	against	people	of	different	beliefs	or	ethnicities.	(Schulz	and	Azoulay	2013)	
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	The	political	basis	of	such	talk	is	important	because	it	highlights	a	tension	at	the	core	of	ALF	programming.	There	is	a	desire	within	the	European	Commission	for	the	ALF	to	be	a	more	vocal	political	actor,	however	this	is	limited	by	the	reality	of	the	political	contexts	within	which	the	ALF	and	its	networks	exist.	In	Egypt,	where	the	ALF	HQ	is	located,	the	state	of	political	freedoms	have	regressed	rather	than	improved	since	the	initial	uprisings	in	2011.	What	political	decisions	have	been	made	result	from	the	impact	of	budget	constraints,	negotiations,	and	strategic	planning.			
Institutional	Context	and	Citizenship		The	ALF	Civil	Forum	highlights	a	range	of	pressures	and	objectives.	Simply	within	the	objectives	of	the	Forum	there	is	a	balancing	act	taking	place.	In	practice,	the	normative	core	of	intercultural	dialogue	is	important	insofar	as	it	hinges	upon	a	critical	belief	that	the	horizontal	opening	of	societies	can	precede	and,	moreover,	contribute	towards	political	cohesion	and	top-down	forms	of	integration.	Here,	evoking	the	existence	and	role	of	regional	citizens	is	performative	of	an	alternative	approach	to	regional	integration	–	and	one	vastly	different	from	the	historical	European	experience.	This	postcolonial	rendering,	however,	also	faces	the	constraints	imposed	by	budget	(and	the	resulting	institutional	relationships)	and	political	context.	Thus,	the	reality	is	something	in	between	where,	for	example,	the	hope	of	transnational	empowerment	is	something	tempered	but	the	politics	of	the	resulting	interactions	are	significant.		Since	the	Arab	uprisings	institutional	relationships	have	changed	in	response	to	evolving	interests	and	objectives	in	both	the	European	Commission	and	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation.	This	is	reflected	in	the	broadened	notion	of	‘intercultural	strategy’,	which	places	culture	firmly	within	the	objectives	of	democratization	and	development	establishing	a	political	and	economic	framing	of	cultural	issues.	In	terms	of	the	institutional	environment,	the	intercultural	strategy	designates	a	role	for	different	Directorate-Generals	from	the	European	Commission	–	DGs	DEVCO,	RELEX	and	EAC	–	where	you	have	organizational	division	between	socio-economic	development,	external	political	relations,	and	cultural	and	education	policy	as	well	as	the	External	Action	Service,	which	to	a	large	extent	coordinates	
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this	relationship	by	organizing	routine	meetings	and	maintaining	regular	exchanges	with	the	ALF	secretariat.	In	other	words,	the	intercultural	strategy	is	an	interinstitutional	plan	insofar	as	it	explicitly	demarcates	the	partner	status	of	the	ALF	with	other	regional	and	international	organizations.	The	organization	of	the	forum	reflects	these	objectives	and	the	inclusion	and	involvement	of	EU	and	other	officials	during	the	Forum’s	proceedings	raise	additional	considerations	about	the	evolving	relationship	between	the	ALF	and	other	regional	bodies.	This	objective	is	set	out	clearly	in	the	Foreword	to	the	ALF	Civil	Forum	2013	Program:	“In	collaboration	with	our	partners,	we	facilitated	the	convergence	of	the	Forum	with	a	Meeting	of	Regional	Authorities	and	a	Summit	of	Heads	of	the	National	Parliaments	of	the	region.”	In	this	capacity,	the	ALF	secretariat	has	demonstrated	a	clear	willingness	to	exert	the	Foundation’s	presence	at	the	heart	of	regional	integration.	The	ALF	secretariat	appears	to	have	set	itself	a	significant	task.	Major	constraints	exist	–	from	budget	to	political	context	–	however	at	the	heart	of	the	ALF’s	programming	is	the	hope	that	societal	opening	can	precede	rather	than	progress	from	top-down	integration.	This	hope	is	expressed	in	a	postcolonial	vision	of	the	Mediterranean	based	on	the	transnational	empowerment	of	regional	societies	and	a	horizontal	opening	autonomous	from	liberalization	policies	(Nicolaidis	2007,	184-5).		The	ALF	Forum,	ultimately,	is	an	opportunity	for	regional	civil	societies,	academics,	NGOs	and	other	transnational	actors	to	engage	with	the	agenda	established	as	a	result	of	these	relationships	and	consultation	processes.	One	of	the	fundamental	criticisms	leveled	towards	the	ALF	is	its	conferral	upon	government	officials	the	right	to	speak	in	the	name	of	specific	cultures.	In	order	to	counter	this	perception,	national	network	building	and	member	surveys,	consultation	workshops	and	regional	programmes,	and	the	ALF	Forum	act	as	avenues	through	which	participants	can	inject	their	own	goals	and	vision.	The	influence	of	cultural	policy	and	funding,	organizational	structure	and	environment	have	implications	for	the	quality	of	networking	and	representation	that	is	on	display	at	events	such	as	the	ALF	Forum.	However,	another	key	objective	of	the	Forum	alters	this	perspective	and	that	is	the	allusion	to	citizenship.	The	Forum	was	developed	around	the	idea	of	a	common	citizenship	–	‘Citizens	for	the	Mediterranean’	–	that	could	be	mobilized	in	support	of	
	 179	
‘resisting	regressive	forces’,	‘contributing	to	feed	the	gap	of	mutual	ignorance’	and	to	boost	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean	through	active	participation	(Foreword	2013).			
Forum	Program	and	Overview	The	official	schedule	was	organized	into	different	segments.	Over	the	course	of	the	entire	event	an	intercultural	fair	took	place	in	the	exposition	hall	outside	the	main	auditorium.	The	fair	allowed	member	organizations	to	setup	displays	and	distribute	materials	presenting	projects	and	initiatives.	In	most	cases	displays	were	unmanned	for	the	majority	of	the	event	but	tables	provided	official	pamphlets,	dvds,	stickers,	reports	and	other	written	materials.	Coffee	breaks	and	lunch	took	place	in	a	long,	open-plan	room	adjacent	to	the	main	auditorium.	This	space	–	espace	vieux-port	–	opened	out	onto	a	patio	area	overlooking	the	port	of	Marseille.	Other	facilities	included	an	artistic	point	exhibiting	different	works	each	day,	a	general	prayer	room,	press	room,	VIP	room	and	networking	area.	All	panels	and	exchange	events	took	place	during	Friday	and	Saturday	sessions	beginning	at	9am	and	ending	at	7:30pm.	Thursday	consisted	of	a	meeting	of	local	authorities	on	the	topic	of	‘youth	and	change’,	an	official	inauguration	and	a	musical	performance.	Sunday	consisted	of	a	morning	session	held	from	9am	to	1:30pm	which	presented	the	official	conclusions	and	some	notable	observations	on	panels	made	by	rapporteurs	from	the	ALF	administration	This	Closing	ceremony	coincided	with	a	Summit	of	the	Presidents	of	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean	Parliaments.	This	allowed	the	Former-President,	Andre	Azoulay,	the	opportunity	to	present	the	official	conclusions	to	the	Summit.	Thursday	and	Friday	were	broken	down	into	three	different	sessions.	The	mornings	consisted	of	the	Agora.	Based	upon	the	Greek	origins	of	the	term,	the	Agora	was	designed	to	be	an	open	space	of	debate	and	dialogue	divided	into	two	sections.	Strategic	debates	took	place	between	9am	and	10:30am	in	one	of	three	auditoriums.	Each	day	three	debates	took	place	simultaneously	bringing	together	academics,	experts,	practitioners	and	institutions	to	debate	topical	issues	related	to	regional	prospects.	The	late	morning	session	–	11am-1:30pm	–	consisted	of	thematic	workshops,	each	organized	according	to	one	of	the	themes	established	by	the	preparatory	meetings.	These	workshops	mostly	took	place	in	smaller	break-out	
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rooms	and	were	intended	to	be	the	arena	for	identifying	proposals	for	future	actions	and	directions	in	EuroMed	cooperation	identifying	actions	that	could	be	taken	by	the	ALF	and	its	networks.		The	objectives	of	the	afternoon	session	differed	between	the	two	days.	Both	afternoon	sessions	were	organized	under	an	Arabic	word	–	medina	–	literally	translating	to	‘city’	but	generally	referring	to	the	old	walled	sections	of	major	cities.	The	Thursday	Medina	had	several	sessions	on	good	practice	intended	to	identify	recommendations	for	practitioners	and	donors	on	building	sustainable	partnerships	and	effective	participation.	The	Friday	Medina	aimed	to	establish	a	space	for	presenting	project	ideas	and	an	opportunity	for	collaboration	and	exchange.	The	Medina	sessions,	like	the	Agora	sessions,	were	also	organized	according	to	the	themes	established	by	the	preparatory	meetings	with	eleven	simultaneous	panels	taking	place	each	afternoon	(two	panels	for	the	
civil	society	theme).	As	mentioned,	the	morning	sessions	took	place	in	one	of	three	auditoriums	and	the	late-morning	and	afternoon	sessions	generally	took	place	in	smaller	breakout	rooms	on	level	1&2	of	the	Palais,	or	in	one	of	two	smaller	rooms	immediately	outside	the	main	auditorium.	However,	late-morning	and	one	of	the	two	afternoon	civil	society	sessions	each	day	took	place	in	one	of	the	auditoriums	used	for	one	of	the	strategic	debates.	These	panels	were	given	clear	emphasis.	Listed	as	being	organized	in	conjunction	with	the	European	Economic	and	Social	Committee,	European	External	Action	Service,	European	Commission	and	League	of	Arab	States	this	priority	could	be	seen	as	being	a	result	of	institutional	influence,	however,	they	were	also	popular	among	attendees.		During	the	course	of	proceedings	groups	formed	quite	quickly	around	the	variables	of	age,	gender,	religious/cultural	background	and	profession.	Though	there	was	steady	mingling	between	groups,	during	breaks	and	lunch	participants	often	retreated	first	into	a	comfortable	environment.	The	Espace-Vieux	Port	–	where	lunch	was	held	each	day	–	centered	on	an	invisible	boundary	across	which	there	was	constant	flow	but	a	subjectively	different	makeup.	The	room	held	two	large	serving	stations	for	drinks	with	food	often	stationed	on	additional	tables	around	the	exterior	walls.	Initially	it	appeared	as	though	the	stations	might	cater	to	culturally	sensitive	diets	as	the	participant	makeup	differed	greatly	from	one	
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end	of	the	room	to	the	other.	This	was	not	the	case	and	did	in	fact	ease	to	some	extent	towards	the	end	of	Saturday’s	proceedings,	though	preformed	groups	continued	to	dominate.	Young	participants	(largely	from	North	Africa	and	Middle	East)	were	especially	prone	to	grouping,	though	in	some	cases	were	also	more	prone	to	do	so	as	a	result	of	attending	as	part	of	a	larger	group	like	Young	Arab	Voices.	Interactions	with	younger	participants	were	much	more	likely	to	be	relaxed,	social	and	inquisitive	in	most	cases	concluding	with	an	exchange	of	email	address	and/or	details	on	how	to	find	each	other	on	Facebook.	Many	of	the	older	participants,	on	the	other	hand,	especially	those	representing	small	NGOs	and/or	community	organizations	took	a	more	targeted	and	professional	approach	identifying	specific	projects	and	ideas	in	order	to	pursue	possible	collaboration	with	representatives.	Intersecting	these	boundaries	was	a	cadre	of	serial	networkers	consisting	of	individuals,	social	entrepreneurs,	media,	academics,	and	representatives	of	partner	organizations	–	such	as	the	Goethe	Foundation	–	handing	out	business	cards,	making	small	talk	and	in	some	cases	exchanging	small	gifts.	ALF	administrative	staff	largely	stuck	together	outside	of	panel	discussions	and	held	various	duties	over	the	course	of	the	event	keeping	them	occupied.	There	appeared	to	be	a	significantly	larger	constituency	of	young	people	among	members	from	non-European	networks	than	from	Europe.	Though	the	focus	on	youth	is	a	central	component	of	the	ALF’s	platform,	it	is	problematic	if	this	priority	only	exists	outside	European	networks	as	it	risks	portraying	relations	as	that	of	teacher-student.	Such	an	age	divide	at	the	Forum	could	have	resulted	in	lower	levels	of	networking	and	satisfaction	among	younger	participants.			
ALF	Forum:	Network	participation	in	numbers	Numbers	can	offer	an	accurate	account	of	certain	features	of	an	event	offering	a	broad	depiction	of	the	constituency	and	participants,	which	can	be	broken	up	according	to	individual	characteristics.	It	also	offers	a	benign	approach	to	measuring	dominant	themes	and	concepts	that	arise	during	the	proceedings.	In	so	doing,	numbers	can	be	a	beneficial	starting	point	allowing	a	crucial	first	step	in	explaining	key	features	and	trends	over	the	course	of	a	multi-day	event.	
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Supplemented	by	thicker	description	and	observation	(as	will	be	provided	in	the	subsequent	section)	these	potentially	take	on	even	greater	significance.			 	
Chart	1.	Key	Numbers		 																 Graph	1.1	shows	the	top	ten	participant	countries	excluding	the	largest	participant,	and	host	country,	France	whose	high	total	of	355	skews	the	results	significantly	to	the	high	end	of	the	graph.	Many	of	France’s	355	participants	were	also	on	staff	either	from	the	ALF	working	in	various	administrative	and	organizational	roles,	representatives	of	local	and	regional	French	administrative	bodies,	local	journalists,	and	politicians.	Just	over	100	French	participants	listed	in	the	official	programme	represented	either	a	city	administration	(ex:	Ville	de	Marseille),	a	regional	body	(ex:	Marseille-Provence)	or	the	French	government.	The	total	does	not	reflect	the	general	interest	in	the	French	network	but	demonstrates	two	additional	factors:	the	local	bias	of	any	major	event	and	the	decision	by	the	secretariat	to	have	the	event	coincide	with	a	meeting	of	Regional	Authorities	and	the	celebration	of	the	European	Capital	of	Culture	–	Marseille.			
• 3,400	individuals	mobilised	in	the	
preparation	
• 1,374	participants	during	the	Forum	
• 46	countries	represented	
• 48	sessions	and	debates	over	140	hours	
• 214	interventions	and	contributions	
• 110	experts,	moderators,	and	rapporteurs	
• 64	good	practices	and	project	ideas	
presented	
• 99	stands	of	civil	society	and	ALF	partners	
• 7	artistic	events	throughout	the	Forum	
• 200	partners	and	institutions	
• 191,522	twitter	accounts	reached	
• More	than	55	media	pieces	produced	
Key	Numbers	(official	conclusions)	
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		 When	the	countries	are	clustered	by	region	(i.e.:	Northern	Mediterranean	and	Southern	Mediterranean)	the	numbers	are	also	interesting.	The	Southern	Mediterranean	group	contains	13	countries	(Algeria,	Albania,	Egypt,	Israel,	Jordan,	Lebanon,	Libya,	Mauritania,	Morocco,	Palestine,	Syria,	Tunisia,	Turkey)	and	the	Northern	Mediterranean	group	32	countries	(28	EU	member	states	plus	Bosnia	Herzegovina,	Montenegro,	Switzerland	and	Monaco).	The	larger	latter	group	had	711	participants	compared	to	296	for	the	former,	exhibiting	the	larger	number	of	networks.	However,	the	average	number	of	participants	for	each	group	is	almost	precisely	equal	-	22.77	for	the	Southern	Mediterranean	group	and	22.22	for	the	Northern	Mediterranean	group.	Perhaps	unsurprisingly,	the	countries	at	or	near	the	top	of	the	list	in	terms	of	participants	also	have	larger	national	networks	from	which	to	draw	participation.	Each	group	is	represented	in	an	equitable	manner.	This	likely	reflects	a	clear	attempt	by	the	ALF	secretariat	to	select	participants	in	a	way	that	represents	the	entire	network,	however	it	raises	its	own	issues.	As	one	of	the	central	objectives	of	the	ALF	programming	and	guidelines	has	been	to	pivot	towards	networking	between	the	southern	countries	the	Foundation	would	have	been	justified	in	achieving	a	higher	proportion	of	participants	from	non-EU	members.	Moreover,	it	raises	the	possibility	that	potential	participants	were	excluded	on	the	basis	of	quotas	rather	than	contribution.			
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Table	3.	Top	20	Total	Participants	Rank	 Country	 Participants	1	 France	 355	2	 Spain	 45	3	 Egypt	 42	4	 Morocco	 40	5	 Jordan	 34	6	 Italy,	Tunisia	 32	8	 Palestine	 28	9	 UK	 27	10	 Germany,	Turkey	 26	12	 Lebanon	 25	13	 Belgium	 24	14	 Algeria	 22	15	 Sweden	 20	16	 Libya	 15	17	 Poland	 14	18	 Croatia,	Israel	 12	
20	 Finland,	Greece,	Mauritania,	Netherlands,	Portugal	 11			 It	is	difficult	to	fully	verify	the	final	numbers	and	types	of	participant	for	the	event.	Some	conclusions	can	be	drawn	by	looking	at	the	official	participant	list	but	it	should	be	noted	that	this	is	far	from	a	perfect	approach.	First,	it	relies	upon	information	provided	by	the	participant	at	time	of	registration.	The	problem	of	omission	is	one	particular	issue	where	the	participant	either	refuses	to	provide	affiliation	details	or	refuses	to	be	included	on	the	official	list	(it	is	not	clear	whether	this	was	possible,	however	a	discrepancy	in	official	numbers	makes	it	a	possibility).	This	raises	a	problem	when	categorizing	participants	and	providing	a	final	count.	There	are	potential	problems	in	categorizing	organizations	according	to	their	status	and	function	especially	where	only	
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abbreviations	are	provided.	In	most	cases,	searching	the	ALF	member	database	or	using	a	web	search	helped	to	clear	up	uncertainty.	Where	this	was	unsuccessful,	attempts	were	made	to	contact	the	organization,	though	this	method	was	rarely	used	because	an	inability	to	find	information	either	via	ALF	or	the	web	meant	it	was	not	possible	to	locate	contact	details	either.	With	these	issues	in	mind,	looking	at	the	official	participant	list	provides	a	useful	understanding	of	representation.			
Table	4.	Civil	Forum	Participant	Breakdown
	Table	3	lists	total	participants	from	each	national	network.	This	is	a	critical	aspect	that	can	clarify	who	is	being	represented.	The	final	numbers	are	interesting	because	they	reveal	a	balancing	of	official	bodies	including	ministerial	representatives,	local	authorities	and	regional/international	institutions	with	private	actors	and	non-governmental	organizations.	The	call	for	participation	consisted	of	two	rounds:	the	first	round,	disseminated	in	December	2012,	was	exclusive	to	ALF	Network	members	and	resulted	in	the	selection	of	220	network	members	plus	an	additional	50	members	from	France.	A	second	
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call	for	participation	was	sent	out	in	February	2013.	This	call	was	open	to	non-network	members	and	did	not	specify	a	final	number.	As	previously	mentioned,	because	of	some	cases	where	affiliation	was	unclear	the	final	numbers	are	approximate	and	offer	an	understanding	of	dynamics	rather	than	a	clear	final	picture.	That	being	said,	grouping	private	actors,	NGOs	and	individuals	together	helps	to	overcome	some	of	the	lack	of	clarity	in	cases	where	organizational	status	was	not	obvious.	Doing	so	also	follows	the	ALF’s	membership	criteria	and,	as	a	result,	is	a	reasonable	approach	to	grouping	Forum	participants.	Numbers	associated	with	official	institutions	and	project	are	more	accurate	as	they	were	clearly	affiliated	on	the	participant	list.	The	total	number	of	participants	according	to	the	official	list	is	1282	(see	Table	4)	–	slightly	less	than	the	number	quoted	in	the	official	conclusions.	There	was	at	least	one	ministerial	representative	from	every	country	except	for	Switzerland	and	Bulgaria.	If	we	group	together	NGOs,	individuals	(including	freelance	journalists	and	academics),	and	private	organizations	this	represented	a	little	less	than	half	of	participants	with	approximately	615.	Government	and	public	actors	added	up	to	roughly	208	participants	whereas	local/regional	authorities	and	international	institutions	made	up	326	participants.	The	Forum	also	included	21	participants	from	the	Young	Arab	Voices	project,	96	local	volunteers	and	16	representatives	of	the	ALF	administration.	Interestingly,	a	significant	proportion	of	participants	come	from	some	form	of	official	body	–national,	local,	or	international.	Representatives	of	governing	bodies	almost	equal	the	number	of	ALF	members	and	non-network	civil	society	participants.	It	is	evident	that	the	ALF	Forum	is	not	just	a	space	intended	to	bring	together	network	participants.	In	practice,	it	is	at	least	a	symbolic	foundation	for	political	dialogue	by	bringing	together	representatives	of	national	and	international	bodies.	Given	the	strict	selection	process	for	participants,	intercultural	dialogue	stems	from	this	foundational	basis.	Amidst	these	agendas,	it	might	also	be	suggested	that	an	event	such	as	the	Civil	Forum	risks	being	treated	as	window-dressing	and	an	opportunity	to	monitor	proceedings	while	paying	lip-service	to	the	objectives	of	dialogue	and	exchange.	What	space	does	this	leave	for	promoting	dialogue?			
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The	Civil	Forum:	Narratives	of	encounter	“Convoked	every	three	years	Forum	is	an	innovative	and	participative	space	for	debate,	networking	and	good	practice	exchange	on	intercultural	dialogue	initiatives.	The	Forum	is	the	first	regional	gathering	of	its	kind	since	the	historic	events	of	the	Arab	Awakening	and	the	social	impact	of	the	eurozone-crisis”	(Day	1	Launch	Highlights).	
	Perhaps	the	best	response	to	the	question	ending	the	previous	section	comes	from	a	participant	reacting	to	the	influence	of	the	European	Commission	on	the	Forum’s	agenda:	“What	is	important	is	to	advocate	for	transparency,	equal	opportunities	and	accountability.	It	is	then	up	to	people	to	see	what	is	best	they	can	take	from	it,	how	they	can	influence	it	and	assess	its	utility	and	function.”	Participants	are	free	to	exert	their	agency	within	the	context	provided.	This	might	seem	too	constraining	but	it	addresses	another	theme	that	was	apparent	among	the	contributions	of	participants	and	it	mirrors	a	key	finding	from	the	2014	Intercultural	Trends	Report	(organized	by	Gallup	and	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation)	that	youth	participating	in	the	polls	displayed	an	attitude	that	is	“more	pragmatic,	less	ideological,	and	more	utilitarian”	(Khadri	2014,	53).	The	previous	quote	from	the	Forum	participant	suggests	some	attempt	to	influence	the	agenda	of	policy-makers.	However,	the	most	important	aspect	points	toward	a	creative	approach	to	participation	not	necessarily	bound	by	the	desire	to	exert	pressure	on	governance	structures	–	the	traditional	civil-political	model.	For	youth,	economic	issues	alongside	innovation	and	entrepreneurship	topped	the	list	of	possible	benefits	of	dealing	with	other	countries	(Ibid).	These	concerns	can	be	found	in	the	contrbutions	of	participants	for	whom	the	experience	is	personal	as	well	as	political	and	relies	upon	the	ingenuity	of	the	participant	to	uncover	opportunity.	The	encounter	realizes	this	essential	hybridity	of	positions	that	does	not	easily	fit	the	bounded	cultural	categories	assumed	by	intercultural	dialogue.	The	main	theme	‘Citizens	of	the	Mediterranean’	presents	the	forum	in	a	political	context	where	the	participants	–	in	their	autonomous	interactions	–	can	create	the	embryonic	discourses	of	a	regional	public	sphere.	This	section	will	draw	upon	observations	and	analysis	of	key	documents	that	provide	insight	into	the	interests	and	identities	of	different	actors	and	how	they	perceive	regional	networks	and	their	role	within	their	ongoing	development.	The	forum	is	a	microcosm	for	networking	within	a	specific	institutional	context	–	that	of	the	
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Euro-Mediterranean.	The	forum	covered	a	wide	range	of	topics	and	themes	inspired	by	the	hopes	of	greater	openness	and	opportunity	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	massive	political	mobilization	and	ongoing	conflicts	on	the	Eastern	and	Southern	shores	of	the	Mediterranean.	Across	these	topics	the	agenda-setting	power	of	dominants	frames	are	evident,	which	necessitate	an	understanding	of	the	connection	between	institutional	environment	and	organizational	interests	and	the	narratives,	performances	and	relations	of	participating	members.	This	approach	allows	us	to	recognize	the	organic	emergence	of	alternative	frames	within	the	act	of	participation.	These	different	opinions,	expressions	and	interests	reveal	the	complexities	of	defining	a	singular	space	and	highlight	the	ways	in	which	alternative	frames	are	articulated	through	a	reference	to	common	interests.	This	section	will	discuss	four	themes	that	have	emerged	in	the	act	of	observation.	Though	these	themes	intersect	with	the	official	objectives	of	the	Forum	they	are	not	articulated	solely	on	the	basis	of	this	agenda.	The	themes,	based	upon	the	critical	observations	of	the	researcher,	have	been	articulated	with	attention	to	the	interactions	between	participants.	They	reveal	the	ways	in	which	those	participants	engage	with,	reject	and	alter	existing	narratives.	Presenting	these	alternative	accounts	helps	to	understand	the	relative	successes	of	the	forum,	its	shortcomings,	and	its	biases,	which	are	evident	when	comparing	proceedings	to	official	conclusions.	The	themes	presented	here	also	raises	issues	central	to	the	organized	cultural	encounter.	Can	this	kind	of	contained	activism	lead	to	real	avenues	for	horizontal	opening?	How	much	dialogue	takes	place	between	top-down	and	bottom-up	narratives?	How	does	participation	affect	outcomes	and	objectives?			 There	are	shortcomings	to	this	approach,	based	upon	participant	observation.	The	subjective	nature	of	observation	must	be	countered	by	strict	methods	of	note	taking,	recording,	selection	and	analysis.	Though	the	biases	of	the	researcher	cannot	be	eliminated	entirely,	these	methods	provide	some	measure	of	objectivity	and	crucial	insight	into	why	specific	decisions	were	taken.	In	the	context	of	a	three-day	event,	there	are	additional	problems.	The	high	density	of	panels	and	events	made	observing	the	Forum	in	its	entirety	impossible.	As	a	result,	the	observations	are	based	on	a	highly	selective	approach	reflecting	the	core	objectives	of	the	research	project.	For	this	reason,	the	
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following	discussion	and	resulting	conclusions	are	not	intended	to	disqualify	or	suggest	that	other	aspects	were	not	important.	On	the	contrary,	the	goal	is	to	highlight	complexity	rather	than	diminish	it	by	neatly	summarizing	the	Forum.	The	panels/events	attended	were	selected	to	capture	specific	criteria:	the	inclusion	of	regional	bodies,	attitudes	towards	and	interpretations	of	the	EuroMed,	role	of	civil	society	and	expressions	of	diversity.	While	there	is	considerable	crosscutting	of	themes	this	process	of	selection	has	led	to	the	exclusion	of	important	issues	from	this	research.	The	themes	of	gender,	youth,	education	and	media	do	not	receive	detailed	analysis,	as	they	are	peripheral	to	the	narrow	objectives	of	the	research.		The	main	Forum	themes	originated	during	the	process	of	consultation	prior	to	the	ALF	Forum,	whereby	a	series	of	workshops	were	organized	in	different	countries	around	specific	issues	in	order	to	begin	a	dialogue.	The	preparatory	meetings	began	with	the	theme	of	youth.	Held	in	Istanbul,	the	meeting	engaged	working	groups	to	discuss	ways	to	increase	the	participation	of	youth	within	the	ALF’s	4D	strategy	–	Dialogue,	Diversity,	Democracy,	and	Development.	The	conclusions	to	be	further	explored	at	the	forum	focused	on	increasing	mobility,	developing	citizenship	projects	and	promoting	the	development	of	exchange	through	forum	and	new	media.	A	subsequent	meeting	held	in	the	Moroccan	city	of	Casablanca	explored	proposals	on	how	to	include	the	theme	of	women.	Examining	successes	such	as	taking	a	leading	role	in	the	field	of	social	media	as	well	as	cultural	stereotypes	and	political	challenges	the	meeting	sought	to	provide	proposals	for	the	empowerment	of	women	in	promoting	dialogue.	The	preparatory	meeting	on	social	movements,	held	in	Luxembourg,	initiated	a	lively	debate	bringing	together	activists	from	‘arab	spring’	countries	and	the	European	indignado	movements.	The	meeting	explored	the	different	contexts	of	organizing	across	the	region	and	strategic	approaches	following	the	global	crisis	concluding	with	a	common	focus	on	dialogue	and	shared	experience	to	promote	dignity,	freedom	and	peace.	The	meeting	on	the	
institutional	dimension,	held	in	Cairo,	sought	to	place	the	ALF	firmly	within	the	context	of	inter-institutional	cooperation	with	regional	and	local	authorities	including	the	League	of	Arab	States,	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean,	the	EU	and	various	national	and	local	governments.	The	meeting	provided	a	clear	mandate	
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for	the	inclusion	of	authorities	in	each	dimension	of	the	forum	and	reinforced	the	multilateral	character	of	the	organization.	The	penultimate	meeting	on	media,	held	in	Barcelona,	aimed	at	developing	a	strong	network	of	international	and	alternative	media	to	counter	threats	to	media	freedom	promoting	increased	access	for	grass-roots	citizen	journalists.	Held	in	Algiers	a	month	before	the	Forum	commenced,	the	final	preparatory	meeting	discussed	the	theme	of	
migration.	Discussion	focused	on	the	issue	of	diversity	in	Mediterranean	societies	and	increasing	public	exposure	to	and	understanding	of	different	identities.	Recommendations	were	provided	with	regard	to	education	and	participation	but	also	legal	means	for	promoting	migrant	rights.	These	preparatory	meetings	established	the	working	structure	for	the	Forum,	whereby	panels	were	organized	according	to	these	themes.	They	also	established	the	focus	points	for	advocacy	in	the	official	conclusions.			
Word	Cloud	1.1	Word	Frequency	From	Official	Program	
		
Critical	discourses	on	Europe	A	theme	that	emerged	during	multiple	panels	concerned	the	presence	and	identity	of	Europe	in	relation	to	its	Mediterranean	neighbors.	This	critical	evaluation	of	European	culture	was	central	to	a	panel	organized	under	the	headline	of	diversity	titled	‘Do	we	all	live	on	the	Mediterranean?’	Organized	by	the	ALF	Head	of	Network,	Poland,	and	a	member	of	the	ALF	Advisory	Council,	the	panel	presented	a	wide-ranging	discussion	on	heritage,	culture	and	identity.	During	this	discussion	a	theme	was	reintroduced,	which	had	also	come	up	in	the	morning	strategic	debate.	The	relationship	between	Europe	and	the	
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Mediterranean	(implied	in	the	EuroMediterranean	framework)	has	largely	been	discussed	from	one	direction	–	the	influence	that	Europe	has	on	its	Southern	neighbors.	However,	over	the	course	of	the	Forum	this	relationship	was	gradually	reversed.	As	expressed	during	the	panel	discussion,	the	EuroMediterranean	should	focus	on	helping	Europe	overcome	its	‘Manichean	identity’	referring	to	a	dualist	image	of	European	culture.	Developing	new	heritage	projects	focusing	on	the	Mediterranean	origins	of	Northern	European	peoples	and	cultures	was	proposed	as	an	essential	component	of	cultural	dialogue	within	the	EuroMediterranean	framework.	Rather	than	addressing	this	system	as	a	political	framework	for	countries	south	of	the	European	Union,	it	should	also	address	cultural	conflict	and	heritage	within	Europe.	The	morning	session	had	laid	a	good	foundation	for	this	discussion.	The	debate	covered	issues	including	the	transformation	of	language,	images	of	the	Mediterranean,	and	philosophical	and	cultural	exchange.	Following	a	presentation	examining	exchange	between	rational	philosophers	in	the	Greek	and	Arab	worlds,	discussion	turned	to	Islamic	roots	in	European	culture.	The	need	to	recapture	the	judeo-christian-islamic	origins	of	European	culture	instead	of	the	judeo-christian	dualism	that	is	typically	espoused	was	expressed	in	multiple	arenas	over	the	three	days.	While	it	is	a	point	that	was	not	included	in	the	official	conclusions	or	highlights,	it	was	picked	up	on	by	numerous	participants	from	cultural	institutes	and	European	organizations	as	an	opportunity	for	collaboration.			
The	Mediterranean	Heuristic	This	discourse	on	Europe	is	constructive	in	seeking	to	establish	a	new	foundation	for	understanding	cultural	boundaries	and	exploring	new	political	identities.	As	the	final	section	of	chapter	6	attests,	members	of	ALF	networks	have	a	critical	and	often	ambiguous	relationship	with	the	Mediterranean.	This	difficulty	in	addressing	the	significance	of	the	term	continued	throughout	the	Forum	discussions.	What	is	clear	about	the	use	of	the	‘Mediterranean’	as	a	marker	is	that	it	is	fundamentally	ambiguous.	Unsurprisingly,	when	conducting	a	content	analysis	of	the	primary	documents	produced	for	the	event	it	is	the	most	prolific	entry	with	188	references.	However,	it	is	also	immediately	clear	that	
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there	are	few	common	uses	of	the	term.	The	‘Euro-Mediterranean’	comes	in	as	the	single	largest	reference	with	33	followed	closely	by	‘Mediterranean	region’	and	‘Southern	Mediterranean’.	In	addition,	there	are	numerous	references	to	institutional	frameworks	(partnership,	UfM,	ALF,	Foundation,	Forum,	Integration,	Parliaments),	normative	principles	(cooperation,	cohesion,	dialogue),	political	descriptors	and	actors	(Women,	citizens,	citizenship,	Youth,	public,	population,	media)	and	geography	(area,	space,	region,	landscape).	This	is	just	to	mention	some	of	the	ways	in	which	the	term	is	employed.		Simply,	the	Mediterranean	is	a	heuristic	device	whose	meaning	depends	upon	the	context	of	the	application.	The	Mediterranean	was	raised	at	crucial	points	over	the	course	of	the	four	days	as	a	cohesive	referent	be	that	historically	speaking	or	in	the	effort	of	developing	a	common	future.	On	the	first	day	during	a	discussion	of	the	possibility	for	co-existence	the	general	idea	was	put	forth.	The	debate	suggested	that	in	order	to	achieve	co-existence	we	need	shared	successes	and	experiences	and	the	first	one	of	these	is	the	idea	of	a	common	Mediterranean.	A	panel	member,	who	agreed,	went	on	to	add	that	the	Mediterranean	may	also	be:	“a	graveyard	for	some,	and	a	possibility	of	co-existence	for	others”.	Our	image	of	the	Mediterranean	must	consist	of	all	these	possibilities	–	that	of	the	migrant	as	well	as	the	cultural	entrepreneur	and	in	order	to	embrace	these	different	images	there	must	be	a	cohesive	system	of	mobility.	It	was	concluded	that	only	exposure	can	transform	mental	frames	and	lead	to	coexistence.	The	Mediterranean	is	not	constructed	according	to	national	cultures	and	boundaries	but	through	experience	and	practice.			
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Civil	Society	and	Citizenship	This	theme	was	especially	interesting	as	it	coalesced	with	a	number	of	other	significant	narratives	pertaining	to	diversity,	democracy,	development,	representation,	and	innovation.	Discussions	of	civil	society	especially	introduced	a	desire	for	innovative	approaches	to	participation	and	representation.	A	critical	attitude	towards	the	category	of	civil	society	was	established	early	on	the	first	day	of	sessions	when	a	panel	member	declared:	‘We	may	be	representative	of	
civil	society	but	we	do	not	represent	all	of	society’.	This	statement	was	prophetic	especially	in	the	case	of	religious	communities	who	were	poorly	represented	during	the	Forum.	But	that	is	not	to	suggest	that	there	was	not	an	attempt	at	inclusion.	Mohamed	Tolba	from	Salafyo	Costa	-	a	network	for	young	Salafi	men	and	women	to	communicate	and	discuss	the	experience	of	being	Salafi	in	modern	Egypt	-	was	scheduled	to	participate	on	a	panel	discussing	religious	dialogue.	Unfortunately,	he	was	not	in	attendance	at	the	event	(and	I	was	unable	to	make	contact	to	clarify	whether	this	was	a	decision	not	to	attend	or	a	result	of	other	factors).	In	any	case,	the	result	was	that	the	religious	community	was	not	included	to	the	extent	that	an	event	proposing	dialogue	across	Mediterranean	communities	would	require	to	be	in	some	way	representative.	While	it	is	tricky	to	draw	conclusions	from	this,	it	is	relevant	to	observe	along	with	Sara	Ahmed	
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that:	“the	very	desire	for	a	shared	social	space	can	be	a	desire	that	restricts	to	
whom	an	institutional	space	is	open	by	imagining	a	social	space	that	is	not	open	to	everyone”	(Ahmed	2012,	39).		 The	topic	of	civil	society	was	a	major	theme	demonstrated	by	larger	number	of	panels	devoted	to	the	theme	and	the	use	of	the	auditorium	instead	of	smaller	break	out	rooms.	It	was	also	an	important	theme	because	these	panels	were	among	the	few	events	during	the	Forum	brought	participants	into	direct	dialogue	with	EU	officials.	As	a	result,	there	was	a	high-level	of	discussion	that	took	place	on	how	to	develop	more	effective	partnerships	between	civil	society	and	regional	bodies.	Given	that	the	European	institutions	promoted	the	civil	society	theme	an	organizational	discourse	was	prevalent	during	panels	including	EU	officials.	However,	there	was	also	a	more	fluid	perspective	arising	from	the	discussion.	The	organizational	discourse	consisted	of	establishing	civil	society	as	the	foundation	of	democracy	and	development.	As	stated	by	Stavros	Lambrindis,	EU	Special	Representative	for	Human	Rights:	“civil	society	is	the	sine	qua	non	of	human	rights”.	This	discourse	assumes	a	particular	stage	of	development	and	its	necessary	progression.	The	same	approach	was	evident	during	Stefan	Füle’s,	Commissioner	DG	RELEX,	address	which	stressed	three	conditions	for	civil	society	to	take	hold:	conditions,	capacity,	and	ability	to	hold	authorities	to	account.	This	approach	urged	civil	society	into	a	more	organized	role	(à	propos	of	EU	policy	established	in	Chapter	3)	and	the	need	for	external	donors	to	take	stage-based	actions	based	on	the	three	conditions.	The	discourse	on	civil	society	stemming	from	the	EU’s	participation	at	the	event	diverged	quite	clearly	from	the	ways	in	which	other	participants	were	interpreting	the	role	of	civil	society.			 Two	elements	distinguished	participants	from	EU	representatives:	the	existence	of	civil	society	was	presumed	rather	than	being	a	first	stage	in	a	process	of	development	and	the	identity	of	civil	society	itself	was	put	to	the	test.	These	turned	to	various	issues	of	representation,	voice,	difference,	encounter,	and	innovation	-	to	name	a	few.	It	was	a	curious	but	repeated	jab	that	civil	society	is	going	off	course	trying	to	attend	events	and	secure	funding	instead	of	organizing	and	networking	autonomously.	One	panelist	initiated	a	long	discussion	by	declaring	that	there	is	more	than	enough	civil	society,	pointing	towards	the	hundreds	of	legally	existing	but	barely	active	NGOs	in	Morocco	
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alone.	This	approach	is	evidently	skeptical	of	the	position	that	seeks	to	build	civil	society	put	forth	by	EU	representatives.	A	common	refrain	marked	this	perspective:	“we	don’t	need	to	reinvent	the	wheel”.	Civil	society	should	be	united	and	diverse	and	seek	to	leverage	as	many	avenues	as	possible.	Rather	than	modeling	new	organizations	on	an	institutionally	oriented	civil	society,	do	whatever	works	and	achieves	the	objectives	set	out.	Despite	the	effortless	attitude	that	could	be	associated	with	such	an	approach	panelists	were	not	short	on	ideas	most	of	which	focused	on	forms	of	social	entrepreneurship	–	projects	that	attract	funding	from	a	much	wider	range	of	donors	including	banks,	corporations,	media,	selling	tickets	etc.	–	such	as	non-profit	schools.	What	was	clear	across	the	contributions	was	that	‘civil	society’	is	not	in	development,	just	in	need	of	partners.	Furthermore,	given	a	general	problem	of	a	disconnection	and	lack	of	effective	mechanisms	by	which	civil	society	actors	can	influence	politics	at	either	national	or	supranational	levels,	social	actors	need	to	be	more	flexible	and	multifaceted.	There	is	a	fundamental	difference	underlying	the	contributions	from	the	EU	versus	those	of	participants.	The	EU	discourse	rests	upon	an	assumption	of	universalism,	stated	as	much	by	Stavros	Lambrindis	who	argued	that	the	conflict	“is	not	between	universalism	and	tradition	but	between	the	powerful	and	the	weak”.		This	is	true,	however	it	also	needs	to	be	acknowledged	that	the	content	of	universal	values	are	impregnated	with	those	power	relations.	While	the	EU’s	contribution	continued	to	reflect	a	hierarchical	set	of	relations	implicit	in	a	Eurocentric	universalism,	participants	rejected	both	the	suggestion	of	relativism	and	the	stage-based	understanding	of	development.	Their	contributions	transgressed	those	boundaries	speaking	instead	to	their	multiple	influences	and	transnational	opportunities.		
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Cosmopolitanism,	regional	identity	and	the	nation-state		“We	have	many	similarities.	Nationalism	will	lead	us	nowhere.	Every	local	community	can	keep	its	national	identity,	but	it	will	not	hold	us	together”	(Day	2	Highlights).		Regional	identity	is	aspirational.	As	we	have	seen	with	the	complex	narratives	of	the	Mediterranean	it	is	not	necessarily	which	imagery	is	chosen	but	the	specific	practices	and	experiences	that	it	entails	that	has	the	potential	to	give	it	meaning.	So,	a	remaining	question	is	whether	the	ALF	Forum	facilitates	contact	with	cultural	difference	and	encourages	interaction	across	realms	of	social	and	national	standing.	Despite	the	institutional	baggage	faced	by	participants,	does	the	Forum	provide	a	space	in	which	to	nurture	the	networks	and	practices	conducive	to	cosmopolitan	identity	(Kendal	et	al	2009,	154)?	Without	more	in	depth	interviews	with	Forum	participants	an	adequate	response	is	unlikely.	However	asking	the	question	is	relevant	given	the	dichotomy	between	the	experiences	and	contributions	of	participants	and	the	overlaying	institutional	environment.	At	the	very	least,	if	offers	a	way	to	catalogue	that	experience.			 Viewed	as	an	organized	cultural	encounter,	Forums	such	as	this	can	be	conceived	as	an	outlet	for	cosmopolitan	performances.	Consisting	of	an	arena	dedicated	to	universalism	and	common	values,	the	Forum	provides	a	context	enabling	actors	to	present	themselves	as	open	and	flexible	and	to	mobilize	their	own	ways	of	being	cosmopolitan	(Skrbis	and	Woodward	2013,	26-7).	This	is	
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essential.	The	agonistic	relationship	displayed	between	official	narratives	and	that	of	participants	may	not	have	been	a	productive	debate	in	terms	of	influence	but	those	contributions	are	significant	in	their	expression	and	in	the	relationships	that	are	developed	in	their	wake.	Underlying	much	of	the	debate	during	the	Forum	proceedings	was	a	debate	about	universal	values	and	understandings.	The	top-down	Eurocentric	approach	was	evident	in	official	discourse,	however	the	contributions	of	participants	pointed	towards	an	interpretation	of	universalism	based	upon	transgression	and	reflexivity	(Said	1993).	It	is	in	this	critical	openness	that	cosmopolitan	sentiment	surfaces	and	which	argues	for	a	basis	in	practice	and	experience	rather	than	values.			
Conclusions:		
New	subjectivities	on	display	“It	is	thus	right	to	emphasize	that	the	new	leaderships	and	people	in	the	region	are	masters	of	their	own	destiny”	(Ashton	2011).			This	analysis	of	the	ALF	Civil	Forum	has	highlighted	the	influence	of	the	institutional	environment	and	the	legacy	of	regional	frames	on	ALF	programming.	The	relative	equality	of	participants	across	networks	and	regions	reveals	a	conscious	effort	for	the	event	to	be	viewed	as	an	open	and	representative	space.	And	in	many	ways,	the	Forum	consisted	of	profound	dialogue	between	participants	from	various	parts	of	the	Euro-Mediterranean.	At	the	same	time,	the	agenda	and	structure	of	the	event	privileges	an	institutional	narrative.	This	narrative	is	embedded	in	the	organized	encounter	and	participants	are	constrained	in	their	approach	to	dialogue.	At	times	this	resulted	in	frustration	–	such	as	when	discussing	Arab	identities	-	or	misperception	–	as	a	result	of	differing	perspectives.	This	latter	problem	was	most	clear	in	the	contrast	between	the	institutional	(EU,	ALF)	narrative	of	civil	society	and	that	of	the	participants.		Each	of	the	themes	mentioned	above	provoked	the	overturning	of	dominant	frameworks.	For	example,	flipping	the	relationship	between	Europe	and	its	Southern	Mediterranean	neighbors	served	to	empower	these	cultures	as	a	source	of	positive	development.	Likewise,	the	Mediterranean	is	not	instilled	with	intrinsic	optimism	nor	is	it	a	bulwark	against	threat	and	instability.	The	
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view	from	the	South	recognizes	the	multifarious	reality	of	the	concept	that	is	inherently	impregnated	with	exclusivist	meanings.	The	heuristic	value	of	the	Mediterranean	emerges	from	subjective	experiences.	The	third	category	was	most	obvious	in	its	rejection	of	ideological	molds	(Bayat	2013)	by	foregoing	the	usual	debates	around	different	types	or	impacts	of	civil	society	and	instead	focusing	on	brainstorming	solutions	regardless	of	the	normative	value	or	means.	If	this	meant	involving	private	actors	such	as	businesses,	banks	then	so	be	it.	In	fact,	some	of	the	most	critical	comments	were	reserved	for	external	donors	who	implicitly	encouraged	particular	issues	or	types	of	behavior	within	funding	conditions.17	Instead,	the	need	for	innovation	and	creative	answers	to	solve	everyday	problems	of	education,	employment,	representation	were	at	the	forefront	rather	than	the	need	for	more	civil	society.		
The	OCE	in	institutional	context	Annette	Jünemann’s	(2003)	analysis	of	the	early	civil	forums	prior	to	the	establishment	and	subsequent	development	of	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	provides	some	useful	parallels	on	which	to	conclude.	While	this	chapter	attempted	a	radically	different	approach	to	understanding	the	significance	of	the	Forum	through	its	influences	and	participant	performances,	it	shares	a	desire	to	understand	what	these	events	mean	for	political	practice.	Jünemann	highlighted	contradictions	found	within	the	organization	and/or	functioning	of	the	early	Forums.	Largely,	these	stemmed	from	the	relationship	to	governance	structures	hindering	their	critical	potential.	This	inheritance	–	if	it	makes	sense	to	call	it	that	–	is	relevant	when	considering	the	ALF	Forum	and	the	institutional	environment	in	which	it	has	been	organized.	Previous	Forums	attempted	to	balance	a	mediating	role	with	the	role	of	critical	observer	(Jünemann	2003,	7).	However,	the	ambition	to	build	a	strong	mechanism	for	civil	society	conflicted	with	the	desire	to	represent	the	heterogeneous	nature	of	civil	society	(Ibid,	26).	This	is	not	a	concern	with	regard	to	the	ALF	Civil	Forum.	The	watchdog	function	of	civil	society	is	all	but	nonexistent	leaving	the	role	firmly	as	heterogeneous																																																									17	The	influence	of	such	conditions	was	discussed	on	a	number	of	occasions.	Outside	the	forum	one	director	of	an	NGO	in	Tunisia	admitted	to	changing	the	name	and	objectives	of	his	organisation	in	order	to	obtain	necessary	funds	from	an	external	source.		
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mediator,	in	Jünemann’s	terms.	Rather	than	supplying	a	critical	observation	of	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean	(the	watchdog	function),	the	ALF	Civil	Forum	is	firmly	incorporated	into	the	framework	by	means	of	its	institutional	attachments.	What	the	Forum	provides	is	a	mechanism	of	outreach	for	governments	and	international	bodies	and	a	means	to	engage	in	informal	political	dialogue.	Participants,	on	the	other	hand,	are	provided	with	a	privileged	space	in	which	to	mobilize	their	own	identities	and	goals.	By	shunning	traditional	models	of	participation	and	influence	this	space	can	also	be	made	productive	through	reflexive	engagement.	So,	was	the	Forum	really	a	‘waste	of	time’?	It	depends	on	how	the	question	is	approached.	For	the	European	Commission,	it	initiated	a	period	of	consultation	with	civil	society	that	resulted,	a	year	later,	in	the	launch	of	a	separate	forum	for	social	dialogue	removed	from	the	multilateral	structure	of	the	Foundation.	For	participants,	it	likely	consisted	of	a	range	of	experiences	between	ephemeral	and	productive.	
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Chapter	8:	Conclusion	
	The	purpose	of	this	concluding	chapter	is	to	connect	the	strands	of	analysis	from	previous	chapters	and	to	present	a	conclusion	on	an	empirical	and	a	conceptual	level.	This	thesis	has	contended	that	the	state	of	cultural	relations	in	the	EuroMediterranean	reveals	a	tension	(both	creative	and	conflicted)	between	the	rejuvenation	of	Europe’s	cultural	identity	(and	competency	for	culture	at	the	supranational	level)	and	the	promise	of	transnational	networking.	It	presented	a	novel	understanding	of	cultural	relations	in	the	EuroMediterranean	as	products	of	the	global	reach	of	networks	and	in	direct	relation	their	influence	in	driving	the	evolution	of	cultural	narratives	at	the	EU	level.		Empirically,	I	will	assess	whether	cultural	relations,	and	the	EU	approach	towards	culture	in	the	EuroMediterranean,	have	evolved	in	part	due	to	the	increased	advocacy	of	networks	and	the	parallel	development	of	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation,	and	what	the	consequences	of	these	developments	have	been	for	the	inclusion	of	civil	society	in	regional	cooperation.	This	analysis	reveals	an	underlying	continuity	in	the	progression	of	relations	through	calls	for	a	new	approach	to	the	post-Arab	Spring	environment	but	it	also	speculates	on	the	evolving	global	actor	hood	of	the	EU	on	the	basis	of	an	ongoing	strategic	review	within	the	EU	on	the	nature	of	its	foreign	policy	and	on	the	role	of	culture	in	its	external	relations.	Unfortunately,	these	developments	are	too	fresh	to	be	included	in	a	more	substantial	manner	but	insights	into	this	process	have	been	related	to	the	evolving	institutional	and	geopolitical	environment.	Conceptually,	a	few	contributions	will	be	made.	First,	the	empirical	discussion	will	be	linked	to	the	evolution	of	political	practice	in	the	contentious	realms	of	democracy,	development	and	culture.	Second,	the	significant	role	played	by	networks	will	be	reiterated,	contributing	to	an	understanding	of	global	cultural	relations	and	novel	approaches	to	cultural	diplomacy.	Third,	observations	of	participation	in	regional	networks	will	be	reconsidered	as	a	contribution	to	understanding	the	experiential	value	of	networking	for	global	politics,	thus	moving	beyond	the	scope	of	the	politically	delimited	region.	Finally,	some	possible	avenues	for	further	research	will	be	discussed.		
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Advancing	regional	relations:	foundations,	networks	and	transnationalism	In	response	to	a	contentious	and	unfolding	set	of	mass	anti-government	uprisings	in	its	Southern	Neighbourhood	the	European	Union	publicly	turned	its	support	to	the	democratic	voices	of	civil	society.	The	first	joint	communication	issued	in	response	to	the	uprisings	“Partnership	for	Democracy	and	Shared	Prosperity	with	the	Southern	Mediterranean”	turned	its	institution-building	focus	to	the	issue	of	creating	a	facility	for	the	support	of	civil	society	and	promoting	a	forum	for	social	dialogue.	This	document	was	part	of	a	first	step	in	announcing	a	new	priority	to	focus	on	the	relationship	with	civil	society	in	addition	to	the	bilateral	relations	represented	by	a	revised	European	Neighborhood	Policy.	The	following	year	a	separate	communication,	“The	Roots	of	Democracy	and	Sustainable	Development”,	issued	another	small	step	in	setting	out	the	EU’s	approach	to	dealing	with	post-Arab	Spring	relations,	however	it	clarified	an	important	point	on	the	significance	of	civil	society	as	an	object	of	policy.	This	significance	is	not	solely	in	the	potential	effect	of	civil	society	organizations	on	decision-making.	Rather,	it	is	the	innate	democratic	character	of	civil	society	that	makes	it	“an	asset	in	itself”	(COM(2012)	492,	3).	This	societal	approach	to	democracy,	that	is	encouraging	the	development	of	a	democratic	culture,	is	only	a	portion	of	the	diverse	and	somewhat	ambiguous	position	established	in	these	communications.	But	part	of	this	asset	is	also	in	the	ability	to	pursue	(or	pressure)	political	dialogue	by	other	means.	Thus,	civil	society	is	not	only	the	‘sine	qua	non’	of	human	rights18	but	partner	in	an	effort	to	hone	perception	of	the	EU’s	external	capacities.		The	evocation	of	civil	society	–	the	norms,	discourses,	practices	and	organizational	models	contained	therein	–	by	political	actors	is	significant	because	it	undermines	the	bilateralism	of	traditional	foreign	policy.	This	is	evident	in	the	EU’s	external	relations.	Indeed,	in	one	of	the	first	practical	responses	to	the	events	taking	place,	Stefan	Füle,	in	September	2011,	expressed	a	public	commitment	to	establish	closer	relations	with	civil	societies	in	the	region	through	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	(ENPI	08/09/2011),	as	one	of	its																																																									18	As	declared	by	Stavros	Lambrindis	at	the	ALF	Forum,	April	5th	2013		
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representative	institutions.	Chapter	3	explored	the	significance	of	a	process	through	which	global	normative	culture	has	penetrated	into	political	strategy	and	altered	the	methods	through	which	official	actors	pursue	and	contest	political	objectives.	Driving	such	a	change	is	the	ability	to	pursue	political	objectives	through	informal	or	nonpolitical	means,	appealing	to	universal	narratives	in	the	global	public	sphere	to	mobilize	support.	It	is	significant	in	its	performativity,	for	which	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	is	a	suitable	partner.	As	such,	‘civil	society’	is	not	necessarily	intended	target.	This	is	corroborated	during	interviews	at	the	EU	Commission.	One	official	in	DG	RELEX	made	it	clear	that	the	Commission’s	positioning	following	the	uprisings	(including	the	release	of	the	previously	mentioned	communication	detailing	a	new	approach	to	civil	society)	reflected	a	desire	within	the	Commission	to	make	an	influential	public	statement	and	did	not	actually	represent	a	substantive	shift	in	policy	focus.	In	considering	the	empirical	basis	of	transnational	civil	society,	Sidney	Tarrow	raised	a	crucial	question:	Is	the	idea	of	transnational	civil	society	actually	just	a	moniker	for	the	web-like	relations	between	international	institutions,	norms,	social	movements	and	other	non-state	actors	(Tarrow	2002:	1)?	As	a	point	of	analytical	clarity	this	is	a	potentially	damning	observation,	which	points	to	a	rather	complicated	network	that	overlooks	the	existence	of	a	discrete	‘civil	society’	entity.	Though	Tarrow	remains	cautious	on	this	conclusion,	the	idea	of	civil	societalization	is	agnostic	about	the	actual	entity	of	civil	society.	The	relations	between	the	elements	pinpointed	by	Tarrow	are	as	important	as	the	object	itself.	They	reveal	a	process	that	has	impacted	upon	political	practice,	demonstrably	in	the	field	of	foreign	relations.	It	is	a	process	that	has	privileged	non-state	actors	–	like	Foundations	–	in	the	political	arena	and	integrates	political	and	cultural	objectives.		In	1999,	Gudrun	Pehn	laid	out	a	simple	depiction	of	the	steady	development	of	cultural	networks	within	European	space.	Since	publishing	
Networking	Culture:	The	Role	of	European	Cultural	Networks,	a	great	deal	of	advocacy	has	been	undertaken	by	cultural	networks	and	substantial	cooperation	has	been	established	across	European	and	national	cultural	foundations.	Foundations	have	played	a	prominent	role	in	diffusing	a	new	narrative	on	culture	and	development	within	Europe.	The	inclusion	of	culture	in	the	
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EuroMediterranean,	on	the	other	hand,	has	followed	on	the	back	of	the	limited	capacities	available	to	the	EU	to	maneuver	in	a	field	closely	guarded	by	nation-states.	The	1992	Treaty	of	Maastricht	raised	the	feature	of	cultural	diversity	as	integral	to	the	European	project	both	in	the	framework	of	promoting	national	cultures	within	the	European	Union	and	promoting	a	European	culture	outside	the	Union.	The	Treaty	allowed	for	the	development	of	financial	frameworks	to	support	specific	projects	including	the	audiovisual	industry	(MEDIA	I),	the	educational	sectors	(Socrates	I)	and	in	the	second	half	of	the	decade	cultural	heritage	(Raphael),	creativity	(Kaleidoscope),	and	translation	(Ariane)	all	in	parallel	to	the	development	of	the	cultural	basket	of	the	Barcelona	Process.	From	the	mid-90’s,	a	new	standard	for	the	development	of	cultural	relations	was	evolving	which	incorporated	lessons	from	the	transnational	experience	of	the	European	Cultural	Foundation,	new	European	competencies	in	culture	and	the	development	of	the	EU’s	external	relations.	The	migration	of	staple	policies,	such	as	the	Erasmus	exchange	program,	from	the	Foundation	to	EU	competency	exhibited	the	authority	and	experience	of	these	non-state	actors	in	an	emerging	matrix	of	cultural	actors.		The	Culture	2000	programme	altered	the	policy	landscape	towards	culture	and	opened	new	avenues	for	existing	cultural	actors	and	organizations	to	network	and	interact	with	European	institutions,	reinforcing	the	functional	role	of	foundations	in	the	development	of	cultural	policy.	This	initiated	a	period	of	boosted	advocacy	on	the	part	of	old	and	new	cultural	actors	including	national	institutes	of	culture	(and	the	umbrella	group	EUNIC)	and	the	ECF,	among	others.	The	development	of	a	strategic	role	for	culture	in	the	EU’s	external	affairs	emerged	as	a	vital	priority	during	this	period	in	order	to	avoid	the	image	of	Europe	as	a	‘gated	community’	and,	in	the	words	of	the	ECF’s	summary	report,	“deaf	to	the	experiences	and	knowledge	of	people	surrounding	it”.	This	process	culminated	in	the	recent	Preparatory	Action	for	Culture	in	EU	External	Relations	initiated	in	2011	by	the	European	Commission.		As	discussed	in	Chapter	4,	these	developments	illustrate	well	the	changing	landscape	in	cultural	relations	since	the	beginning	of	the	millennium.	Cultural	foundations	have	an	essential	role	in	promoting	the	cultural	landscape.	They	can	be	flexible	intermediaries	between	the	public	sector	and	small-scale	
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cultural	operators.	They	are	not	only	active	in	distributing	small	grants,	but	are	also	engaged	in	activities	closely	related	to	cultural	policy	reform.	One	of	the	objectives	of	an	EU	strategy	for	culture	is	to	ensure	that	the	cultural	sector	has	the	capacity	to	structure	itself	and	develop	a	continuous	dialogue	between	public	authorities	and	civil	society.	The	role	that	Foundations	play	in	fostering	this	relationship	is	crucial	to	this	approach.19	There	have	been	two	notable	effects	associated	with	this	process:	the	emergence	of	a	narrative	on	transnational	networking	and	attempts	to	establish	a	European	perspective	on	cultural	diplomacy.	Foundations	and	their	offshoot	networks	demonstrate	that	global	politics	is	increasingly	heterogeneous	(Scott	1999,	147).		The	proposal	to	create	a	EuroMediterranean	Foundation	for	intercultural	dialogue	was	a	precursor	to	the	official	recognition	of	this	narrative	in	EU	policy.	In	2003	the	Prodi	Commission	established	a	group	of	experts	to	offer	advice	on	improving	Mediterranean	relations	-	especially	with	regard	to	the	cultural	field	–	in	an	increasingly	stale	EuroMediterranean	Partnership.	The	‘Groupe	des	Sages’	report	helped	to	establish	a	set	of	objectives	responding	to	a	fear	of	conflict	and	fragmentation	and	it	is	clear	that	the	political	climate	had	some	influence	on	the	objectives	put	forth.	The	report	represented	a	consensus	among	different	intellectuals	and	academics,	and	inevitably	resulting	in	the	downplaying	of	aspects	deemed	crucial	to	some	participants	but	not	others,	yet	it	reflects	the	narrative	of	culture	being	put	forth	at	the	time.	One	of	the	main	priorities	in	the	report	referred	to	the	establishment	of	“transnational	institutions	and	cooperation	flows”,	“new	relationships	between	cultural	identity	and	citizenship”,	and	the	“emergence	of	open	and	pluralistic	public	spaces	in	the	countries	on	the	south	side	of	the	Mediterranean”	(2003,	8).	This	need	was	directly	attributed	to	the	marginalization	of	Mediterranean	societies	deemed	to	be	uniquely	vulnerable	to	the	ill	effects	of	globalization	(Ibid,	14).	Transnational	cooperation	provides	a	potential	solution	by	increasing	the	experience	of	contact	and	providing	an	outlet.	The	inauguration	of	policies	on	cultural	diversity	and	intercultural	dialogue	changed	the	‘kind	of	labor’	(Ahmed	2012)	involved	in	doing	cultural	work.	Through	these	changes,	transnationalism	emerged	as	an	instrument	in	global	cultural	policy	for	pursuing	political	objectives	in	response																																																									19	Interview	with	representative	from	DG	EAC	27th	November	2013	
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to	the	negative	side	effects	of	globalization	such	as	economic	competition,	conflict	and	fragmentation	(Griffin	and	Devereaux	2013).	In	addition	to	this,	major	political	concerns	–	for	example	migration	–	have	increasingly	come	to	be	seen	in	this	context	necessitating	a	regional	approach	that	recognizes	the	transnational	basis	of	many	issues.	The	identity	building	function	of	cultural	policy	(Sassatelli	2009)	feeds	into	the	materialization	of	cultural	diplomacy.	But	whereas	cultural	diplomacy	is	essentially	interest-driven	and	unitary	in	its	promotion	of	culture,	there	is	a	fundamental	ambiguity	in	its	extension	to	the	EU-level	resulting	from	two	factors:	first,	institutional	competency	and	development	referring	both	to	the	division	of	labor	between	the	Council	and	other	European	institutions	and	the	ongoing	development	of	the	European	External	Action	Service,	and	second,	the	influence	of	foundations	and	their	networks	in	driving	policy	evolution	upwards	and	implementing	cooperation	on	the	ground.	These	factors	complicate	the	argument	that	an	EU	level	approach	to	cultural	diplomacy	is	inherently	less	interest-driven	(Isar	2015).	Rather,	the	interests	are	conveyed	through	different	actors	and	the	role	of	culture	at	the	EU	level	is	Janus-faced	in	that	it	must	also	justify	its	existence.	As	expressed	by	Pierre	Vimont,	then	executive	secretary-general	of	the	EEAS,	during	a	conference	at	the	European	Policy	Centre	to	have	a	cultural	diplomacy	at	the	EU	level	means	that	the	‘EU	culture	part’	must	be	created.		One	of	the	findings	of	the	report	derived	from	the	period	of	consultation	beginning	in	2011	as	the	Preparatory	Action	for	Culture	in	EU	External	Relations	clarifies	this	situation.	The	remit	of	culture	in	the	external	functions	of	the	Commission	and	EEAS	should	act	“in	ways	that	generate	trans-national	added	value	and	transmit	the	overarching	European	message…”	(2014,	5).	This	added	value	approach	constructs	European	cultural	diplomacy	on	the	back	of	a	multilateral	approach	to	culture.20	However,	it	also	creates	space	for	a	wide	range	of	cultural	actors	–	what	Sassatelli	(2009,	195)	labels	a	polyvocal	process	–	to	participate	and	contribute,	potentially	opening	the	door	to	the	representation	of																																																									20	This	multilateral	approach	was	one	of	the	crucial	points	endorsed	by	Ana	Paula	Laborinho,	former	president	of	EUNIC	global,	during	a	conference	at	the	European	Policy	Centre,	December	2011.	
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alternative	European	formations	(Axford	and	Huggins	1999,	186).	Though	it	is	too	early	to	draw	a	conclusion	on	the	direction	these	developments	will	take	there	is,	as	pointed	out	by	Isar	(2015),	a	blurring	of	the	lines	between	diplomacy	–	fundamentally	interest-driven	and	unitary	-	and	intercultural	dialogue	–	bottom-up	and	heterogeneous.		Following	the	EU’s	varied	response	to	the	Arab	Spring	it	is	still	unclear	precisely	what	direction	policy	will	take.	However,	it	appears	that	the	EU	is	likely	to	continue	to	pursue	multiple	directions	at	once	–	promote,	or	strategically	direct,	the	development	of	regional	institutions,	increase	ties	to	regional	blocs,	and	commit	to	stronger	bilateral	ties	with	regional	governments.	That	being	said,	there	is	also	reason	to	believe	that	the	EU’s	new	competencies	and	ambitions	will	drive	a	future	European	cultural	diplomacy.	There	is	already	in	development	a	strategic	reconsideration	of	the	role	of	culture	in	the	EU’s	external	relations	but	whether	this	will	establish	a	profoundly	new	identity	and	structure,	or	in	practice	rely	on	the	skeletons	of	past	frameworks	is	still	to	be	determined.	Issues	such	as	migration,	economic	inequality,	and	disagreements	over	objectives	continue	to	confound	attempts	to	produce	a	cohesive	foreign	policy	at	the	EU	level	(Tömmel	2013).	But	the	EU	has	started	to	cultivate	relationships	with	its	near	abroad	based	on	a	more	effective	use	of	its	post-Lisbon	foreign	policy	capacities,	which	would	imply	more	centralization	and	potentially	allow	the	European	Commission	to	pursue	a	stronger	normative	agenda	(Johanssen-Nogues	2015).	If	it	is	able	to	overcome	the	current	fragmentation	among	member	states,	the	outcome	of	ongoing	policy	reviews	could	be	the	starting	point	for	a	more	activist	international	identity.	In	this	context,	it	is	clear	that	the	EU	already	considers	the	ALF	to	be	a	partner	in	its	cultural	relations	abroad	(JOIN(2016)	29).			
‘Stuck	in	the	middle’	or	Intercultural	Agent?:	The	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	For	its	part,	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation,	under	new	president	Elisabeth	Guigou	and	Executive	Director	Hatem	Atallah,	is	entering	a	period	of	great	activity.	But	it	is	also	shifting	in	conjunction	with	the	European	Commission’s	new	agenda	by	situating	itself	as	part	of	the	new	European	Neighborhood	Partnership.	This	may	be	a	privileged	space	for	the	ALF	as	it	becomes	the	champion	of	culture	for	
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related	countries	(Tanzarella	2012,	292).	However,	it	perpetuates	previous	limitations.	The	ALF	exhibits	the	tensions	within	these	developments	in	its	relationship	with	its	regional	institutional	context	of	which	the	European	Union	is	a	central	actor.	It	exhibits	the	political	value	of	a	regional	foundation	when	politics	is	increasingly	contested	beyond	the	nation-state	and	provides	a	key	partner	to	European	institutions	during	a	process	of	redefinition,	symbolizing	a	different	character	as	well	as	strategy	to	regional	relations.	As	Gillespie	noted	early	on	in	the	evolution	of	the	Foundation,	the	cultural	basket	during	this	time	was	being	geared	towards	a	broader	political	dialogue	undergirded	by	democracy	promotion	activities.	Thus,	one	hope	for	the	Foundation	was	that	it	could	aid	in	overcoming	resistance	among	authoritarian	regimes	to	the	normative	content	of	the	EMP	framework	and	drive	greater	inclusion	among	communities	excluded	from	or	skeptical	of	existing	programs	(Gillespie	2003).	The	reality	has	displayed	a	struggle	between	these	two	sides	but	it	has	also	been,	more	than	intended,	tied	to	the	changing	approach	towards	culture	within	the	EU.		 The	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	is	not	a	simple	representative	of	a	coherent	EU	cultural	diplomacy.	In	interviews	across	the	European	Commission,	it	was	a	common	refrain	that	the	Foundation’s	value	lays	first	and	foremost	in	its	existence	as	a	successful	multilateral,	and	(such	as	it	is)	independent,	regional	organization.	It	is	this	symbolic	value	that	made	it	an	immediate	target	for	cooperation	in	response	to	the	‘Arab	Spring’.	But	this	identity	also	betrays	an	institutional	anxiety	that	can	be	implied	from	its	balancing	of	different	agendas.	As	a	multilateral	institution	the	ALF	involves	actors	both	within	–	UfM	member	states	and	regional	organizations	such	as	the	Arab	League	-	and	beyond	the	region	–	UNESCO,	Council	of	Europe,	UN	Alliance	of	Civilizations	-	through	partnerships	and	engagement	in	projects.	The	significant	attendance	figures	for	ministry	personnel,	ambassadors,	EU	and	other	representatives	of	international	organizations	at	the	2013	ALF	Civil	Forum	are	a	clear	reminder	of	the	political	interest	in	the	work	of	the	Foundation.	While	there	has	been	some	relaxation	of	the	control	that	governments	exert	over	the	selection	of	network	heads,	states	continue	to	exercise	influence	both	through	the	Board	of	Governors	and	through	mobility	controls.	The	Egyptian	government’s	veto	of	the	initial	strategy	and	
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guidelines	over	its	normative	content	is	one	example,	though	it	could	be	suggested	that	this	act	was	as	symbolic	as	it	was	principled.	For	some	representatives	of	civil	society,	this	formal	relationship	is	enough	to	completely	reject	the	idea	of	membership	including	participation	at	the	Forum.21		On	the	other	hand,	there	have	also	been	firm	efforts	within	the	Commission	to	use	its	budgetary	influence	to	bring	the	ALF	in	line	with	the	EU’s	external	policies.	The	organization’s	intercultural	strategy	displays	this	influence.	Essential	to	this	strategy	is	a	fundamental	realignment	towards	a	more	crucial	role	for	the	ALF	within	the	UfM	and	–	taken	next	to	the	EU’s	Partnership	for	Democracy	and	Shared	Prosperity	–	the	developing	Euro-Mediterranean	region,	echoing	the	sentiment	of	Commissioner	Füle.	During	the	negotiation	phase	of	the	new	strategy	and	guidelines	regular	meetings	were	established	between	members	of	the	ALF	secretariat,	DG	external	relations	(RELEX),	DG	development	and	cooperation	(DEVCO),	European	external	action	service	(EEAS),	and	DG	education	and	culture	(EAC).	This	period	of	consultation	resulted	in	a	strategy	that	emphasized	the	ALF’s	function	in	relation	to	an	evolving	institutional	context	from	the	cooperative	EMP	to	multilateral	UfM	to	bilateral	ENPI.	 The	strategic	realignment	of	the	ALF	requires	a	reconsideration	of	the	autonomy	of	the	Foundation	in	relation	to	the	EU	commission	given	not	only	the	replication	of	policy	language	but	also	the	explicit	statement	of	intent	to	prioritize	the	interests	of	donors,	the	EU	commission	being	the	largest	thereof.	In	this	sense,	the	ALF	might	be	seen	within	an	extension	of	EU	patterns	of	governance	over	the	region.	This	situation	harkens	back	to	the	problems	facing	the	EMP	during	the	conception	of	the	Foundation.	For	one	member	of	the	EEAS22,	this	is	indeed	a	concern	as	much	for	its	impact	on	the	image	of	the	Foundation	among	societal	elements	as	the	potential	for	political	resistance	from	regional	governments.	The	institutionalization	of	the	relationship	between	the	ALF	and	the	EU	Commission	is	contradictory	for	this	reason.	There	is	great	concern	not	to	diminish	the	autonomy	of	the	Foundation	but	in	practice	this	conflicts	with	the																																																									21	This	view	was	expressed	on	multiple	occasions	in	conversation	with	civil	society	representatives	while	in	Tunisia	22	Interview	with	EEAS	2nd	October	2014	
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institutional	objective	of	incorporating	a	greater	role	for	culture	(and	civil	society)	in	the	EU’s	actions	abroad.	This	tension	is	significant	in	the	context	of	political	events.		Though	not	officially	confirmed23,	interviews	at	the	European	Commission	revealed	that	during	the	mass	protests	across	North	Africa	representatives	of	the	Commission	had	tried	to	put	some	pressure	on	the	ALF	secretariat	to	take	more	of	a	public	position	on	events.	This	is	surprising	for	two	reasons	–	first,	given	that	the	ALF’s	headquarters	in	based	in	Alexandria,	Egypt	it	would	have	placed	the	Foundation	in	a	potentially	precarious	relationship	with	the	ruling	regime	depending	upon	the	outcome	of	events.	Second,	the	relative	silence	of	the	EU	during	the	events	was	a	point	of	criticism	towards	a	perceived	lack	of	cohesion	and	capacity.	But	is	the	Foundation	merely	stuck	between	these	external	influences,	or	can	it	be	viewed	as	a	meaningful	agent	of	change?	To	paraphrase	Mohr,	the	Foundation	demonstrates	an	important	capacity	in	its	ability	to	establish	partnerships	with	smaller	organizations	based	upon	common	values	and	trust,	and	gain	access	to	‘functional	elites’	who	can	exert	influence	at	the	local	level	(2010,	111).	Reduced	controls	over	national	networks	in	most	cases	benefits	this	capacity.	Certainly,	the	2013	ALF	Civil	Forum	displayed	a	diversity	and	strong	interest	among	cultural	entrepreneurs	from	both	sides	of	the	Mediterranean.	But	it	also	rests	on	the	extent	to	which	the	ALF	creates	opportunities	for	networking	across	the	diverse	communities	of	European	and	Mediterranean	societies.	Chapter	6	explored	this	from	the	perspective	of	networks	and	partnerships.	In	this	analysis	it	was	clear	that	the	institutional	context,	discussed	prior	to	this,	presents	limitations	in	the	form	of	influence,	censorship	and	also	image	amongst	the	public.	However,	the	agency	of	the	Foundation	and	its	value	to	societal	actors	as	an	opportunity	structure	should	also	be	addressed.	There	is	no	doubt	that	the	type	of	transnational	networking	supported	by	the	Foundation	is	an	uneven	process.	It	exhibits	the	ability	of	states	and	supranational	institutions	to	“discriminate	quite	deliberately”	(Hurrelmann	and	DeBarbeleben	2011,	7).	The	Foundation,	to	some	extent,	provides	an	intermediary	function	through	which																																																									23	One	interviewee	made	this	point	clearly	declaring,	“you	will	not	find	this	published	in	the	official	journal”.	
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control	can	be	exerted	over	the	practice	of	transnational	networking.	At	the	same	time,	the	ALF	operates	within	a	space	determined	by	the	institutional	leverage	of	the	EU	and	the	ideational	contributions	of	both	institutional	and	societal	actors.	Chapter	7	addressed	some	of	the	ways	in	which	participants	approached	this	question	of	value	pointing	to	an	attitude	to	openness	and	creativity.	But	as	much	as	anything,	this	perspective	reflects	the	elite	demographic	of	the	Forum	for	whom	access	is	not	an	impediment.		Empirically,	this	analysis	cannot	completely	answer	the	aforementioned	question.	A	number	of	crucial	changes	to	the	ALF’s	approach	to	networking	are	still	relatively	recent	and	ongoing.	For	example,	the	shift	towards	promoting	the	development	of	networks	across	Southern	Mediterranean	societies	is	not	captured	in	the	network	data	presented	in	Chapter	6.	And	yet,	this	is	an	important	change	of	direction	for	reasons	that	are	demonstrated	in	the	evaluation,	namely	the	dominance	of	European	networks	represented	in	partnerships	and	the	relative	lack	of	networking	between	Southern	Mediterranean	networks.	In	all	cases,	southern	national	networks	have	more	partnerships	with	northern	countries	than	with	southern	countries.	On	the	other	hand,	14	northern	Mediterranean	networks	have	a	greater	number	of	partnerships	with	other	northern	networks.	The	predominance	of	networking	among	European-based	networks	and	the	relatively	smaller	number	of	partnerships	between	southern-based	networks	is	highly	significant.	Ultimately,	the	answer	to	this	question	lies	in	the	ability	of	the	Foundation	to	pursue	a	reorientation	to	building	Southern	Mediterranean	networks	and	expand	the	reach	of	networks	sub-nationally	as	well	as	transnationally.	The	effect	that	organizations	have	in	constructing	the	dimensions	of	transnational	activity	is	evident	in	this	instance.	Call	for	proposals	work	on	a	1+1	partnership	basis,	which	specifies	that	there	must	be	one	European	partner	and	one	Southern	Mediterranean	partner.	However,	regional	campaigns	are	not	bound	by	this	regulation	and	as	a	result	can	be	used	to	pursue	significant	organizational	objectives.	Subsequent	research	into	the	effects	of	the	Dawrak	–	Citizens	for	Dialogue	campaign,	which	ran	from	2012-2014	would	be	a	useful	next	step	in	understanding	as	this	campaign	is	at	the	center	of	the	Foundation’s	reorientation.	It	would	also	be	interesting	to	pursue	this	with	regard	one	of	the	
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Foundation’s	commonly	referenced	shortcomings,	namely,	the	ability	to	take	the	debate	to	the	public.24	This	could	be	a	side	benefit	of	placing	greater	focus	on	developing	sub-national	constituencies	by	generating	a	wider	network	of	dialogue.			
Encountering	the	EuroMediterranean:	the	promise	of	networks	As	of	yet	there	has	been	no	real	consideration	of	the	effects	of	the	Arab	Spring	on	regional	encounters	and	the	construction	of	shared	regional	meaning.	This	final	section	will	conclude	by	making	a	brief	connection	between	the	promise	and	experience	of	networks	represented	through	encounters	and	discussions	with	ALF	members	and	Forum	participants.	An	important	feature	of	participating	in	transnational	networks	is	the	value	of	the	encounter	and	the	possibility	of	engagement.	As	a	‘network	of	networks’	the	ALF	hints	at	the	emergence	of	a	social	space	based	on	the	image	of	a	common	Mediterranean.	This	constructed	space	remains	subject	to	the	interplay	of	particular	power	dynamics	and	the	intervention	and	influence	of	institutions	on	transnational	actors.	It	is	generally	accepted	that	involvement	in	transnational	networks	can	have	an	impact	on	the	character	and	identity	of	participants.	Thus,	identity	fluctuates	as	participants	move	through	space	(Guarnizo	and	Smith	2009,	21).	This	conception	rests	upon	the	underlying	assumption	of	corporeal	mobility.	But	many	of	the	interviews	conducted	with	ALF	members	suggest	that	a	similar	fluctuation	can	appear	in	acts	of	relative	dislocation	where	a	given	participant	alters	his/her	frame	of	reference	in	response	to	an	encounter	with	transnational	phenomena.	In	other	words,	mobility	is	shifted	from	physical	act	to	psychological	act.	The	discussion	of	narrative	encounters	in	Chapter	7	as	well	as	the	discussion	of	membership	and	belonging	at	the	end	of	Chapter	6	illustrates	this	process	well.	The	regional	heuristic	exhibits	various	ways	in	which	participants	mold	the	image	of	the	region	to	their	political	identity.	These	expressions	only	begin	to	exemplify	the	ways	in	which	regional	participants	employ	the	imagery	supplied	to	negotiate	their	own	transnational	practices	and	orientations	signifying	the	heterogeneity	of	the	encounter	(Rovisco	2013).	Similarly,	the	contributions	on	civil	society	and																																																									24	Interview	at	ALF	Civil	Forum	6th	April	2013	
	 212	
citizenship	rested	upon	a	transnational	knowledge	underlining	the	problem	of	categorizing	participants	of	dialogue	according	to	their	cultural	or	national	identity.			 Both	the	experience	of	crisis	and	the	ability	to	express	an	active	role	in	society	laid	the	seeds	of	commonality	amongst	populations	on	either	side	of	the	Mediterranean	Sea.	As	Glasius	and	Pleyers	(2013,	552)	have	pointed	out,	the	general	sense	of	insecurity	(especially	economic)	and	persisting	inequality	contributed	to	a	“global	and	precarious	generation”.	Protestors	explicitly	sought	to	unify	their	local	struggles	with	those	more	distant	generating	a	transitory	solidarity	witnessed	in	Tahrir	Square,	Barcelona	and	New	York,	amongst	others	(Allende	and	Hattinger	2014,	594).	But	perhaps	the	most	unifying	characteristic	was	reflected	in	the	creative	expression	of	non-ideological	viewpoints	(Makar	2011;	Bayat	2013).	This	also	manifested	a	general	skepticism	towards	rigid	categories	including	those	of	democracy,	culture,	civil	society.	It	is	no	surprise	that	in	the	experience	of	conducting	this	research,	on	the	whole,	the	presumption	of	a	shared	Mediterranean	identity	was	met	with	equal	caution	as	it	was	associated	with	past	regional	frameworks	that	were	typically	too	Euro-centric	and	too	friendly	with	authoritarian	governments	(Solera	2015).	What	was	significant	was	that	discussions	of	the	Mediterranean	tended	to	look	beyond	the	region	rather	than	to	the	region.			 These	contributions	reveal	an	important	quality	of	the	encounter	afforded	by	transnational	networks.	That	quality	is	the	essential	globality	defined	simply	as	a	potential	consequence	of	the	experience	of	interaction	(Axford	1995,	86-93).	Participants	largely	glossed	over	the	idealized	image	of	a	Mediterranean	space	as	an	end	in	itself	with	some	participants	identifying	with	a	desire	for	empowerment.	So	the	regional	becomes	grounds	for	pursuing	political	engagement	beyond	the	national	context	but	also	for	pursuing	a	global	identity	by	grasping	the	symbolism	of	a	collective	memory	and	using	it	to	establish	a	voice	beyond	their	particular	circumstances.⁠25	To	paraphrase	Axford	(2013,	33-34),	it	reflects	the	recognition	of	a	wider	context	of	constraints	and	opportunities,	which	may	variously	lead	to	a	rejection	of	developments	or	a	
																																																								25	Interview	with	Tunisian	ALF	member	3rd	July	2013	
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creative	engagement	with	them.	The	regional	construct	becomes	a	convenient	way	to	link	the	local	to	the	global	without	succumbing	to	a	specific	ethics	or	dropping	the	essentially	political	problem	of	existing	beyond	the	nation-state.			
Avenues	for	further	research	This	research	presents	a	novel	but	partial	approach	to	understanding	the	state	of	cultural	relations	across	the	EuroMediterranean	as	embodied	in	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation.	The	thesis	is	limited	in	its	approach	and	has	left	open	a	couple	of	intriguing	avenues	for	further	research.		
	 One	interesting,	and	immediate,	avenue	would	be	undertaking	a	comparative	analysis	of	the	ALF	and	the	Asia-Europe	Foundation.	This	comparison	is	apposite	given	the	similar	institutional	structures	and	objectives,	regional	context,	and	relationship	to	the	EU	and	other	regional	bodies	(ASEAN	and	the	UfM).	The	lack	of	existing	comparison	is	somewhat	surprising	given	these	similarities.	But	one	of	the	real	fruitful	aspects	of	this	comparison	would	concern	the	approach	taken	in	this	research,	especially	with	regard	to	the	influence	of	cultural	networks	and	new	cultural	narratives	at	the	European	level.	Empirically,	this	could	be	intriguing.	But	it	could	serve	to	validate	or	identify	shortcomings	in	the	contentions	made	in	this	thesis.	Certainly,	the	immediate	differences	and	similarities	indicate	that	a	more	in-depth	comparison	would	help	to	understand	the	significance	of	each.	As	indicated	earlier,	pursuing	a	lengthier	ethnographic	investigation	into	the	impact	of	regional	campaigns	would	help	to	understand	the	actual	value	of	the	Anna	Lindh	Foundation	for	regional	societies.	The	benefit	of	this	approach	is	that	it	would	offer	real	insight	into	the	constraints	experienced	by	participants	at	the	local	and	national	levels.	Also,	as	mentioned	previously,	it	would	also	help	to	understand	the	outreach	capacities	included	in	these	smaller	community-level	events	and	the	possibility	of	generating	a	more	public	debate	on	Mediterranean	relations.	One	of	the	limitations	of	the	research	presented	in	this	thesis	lies	in	the	relative	lack	of	access	to	the	internal	and	ground	level	functioning	of	the	Foundation.	As	a	result,	it	presents	a	privileged	outsider	perspective	(I	say	privileged	because	of	my	invitation	to	several	events	and	full	participation	during	the	Forum)	that	would	be	well	accompanied	by	a	more	complete	image.		
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APPENDIX	I	
List	of	interviews	(excluding	conversations	with	protestors	in	Tunisia	and	participants	at	ALF	
Civil	Forum	2013)	
	
No	 Name	 Organisation	and	Type	 Date	
1	 Richard	Shotton	 ion	Creative	&	ALF	HoN	UK,	Interview	at	Manchester	Metropolitan	 5th	July	2012	
2	 Daniel	Gorman	 Firefly	International,	Discussion	at	‘Sharing	Values	across	the	Euro-Mediterranean’	 12th	September	2012	
3	 Kareem	Khalil	Takween	 Integrated	Community	Development,	Email	correspondence	 4th	and	6th	June	2013	
4	 Ayman	Okeil	 Maat	Peace,	Email	correspondence	 4th	June	-	8th	September	2013	
5	 Katharina	Obenhuber	 Fomer	ALF	intern,	Email	correspondence	 9th	June	2013	
6	 Taha	Bouchaddakh,	 Djerba	Solidarity	and	Development,	Skype	interview	 17th	June	2013	
7	 Fadi	Hadad	 Mosaic,	Interview	in	London,	UK	 19th	June	2013	
8	 Sofiane	Ouissi	 L’Art	Rue,	Skype	interview	 3rd	July	2013	
9	 Dhouha	Bokri	 L’Art	Rue,	Skype	interview	 3rd	July	2013	
10	 Dalia	Khalil	 Egyptian	Association	for	Education	Resources,	Skype	interview	 9th	August	2013	
11	 Simone	Susskind	Weinberger	 Interview	at	ambassador’s	residence,	Tunis	 21st	August	2013	
12	 Bernard	Brunet	 Interview	at	DG	RELEX,	European	Commission,	Brussels	 15th	October	2013	
13	 Gyongi	Mikita	 DG	EAC,	Email	correspondence	&	telephone	interview	 20th	November	2013	and	27th	November	2013	
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14	 Alberto	Cortezon	 Interview	at	DG	DEVCO,	European	Commission,	Brussels	 25th	November	2013	
15	 Samar	Mezghanni	 Email	correspondence	 6th,	13th,	26th	February	2014	
16	 Thomas	McGrath	 EEAS,	Telephone	interview	 11th	February	2014		
